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                     Abstract  
Purpose: the aim of this study is to explore the extent of dynamic managerial capability 
(DMC) deployment and development by firms in the emerging economies. 
Design/Methodology/approach 
This study follows a critical realism philosophy, and qualitative research method involving 
semi-structured interviews with senior and middle-level managers in five banks within the 
Nigerian banking sector to generate data for the study. The interview data were triangulated 
with data from CEOs’ letters to shareholders over a three year period, press releases, and 
relevant media reports to assess the extent and how managers deployed and further developed 
DMC. Data was analysed following a qualitative content analysis technique. 
Findings 
This study in identifying how economic-downturn, regulation, and competition intensity 
triggered DMC deployment and development in Nigeria, observed that ineffective cognition 
of resources related to crude-oil income stream, and government financial deposits in Nigeria 
banks acted as constraints to the extent of DMC deployment and further development. 
Attention diversity, after two critical events in the industry, enabled asset orchestration that 
led to firms’ level innovations and capacity building. This study also contributes to a more 
nuanced understanding of the communication practices enabling DMC by identifying two 
concepts including buying-in and collegiate systems as processes relevant to better decisions 
making by managers in the emerging economy. 
Originality/Value  
The study represents an empirical attempt to highlight the significance of resource cognition 
and to further make a case for attention diversity (AD) in the current discussion on DMC 
research from the emerging economies context. An integrative model is provided to show 
how attention diversity enables DMC in the Nigerian banking industry, and also show that 
collegiate systems and buying-in are communication practices enabling DMC in Nigeria.   
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                                                 Chapter One 
                                                 Introduction  
            “If developing countries focus on investment for technical efficiency without consideration of market 
needs and the building of dynamic managerial competences, the d-ineffectiveness of local firms will grow worse 
and national economic growth will be hamstrung” (Teece, 2017:716). 
1.1  Rationale for this Study 
The age-long question being dealt with in the strategic management field has been why/how 
some organisations survive and further achieve sustainable competitive advantage (SCA) 
when others do not (Helfat & Peteraf, 2009; Salvato & Vasollo, 2018; Teece, 2014). 
Nowadays, the relevance of this question seems amplified due to the increasing frequency of 
major environmental setbacks, changes, uncertainties, and complexities (Fainshmidt, Nair & 
Mallon, 2017). Although this trend can be observed globally, there is now increasing interest 
in firms in emerging economies. Business management by firms in emerging economies 
epitomise more complexities due to weaker institutions, inadequate infrastructure, and 
political instabilities compared to their developed counterparts (Makino, Isobe & Chan, 2004; 
Maitland & Sammartino, 2015). And indeed, these conditions place heavier demand on firms 
in emerging economies and their managers to go beyond investment for technical efficiency 
(Teece, 2017) to being more effective in decision making and strategic actions enabling 
successful outcomes (Maitland & Sammartino, 2015; Fainshmidt et al 2017). Yet, while 
desirable, ‘the road to this success is not easy’ (Pandit, Joshi, Sahay, & Gupta, 2018:328). 
The skills for effective decisions making and firms’ survival under such environments are far 
from common, and thus an essential mission in contemporary research (Fainshmidt et al 
2017; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015; Teece, 2017; Vergne, & Depeyre, 2016).   
In recent years, strategic management scholars have conceptualised that dynamic managerial 
capabilities (DMC) are crucial in explaining why/how firms not only survive but also 
maintain advantage over rivals under such complex business environment (Adner & Helfat, 
2003; Ambrosini & Altintas, 2019; Martin & Bachrach, 2018; Sirmon & Hitt, 2009; Teece, 
2017). DMC refers to “the managerial capacity to purposefully create, extend and modify the 
resource base of an organisation” (Helfat, Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf, Singh, Teece & 
Winter, 2007:24). The DMC idea is also expounded in terms of asset orchestration by 
suggesting that there is a relationship between decision making involving search/detection of 
opportunities and threats, resource base improvement, and firm performance under complex 
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and turbulent environmental conditions (Helfat & Martin, 2015; Helfat et al, 2007; Schriber 
& Lowstedt, 2018, Sirmon & Hitt, 2009). Scholars believe that not all managers have DMC 
(Helfat & Martin, 2015:1285) but firms whose managers have DMC are likely to influence 
managerially directed assets orchestration that may enable their firm to continuously survive 
and even prosper under turbulent environment and times (Sirmon et al, 2009; Teece, 2017). 
In other words, under the increasing frequency of major environmental setbacks, changes, 
uncertainties, and complexities nowadays, firms and their managers must deploy and further 
develop the DMC required to continuously facilitate resource base advantage in order to 
maintain competitive survival (Fainshmidt, Nair & Mallon, 2017; Martin & Bachrach, 2018; 
Sirmon & Hitt, 2009; Teece, 2017). However, despite the advances in research so far, 
knowledge about the DMC in practice, and the critical challenges that may affect managers’ 
DMC has not been fully explored, and its empirical validation remains limited (Ambrosini & 
Altintas, 2019; Beck & Wiersema, 2013; Correa, Bueno, Kato, & Silva, 2019; Helfat et al, 
2007; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Helfat & Martin, 2015; Huy & Zott, 2019).     
The DMC perspective builds on the broader concept of dynamic capabilities (DCs) defined as 
“the capacity of an organisation to purposefully create, extend or modify its resource base” 
(Helfat, et al, 2007:4). DCs in practice appears in form innovation by firms (Wang & Ahmed 
2007) and organisational routines by which firms achieve new resources configurations as 
markets emerge, collide, split, evolve and die (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). However, 
scholars have also stressed that the DCV in that sense is underdeveloped because it offers less 
clarity about the role of managers, and unclear about the micro-foundations of how they are 
deployed, or the sources of their dynamism (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Ambrosini, Bowman & 
Collier, 2009; Helfat et al, 2007; Salvato & Vasollo, 2018; Teece, 2007; 2012). Despite these 
shortcomings, or partly because of that, the DCV has continued to attract significant interests. 
Accordingly, scholars see the DCV as the new touchstone concept (Arend & Bromiley, 
2009); one of the most vibrant (Vogel & Güttel, 2013), influential, and promising strategy 
perspectives in contemporary management scholarship (MacLean, MacIntosh, & Seidl, 
2015), because they may offer a route to competitive advantage Schilke, Hu & Helfat, 2018). 
The DMC is considered as one example of DC (Ambrosini & Altintas, 2019), or a subfield in 
the DCV (Teece, 2018). Adner & Helfat (2003) introduced the concept of DMC to emphasise 
that the effective implementation of DCs depends on managers either individually, or as a 
team, especially those with the strategic decision-making responsibility, and even middle 
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managers too (Martin, 2011a). DMC influences both the internal attributes of their firm and 
their external environment (Harris & Helfat, 2013). Externally, managers can use their DMCs 
to search for, or sense opportunities/threats, and respond accordingly (Helfat et al, 2007; 
Teece, 2007; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). Internally, managers can use their individual 
capabilities for decision making to influence the development and deployment of their 
organisational-level DCs, or new resource base transformations that are needed for staying 
ahead (Harris & Helfat, 2013; Teece, 2018).  
In considering the pivotal role of managers in effectuating such needful asset orchestration 
(Teece, 2007; Helfat et al, 2007), the DMC theorists argument entails that DCs can best be 
analysed at managerial level because “an answer to the question of what makes a firm 
different requires an answer to the question of what makes managers different” (Adner & 
Helfat, 2003: 1012). The DMC is only distinct from the broader DCs by being concerned 
particularly about ‘managerial impact on strategic change’ (Martin & Bachrach, 2018: 28) on 
resource base, and managerial behaviours that are needed to consistently create and support 
resource-based advantage (Helfat & Martin, 2015; Badrinarayanan, Ramachandran & 
Madhavaram, 2019; Huy & Zott, 2019). Nonetheless, some scholars have also argued that 
what makes a firm different may not only depend on individual managers’ capabilities and 
behaviours but also on having the supportive organisational mechanisms and motivation to 
nurture such managerial behaviour and capabilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). Felin, Foss, 
Heimeriks & Madsen (2012:1357) describe this as “the role of interaction effects”. This 
means that more studies exploring both the DMC and how organisational context may affect 
DMC are needed (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015).   
In the literature, a further theorisation is that DMC rests on three key drivers including 
managerial human capital, social capital, and cognition (Adner & Helfat, 2003). It is believed 
that these three drivers together shape the dominant logic used by managers and their 
organisation in strategic decision-making (Kor & Mesko, 2013). In this regards, scholars  
have been focusing particularly on the managerial cognition aspect as perhaps the most 
important lens for understanding the key role of managers under conditions of environmental 
volatility requiring strategic intelligence, astute decision making and investments choices 
(Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Kunc & Morecroft, 2010; Levine, Bernard & Nagel, 2017; Martin 
& Bachrach, 2018). Yet, despite the contributions so far, scholars maintain that cognition is 
the least understood aspect of DMC (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Helfat & Martin, 2015). One 
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reason adduced is that cognition is often difficult to identify unless it is used (Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2015).  
In response to this lacuna, Helfat & Peteraf (2015) have more recently developed the concept 
of managerial cognitive capability, defined as the capacity of individual managers to perform 
one or more mental activities that comprise cognition. Cognition consists of mental models, 
belief systems (or knowledge structure) that managers use to make decisions (Adner & 
Helfat, 2003; Tai, Wang & Yeh, 2019). In their work, Helfat & Peteraf (2015) identified that 
specific types of cognitive capabilities including, perception, attention, and problem-solving 
underpins DMC for strategic changes that can be related to competitive advantage. They 
show that such cognitive capabilities can influence the way managers may anticipate, 
interpret and respond with relevant decisions to changes in the business environment. 
However, Helfat & Martin (2015: 1305) also laments that knowledge about the conditions 
under which managerial cognition may “have a positive, negative or no impact on strategic 
change” and holistic study of DMC that can enable firms to survive and succeed over time, in 
different contexts remains inadequate and largely theoretical (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Jung, 
Foege & Nuesch, 2018). 
This study considers that the above observations renew Ambrosini et al, (2009: S5) earlier 
suggestion that “to fully understand dynamic capabilities we need to consider what they (i.e. 
managers) perceive, act upon in terms of their environment and resources”. In their extensive 
review paper, Ambrosini & Bowman (2009) also suggests that by investigating “the details of 
how dynamic capabilities are deployed we should be able to understand better the dynamic 
capabilities in practice, whether and how they might differ across firms, which could form the 
basis for developing managerial prescriptions” (p.46). So, although scholars have examined 
organisational level DCs, more insights are needed about the managerial processes connected 
with such DCs, and challenges that may affect these processes in underexplored contexts 
(Bititci et al, 2011; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). These cues and other findings from literature led 
to the following consideration, question and objectives addressed by this research. 
1.2 Key consideration and gaps addressed by this research 
The interrelationships between managers, DCs and competitive advantage, and critical 
challenges that may affect managers’ efficacy in those roles has not been fully explored 
(Ambrosini & Altintas, 2019; Beck & Wiersema, 2013; Helfat et al, 2007; Helfat & Peteraf, 
2015; Helfat & Martin, 2015; Huy & Zott, 2019; Martin & Bachrach, 2018; Tripsas & 
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Gavetti, 2000). As earlier stated, the empirical evidence of DMC remains scant (Helfat & 
Martin, 2015; Correa et al, 2019). Besides, only “few studies have examined the relationship 
between DMC and firm performance under extremely unfavourable macro-environmental 
conditions” (Fainshmidt et al, 2017:1089), especially, the emerging economies (Maitland & 
Sammartino, 2015; Pandit et al, 2018; Teece, 2017). There remains a paucity of research 
about exactly how managers facilitate the asset orchestration enabling their organisation to 
navigate through such complex business environments to not only maintain competitive 
survival but also advantage over time (Beck & Wiersema, 2013; Day & Schoemaker, 2016; 
Helfat et al, 2007; Helfat & Martin, 2015; Jung et al, 2019; Schriber & Lowstedt, 2018).  
Taken separately, therefore, there is a need for more research about the different 
environmental factors that enable or inhibit DMC (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009). That is 
organisational contexts (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015) and external environmental factors that can 
affect the cognition and capabilities of managers (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). There remains a 
gap in research about “how an unexpected critical event or a series of events can cause shifts 
in belief and knowledge systems of executives” (Kor & Mesko, 2013:242). Under such 
conditions, little is known about how managers make better strategic decisions as opposed 
simply to, different decisions (Beck & Wiersema (2013: 417). “Whether and how executive 
act in ways that purposefully create, extend, and modify its resource base in a value-creating 
manner” in underexplored contexts remains an open question (Helfat et al, 2007:46). In the 
context of DMC too, there have been recent calls for more studies to investigate how 
capabilities and cognition can be further identified (Danneels, 2011; Eggers & Kaplan, 2013).  
In sum, the need to explore the above highlighted missing links in research formed the basis 
of this empirical study. This research aims to contribute to understanding the nature and 
processes of DMC deployment and development from an emerging economy context, 
particularly, Nigeria. The country represents an interesting context to explore DMC for many 
reasons. “Nigeria is the most populous black-country in the world and is influential both 
within sub-Sahara Africa and in the global economy – not least in the proven capability of her 
internal events to destabilize the global oil market” (Amaeshi, Adi, Ogbechie, & Amao 
2006:1). Nonetheless, environmental volatility, uncertainties and complexities (Shoemaker, 
Heaton & Teece, 2018) as typically exaggerated in Nigerian are not unconnected with 
concerns that lie at the heart of contemporary debate in dynamic capabilities research (e.g. 
Jonathan, Seun, & James, 2016; Teece, 2017). 
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1.3. Research Question  
The overarching question of the research is: to what extent are dynamic managerial 
capabilities deployed and developed in Nigeria?   
1.4. Research Objectives  
Consistent with the above stated question of the research, the objectives of the study are 
captured in table 1.1 below:  Table1.1Research objectives  
 
No 
 
Research Objectives 
 
Related literature  
1 To determine the key environmental challenges 
managers face that are relevant to the deployment 
of dynamic managerial capabilities in Nigeria 
 Ambrosini & Bowman (2009), 
Helfat & Peteraf (2015); Fainshmidt 
et al, 2017; Lee & Kelly (2008);  
Salvato (2003), Sharma (2000) 
Tripsas & Gavetti (2000)  
2 To examine how dynamic managerial capabilities 
influence competitive survival in Nigeria 
Adner & Helfat (2003), Helfat et al 
(2007),  Ambrosini & Bowman 
(2009), Ambrosini et al (2009), 
Salvato 2003; Sirmon & Hitt, 
(2009); Kor & Mesko, (2013) Helfat 
& Martin (2015) Teece (2017)  
3 To determine how managers find balance between 
organisational routine and better decision enabling 
competitiveness in Nigeria 
Koprax & Konlenchner (2014), 
Tippman et al (2014), Teece (2012), 
Beck & Wiersema (2013) 
 
1.5 Addressing the research gaps/objectives  
To address the above stated research gaps and objectives, this study builds on Helfat et al 
(2007) and Helfat & Peteraf (2015) understanding of DMC and cognitive capabilities to 
explore the extent in which managers deployed and further developed DMC in the Nigerian 
banking industry in navigating through a recent period of unprecedented critical events, and 
challenges for firms in Nigeria. Using a qualitative research method and a case study of five 
selected banks within the Nigerian banking industry, the study through semi-structured 
interviews explored perspectives from both senior and middle-level managers. Incorporating 
those two levels of management was necessary to mitigate the biases often related to relying 
on perspective from one management level alone (Martin, 2011; Taylor & Helfat, 2009). The 
study also triangulated the interview data with other important data sources including banks’ 
annual report and CEOs’ letters to shareholders therein, press release statements, and media 
interviews with corporate-level managers of the selected banks, and information from their 
websites. Triangulation of data as employed allowed the study to amass and draw from a 
vast, rich and contextual dataset to address the question and objectives of this research. 
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Relying on the dataset amassed by the study, analysis firstly explored managers’ perspectives 
about the major environmental challenges they have faced in the recent period, from 2014 
especially. Thereafter, it focused on whether and how managers influenced asset 
orchestration in response to the challenges and critical events they experienced in order to 
maintain competitive survival/advantage. Analysis also focused particularly on the decision-
making processes and weighing-up the cognitive frame related to the strategic responses 
highlighted. Findings show that managers in the Nigerian banking industry acted/responded 
to the environmental challenges and unprecedented events they experienced, with DMCs 
directed asset orchestration in ways most plausibly underpinned by attention diversity.  
1.6. Contribution  
This study offers many contributions. Firstly, the contribution of this study derives from the 
context explored. It contributes to the literature by extending the understanding of the DMC 
and DC perspectives through empirical evidence from the emerging economies, Nigeria in 
particular. Secondly, the study contributes to the knowledge of external and internal 
environmental factors with critical implications for DMC (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; 
Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) in Nigeria. In particular, the study show 
how unexpected economic downturn in Nigeria following falls in crude oil prices from 2014, 
the introduction of TSA policy in Nigeria in 2015, stiffened competition and their associated 
tensions constituted key environmental challenges faced by managers in ways that highlight 
critical implication for DMC. Until then, thirdly, this study uncovered that managers’ 
ineffective cognition of their resource base in relation to crude-oil revenue, and government 
deposits, which served as de facto financial resource base acted as constraints to DMCs 
deployment and development. This study thus responds to the calls for more research 
addressing the importance of resource cognition in the context omitted in prior theorisation 
e.g. Danneels (2011) and how context factors internal to an organisation may place limits on 
DMCs (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015).   
Fourthly, the study established that following those two critical events and the associated 
tension for firms in the industry, attention diversity plausibly enabled asset orchestration 
related to the competitive survival and performance differentials observed among Nigerian 
banks. This allows this study to identify that attention diversity as opposed to attention 
concentration as an important driver of DMC. Finally, the study also contributes to a more 
understanding of nuances of communication practices related to DMC and attention diversity 
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by explaining how managers used collegiate system and buying-in as vital processes to better 
decisions making and DMC development by managers in the Nigeria banking industry.  
A critical evaluation of the interrelationships represented in the above findings led to the 
development of an integrative framework (figure 11.2 in the concluding chapter of this 
thesis). The basic assumption of the framework is that ineffective cognition of resources base 
had a significant moderating effect on the extent of DMC implementation by managers in the 
Nigerian banking industry. Attention diversity, however, enabled managers to address the 
incorrect cognition of their resource base and to facilitate congruent strategic response after 
the recent critical events, and environmental challenges they experienced. The framework 
also incorporates evidence suggesting that collegiate systems and buying-in contributed to 
attention diversity and DMC. The thesis also discussed the practical implication of these 
findings for managers and possible areas for future development. It is believed that the 
findings by this study contributes new insights to the research aiming to understand the role 
of DMC deployment and development in underexplored contexts like Nigeria and factors that 
may impede their efficacy. The structure of this thesis is organised as follows:  
1.7. Summary and Structure of this thesis  
Table1. 2 Summary and Structure of the thesis 
 
S/NO 
 
Chapter 
 
Summary of Content 
1 Introduction  This chapter presents the introduction of the thesis  
2 Industry Organisation and 
The Resource-based View  
Review of literature on the Industrial Organisation (IO) 
and The Resources Based View (RBV)  
3 Dynamic Capabilities 
View (DCV) and DMC 
This chapter presents a literature review on Dynamic 
Capabilities View  and Dynamic Managerial Capability 
4 Research Methodology  This chapter provides a detailed explanation of choices 
and justification for the philosophical lens and research 
methodologies adopted for this research 
5 The Case of Abia This chapter presents empirical evidence from Abia case 
6 The Case of Bayelsa This chapter presents empirical evidence from Bayelsa 
7 The Case of Cross River This chapter presents empirical evidence from Cross 
River (CRB) case 
8 The Case of Delta This chapter presents empirical evidence from Delta 
9 The Case of Ebonyi This chapter presents empirical evidence from Ebonyi 
10 Cross-Case Analysis and 
Synthesis of findings 
This chapter documents cross-case evidence and analysis 
of the five cases explored by the study 
11 Discussion, Contributions, 
Limitations, Conclusion  
 
This  chapter draws this thesis together  
   
References  
 
List of references following APA 6th style  
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                                                 Chapter Two 
                   Industry Organisation and Resource Base View (RBV) 
“The pattern of the thing precedes the thing” (Vladimir Nabokov, cited in Dunleavy, 2003:43) 
2.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to develop the literature review of this study in a coherent and 
robust manner by discussing first, the concepts of Industrial Organisation economics (IO) and 
the Resource-Based View (RBV) – two of the key concepts built on by the dynamic 
capabilities and the dynamic managerial capabilities views. Good literature review often 
shows the evolution of the focal constructs, extant knowledge, work-in-progress in the field 
and contexts from which further investigations might proceed (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995; 
Trafford & Leshem, 2008). Dynamic capabilities perspective is still in its developing stage 
and one still in need of better theoretical precision and empirical validation (Helfat & Peteraf, 
2009; Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Barreto, 2010). By discussing first, the foundational 
thoughts and developments that led to the DCV and DMC, this study also aims to avoid ‘risk 
of obscuring the conceptual heritage and development of isolated research’ (Bowman & 
Collier, 2006:193). Figure 2.1 below illustrates the literature review processes and coverage 
incorporated by this study as necessary to ensure clarity and comprehensiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Literature Review Process 
The above figure shows the set-up boundaries of the review of relevant literature for the 
study involves three key antecedent concepts relevant to the DMC. It highlights that, first, the 
review includes the concept of SCA – the key question of strategic management and 
subsequently, a reflection on the IO and RBV, - two most influential constructs known to 
have attempted to address the question. It also shows that a departure from the IO and RBV 
led to the DCV and a shift from the baseline DCV to a managerial perspective of the 
construct in terms of DMC – the theoretical framework built on by this research.  
Sustainable Competitive 
Advantage (SCA) 
 Industrial 
Organisation  (IO) 
 Resource Based 
View  (RBV)                                                                      
  
The Dynamic Capabilities View 
 Origin  
 Definition and examples 
 Key  Contributions  
 Criticisms  
                                                                                                                        
Dynamic Managerial 
Capabilities View 
 Overview 
 Empirical 
studies 
 Research 
Framework  
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2.2 Strategy Research and Sustainable Competitive Advantage (SCA)   
As briefly mentioned in the introduction chapter, how to achieve and sustain competitive 
advantage (SCA) is the ‘holy grail’ of strategy research (Helfat & Peteraf, 2009) and in 
general, the central concern and conversations in the strategic management field (Schilke et 
al, 2018). According to Peteraf & Barney (2003), a firm has a competitive advantage when it 
enjoys better success than its competitors do. Firms can enjoy competitive advantage 
temporarily, and may further enjoy SCA (Huang, Dyerson, Wu & Harindranath, 2015). SCA 
is about having better success over time than other rivals in the industry (Peteraf & Barney, 
2003). D’Aveni, Dagnino & Smith, (2010) also consider SCA as involving having a series of 
temporary advantages over a prolonged period. In literature, several other terms including 
superior rents (Makadok, 2001), profits (Huang et al, 2015), growth (Penrose, 1959 in Kor & 
Mahoney, 2005) and survival (D’Aveni et al 2010) are also being used as proxies for 
competitive advantage as well. Despite these different terms, an understanding is that each 
could also serve as a measure of an advantage by firms, and importantly, the primary focus of 
different firms depending on their position in what often looks like a performance continuum. 
However, although scholars generally accept that why and how firms may maintain SCA 
have been the primary concerns or questions of the strategy research, there have been diverse 
explanations to this age-long question (Schilke et al, 2018).  
For example, Hoskisson et al (1999) used what they described as “swings of the pendulum” 
to chronicle an array of theoretical explanations of sources of SCA that have been offered in 
strategy literature. Not to ‘reinvent the wheel’ per se, by reviewing all the theoretical 
explanations in the literature thus far. However, discussion in this chapter reflects on two 
prominent concepts, in particular, the Industrial Organisation (IO) economics and the 
Resource-Based View (RBV), acknowledged by scholars as the key sustainable advantage 
models (D’Aveni et al, 2010; Levine et al, 2017).  Adner & Zemsky (2006) observed that IO 
and RBV offers two strongly contrasting views of SCA. And notably, insights from, and 
debate between those concepts was what dominated strategy research especially in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1991; D’Aveni et al, 2010) and until 1997 which 
heralded the introduction of DCV, and DMC perspectives investigated by this study.  
According to Foss (1997b: 5), strategy researchers particularly need to reflect on ideas from 
the IO and the RBV. D’Aveni et al (2010:1383) adds that “there is a lot to learn from 
breaking away from two of the most dominant paradigms in the field of strategy (RBV and 
the industrial organisation economics perspectives)”. Ambrosini & Bowman (2009) suggest 
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that this very important for DC research - the broader construct build on by this research 
because of their profound influence on the construct. The next section addresses the IO idea.   
2.3 The Industrial Organisation Economics (IO) School of Thought  
The Industrial Organisation (IO) economics school of thought is based on what is popularly 
referred in literature as the ‘structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P)’ paradigm, often traced 
back by many scholars to the ideas of Mason (1939) and Bain (1956) (Rumelt et al, 1991; 
Teece, 2007; Pisano, 2015). The SCP paradigm offers a causal link between a firm’s 
economic conduct (strategy) and the market environment. According to Farjoun (2002:564), 
in the SCP paradigm, “the main causality flows from industry structural variables to firm 
conduct and then to firm and industry performance”. Porter (1980) progressed the SCP 
thinking in the strategic management field by using the paradigm to advise about strategies 
with which firms can achieve a competitive advantage. As mentioned earlier, Porter’s 
concept went on to become one of the dominant strategy paradigms in the 1980s especially 
(Rumelt et al, 1991; Farjoun, 2002). 
Porter’s article in 1979 later published (1980) in his book titled “Competitive Strategy: 
techniques for analysing industries and competitors” argued that competitive advantage of an 
organisation is an industry-related phenomenon, first, because it is the arena in which 
competition happens. Secondly, to understand how to play and win in an industry, it is critical 
to see the industry beyond the firms’ direct competitors/rivals. Looking at an industry as 
constituents of immediate/direct rivals only is too narrow and self-defeating (Porter, 2008). 
Thirdly, he identified five forces that shapes/erode the industry and profitability which firms 
need to be aware of and to guide their conduct. The five competitive forces include: (1) threat 
of new entry (2) threat of substitute products/services (3) the bargaining power of buyers, (4) 
the bargaining power of suppliers, and (5) the extent of rivalry among incumbent competitors 
(Porter, 1980:4; 1991; 2008). These five competitive forces are what scholars widely consider 
as the central message of Porter’s thesis. 
Therefore, it means that “awareness of the five forces can help a company to understand the 
structure of its industry and stake out a position that is more profitable and less vulnerable to 
attack” (Porter 2008:25). In other words, if ‘holding the industry structure constant’, firms 
can achieve and sustain competitive advantage by taking a protective position against the 
industry competitive forces (Porter, 1991). In particular, Porter suggests that in applying the 
framework to diagnose the industry structure, a firm can aim to select and play in mainly in 
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an industry with high profits potentials due to high entry barrier, weak buyers and suppliers, 
few threats of alternative products/services and limited rivalry (D’Aveni et al, 2010). Also, if 
the awareness is holistic, a firm can select and enact strategies to outwit rivals and fully 
exploit the industry condition to its advantage. In sum, it means that the five forces 
framework is a framework for diagnosing industry structure (Porter, 1991). By understanding 
of the structure of an industry, a firm can manipulate the rule of competition through relevant 
strategic choices, and then hope to attain competitive advantage –the central interest of 
strategy (Porter, 2008; Teece, 2007). 
In what can be seen as an addendum, Porter (1985) through his work titled ‘Competitive 
Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance’ also elaborated on his 
competitive forces thesis by identifying three generic competitive strategies which a firm can 
use to manipulate the industry to its advantage. This addendum took into consideration that 
staking out an attractive position as argued in his five forces framework is often an outcome, 
not a cause (Porter, 1991).  The generic strategies include cost leadership, differentiation, or 
focus. Cost leadership strategy involves identifying and exploiting all relevant sources of 
low-cost advantage to a firm. Differentiation strategy involves trying to be unique in an 
industry by offering some form of unique and valued products/services. The focus strategy is 
about selecting a specific market segment and focus on (tailoring) either, cost leadership or 
differentiation strategies to serve that segment exclusively (Porter, 1985). In short, this 
concept suggests that SCA derives either from offering lower-cost products/services than 
rivals or by differentiation in the firm’s products/services and commanding premium price for 
them, or by implementing both (Porter, 1991). The ‘both’ idea is however not without a 
caveat of the tendency of being ‘stuck-in-the-middle’ (Porter, 1985). 
In this regard, the author also made the point that each of these generic strategies has the 
potentials to deliver competitive advantage through effective configuration and coordination 
of its value chain activities (Porter, 1985; Stonehouse & Snowdon, 2007). The term ‘value 
chain’ was used to refer to some primary and support activities through which a firm creates 
value for its customers and to enable managers to identify resource configurations, which are 
necessary (Porter, 1985). Some scholars see this later proposition as a useful internal 
environment focused construct and a review of his original ‘five forces model’ partly in 
acknowledgment of its limitations, as charged by the RBV, discussed later.   
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In sum, it is evident in literature that the ‘five competitive forces’ model and three ‘generic 
competitive strategies’ hitherto, were widely accepted as salient and logically coherent 
contributions (Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989:400). Pisano (2015) for instance considers that the 
five forces framework is consistent and useful to the extent that it helps to understand for 
instance why airlines or banking firms (on average) may be less successful than 
pharmaceutical companies. Less clear however is, to what extent this perspective may be 
relevant under different country-contexts, for instance in developed or less-developed country 
contexts, given that “country effects are as strong as industry effects” (Makino et al, 
2004:1028). Therefore, despite claims about its logical consistency and empirical utility 
(Pisano, 2015; Porter, 1991) so to speak, the ‘five competitive forces framework’ (Porter, 
1980) also faced criticisms that led to a pendulum swing (Hoskisson et al, 1999) away from 
to the idea. The following section looks at some key criticisms levelled against the IO/SCP 
approach and the rationale for subsequent developments that have since emerged in the field. 
2.3.1 Criticisms and limitations of the IO/SCP school of thought 
One of the most highlighted critical views against the five forces framework in scholarship 
was that the framework is limited because it focused on the industry as the main unit of 
analysis rather than the organizations (Wernerfelt, 1984; Rumelt et al, 1991; Stonehouse & 
Snowdon, 2007). According to Rumelt et al (1991), from the standpoint that an industry often 
constitutes a group of rival firms with distinct characteristics, alternate consideration entails 
that firm-specific factors are more relevant to the profitability of business than industry 
generic factors. Firms within the same industry often show different performance results, 
suggesting that the five competitive forces may not affect all firms in an industry in the same 
way (Pisano, 2015). In other words, in reality, the momentum of the industry forces is likely 
to be relative and can vary from business to business based on many other strategic factors 
which may include: firm size, resources like brand or goodwill (Barney, 1986a, 1991; 
Stonehouse & Snowdon, 2007).  
Scholars also argue that ‘five forces framework’ is static in nature and ignores that business 
environments are increasingly dynamic and competitive in many aspects e.g. “the role of 
complementarities, path dependencies, and supporting institutions” (Stonehouse & Snowdon, 
2007; Teece, 2007:1325) and collaborative relationships (Dyer & Singh, 1998). This means 
for example as Dyer & Singh (1998) averred that the framework failed to appreciate the fact 
that crucial resources for an organisation success can be created by partnerships in forms of 
strategic alliances or even merger with a supposed rival. In other words, an organisation can 
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achieve competitive advantage by being part of an important network of relationships that 
may involve the suppliers, buyers, potential entrant or the existing rivals emphasised by 
Porter in his competitive forces framework (Porter, 2008; Dyer & Singh, 1998).   
From the dynamic capabilities standpoint, Teece (2007:1325) summarises as follows: “the 
five forces framework is compromised because it has insufficient appreciation for the 
importance and nature of innovation and other factors that change the rules of the game. It is 
limited because it has less appreciation  “for factors inside the business enterprise that 
constrain choices” (c) for factors that impact imitation and appropriability issues, (d) for the 
role of supporting institutions, complementary assets, cospecialisation, and network 
externalities, or (e) the blurred nature of industry boundaries” Teece (2007:1325).  
In short, perhaps against the consideration of the framework as logically coherent and useful 
contribution (Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989:400) in some aspects, according to Teece 
(2007:1325) “if the network effects, path dependencies, and co-evolution of technologies and 
institutions are significant, the five forces framework is of limited utility”. In other words, the 
mere assessment of the industry structure does not ensure SCA (Teece, 2007). In Porter’s 
(1980) five forces framework, the treatment of the inner configuration of an organisation as 
passive is self-defeating. With the role of managers offered little consideration, it suggests 
that a more precise development that would facilitate a more holistic consideration of both 
inner and external environment is needed to guide this work. The RBV proponents in 
stressing the limitations of the competitive forces idea also attempted to address the concerns. 
2.4 The Resource-Based View (RBV) of Strategy and Competitive Advantage 
The resource-based view suggests that the basis of strategy for competitive advantage 
depends on the resource base an organisation controls and those they have access to. 
Wenerfelt (1995:172) in a reflective article titled “the resource-based view of the firm: ten 
years after” wrote, “the streams of research known under the label ‘resources-based view’ are 
the work of many people”. I put a stone on the ground and left it. When I looked back, others 
had put stones on top of it and next to it, building part of a wall”. This comment meant that 
his 1984 work was the article that conceived the resource-based view framework. Scholars 
appear to agree with Wenerfelt’s claim, as this review did not locate any counter-claims.  
In his original paper titled “A Resource-based View of the Firm” Wernerfelt (1984) argued 
that “For the firm, resources and products are two sides of the same coin.  …products require 
many resources, and most resources are both input and instrumental in the production of most 
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products” (p.171). From this perspective, one can observe that the author highlighted both the 
shortcoming of the industry-based thoughts of competitive advantage discussed earlier and 
then the key message of his own work. Wenerfelt thesis entails that firms’ long-run 
profitability is a function of their resources and capabilities profile rather than the one-sided 
IO perspective, which considers that as a set of established product or market/industry 
positions (Wernerfelt, 1984; Lawson & Samson, 2001). Wenerfelt in his reflective article also 
paid special tribute to Penrose (1959).  
Many other scholars, for example, Barney (1991), Kor & Mahoney, (2005) and Ambrosini & 
Bowman (2009) all suggest that historically Penrose (1959) was seminal and arguably the 
more ground-breaking work on the resources-based idea. Against the backdrop of the 
significance of the RBV on the dynamic capabilities view (the broad theoretical hub of this 
research), scholars have also argued, “any review of dynamic capabilities should address the 
contribution of Penrose’s ground-breaking ideas” (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009:31). 
However, from the assessment of literature by study, it was observed that discussions in 
many DCs research tend to refer to Penrose’s contributions in a cursory manner and does not 
deeply address her contributions in the light of her work’s in-road to the DCV. 
In line with Ambrosini & Bowman (2009), consideration in this research implies that 
addressing that seminal contribution of Penrose is necessary for at least three other reasons. 
Firstly, despite that the DCV was offered as an extension of RBV (Teece et al 1997), part of 
the charge against the concept as the next chapter will show, for example as Arend & 
Bromiley (2009) argued was that the DC view does not have a ‘theoretical root’. Secondly, 
the interpretation of Penrose’s propositions as related to the resources-based and capability 
views is also a subject of debate, at least between (Kor & Mahoney, 2004; Rugman & 
Verbeke, 2002; 2004). Thirdly, this study agrees with Lockett & Wild (2014) who reminds us 
of the need to bring history back into research. 
2.4.1 The Penrose (1959) Contributions  
The question can simply be, what actually are the contributions of Edith Penrose (1959) as 
often referred, and what are their relevance to the RBV and DCV. The researcher has not 
reviewed Penrose's (1959) textbook particularly but has drawn useful insights from her 
intellectual contributions to what is now the RBV through engagement with other literature 
accessed for this research. Scholars have described her contributions as ‘nontrivial and 
fundamentally insightful’ (Kor & Mahoney, 2004; Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009). Nair, 
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Trendowski, & Judge (2008) also described Penrose (1959) as ‘classic’ and a ‘seminal text 
for the resource-based view of the firm’. Hoskisson, Hitt, & Wan, (1999), Kor & Mahoney 
(2004; 2005), and Pitelis & Teece (2009) all agree that Penrose's contributions have been 
fruitful in on-going developments in and even beyond the strategic management field. The 
question is what exactly are those contributions that make Penrose (1959) always a key 
reference point?   
To begin to address the above question, this study considered the stated question of Penrose's 
(1959) research as a good starting point. Nair et al (2008) restates Penrose (1959) research 
question that “I am not asking what determines whether a particular firm can grow, but rather 
the very different question: assuming that some firms can grow, what principles will then 
govern their growth, and how fast and how long can they grow?”. Albeit differentials in 
terminology, it is understandable that the question is consistent with the fundamental question 
of strategic management as earlier mention in section 2.2. According to Nair et al (2008), this 
research question was in part the reason why Penrose’s ideas remain seminal in the strategy 
field.  
Penrose suggests that the firm is “more than an administrative unit; it is a collection of 
productive resources, the utilisation of which between uses and overtime is determined by 
administrative decision” (Penrose 1959 in Augier & Teece, 2007:176; Nair et al, 2008). 
Augier & Teece (2007) discussed that this is one of Penrose’s key legacies today. Therefore, 
in addition to the firm as identified, one can also acknowledge that in relation to the DMC 
perspective followed by research, Penrose earlier informed about the key role of resources 
decision making and managers for any firm. Another striking comment of Penrose notably 
seen to have influenced the RBV was that “demand is no more important, and is perhaps less 
important, than the existing resources of the firm” (Penrose, 1959:84 in Nair et al, 2008). 
This view is notably consistent with Wernerfelt (1984) position about “two sides of a coin” in 
pointing out that internal factors are more related to competitive advantage that external 
factors may be. An argument that is now undergoing refinements through the micro-level 
perspective of DC, and DMC as this review expounds further in the succeeding chapters.  
Penrose (1959) also believes that “it is never resources themselves that are the ‘inputs’ in the 
production process, but only the services that the resources can render. …exactly the same 
resources when used for different purposes or in a different way and in combination with 
different types or amounts of other resources provide different service or set of services” 
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(Nair et al, 2008:1026). In other words, heterogeneity among organisations in an industry can 
always occur because even when organisations possess a similar set of resources they are 
likely to configure them in distinct ways to deliver different services, which may lead to 
different performance outcomes (Hoskisson et al, 1999:438). This assertion continues to have 
greater relevance for the DMC perspective and asset orchestration (Helfat et al, 2007) as the 
succeeding chapters would show.  
In particular, the book insightfully highlights the role of resources and capabilities in a firm’s 
diversification into new products and/or markets. The author suggests that the growth of a 
firm is a dynamic process catalysed by the organisation’s management and their interaction 
with the resources under their control (Penrose, 1959 in Nair et al, 2008). There are two key 
facts linkable to the theoretical basis of this research derived from that assumption. One, it is 
the resources under a particular firm’s control that would determine any form diversification, 
and not necessarily about the demand in the market. This is reflective in what Teece et al 
(1997) later termed the asset position’ of a firm. Secondly, for any diversification that may 
lead to firm growth, managerial capacities are the key; a perspective intrinsically ingrained in 
Adner & Helfat's (2003) argument about the importance of a managerial analysis of DC.    
In light of the above viewpoints, as Pitelis (2002) observed, one central fact about Penrose's 
contribution has been the breakaway she made from the traditional economic schools of 
thought on growth/competitive advantage to redirecting focus on idiosyncrasies among firms. 
The intellectual link between Penrose ideas and the RBV (Mahoney, 1995; Hoskisson et al, 
1999) and dynamic capabilities view (Teece et al, 1997; Augier & Teece, 2009; Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2009; Pisano, 2015) resonates mainly in DMC (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). The 
centrality of the role of managers in terms firm’s both resource use or ‘fungibility’ (Danneels, 
2011:21) and related decisions making is particularly fruitful in the DMC.  However, there 
were also pockets of controversy about Penrose's (1959) contributions as related to the RBV 
and capabilities perspectives uncovered by this research. A discussion of the debates is next. 
2.4.2 Critical perspectives about Penrose (1959) Contributions  
Rugman & Verbeke (2002; 2004) for example questions the interpretation of Penrose's 
(1959) ideas as often linked to the RBV; arguing that hypothetically, her research focused 
only on explaining the processes which may help to achieve firms’ growth. In their view, 
Penrose did not intend to ‘provide any strategy prescriptions for managers on how to create 
sustainable streams of rents’ as most research always seems to imply (Rugman & Verbeke, 
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2004). In other words, building on Penrose ideas to make a direct link between resource base 
and competitive advantage as many scholars often do is misrepresentative, to say the least.  
However, not many authors appear to share this view. Kor & Mahoney (2004) provides a 
direct response to Rugman & Verbeke's (2002) opinion about Penrose’s contribution to RBV. 
The authors suggest that Rugman & Verbeke appears to underestimate the contribution of 
Penrose. And quite instructive too, it is noted that more recent contribution such as Pitelis 
(2007), Hodgkinson & Healy (2011) and Helfat & Peteraf (2015) all suggests that Penrose 
(1959) contributions to the RBV, DCV and DMC developments are non-trivial and thus 
merits acknowledgment. This research in line with the dominant views in research considers 
that it is hard to distance Penrose's (1959) ideas from the present day resources-capabilities 
perspective only because her views focused on ‘firm growth’ with no more than that intended 
as Rugman & Verbeke, (2004) argued. As earlier mentioned, if growth is analogous to 
competitive advantage, this study takes the view that “a mother can hardly be denied 
maternity even if the pregnancy was unintended” (Author). In other words, if ‘the sources of 
growth of firms’ was the focus but how organisations may achieve competitive advantage in 
relation to firms' resource-base was evidently addressed, it means it was addressed, important 
and should be acknowledged. 
However, a more widely suggested limitation of Penrose's contribution was that what she 
meant by resources remained vague (Augier & Teece, 2007) or unclearly specified. Asides 
that, many scholars e.g. Fahy (2000) also observed that the resources-based thinking 
remained fragmented; arguably, why the equilibrium framework of (IO) dominated business 
strategy thinking until a formal RBV was developed (Grant, 1991:114). Having addressed the 
theoretical connection between the Penrose, (1959) “theory of the growth of firms” and the 
RBV and DCV as previous studies have acknowledged, the next section focuses more deeply 
on the modern RBV development/arguments. Table 2.1 below provides useful definitions. 
2.5 Definitions and further RBV contributions 
The RBV is a concept explaining that competitive advantage depends on the resource base 
available to a firm. As Wenerfelt (1995) noted in his reflective statement, many scholars like 
Rumelt (1984), Barney (1986 a, & b), Dierickx & Cool (1989) and Barney (1991), Amit & 
Schoemaker (1993), Peteraf (1993), Grant (1991; 1996) have all contributed insightfully to 
the RBV in terms of what, why, how, when and the nature of firms’ resources can be related 
to long-run competitive advantage. Table 2.1 below provides definitions of key concepts in 
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order to aid further discussion on the RBV in this chapter and dynamic [managerial] 
capabilities view in the succeeding chapter. It also clarifies the meaning of resource base 
being the keywords emphasised by the construct and its integral concepts including resources 
and capabilities. 
Table 2.1 Definition of key terms 
Terms  Definition 
RBV  The RBV refers to “a model of firm performance that focuses on the exploitation of 
existing resources and capabilities controlled by a firm as sources of competitive 
advantage” (Barney & Hesterly, 2012:352).    
Resources Resource comprises “anything that can be thought of as the strength or weakness of a 
given firm” (Wernerfelt, 1984:172). They include the “stocks of available factors that 
are owned or controlled by the firm” (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993:35) and specifically, 
“the tangible and intangible assets that a firm controls which can be used to conceive 
and implement strategies” (Barney & Hesterly, 2012:352).   
Capabilities  This refers to a firm’s ‘capacity to deploy resources, usually in combination, using 
organisational processes, to effect a desired end’ (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993:35). They 
are the “subset of a firm’s resources which enable the firm to take full advantage of the 
other resources” (Barney & Hesterly, 2012:347). 
Resource base  “The resource base of an organisation includes tangible, intangible, and human assets 
(or resources) as well as capabilities which the organisation owns, control, or has access 
to on a preferential basis” (Helfat et al, 2007:4) 
 
Rumelt (1984) examined the role of stochastic factors in determining firm performance and 
identified three ‘isolating mechanism’ namely, learning and development costs, property-
rights to scarce resources, and casual ambiguity that enables heterogeneity and prevents the 
imitation of an organisation’s resources and capabilities (Hoopes, Madsen, & Walker, 2003). 
A perspective later shared by Barney’s (1991) by outlining more isolating mechanisms, why 
they can and under which conditions they might become sources of competitive advantage. 
Barney’s (1986a) made perhaps his initial contribution to the RBV by introducing what he 
termed ‘strategic factor market’ defined as “a market where resources necessary to implement 
a strategy are acquired” (p.1231). In the article, Barney focused his analyses on the cost of 
implementing product/market strategies, and the nature of the ‘market for resources’ 
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(Wernerfelt, 1995; Barney, 1986a). The article’s core message entails that “from the point of 
view of firms seeking greater than normal economic performance …strategic choices should 
flow mainly from the analysis of its unique skills and capabilities rather than the analysis of 
its competitive environment” (Barney, 1986a:1231). 
Notable in the review of Barney (1986a) was that wittingly or unwittingly did not make direct 
reference to Wenerfelt (1984) contribution.  However, despite that, it was clear that his 
analysis significantly bears semblance to earlier arguments by Penrose (1959), and Wenerfelt 
(1984). This review notes at least three aspects shared by Wenerfelt and Barney. Firstly, 
Barney's (1986a) paper as with Wernerfelt (1984) was critical of Porter’s (1980) argument 
that only firms who create an imperfectly competitive product market can enjoy a 
competitive advantage. Secondly, both articles differently suggest that products/market 
analysis does not ensure superior economic performance except by luck (Barney, 1986a). 
Thirdly, both articles posit that competitive environment and implementation of product 
market strategies are no guarantee for superior performance, firms can achieve that by 
looking inwards in terms of choosing to implement strategies that exploit resources, skills, 
and capabilities available to them. Barney (1986b) advanced his idea further by analysing 
organizational culture as a useful resource, which could be a source of competitive 
advantage, particularly if the culture is valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable. The role of 
organisational culture resonates quite considerably in the context of this study as the findings 
chapters of this thesis would show. 
Dierickx & Cool (1989) challenged Barney’s (1986a) strategic factor market idea by pointing 
out that firms deploy both tradable and untradeable assets. Therefore, the ‘strategic factor 
market’ idea applies to only tradable assets, as markets for untradeable assets do not exist 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Referring to Barney’s (1986b) example about ‘corporate 
reputation’, the authors maintain that assets like reputation, loyalty or trust of a customer or 
supplier are rather earned or developed through a history of for instance: honesty, prudence, 
and consistent dealings (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; 1505).  
Central to their contribution, Dierickx & Cool (1989) used what they termed ‘assets 
accumulation’ and ‘assets flow’ to suggest that it is the accumulation of resource bundles 
rather than the flow of resources that matter. They explained that assets like knowledge and 
firm-specific skills often accumulate through for instance job learning and training but the 
idiosyncrasy of such firm-specific resources does not allow their overt tradeability (Dierickx 
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& Cool, 1989). Accordingly, only such assets can provide a competitive advantage because 
they characteristically defy imitation due to their tacit dimensions and social complexity 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989). An opinion that soon became elementally entrenched in RBV as 
Barney (1991) and Peteraf (1993) also proclaimed thereafter, just to name a few. Prahalad & 
Hamel's (1990) notion of ‘core competencies of the corporation’ – are referred to as the 
unique combination of firm resources and skill-set, offers similar proposition but the core 
message of their thesis was considerably subsumed in Barney’s (1991) seminal restatement of 
the RBV. Dierickx & Cool's (1989) idea of ‘resource accumulation’ and ‘core competencies 
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) are notably insightful but neither of the ideas provided a complete 
framework for analysis of how assets may be developed over time just as the DMC 
perspective now claims.        
2.6 RBV: Barney’s VRIN idea 
Barney’s (1991) seminal article, “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage” 
responds to Dierickx & Cool (1989), enhanced interests in RBV and offers what scholarship 
widely consider as the detailed resource-based view/framework (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan, & 
Yiu, 1999; Priem & Butler, 2001). The article enhanced the RBVs in four notable aspects. 
First, the paper defined strategic resources including; physical capital, human capital and 
organizational capital as a source of competitive advantage to firms who control them. 
Secondly, the article highlights that competitive advantage mainly derives from such 
resources being heterogeneous in and among firms within an industry.  
Thirdly, he explained that resources should not be perfectly mobile across firms if the 
heterogeneity is to be sustainable, a perspective that is consistent with Deirickx & Cool's 
(1989) argument against the ‘strategic factor’ idea. The fourth is what many scholars see as 
the core contribution of Barney (1991) paper – the four conditions under which a firm’s 
resources base may become sources of SCA: 1) it must be valuable 2) it must be rare 3) it 
must not be perfectly imitable (4) it must be non-substitutable (Barney, 1991).  
Valuable resources 
A firm’s valuable resources are those resources, which enable the organisation to conceive 
and to implement strategies that provably improve their efficiency and effectiveness and 
necessary to deliver value to customers (Barney, 1991; Fahy, 2000). The value of resources 
also lies in being unique among those controlled by rivals and enables an organisation not 
only to exploit opportunities but to also neutralise exiting or potentials threats of other rivals 
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in its environment (Barney, 1991). However, scholars have argued that the determination of 
‘valuable resources’ is one of the controversial elements of Barney’s (1991) conception 
(Schmidt & Keil, 2013).  
Amit & Schoemaker (1993:37) and Peteraf (1993) for instance note that the determination of 
the value of a firm’s resources is not so simple because it goes beyond their contribution to 
the production process. In their view, valuable resources also need to effectively match 
opportunities (Peteraf, 1993) and be consistent with other plausible characteristics and 
relevant set of ‘strategic industry factors’ (Amit & Schoemarker, 1993). In other words, the 
definition of ‘resources value’ is not likely to be constant as it is essentially a function of 
exogenous rather than endogenous factors (Priem & Butler, 2001:29-30). Fahy (2000) 
suggests that the key might be to try to recognise and to control resources that are valuable in 
terms of congruence with the existing or potential business realities in an industry. Implicit in 
these views is thus that the determination of resources value is not only essential but also the 
preserve of managers. 
Rare resources 
Rareness is about an organisation’s valuable resources that are not possessed by many other 
rival or potential rival organisations (Barney, 1991). But how rare must a particular 
resource(s) be to meet this requirement?  Peteraf (1993) addresses this aspect by adding that a 
resource should be rare or scarce in the sense that they are in short supply or not accessible 
enough to satisfy the demand for their use. It is thus believed that if the valuable resources an 
organisation possess or control are relatively limited, that that would cause imperfect 
competition in an industry and make such resources a potential source of competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993) especially if the other criteria are met as well.   
Imperfectly imitable 
Imperfectly imitable resource is according to Barney (1991) the resources that are not easy to 
duplicate or copy by rivals, and thus places rivals at costs disadvantage (Peteraf, 1993). 
Barney (1991) also suggests that the extent to which an organisations resources can be 
imperfectly imitable depends on 1) the ‘resource unique historical conditions’, (2) casual 
ambiguity, and (3) the social complexity of the resources. Ideas that notably build on 
Rumelt's (1984) idea of ‘isolating mechanisms’, Lippman & Rumelts' (1982) idea of 
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‘uncertain imitability’, and Dierickx & Cool (1989) contribution about asset stock 
accumulation and limits to imitation. To ensure clarity, this review also explains these terms. 
Unique historical condition refers to the fact that each organisation has a distinct creation or 
pathway with which it arrived where it finds itself (Barney, 1991). According to Barney 
(1991:108) “if a firm obtains valuable and rare resources because of its unique path through 
history, it will be able to exploit those resources in implementing value-creating strategies 
that cannot be duplicated by other firms, for firms without that particular path through history 
cannot obtain the resources to implement that strategy”. Recall Dierickx and Cool's (1989) 
argument about assets accumulation and their effects on the inimitability of firm resources. 
They show for instance that, tacit organisational knowledge, trust between management and 
labour are often historically dependent and unique to a firm, which because firms build over 
time, rivals would find them quite hard to copy perfectly (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993).   
Causal ambiguity – describes the tendency or condition of a blurry link between the cause 
and effects; specifically, when rival firms find it difficult to perfectly grasp or discern the 
relationship between actions (cause) and the sustained competitive advantage an organisation 
enjoys (Barney, 1991). As mentioned earlier, this idea builds on Lippman & Rumelt (1982) 
argument that inter-firm causal ambiguity constrains copying by rival firms. According to 
Fahy (2000:97), “casual ambiguity exists where resources are highly tacit, highly complex or 
are the result of accumulated firm-specific activities’. Therefore, the understanding implies 
that if resources and their effects are hard to place by competitors, its diffusion and imitation 
among competitors can be constrained and only then can competitive advantage can be 
sustained (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Barney, 1991). In other words, rival organisations must 
not have a perfect understanding of the relationship between the resources controlled by an 
organisation and their results if they would command superior outcomes over time. 
Social complexity - refers to the extraordinarily and ‘complex phenomena typically special 
to an organisation such that other organisations find them difficult to systematically manage, 
influence or replicate’ (Barney, 1991:110). Given examples include an organisation’s culture, 
reputation attained by an organisation among suppliers and customers, and the interpersonal 
relations among the organisation’s staff, and managers (Barney, 1991). So, to the extent that 
socially complex resources owned by an organisation are not subject to procedural 
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management, those resources can be imperfectly imitable (Barney, 1991), non-tradable 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989), perfectly immobile (Peteraf, 1993) and likely confer advantage.    
Non-substitutable  
This requirement simply means that there should be no substitutes for the resource (s) 
because the strategic value of a firm’s resources is likely to decline to the extent that they are 
available substitutes for them (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993:39; Barney, 1991). In other words, 
firms can hardly leverage competitive advantage under circumstances of equifinality in 
resources (Barney, 2001a). Figure 2 below is illustrative of Barney’s (1991) original RBV 
framework which shows that a firm’s resources that are both heterogeneous and immobile 
leads to resources that are characteristically (valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutability) and which are the primary basis of SCA.  
 
 
    
 
 
Source: Barney (1991:112) 
 
Figure 2  Barney's 1991 RBV Framework 
As earlier mentioned, Barney’s (1991) RBV was widely appreciated for being more detailed 
(Priem & Butler, 2001). Apart from Barney, other writers on the subject because of their 
notable contributions are also seminal. Popular examples including; Mahoney & Pandian 
(1992), Peteraf (1993), Amit & Schoemaker (1993), and Collis & Montgomery (1995) have 
been examined by this research.  
With reference to Barney’s (1991) paper, Mahoney & Pandian (1992:365) citing the earlier 
work by Penrose (1959) points out that “a firm may achieve rent not because it has better 
resources, but rather the firm’s distinctive competence involves making better use of its 
resources”.  They argued that a firm requires competencies that can help them to make the 
best use of their resources and in a manner that would maximize their potential productivity 
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and financial yield. Essentially, the authors extended the RBV in an ‘evolutionary context’ in 
acknowledging the influence of learning, path-dependency, and managers by arguing that, “a 
firm’s distinctive competence may be defined by the set of substantive rules and routines 
used by top management” (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992: 369). Managerial decisions and rules 
in the past are the ‘basic genetics which firms’ possess’ – suggests that sustainable 
competitive advantage is a path-dependent process (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992:369)   
Peteraf (1993) contributed to Barney’s (1991) RBV by highlighting resource heterogeneity as 
the most fundamental condition for competitive advantage especially when they also satisfy 
the VRIN conditions. Writing on what she called ‘the cornerstones of competitive advantage’ 
the paper identifies that: heterogeneity of resources, imperfect mobility of the resources, ex-
post limits to competition, and ex-ante limits to competition as the four conditions needed in 
order to enjoy sustained competitive advantage. She explained that when resource is 
heterogeneous, it is possible to obtain Ricardian or monopoly rent. With ex-post limits to 
competition, rivals can strategically preclude rents from competition. The imperfect mobility 
ensures that valuable factors remain within the firm and ex-ante limit to competition ensures 
that costs do not offset the rents.  
Amit & Schoemaker (1993) clarifies the distinction between resources and capabilities (see 
table 2.1 above) and further argue that what accounts for inter-firm difference is the 
deployment of resources (the capability aspect) – described as, strategic asset, not necessarily 
the resources themselves. The authors provide a salient link between IO and RBV by 
analysing conditions that support the derivation of economic rent (SCA) over time and 
bounded rationalities that managers always face. They argue that when the product-market is 
the unit of analysis, ‘certain resources and capabilities which are subject to Strategic Industry 
Factors (SIF) becomes the ultimate determinant of economic rent’ (Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993:36). While SIF can be determined at the industry level, the challenge before the 
managers in a firm is how to recognise ex-ante the strategic assets required for achieving a 
competitive advantage. They described strategic assets as “the set of difficult to trade and 
imitate; scarce, appropriable and specialized resources and capabilities that bestow the firm’s 
competitive advantage (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993:36)”. 
 On the other hand, when the firm becomes the unit of analysis, the challenges managers face 
would be how to create and marshal out resources and capabilities ‘whose economic returns 
are appropriable by the firm’ (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993:36)”. The authors’ core message, 
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therefore, is that strategic assets (resources and capabilities) are often firm and/or industry-
specific – in other words, idiosyncratic (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). It is the idiosyncrasy of 
the resources and capabilities that make them inimitable, difficult to abridge their time and 
building process, and partly determines their capacity to yield rent (Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993). They further argue that organisational rent comes from the imperfect and discretionary 
decisions to develop and deploy selected resources and capabilities by managers.  
Based on the industry analysis framework and RBV the authors also conceptualised a 
behavioural view of strategic assets – ‘Behavioural Decision Theory (BDT)’ and in addition 
suggest how to target, develop and deploy them (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Peteraf, 2003). 
The BDT indicates that cognitive imperfections, complexities and internal conflicts impact on 
firm's approach to its external environment. They suggest that firms and managers, in 
particular, must identify those resources and capabilities, which are congruent with the 
strategic industry factors (SIF) for the now, and likely to be vital for the future in order for 
superior rent and competitive to be attained (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). This study finds 
this argument to be relevant in the DMC concept. 
In short, the above contributions and notably, some compelling assumptions are related to 
why the RBV is widely acknowledged as a fruitful theory in strategic management research; 
particularly by redirecting attention to firms’ internal factors consideration unaddressed by 
the IO. DC and DMC both align with the RBV consideration of internal factors as being 
important. However, despite its relevance, how the resources and capabilities emphasised by 
RBV may be developed remained unclear (Amit & Schoemarker, 1993). These observations 
and more underpins the tractions for enhancement of the RBV by incorporating the dynamic 
and behavioural aspects that later became the rationale for the DC and the DMC. A review of 
the key criticisms associated with the RBV is necessary in order to highlight more clearly the 
basis for the departure provided by the capabilities perspectives including the DMC.  
2.6 Criticisms against the RBV 
Unclear conceptual definitions and tautological statements 
One critical charge against RBV is about unclear definition of concepts, and offering 
tautological statements (Priem & Butler, 2001a; Foss, 1997). According to Foss (1997), the 
RBV is an epitome ‘terminological soup’ by not having a shared terminology among its 
proponents, example, Lippman & Rumelt (1982), Wernerfelt (1984), Barney (1991) and 
others like Prahalad & Hamel (1990) ‘core competence’ idea. This means that there are 
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different versions of the resource-based approach’ and yet no one integrated perspective 
(Grant, 1991). Priem & Butler (2001a/b) amplified this argument by highlighting what they 
considered as ‘elemental fallacies’ of the RBV and further declares that the RBV is 
tautological and a poorly explained framework.  Porter (1991) puts it that, “at its worst, the 
resource-based view is circular. Successful firms are successful because they have unique 
resources. They should nurture these resources to be successful. …what is a unique resource? 
What makes it valuable? Why was a firm able to create or acquire it? Why does the original 
owner or current holder of the resources not bid the value away? What allows a resource to 
retain its value in the future? There is once again a chain of causality that this literature is just 
beginning to unravel” (p.108).  
Lack of actionable prescription for managers 
Scholars also argued that the RBV lacks actionable prescription and thus unhelpful to 
industry practitioners, executives (Bowman & Collier, 2006:192) or managers (Priem & 
Butler, 2001a). For example, Collis & Montgomery (1995) argue that SCA does not depend 
only on VRIN resources, rather resources that pass the test of durability, appropriability, and 
competitive superiority. Foss & Knudsen (2003) believes that, in Barney’s VRIN resources 
idea, only two criteria, namely, uncertainty and immobility of resources are necessary for 
gaining SCA. Foss (1997) considers that it may not often be the uniqueness or rareness of 
resources that matters, but rather the implicit fit of resources in a system.  
Foss (1997:19) buttressed his argument by asserting that assuming resources as unit of 
analysis and to suggest that some resources may be unique or valuable in certain instances 
can lead analysis off-target and consequently deliver the wrong advice.  This is especially 
where there is complementary and co-specialisation among individual resources such that it is 
the interplay of resources cluster rather than individual resource that is vital for competitive 
advantage. Priem & Butler (2001a:32) supports this view by arguing that ‘simply advising 
practitioners to obtain VRIN resources in order to obtain SCA does not meet operational 
validity criterion. The authors questioned the empirical content and testability of the VRIN 
criteria, pointing out for instance that the RBV is limited because even the criteria for value 
remains in an exogenous black box’ (Priem & Butler, 2001). They believe that effective 
prescription ought to involve a clear criterion with which each alternative resources can be 
determined on each resource criteria (Priem & Butler, 2001). Thus, “Additional conceptual 
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work is needed if the foundation of the RBV is to meet law-like generalisation standard” 
(Priem & Butler, 2001a:28). 
A static concept  
Priem & Butler (2001a:33) also argued that despite that the RBV emerged as a dynamic 
approach, it largely a static concept. Teece et al (1997:514) also agreed that the RBV is a 
static theory by focusing only on strategies for exploiting existing firm-specific assets 
because such assets are inadequate to support SCA in a rapidly changing environment. Foss 
(1997:352) put it that, its lack of ‘clear conceptual model of the endogenous creation of new 
resources to be found in the resource-based perspectives’. Scholars believe that companies 
can accumulate a large stock of valuable assets and still not have many useful capabilities to 
drive survival and competitive advantage over time (Teece et al, 1997; Priem & Butler, 
2001). As Teece et al (1997) observed, “Winners in the global marketplace have been firms 
that can demonstrate timely responsiveness and rapid and flexible product innovation, 
coupled with the management capability to effectively coordinate and redeploy internal and 
external competences (Teece et al 1997:515). This argument is widely shared by the DC 
research community (e.g. Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat et al, 2007; Newbert, 2007; 
Teece, 2007; Winter, 2003; Wang & Ahmed, 2007; Zahra, Sapienza & Davidsson, 2006).  
Unclear contribution and not an established theoretical structure  
Consistent with the above arguments, in sum, a widely held view is that the RBV could not 
provide any clear contribution or clarity about its core aspects, and is thus not an established 
theoretical construct. According to Grant (1991:15), ‘the implications of the ‘resource-based 
theory’ for strategic management are unclear for two reasons. First, the various contributions 
lack a distinct integrative framework, and secondly, not much has been achieved on 
developing the concrete or practical effect of this theory’ Grant (1991:15). Put differently, the 
RBV only made implicit assumptions that are not just different from the IO model and is 
therefore not an established theoretical structure (Priem & Butler, 2001a). Foss (1997) 
nonetheless believes that the RBV could be a basis for ‘fertile dialogue’ between RBV and 
IO economics (Foss1997:21-22); a position also shared by Amit & Schoemaker (2003). 
2.7 Some Response 
Barney (2001b) responded to some of the critical comments generated by his 1991 article 
especially and the RBV generally. Barney, for instance, described Priem & Butler (2001) 
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criticisms as unfounded because they failed to acknowledge the ways in which his article 
operationalized the key variables in his hypothesis. Barney (2001:42b) admitted that value is 
exogenous to the RBV as articulated in his 1991 article but argued, that “it would be 
inappropriate to suggest that the 1991 article fails to give at least some guidance as to how 
the value of resources can be determined”. He maintained that his 1991 article specified that 
one could determine the value of resources by models of the competitive environment in 
which a firm operates. The author also maintained that while ‘rarity’ criterion 
parameterisation in his 1991 article was incomplete, it was specific enough to generate 
empirically testable assertions (Barney, 2001:43b). In fact, the paper also demonstrates with 
reference to some empirical research that ‘indeed it is possible to derive some empirically 
testable assertions from his 1991 article contrary to criticisms by Priem & Butler (2001a)’ 
(Barney, 2001:43b).   
On the criticism that the role of product market in Barney (1991) was implicit, Barney 
(2001:48b) maintains that his 1991 article pointed out that “a complete model of strategic 
advantage requires the full integration of models of the competitive environment” and in fact 
that the factor and product markets model in Priem & Butler (2001) analysis partially 
accomplished that call. The author also indicated that his 1991 article has focused on 
resources (factor) as the unit of analysis, only because the factor/product markets model that 
his earlier article (1986a) already addressed Priem & Butler’s observation.  
Further to the above, the author also disagrees with Priem & Butler’s criticism that the RBV 
as articulated by Barney (1991) was void of prescriptive ability and applicability. Barney 
(2001b) maintains that his 1991 resources-based logic has considerable practical implications 
for managers. His examples include:1) that it can help managers in organizations that are 
experiencing strategic disadvantage to at least gain strategic parity by detecting those 
valuable and rare resources to help them in the process of benchmarking as many 
organizations would always try to (Barney, 2001:49b). Secondly, the author believes that 
resource-based logic could help managers to understand the kind of resources with the 
potentials for generating competitive advantage, and more importantly those controlled by the 
organisation with the potentials to deliver sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 
2001:49b). With that understanding, the paper argues that managers can be able to nurture, 
maintain, and protect those resources that constitute the organizations current sources of 
advantage (Barney, 2001:49b) – therefore, an acceptance that the role of managers was less 
developed in the RBV.   
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Regarding Priem & Butler (2001) position that the RBV is largely static, Barney (2001:52b) 
argues that their observation has focused on the undeveloped aspect of his 1991 article but 
admitted that they are correct to have emphasised the importance of dynamic analysis of 
sustained competitive advantage. He also acknowledged that it is through that kind of 
analysis that the complete implication of the resource-based concept connection with 
sustainable competitive advantage can be better understood (Barney, 2001:52b). Implication 
of Barney's (2001b) response is also that the argument by Teece et al (1997) is right in terms 
of his observation and traction, which led to developing a dynamic capability approach.  
2.8 RBV – why the debate continues?  
After Priem & Butler (2001) and Barney’s (2001b) exchange, some contributions towards the 
refinement of the theory show that Barney’s responses seem to have offered little as the 
debate is simply not going away. Miller (2003:962) for example further argued that the 
conditions of VRIN outlined by Barney present a sustainability and attainability dilemma for 
practitioners. According to Miller (2003), if a value is preserved by their inaccessibility to 
others, the question is “how can companies that do not already have such resources create 
them when others cannot? Or how could they purchase them, given their obvious value, at 
costs that would allow a superior return?” (Miller, 2003:962). Knott (2003:930) also made 
the point that if there is the availability of market for franchises for instance – a market in 
whereby organisational routine, brand name, and reputation is accessible it means that the 
logic of the RBV represents a paradox. 
 Peteraf & Barney (2003) however focused on addressing definitional issues regarding 
competitive advantage, value, and resources. Whilst delineate the resources-based theory, the 
authors also warned about any attempt to incorporating aspects of economic theory that are 
outside its domain (Peteraf & Barney, 2003). Against the criticisms of the RBV not having 
practical implications for managers (Priem & Butler, 2001), Newbert (2007), and Armstrong 
& Shimizu, (2007) have taken empirical approaches to test the RBV hypothesis.  Newbert 
(2007) for instance examined the relationship between value, rareness, competitive advantage 
(CA) and performance and found that both value and rareness are related to CA and CA 
mediates the rareness-performance relationship. Some empirical studies focused on 
measuring the characteristics of firm resources and capabilities in relation to firms’ 
performance, e.g. Henderson & Cockburn (1994), and Barney & Akira (2001). Armstrong & 
Shimzu (2007) focused on the evaluation of the methodology issues around the RBV, how to 
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clarify the value and boundaries of the resources-based assumptions. Many researches 
provide considerable support to the key assumptions of Barney's (2001b; 1991) assumptions.      
Kraaijenbrink, Spender, & Groen (2010) conducted a review of the key criticism received by 
RBV in order to make them more comprehensive and to ascertain their merits. The authors 
identified and classified the different critiques into eight categories and insightfully discuss 
their associated severity and impact. (a) ‘The RBV has no managerial implications. (b) The 
RBV implies infinite regress. (c) The RBV applicability is too limited (d) SCA is not 
achievable based on RBV (e) RBV is not a theory of the firm, (f) VRIN is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for SCA, (g) the value of the SCA is too indeterminate to provide for useful 
theory, and (h) the definition of resources is unworkable’ (pp.351). From their analysis of 
those criticisms, Kraaijenbrink and his colleagues maintain that criticisms regarding (a) to (e) 
are wrong and do not pose a threat to the RBV. However, the paper maintains that critical 
opinions as regards ‘f, g and h’ are right and should be addressed if the RBV is to completely 
demonstrate its latent ability to explain the superior performance of firms both in stable and 
under conditions of changing business environment. 
Of the key criticisms that have trailed the RBV, it can be argued that despite Barney's 
(2001b) response to Priem & Butler (2001a), it remains that the most underdeveloped 
theorisation in Barney’s (1991) is about the role of managers. In particular, while Barney's 
(2001b) response as earlier mentioned argues that the RBV can help managers understand 
resources that can confer competitive advantage. However, it remains to be fully addressed 
how managers contribute to establishing what valuable resources are in relation to their 
congruence in the business environment and how managers may manage the process of both 
building the important resources and its outcomes (Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland & Gilbert, 2011; 
Amit & Schoemaker, 1993).  
2.9 Summary 
This chapter discussed the industry competitive forces analysis and the resource-based view 
(RBV) as the two prominent but parallel theoretical frameworks with notable attempts on 
explaining the sources of competitive advantage, in the 80s and early 1990s respectively. 
Analysis in the chapter also demonstrates that the RBV parallels the competitive forces 
framework by taking an inward-outward position rather than an outward-inward perspective. 
Argument for and against the traceability of the RBV to Penrose (1959) as the precursory was 
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reflected upon and based on findings infer as some studies have previously acknowledged 
that it is difficult to trivialise the contribution of Penrose to RBV and DCV.   
Discussion in this chapter also reflected on Barney’s (1991) restatement of the RBV, which 
prescribes the control of a VRIN resource-base as conditions for SCA. However, whilst 
widely being accepted as a fruitful framework, scholars also accused the framework of being 
overtly static and limited. The framework is limited due to its failure to incorporate 
consideration for dynamics in the environment in which firms operate, and being silent on the 
roles of managers in meeting the criteria, it suggests. How managers may manage the process 
of both building important resources and their (resources) outcomes remains unaddressed in 
the framework. These observations and as many previous research have acknowledged 
implies that while the RBV development is helpful to some extent. In the current era of 
market turbulence, the age-long question of strategy – how firms achieve and sustain 
competitive advantage calls for more research effort and insights beyond the contribution 
offered in the RBV. The dynamic capabilities perspective discussed in the succeeding chapter 
was developed mainly to address gaps in the RBV theorisation. 
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                  Chapter Three 
                            The Dynamic Capabilities View  
 “Our view of the firm is somewhat richer than the standard resource-based view …it is not 
the bundle of resources that matter, but the mechanisms by which firms learn and accumulate 
new skills and capabilities, and the forces that limit the rate and the direction of this 
process” (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1990:11). 
3.1 Introduction  
The preceding chapter was an attempt to develop this literature review on a robust foothold 
by reviewing the IO and RBV – the two popular strategy perspectives in the 80’s and 90’s but 
unfortunately, have had little success in addressing the question of how firms’ achieve SCA. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the dynamic capabilities view (DCV) developed by 
scholars in response to the limitations of the IO and RBV. Whilst still an emerging theoretical 
stream (Helfat & Peteraf, 2009), scholars recognises the DCV as the new-touchstone, most 
active, vibrant and one of the most promising strategy perspectives (Arend & Bromiley, 
2009; Di Stefano et al, 2010; Barreto, 2010; Vogel & Güttel, 2013). According to Ambrosini 
& Bowman (2009:29) “the DCV focuses on the capacity of an organisation facing a rapidly 
changing environment has to create new resources, to renew or alter its resource mix”.  
Often regarded as an extension of the RBV, and whilst scholars consider the DCV to be 
richer than earlier strategy perspectives (Teece et al, 1990; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; 
Ambrosini & Bowman 2009) given its promising route to SCA under conditions of change 
(Schilke at al 2018). Some theoretical omissions and contradictions also means that explicit 
knowledge of how organisations may usefully apply DCV the promise it claims is yet to fully 
emerge. This study aims to contribute empirically to the DC concept from a managerial 
perspective, hence, continuing with a review of the concept in this chapter. The remaining 
sections in this chapter have been organised to include first, the literature review process, and 
then, the theoretical foundation of DCV, definitions of DCs and then, the definition adopted 
in this study. Next, it discusses the distinction between DCs and ordinary capabilities, and 
thereafter, the DCs development and deployment processes. The chapter further discusses 
DCs as context path/context-dependent construct, its link to SCA, and then reflect on the 
criticisms and associated with the DCV. Discussion continues thereafter with a focal analysis 
of the DMC perspective, the cognitive capabilities aspect, and the research framework. 
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3.2 Systematic Literature Review Process 
As the broad theoretical pivot of this research, the researcher made a decision to try to 
approach the review of the concept more systematically. In particular, the review of the 
DCV/DMC literature in this chapter follows an approach reflecting the systematic literature 
review (SLR) technique suggested by Tranfield, Denyer & Smart (2003), Rousseau et al 
(2008), and Macpherson & Jones (2010) albeit, in a non-rigid fashion, for reasons discussed 
later. SLR involves using clear and orderly processes to search, identify and assess theoretical 
contributions in a research field/area (Tranfield et al, 2003). Although the SLR technique has 
become prominent in other research fields, it is still rare in DCs research; few exceptions 
include Eriksson, (2013), Giudici & Reinmoeller, (2012) and Schilke et al (2018).   
Compared to conventional literature reviews (CLR), scholars provide strong support for the 
SLR because 1) it helps to enrich the quality and validity of a review by showing clear 
processes or steps that have been followed in e.g. the literature search and analysis (Jones & 
Gattrel, 2014; Tranfield et al, 2003; Briner & Denyer, 2009; Eriksson, 2013). 2) It enhances 
the rigor in a literature review process by showing sources of the underpinning evidence 
related to the questions and objectives of research (Pittaway, Robertson, Munir, Denyer & 
Neely, 2004). And 3) based on many unresolved discrepancies about DC (discussed later) it 
is also considered that SLR is an important way to help show what is known, unknown, and 
what we would want to know about DCV/DMC (Ericksson, 2013; Schilke et al 2018).  
Despite its advantages, the SLR is however not without shortcomings. Chugh & Wang (2014) 
and Pittaway et al (2004) suggest that SLR when performed in a rigid fashion, may lead to 
exclusion or missing out important contributions/articles/books. With that in mind, this study 
follows the ideas by Chugh & Wang (2014), Giudici (2013) and Helfat & Martin (2015) and 
Schilke et al (2018) innovatively employed SLR to identify, assess and reflect on current 
knowledge of what has been an impressive flow of literature in the field (Barreto, 2010) 
rather than a set of rigid rules of literature survey. Discussion continues next with the 
processes of literature search, selection, and ideas synthesis that have influenced this study.   
3.2.1 Search and selection of literature 
Trafford & Leshem (2008) suggest three main types of literature sources on which research 
can draw ideas, namely, primary, secondary and supporting sources. The primary sources 
refer to original works that have made ‘major epistemological contribution’ or ‘paradigm 
shift’ to the understanding in a field (Trafford & Leshem, 2008 p.74). The secondary sources 
comprise literature that are not the original work but usually cite and reviews the primary or 
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foundational works (Trafford & Leshem, 2008). The supporting sources often include 
literature, which may or may not be entirely research-based; seeking to extend knowledge 
boundaries in the field or not but offers respectable arguments – often more contemporary in 
terms of date and content (Trafford & Leshem, 2008). The literature survey in this study 
embodies all three sources. 
In line with the above idea, this review focused on first, locating/evaluating the foundational 
and intellectual/knowledge core contributions on DCV (Di Stefano et al, 2010; Peteraf, Di 
Stefano & Verona, 2013). Secondly, to identify and engage with review papers (Jones & 
Gattrel, 2014), and of course other relevant articles including, more-recent publications. 
Trafford & Leshem (2008), and Di Stefano et al (2010) suggests that the intellectual core 
(primary contributions) and secondary contributions often provides a good and useful starting 
points for gaining informed interpretations, whereas the secondary contributions e.g. review 
articles often provides new ways to understanding the arguments in the foundational thesis.   
The researcher conducted targeted search for relevant dynamic capabilities and dynamic 
managerial capabilities articles from two popular databases namely, the ISI web of science 
and SCOPUS. In line with the recommendation by established researchers, and from the 
researcher’s experience, those databases offer some of the best and up to date sources of peer-
reviewed strategic management research publications. The decision to involve two databases 
was simply to compare findings and help to complement for literature not returned by search 
from either database. More specifically, this review started with a search on the ISI web of 
science for articles published from 1997 to 2015 that used keywords: ‘dynamic capabilities 
view’ or dynamic managerial capabilities’ as title, in their abstract or as keywords.  
The selected period reflects the time in the course of this study in late 2015 when the 
researcher decided to approach the literature search more systematically. The search returned 
an initial result of (440) articles at the time; a significant reduction from a search when only 
“dynamic capabilities” were used as keywords. As earlier mentioned, next the researcher 
targeted the highly cited publications/articles. Highly cited publications often points towards 
the primary and knowledge core contributions (Peteraf et al, 2013; Trafford & Leshem, 2008) 
in a field and can serve as a measure of influence (Di Stefano et al, 2010) and quality of the 
publication (Vogel & Güttel, 2013). Based on the result, the most cited DC publication was 
Teece et al (1997), followed by Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) and thereafter, other articles with 
high citation count as well. By reading the abstracts of the most highly cited articles 
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retrieved, it was interesting to see that a number of review articles in the field were part of 
them e.g. Zahra et al (2006). Jones & Gattrel (2014) provides a focal analysis of the 
importance of review articles. Trafford & Leshem, (2008) categorised review articles as 
secondary literature sources, which they described as ‘valuable’. Thus, similar to Giudici's 
(2013) idea, the search and selection were refined to include DC and DMC review articles 
with interest especially on those with appreciable citation index and/or those appearing on 
top-quality journals as earlier mentioned.  
Consistent with Jones & Gattrel's (2014) and Trafford & Leshem, (2008) suggestions, the 
review articles helped the researcher to gain a better understanding of arguments in the 
primary or knowledge core DCV contributions. Secondly, the review articles e.g. Helfat & 
Martin (2015) served as lead to other useful articles from top journals sources e.g. the 
Strategic Management Journal. Recent contribution by Schilke et al (2018) also involved a 
similar idea by identifying most cited articles from Peteraf et al (2013). Selection of other 
publications based on relevance and newness. For consistency, the same process was used for 
the search on the SCOPUS database. Further additions just to ensure update review rounded-
off the literature selection. The process is consistent with Tranfield et al (2003) who suggest 
that benchmarking a search and following these clearly defined steps or criteria is in itself a 
distinction from traditional review because it facilitates comprehensive results.   
3.2.2 Result/Literature Composition 
After excluding several articles that seemed not particularly targeted/relevant, this review 
involved an initial panel of 136 articles from 17 sources in the business and management 
area. The sources include but not limited to Strategic Management Journal, Organisational 
Science, Journal of Management Studies, Decision Science, Academy of Management 
Review, Academy Of Management Annals, International Journal of Management Review, and 
British Journal of Management. See appendix 11 for other sources not mentioned here. In 
addition, expediency necessitated this review to examine arguably the pioneer, and the most 
referred DC textbook i.e. Helfat et al (2007). Note that the researcher identified and reviewed 
other articles progressively in the course of this research and thereby kept up-to-date of the 
contemporary developments in the field. The reference list of this thesis provides a 
comprehensive account of conceptual and empirical DC/DMC literature examined by this 
study.  The researcher believes that the SLR process (in less rigid fashion) as used by this 
study aided a rigorous and comprehensive assessment of the DCV and DMC literature. Table 
3.1 below synthesises some of the most referred DC articles, review articles, and one book.  
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Table 3. 1 Dynamic Capabilities (foundational articles, reviews, and one book) 
Authors/Date Title                          Source  Cited 
times 
Teece, Pisano & Shuen 
(1997)  
Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management  SMJ 9679 
Eisenhardt & Martin 
(2000)  
Dynamic Capabilities: What are they? SMJ 4837 
Makadok (2001) Towards a synthesis of the resource-based and dynamic capabilities views 
of rent creation 
SMJ 896 
Zahra & George Absorptive Capacity: a review, reconceptualization, and extension AMR 2845 
Zollo & Winter (2002) Deliberate Learning and the Evolution of Dynamic Capabilities OS 2292 
Winter (2003) Understanding Dynamic Capabilities SMJ 1512 
Adner & Helfat (2003) Corporate Effects and Dynamic Managerial Capabilities SMJ 447 
Helfat & Peteraf (2003)  Dynamic Resource-based View: Capability Lifecycle SMJ 1103 
Zott (2003) DCs capabilities and the Emergence of Intra-industry Differentials Firm 
Performance: Insights from a simulation study 
SMJ 487 
Zahra, Sapienza, & 
Davidsson (2006) 
Entrepreneurship and Dynamic Capabilities: A review, model and research 
agenda 
JMS 833 
Schreyöegg & Kliesch-
Erbel (2007) 
How Dynamic Can Organisational Capabilities be? Towards a dual-process 
model of dynamization 
SMJ 337 
Wang & Ahmed (2007) Dynamic Capabilities: A review and research agenda IJMR 619 
Helfat et al (2007)* Dynamic Capabilities: Understanding Change in Organisations BOOK NA 
Teece (2007) Explicating Dynamic Capabilities: the nature and microfoundations of 
sustainable enterprise performance  
SMJ 2851 
Ambrosini & Bowman  
(2009) 
What are Dynamic Capabilities and are they a useful construct in strategic 
management? 
IJMR 424 
Arend & Bromiley 
(2009) 
Assessing Dynamic Capabilities View: spare change, everyone? SO 88 
Helfat & Peteraf (2009) Understanding Dynamic Capabilities: Progress along a Development Path SO 151 
Easterby-Smith et al 
(2009) 
Dynamic Capabilities: Current debate and future directions BJM 194 
Barreto (2010) Dynamic Capabilities: review of past research and an agenda for the future JM 457 
Di Stefano, Peteraf, & 
Verona (2010) 
Dynamic Capabilities Deconstructed: A bibliographical investigation into 
the origin, development, and future directions of the research domain 
ICC 141 
Bititci et al (2011) Managerial Process: Operations management perspective towards dynamic 
capabilities 
IJOPM 40 
Giudici, A & 
Reinmoeller (2012) 
Dynamic Capabilities in the Dock: A Case of reification? SO 28 
Vogel & Güttel (2013) The Dynamic Capabilities View in Strategic Management: A bibliometric 
review  
IJMR 54 
Piening, E.P., (2013) Dynamic Capabilities in Public Organisations. A Literature Review and 
Research Agenda. 
PMR 43 
Peteraf, Di Stefano & 
Verona (2013)  
The Elephant in the Room of Dynamic Capabilities: Bringing two divergent 
conversations together 
SMJ 138 
Eggers & Kaplan 
(2013) 
Cognition and Capabilities: A multi-level Perspective AMA 120 
Helfat & Martin (2015) Dynamic Managerial Capabilities: review and assessment JM 96 
Schilke et al (2018) Quo Vadis, Dynamic Capabilities? A Content Analytical Review of the 
Current State of Knowledge and Recommendation for Future Research 
AMA 24 
Ambrosini, V., & 
Altintas, G., (2019) 
Dynamic Managerial Capabilities. In Oxford Research Encylopedia, 
Business and Management. USA: Oxford University Press 
BC NA 
Acronyms*British Journal of Management (BJM) Industrial/Corporate Change (ICC) International Journal of Management Review (IJMR), 
Journal of Management (JM), Journal of Management Studies (JMS) Strategic Management Journal (SMJ), and Strategic Organisation 
(SO) …. (Citation counts updated, July 2019).  
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3.3 Understanding the Theoretical Foundations of DCV 
Discussions in literature show that the dynamic capabilities idea is traceable to a wide-range 
of intellectual origins. Based on Teece et al (1997) acknowledgment and opinions in most 
review articles assessed e.g. Ambrosini & Bowman, (2009) Barreto (2010), Easterby-Smith, 
Lyles & Peteraf (2009), and Schilke et al (2018). The most cited ones include Schumpeter's 
(1942) analysis of innovation and entrepreneurship; ‘the theory of firm growth’ (Penrose, 
1959) briefly discussed in chapter 2, and ‘the behavioural theory of the firm’ (Cyert & 
March, 1963). Scholars also acknowledge that DCV was influenced by ideas from the 
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975), industrial organisation (IO) economics e.g. 
the five competitive forces theory (Porter, 1980), the evolutionary theory of the firm (Nelson 
& Winter, 1982); the core competence of corporations (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) and the 
resource-based view (RBV) of firms’ SCA (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991).  
In fact, Teece et al (1997) also talks of a number of other research areas often considered to 
be outside of the conventional strategy boundaries as also ‘elemental and integrative’ in the 
DC approach (p.510). Eisenhardt & Martin (2000), Augier & Teece (2009; and previous 
reviews such as Di Stefano, Peteraf & Verona (2010), Vogel & Güttel (2013), and Ambrosini 
& Bowman (2009) all confirms this. As the earlier cited excerpts in Teece & colleagues 
(1990) indicates, their argument entails that preceding frameworks used to address the 
sources of SCA failed to dig deep. According to Augier & Teece (2009), DCV developed 
something richer by building on the expanse of preceding ideas referred. And indeed, many 
scholars believe that the DCV is mainly an extension of RBV of the firm (Teece et al, 1997; 
Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Barreto, 2010) in a dynamic context (Barney, 2001a; 
Ambrosini et al, 2009; Helfat & Peteraf, 2009; Schilke, 2013; Schilke et al 2018). To 
appreciate the relationship and extension, which the DCV asserts against the preceding 
concepts, it is vital to define the DC concept.   
3.4 What is Dynamic Capabilities? 
As Barreto (2010) rightly observed, the“…. literature on dynamic capabilities has provided 
successive and distinctive definitions of the construct” (p.257). Teece et al (1997) and 
Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) are the two most cited DC articles (definitions) in literature, as 
table 3.1 above also indicates. According to Ambrosini & Altintas (2019), Teece et al (1997) 
provided the first well-known definition of the DC concepts. Teece et al (1997) defined 
dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and 
external competences to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece et al, 1997: 516).  
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Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) thereafter defined DCs as “the firm’s processes that use 
resources – specifically the processes to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources – to 
match and even create market change” (p.1107). Apart from these two most cited DC 
theorists (and conceptions), literature also show that several other scholars including, Winter 
(2003), Zahra et al (2006) Teece (2007), Zollo & Winter (2002) and Zott (2003) Helfat et al 
(2007) also offered popular definitions and contributions that have helped to sharpen the 
framework. Di Stefano, Peteraf & Verona (2010:1191) recognised these contributions among 
what they referred to as the “intellectual core” DCs research. Table 3.2 below provides a 
synthesis of the intellectual core and most referred DC definitions located in literature. 
Table 3. 2 Key Definitions of Dynamic Capabilities 
Author(s)/Year Definitions of dynamic capabilities 
Teece, Pisano, 
& Shuen (1997) 
“We define dynamic capabilities as the firm’s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure 
internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing environments” (p.516). 
Eisenhardt & 
Martin (2000) 
 
“DCs are the firm’s processes that use resources – specifically the processes to integrate, 
reconfigure, gain and release resources – to match and even create market change....the 
organizational and strategic routines by which firms achieve new resources and 
configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, and die” (p.1107).   
Zollo & Winter 
(2002)  
“…pattern of collective activity through which the organization systematically generates and 
modifies its operating routines in pursuit of improved effectiveness” (p.340).  
Zahra & 
George (2002) 
“DCs are essentially change-oriented capabilities that help firms redeploy and reconfigure 
their resource base to meet evolving customer demand and competitor strategies” (p. 148). 
Winter (2003) “…the capabilities that operate to extend, modify or create ordinary capabilities” (p. 991). 
Zahra et al 
(2006) 
“…the abilities to reconfigure a firm’s resources and routine in a manner envisioned and 
deemed appropriate by its principal decision-maker(s)” (p. 918). 
Helfat et al 
(2007) 
“…the capacities of an organization to purposefully create, extend or modify its resource 
base” (p.4). 
Wang & 
Ahmed (2007) 
“…a firm’s behavioural orientations to constantly integrate, reconfigure, renew and recreate 
its resources and capabilities, and most importantly, upgrade and reconstruct its core 
capabilities in response to changing environment to attain and sustain competitive 
advantage” (p.35).  
Teece (2007)  “the capacity (a) to sense and shape opportunities and threats (b) to seize opportunities, and 
(c) to maintain competitiveness through enhancing, combining, protecting, and, when 
necessary, reconfiguring the business enterprise’s intangible and tangible assets” (p.1319). 
Ambrosini & 
Bowman (2009) 
Dynamic capability is a process that impacts on resources (p.34). 
Barreto (2010) “the firm’s potential to systematically solve problems, formed by its propensity to sense 
opportunities and threats, to make timely and market-oriented decisions, and to change its 
resources base” (p.271). 
 
As one can see from table 3.2 above, scholars have used many different terms including 
ability, process, capability, capacity, pattern of collective activity, behaviour, competence, 
routine, and potentials, to conceptualise/define dynamic capabilities. This variety of terms 
used to describe DC has led to critical questions about the exact nature of DC, i.e. what are 
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they exactly? For instance, some scholars argued that these terms as differently used to 
describe DCs are not only inconsistent, overlapping but in some ways outright contradictions 
(Zahra et al, 2006:2; Schreyöegg & Kliesch-Eberl, 2007).  
However, some scholars have also defended the different terminologies by explaining that 
that is what one can expect of a complex construct, which is still at its development stage 
(Helfat & Peteraf, 2009). That being said, it still remains a key concern that the concept is 
specified in ways that make it difficult to understand what DCs are exactly – a major source 
of criticisms (discussed later in this chapter) and debate impeding its progress (Easterby-
Smith et al, 2009). This issue has recently led to calls for a re-visitation to the foundational 
conception about the framework in order to find a way forward (Peteraf et al, 2013).  
3.5 DC as involving two distinct foundational conceptions 
One of the arguments in literature is that many confusion and contradictions in the DCV are 
traceable back to two foundational conceptions, Teece et al (1997) and Eisenhardt & Martin 
(2000). Scholars observed that these two seminal and foundational conceptions have since 
their emergence developed, and being, analysed as two bodies of knowledge, and arguably 
the “elephant in the room” against DCV research progress (Barreto, 2010; Peteraf et al, 
2013). Table 3.3 below synthesises key differences between Teece et al (1997) and 
Eisenhardt & Martin's (2000) concepts.  
Table 3. 3 Key Assumptions/Differentials in the two Foundational DC Conceptions 
Key assumptions Teece, Shuen, and Pisano (1997) Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) 
Nature Ability,  DCs are idiosyncratic,  Processes, DCs exhibits commonality 
Role/purpose …reconfigure competence to 
address rapidly changing 
environment 
…reconfigure resources …to match and even 
create market change 
Context applicability Rapidly changing environments Stable /moderately changing environments  
Antecedents of DCs Process, position, and path (history) Strategic routines, learning, and mistakes 
Outcomes of DCs Competitive advantage  Not a guarantee for competitive advantage 
Source: Author 
Peteraf et al (2013) considers that each of these two conceptions is inherently parallel and 
somewhat or outright contradictory assumptions. Many other scholars e.g. Schreyöegg & 
Kliesch-Eberl (2007), Zahra et al (2006), Barreto (2010) also share this position. Helfat et al 
(2007) and Helfat & Peteraf (2009) however suggest that Teece et al (1997) and Eisenhardt & 
Martin (2000) are rather complementary because the two conceptions collectively highlight 
the critical elements of DCs. Beginning with the different definitions (in table 3.3 above), it 
has been argued that one understanding that can be derived. The understanding is that DCs 
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are about strategic change on a firm’s resource base in ways that can allow a firm to create or 
respond to environmental dynamics (Pisano, 2015; 2016).  
Therefore, as an extension of the RBV (Salvato & Vassolo, 2018), the DCV is not about the 
resource base itself rather about the change on the resources (Schilke et al 2018). This is 
consistent with Eisenhardt & Martin, (2000:111) earlier assertion that DCs “are best 
conceptualised as tools that manipulate resource configurations”. In this regard, Pisano 
(2015:1) has lately opined that “the dynamic capabilities research programme has become 
mired in endless debate about definitions and elusive search for properties that make 
organisations adaptable rather than the fundamental strategic problems facing firms”. 
However, of course, the importance of a clear definition of a concept and for any empirical 
inquiry cannot be underestimated (Easterby-Smith et al, 2009; Schilke et al, 2018). The next 
section discusses the accepted definition of DC in this study.   
3.6 Definition of Dynamic Capabilities adopted by this research  
Consistent with Schilke et al (2018) observation, this research adopted the integrative 
definition of DCs by Helfat et al (2007:4), as “the capacity of an organisation to purposefully 
create, extend or modify its resource base”. A number of critical considerations informed the 
researcher’s choice for this definition. First, in reviewing Helfat et al (2007), and as Easterby-
Smith et al (2009) correctly noted, it became clear that this definition emerged from the joint 
effort of core DC scholars who based on reflection were responding to key concerns in 
literature about DCV. This reflective approach is consistent with Di Stefano, Peteraf & 
Verona's (2014) idea of “organisational drivetrain” which suggests that such harmonising 
thoughts are key to the needed advancement in the DC knowledge.   
Secondly, it is accepted that Helfat et al (2007) definition is succinct and well-articulated in a 
manner that addresses, and avoids ‘logical inconsistencies’, ‘tautology trap and confusions’ 
charged against the construct (Zahra et al, 2006; Easterby-Smith et al, 2009; Schilke et al 
2018). This is notable because it highlights (DC purpose) or exactly what DC does i.e. 
changing an organisation’s resource-base or their ordinary ways of earning their living – how 
it does that is by creating, extending or modifying the resource base. Thirdly, the change must 
be those driven by the deliberate intent of the firm’s decision-makers, thus highlighting that 
managers are the agency of DC in action (Ambrosini & Altintas, 2019). Fourthly, the 
definition addresses concerns regarding the applicable context of the construct – a key area of 
disagreement between Teece et al (1997) and Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) as earlier 
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highlighted. This is because the definition did not restrict the applicable context to a rapidly 
changing, moderately changing or stable environment. In other words, DCs can be relevant in 
any business environment (Schilke et al, 2018) including the emerging economies and the 
industry explored by this study.   
In fact, the researcher was also encouraged to follow this definition because scholars such as, 
Ambrosini et al (2009), Augier & Teece (2009) Easterby-Smith et al (2009), Peteraf et al 
(2013) and Schilke et al (2018) all agrees that this definition offers significant improvement 
on earlier definitions and ‘precise enough’ to support future developments on the concept. 
Evidence from empirical contributions e.g. Danneels (2011) and Martin (2011) also confirms 
the utility of this definition. As such, this study accepts that Helfat’s et al (2007) definition 
having commanded a fairly, coalescing voice as confirmed by conceptual and empirical 
studies alike is logical and thus adopted. To enhance clarity about what DCs are, scholars 
have also compared it to other forms of capabilities. The next section further reflects on this.  
3.7. Dynamic Capability vs. Ordinary Capability  
Scholars have also attempted to clarify DC by demonstrating that there are different 
typologies of capability. Capability is the “capacity to deploy resources to achieve specific 
goals” (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993:35). According to Winter (2003), capability can be 
ordinary or dynamic. Winter’s (2003) position, which builds on Collis (1994), also represents 
an effort to organise capabilities in hierarchies. An idea also shared by e.g. Eisenhardt & 
Martin (2000), Zollo & Winter (2002), Danneels (2002); Schreyöegg & Kliesch-Eberl, 
(2007) Wang & Ahmed (2007), Ambrosini et al (2009) and Pavlou & El Sawy (2011). Table 
3.4 highlights key distinctions between DC and the ordinary capability of firms. 
Table 3. 4 Dynamic Capabilities vs. Ordinary Capabilities 
 
Dynamic Capabilities  
 
Ordinary capabilities  
   
Related sources 
Higher-order capabilities  Zero-order/level firm’s 
capabilities  
Winter (2003); Danneels 
(2002) Schilke (2014) 
Change ordinary capabilities and 
builds new capabilities; directed 
towards strategic change  
How an organisation 
makes a living now  
Winter (2003) Helfat & 
Winter (2011); Schilke et al 
(2018); Teece (2018 
Governs new combinations and 
improvements on ordinary 
capability 
Helps maintain day-to-day 
operation/ problems 
solution  
Pavlou & El Sawy (2011); 
Winter, (2003) Zahra et al 
(2006) 
Change on a firm’s resource-base Equates resource-base Winter (2003) Pisano  (2015) 
Doing the right things 
 
Doing things right Teece (2017) 
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According to Winter (2003), a firm’s ordinary capabilities are zero-level capabilities which, 
enable the firm to “make a living now” (p.992) or differently put, maintaining their day-to-
day operations (Pavlou & El Sawy, 2011). Zahra et al (2006) echoed Winter’s (2003) 
argument by explaining that ‘substantive capabilities’(their proxy for ordinary capabilities) 
are capabilities that helps an organisation solves problems and maintain survival in the 
marketplace (Zahra et al, 2006:5). Cited examples of ordinary/substantive capability include; 
‘producing and selling’ the same set of products, on the same scale, to the same market 
segment over time (Winter, 2003:992). So they are ordinary “by using the same technique on 
the same scale to support existing products and services for the same customer population” 
(Helfat & Winter, 2011:1244) and indeed, that helps to maintain status quo as observable in 
many viable business firms (Schilke et al, 2018). However, scholars think that this capability 
is more like the RBV, may not offer an advantage under changing business environment 
circumstances because a number of other contingencies are critical (Teece, 2014; Schilke, 
2014; Wilden, Gudergan, Nielsen, & Lings, 2013). It means that the ordinary capability can 
allow an organisation mainly to compete and just maintain parity with their rivals. 
Dynamic capabilities are considered as first-level and higher-order capabilities that facilitate 
continuous change by way of new combinations or improvements on a firm’s ordinary 
capabilities in terms of e.g. their product(s), the production process, scale of production, and 
the segment of market served (Winter, 2003:992). They are capabilities that enable managers 
to “reconfigure a firm’s resources or routine in a manner envisioned and deemed appropriate 
by its principal decision-maker(s)” (Zahra et al, 2006:5). As Zahra et al (2006) suggested in 
addition, the change on the resource base (DC) is often a function of managerial vision and 
‘choices’ because it is the managerial vision that makes it possible to innovate. 
Winter (2003) also warns that not every change on a firm’s resource base or ordinary 
capability represents an exercise or the result of dynamic capability. The author highlights 
that some change can happen either by luck, as one-off or ad hoc problem-solving. So, such 
change does not represent an exercise of DCs because they do not always reflect reliable and 
patterned behaviour (Winter, 2003: 992-3). In other words, DCs should be a patterned effort 
towards change on a firm’s ordinary capability (resource base) (Zollo & Winter, 2002; 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Zahra et al (2006) also agree with Winter’s (2003) by suggesting 
that successful companies are unlikely to be applying ‘improvisation’ (ad hoc problem 
solving) as strategy or problems solving approach. It means that the exercise of DCs would 
reflect a structured system, routinized or patterns of what a firm does effectively. Helfat et al 
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(2007) further distinguished DC from “innate talent that does not derive from patterned 
experience of the individual involved in the decision making or deployment of the 
capability”. They agree that DCs must involve some patterned, repeatable or routinized set of 
activities that are distinct from one-off idiosyncratic change to an organisation’s resource 
base (Helfat et al, 2007:5).  
However, whereas it is accepted that DCs are different from a firm’s ordinary capabilities, 
some scholars questions the idea that only patterned or routinized change can represent an 
exercise of DC (see: Teece, 2012; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018; Teece & Altintas, 2019).  
According to Teece (2012), that idea constitutes a false dichotomy because many strategic 
actions and key transformations involve actions that one may never replicate. Salvato & 
Vassolo (2018:1729) also shares this perspective by arguing that, “treating DC primarily as 
routines makes it difficult to identify the source of dynamism in firms”. In this study, it is 
considered that this recent argument is redirecting scholars to Teece et al (1997) original idea 
of how dynamic capability works as a composition of both organisational and managerial 
processes. Teece (2018) also confirms this. The next section elucidates these processes. 
3.8 Dynamic Capabilities as Organisational and Managerial Processes 
According to Teece et al (1997), “We advance the argument that the competitive advantage 
of firms lies with its managerial and organisational processes, shaped by its (specific) asset 
position, and the path available to it. By managerial and organisational processes, we refer 
to the way things are done in the firm, or what might be referred to as its routines, or pattern 
of current practices and learning. By position, we refer to its endowment of technology, 
intellectual property, complementary assets, customer base, and its external relations with 
suppliers and complementors. By path, we refer to the strategic alternatives to the firm, and 
the increasing returns and attendant path dependencies” (p: 518). In other words, research 
can problematize internal factors (process, position, and path) in order to understand what 
and how DC facilitates a firm’s distinctiveness that may, in turn, lead to firms’ SCA. 
Of the three internal factors put forward by Teece & his colleagues, discussions in literature 
mainly confirms that DCs often reflects embedded organisational and managerial processes. 
Benner & Tushman (2003) described a process as a “collection of activities that taken 
together produce outputs for customers” (p.240). Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) to an extent 
agree with Teece et al (1997) by arguing that DCs consist of ‘strategic and organisational 
processes’ (p.1106); ...antecedent organisational and strategic routines by which firms 
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achieve new resources and configurations (p.1107). The authors explained that the strategic 
process relates to managerial deft for effective decisions-making, while organisational 
process relates to operational routine and standards in the firm. They believe that DCs 
consists of ‘simpler capabilities and routines related to them, some of which may be 
foundational to others and so much to be learned’ (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000:1116). 
Flowing from this subtle consensus, scholars believe that organisational and managerial 
processes analyses are a sensible starting point for understanding how DCs work (Eggers & 
Kaplan, 2009; Narayanan et al, 2009). 
To also address one of the early concerns in the literature that DCs are often described as 
abstract concepts (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Danneels, 2008). Studies have identified 
decision making, new products development, and alliancing (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000; 
Danneels, 2011; Pavlou & El-Sawy, 2011), learning, and innovation (Zollo & Winter, 2002; 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), coordinating/integrating, learning and reconfiguring assets 
(Teece et al, 1997), and dynamic managerial capabilities (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Martin, 
2011) as example of dynamic capabilities in practice. Despite that, Helfat et al (2007:6) 
however argues that “…when we seek to understand dynamic capabilities, we must move 
beyond general typologies of capabilities”. Ambrosini & Bowman (2009:35), Moliterno & 
Wiersema (2007) and Helfat et al (2007) all suggest that “We still need to develop a better 
understanding of both the content and process of dynamic capabilities”. 
3.9. DC as a multi-level/dimensional organisational and managerial process 
In regards to the above viewpoints, many contribution offering more clarification about how 
DC works have analysed the concept as a multidimensional process involving the 
development and deployment aspects, and more lately, emphasising that the role of managers 
is key. Helfat et al (2007) suggests two primary ways in which organisational and managerial 
processes underpin dynamic capabilities, namely, development, and deployment processes.  
Figure 3 DCs Development and Deployment Processes 
 
 
 
 DC Development  
Managerial and organisational 
processes 
DC deployment  
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Copyright - adapted from Helfat et al (2007:31) 
Figure 3 above in Helfat et al (2007:31) is illustrative. It shows that looking at DC under 
these two labels can be a good approach from which one can address/add to the existing 
knowledge. When it comes to DCs implementation, Helfat et al (2007) implies that 
‘organisational and managerial processes are inextricably linked, and the benefit from DCs 
depends on the efficacy of the micro/underlying aspects of those processes as invoked’. An 
opinion also shared by Bruni & Verona (2009), and Easterby-Smith et al, (2009).    
3.10.1 Dynamic Capabilities Development Process 
Unlike the RBV, it has been argued that DCs cannot be acquired in the factor market, but 
rather, can be developed (Helfat ate al, 2007; Makadok, 2001). Dynamic capability 
development refers to processes by which firms create new resources base or improve the 
existing ones (Helfat et al, 2007). The commonly shared perspective is that DCs often 
develop through learning processes (Zollo & Winter, 2002), investment (Maritan, 2001; 
Helfat et al, 2007; Capron & Michelle, 2009), and appropriate commitments at both 
organisational, managerial (Teece et al, 1997; Helfat et al, 2007) and network levels 
(Rothaermel & Hess, 2007) that may evoke other strategy processes. Teece et al (1997) 
describes learning as both process and an outcome of practice, repetition, and 
experimentation, which allows tasks to be performed better. The authors consider “The 
capacity to reconfigure and transform is itself a learned organisational skill. The more 
frequently practiced, the easier accomplished” (Teece et al, 1997: 521). 
Zollo & Winter (2002) identified three learning processes or mechanisms that support DCs 
development to include: 1) tacit knowledge accumulation of experience, 2) knowledge 
articulation and 3) knowledge codification processes. Accordingly, these learning 
mechanisms are interrelated and together influences interaction among different resources of 
firms (e.g. material and human resources) in ways that lead to enhanced productive capacity 
of one resource (Zollo & Winter, 2002) and for tasks to be performed more effectively (Teece 
et al 1997). The paper also points out that the efficacy of these mechanisms might depend on 
the characteristics of the task to be learned e.g. its degree of causal ambiguity but purposeful 
investment in organisational learning could, for example, helps in the creation and 
modification of DCs for acquisitions or alliances. Teece et al (1997) also talked about 
learning in terms of trial and error. Cope (2003) suggests that organisation and entrepreneurs 
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often learn from failures, while Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) adds that both success and 
failures are key learning sources. 
Zahra & George (2002) also argued that dynamic capabilities develop through ‘absorptive 
capability’ (another proxy for learning) which they defined as “organisational routines and 
process by which firms acquire, assimilate, transform, and exploit knowledge to produce a 
dynamic organisational capability” (p.186). Their work notably builds on Cohen & 
Levinthal's (1990) earlier conception of absorptive defined as “the firms’ ability to recognise 
the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” 
(p.128). In short, several DC research e.g. King, & Tucci (2002), Lavie (2006), Kale & Singh 
(2007), Pablo, Reay, Dewald, & Casebeer (2007) & Pandza & Thorpe (2009) all offer 
empirical evidence of learning practices which allowed different organisations to develop 
their capabilities.  
Kale & Singh (2007) for example discovered that an alliance-learning process is one of the 
mechanisms of how firms achieve greater alliance success by helping them develop or 
improve their lower-order partnering skills. Pablo et al (2007) found that DC development 
involved learning through experimenting. Other scholars like conceptual contributions e.g. 
Schilke (2014b) also highlights concepts like, ‘learning to learn’, ‘learning by thinking’ (Di 
Stefano, Gino, Pisano, & Staats, 2014) and ‘learning by doing’ (Pisano, 2016) all constitutes 
a source of DCs development. In sum, it means that organisations and managers are 
encouraged to make objectives and rewards seeking investment in learning processes and 
activities. And in that way, they are likely to develop their capability as to absorb 
relevant/critical information, experience or knowledge from their internal, external and 
network environments that are translatable into useful strategic assets, business ideas or 
solution on a relatively continuous basis (Pisano, 2016; Teece, 2018; Zahra & George, 2002).   
3.10.2 Dynamic Capabilities Deployment process  
DC deployment is about how DCs are used. Scholars believe that DC in practice involves 
processes of resource orchestration and allocation in ways that may lead to the creation 
(development), adjustment of organisational strategies and/or resource-base (Helfat et al, 
2007). Helfat et al (2007) provides a focal analysis regarding the micro-processes of DC 
deployment processes by firstly identifying three roles that DCs helps to accomplish, overall: 
1) recognising the need/opportunity for change 2) formulating appropriate response to the 
opportunity recognised, and 3) executing courses of action. In other words, when referring to 
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DC deployment, ‘…the way managers interpret, invest and use the resources and capabilities 
at their disposal is critical’ (Helfat et al, 2007:63; Sirmon & Hitt, 2009). Sharma (2000) also 
shows a link between the interpretation of the external environment and strategic choices.  
It is argued that deployment of DCs hinges fundamentally on effective search and selection, 
where “search and selection entails decision-making” (Helfat et al, 2007:6) that often reflects 
the entrepreneurial capacity of the executive management (Teece, 2012). The authors 
explained for example, that incumbent managers make the decision of what to do or not to 
do, ‘products and services to offer, in what form, and to which customers’. Those activities 
can take place at different organisational unit levels (top management, divisional level or sub-
unit) (Helfat et al, 2007). However, managers do not have equal skills to make those 
decisions and perform them effectively, and that can either aid or hinder a firm’s potentials 
and success (Helfat et al, 2007). Therefore, executive/management actions/inactions through 
the decisions they make and implement are at the epicentre of organizational DC deployment. 
It means that DC deployment involves the dexterous strategic decision-making which 
requires opportunities search and detection, and appropriate resource management actions.  
Teece (2007) offered a similar explanation by disaggregating the exercise of DCs into three 
microfoundations of capabilities, namely, sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring the resource-
base of an organisation. Sensing refers to managerial skills and organisational processes 
related to scanning for, and discerning opportunities/threats, whereas seizing 
capability/processes reflects the decision-making process, for example, the selection of 
business models, product architecture, and operational remits of the organisation. 
Reconfiguring capability relates to processes of recombining or reallocation of 
assets/resources/structures to execute the strategic decisions earlier arrived at. It may include 
changing governance structure, and business model to support the new strategic decision, 
knowledge management and assets co-specialisation activities or processes. Many scholars 
e.g. Helfat & Peteraf (2015), Martin (2011) share Teece's (2007; 2012) abstraction pointing 
out that all three activities involve entrepreneurial skills and “right-brain” and thereby 
underscore the key role of managers in DC deployment/development.     
As noted in chapter one, one stream of research in which the variation in managers' skills in 
implementing the above set of functions is emphasised is the dynamic managerial capabilities 
view. According to Helfat et al (2007:46) “without considering whether and how executives 
act in ways that… modify resource base, …discussions of dynamic capabilities risks 
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remaining in the abstract, removed from the lifeblood of organisational life”. As Schilke et al 
(2018) recently observed, to date, research with focuses on analysis at the organisational 
processes level remains the most common, and there have been interestingly calls to increase 
focus on DMC given its focus on the managerial processes. This study focuses on the DMC 
concept but before delving into the review of literature on the concept, it is useful to examine 
other key themes about the DCV in its broader context.  
3.11 DCs and its value are context/path dependent 
Another consensus gleaned from literature is that ‘DCs and their value are context-
dependent’ (Helfat et al, 2007:7; Barreto, 2010). Much of the discussions have relied on 
‘contingency theory’ (e.g.  Barreto, 2010, Peteraf & Reed, 2007) to argue that internal and 
external factors in terms of ‘organisation, and its market environment’ character can act as a 
contingent enabling or inhibiting factors to DC development and deployment (Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2009:39). It means that the condition of (e.g. country, industry or institutional 
environment) and time within which an organisation operates or seeks to exercise DC 
matters, and should be an important consideration (Dixon et al, 2010; Peteraf & Reed, 2007; 
Salvato, 2003; Sirmon & Hitt, 2009; Schilke, 2013; Teece et al, 1997; Winter, 2003; Zott, 
2003). 
Another emphasis in this regard is environmental change. Scholars have referred to various 
types of change relative to the purpose of DC and its contextual relevance. For example, 
Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) talked about the relevance of DCs in stable, moderately 
changing, and high-velocity environments. Schreyöegg & Kliesch-Erbel, (2007) and Schilke 
(2014a) all believe that the level of stability or volatility in an environment acts as mediators 
of the value, character, and efficacy of DCs in practice. Winter (2003) explained that the pace 
of change in an environment acts as a contingency influence on the decision to develop and 
deploy dynamic capabilities.  
Other recent contributions e.g. Schoemaker et al (2018) have amplified the conversation 
about context by discussing the notion of the “VUCA world”. VUCA is an acronym for 
volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity, used to describe the extent of turbulence or 
degree of change in an external business environment (Schoemaker et al 2018; Pandit et al, 
2018). Under such environmental conditions, a consistent message by scholars is that 
implementing DC generally poses a significant challenge (Day & Schoemaker, 2016; Pandit 
et al, 2018; Teece, 2017). However, the pace of change often affects firms differently 
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especially as moderated by managerial cognition e.g. perceptions and interpretation of reality, 
and sometimes can be limited by ineffective perception rather than the reality itself 
(Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Aragon-Correa & Sharma 2003; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; 
Schoemaker et al 2018; Teece, 2012). 
From the internal environment context, another aspect to this perspective relates to the 
‘organisational path’ (Teece et al, 1997). Scholars consider that organisational paths or 
historical trajectory including established routines of an organisation often have enabling or 
constraining effect on development and deployment of dynamic capabilities (Teece et al, 
1997; Schreyöegg & Kliesch-Erbel, 2007). It is considered that bygone are rarely bygone 
(Helfat & Martin, 2015) and experience, whether positive or negative, together with 
established norms can shape the implementation of DC (Ambrosini & Altintas, 2019; Helfat 
& Peteraf, 2015).      
3.12 Dynamic Capabilities and Competitive Advantage 
Another consensus in literature is that there is a potential connection between DCs and 
competitive advantage enjoyed or otherwise by firms (Teece et al, 1997; Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000; Helfat et al, 2007). However, the linkage between DCs and competitive 
advantage has been a subject of split opinions between scholars who posits a direct 
relationship between DC and competitive advantage and those suggesting only an indirect 
relationship (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009:30; Helfat et al, 2007; Peteraf et al, 2013).  
In this regard, Teece et al (1997:515) for example suggests that “We refer to this ability to 
achieve new forms of competitive advantage as dynamic capabilities”. This comment 
evidently indicates a direct linkage. They believe that ‘DCs also leads to SCA but that 
depends on how smart other competitors are to copy the DCs deployed’ (Teece et al (1997: 
516). Makadok (2001) also aligned with this position by arguing that DCs are causal 
mechanisms by which firms generate economic rent; using rent as an analogy for competitive 
advantage. Article by Teece (2007) reaffirms this position by arguing that DCs are the ‘basis 
of enterprise-level competitive advantage in regimes of rapid technological change’ (p.1341). 
In other words, DC “lies at the core of enterprise success and failure” (Teece, 2007:1320).  
However, the alternative position has been that DCs are necessary but do not always lead to 
or guarantee competitive advantage (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Zott, 2003; Zahra et al, 
2006; Helfat et al, 2007). Scholars who share this position believe that DCs does not 
guarantee competitive advantage because DCs exhibits commonalities across firms 
  
64 
 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat et al, 2007). Rather, “competitive advantage lies in the 
unique resource configurations that managers build using dynamic capabilities, not in the 
capabilities themselves” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000:1117). Secondly, scholars sharing this 
position also believe that not every change is useful, and actually that the “misapprehension 
of the state of nature or misuse of the dynamic capabilities can undermine results” rather than 
enhance it because DCs are costly (Zahra et al, 2006). To that extent, to directly link DC to 
CA has been described as rather tautological (Priem & Butler, 2001; Helfat et al, 2007; Arend 
& Bromiley, 2009), or mildly put an “unsatisfying tautology” (Zahra et al, 2006).  
By juxtaposing these opposing viewpoints, previous review articles e.g. Barreto (2010) agree 
that the indirect linkage between DC and competitive advantage indeed “holds the most 
promise” and deserves more appreciation (p.275-6). Augier & Teece (2009) admits that “the 
possession and employment of dynamic capabilities provides the business enterprise a chance 
to generate superior profitability over the long run” (p.412). It is conceivable that “chance” as 
used by Augier & Teece (2009) implies that it is only a possibility, not a guarantee for 
competitive advantage. Helfat et al (2007) proposed severing direct linkage between DC and 
SCA. In other words, DCs are firstly about strategic change, which in turn may or may not 
lead to SCA (Helfat et al, 2007; Zahra et al, 2006; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015).   
In light of the above, this study aligns with Eisenhardt & Martin's (2000) position that how 
DCs may be “a source of competitive advantage over time lies only by using them sooner, 
more astutely, and fortuitously than competitors” (p.1117). As Zott (2003) suggests, the 
effect of DCs deployment can be mediated by the timing of the resource deployment to affect 
adaptive change, the cost, and learning from such resource deployment. This means that the 
performance of these activities in ways that may lead to the desired outcome largely hinges 
on the actors' efficacy (Helfat et al, 2007; Teece, 2012; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018) – a central 
thesis in DMC (Adner & Helfat, 2003). Although the discussion thus far already notes some 
criticisms associated with the DC, the succeeding section captures the criticisms more 
comprehensively. 
3.13 Criticisms and debates associated with DCV  
According to Helfat & Winter (2011:1244), “important concepts rarely have edges that are 
entirely sharp”. DCV is no different. Scholars have also observed that constructive criticisms 
are often beneficial for any theory especially those in their development stage like DCV 
(Williamson, 1999; Helfat & Peteraf, 2009). Previous review articles (e.g. Barreto, 2010; 
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Peteraf et al, 2013; Di Stefano et al, 2014) all acknowledge that criticisms attributed to DCV 
are now contributing towards the development of a stronger DC construct. This study also 
reflects on the criticism attributed to DCV, and improvements made thus far to show what 
makes empirical research like this one, a worthwhile endeavour. Their discussion is next.  
Inconsistent definitions and tautological views  
One of the most significant sources of criticism against the DCV is about, inconsistent 
definitions. Scholars argue that the different terms used to describe DCs are vast and 
inherently confusing, overlapping and in some instances, outright tautology (Zahra et al, 
2006; Schreyöegg & Kliesch-Eberl, 2007; Arend & Bromiley, 2009). According to Arend & 
Bromiley (2009:78) “scholars seem to be giving dynamic capabilities label to very different 
constructs; …thus raises the question, how should researchers identify firms with dynamic 
capabilities”.  Scholars consider that this use of inconsistent terminologies makes it difficult 
to understand what they are and how they can be used in actionable decision-making (Pavlou 
& El Sawy, 2011). 
However, Helfat & Peteraf, (2009) responded to this charge, and to Arend & Bromiley 
(2009:93) in particular by arguing that ‘the various terminologies used to describe DCs are a 
reflection of the complexity of the phenomenon and because it is still in its early stage of 
development’. Arguably, Helfat & Peteraf's (2009) response is more or less admissive of this 
charge. However, after re-stating DC as “the capacity to create, extend or modify an 
organisation’s resource base” (Helfat et al, 2007: 4) as adopted by this study. The literature 
shows that scholars have voiced that the issue of unclear definition and tautology has been 
relatively addressed (Peteraf et al, 2013, Schilke et al 2018) because the definition is precise 
and sensible enough to support further developments (Easterby-Smith et al, 2009).   
Vague and unresolved measurement approach 
Another charge against the DCV was that the concept is vague and difficult to assess due to 
its unresolved measurement model (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Kraatz &Zajac, 2001; Helfat 
et al, 2007; Arend & Bromiley, 2009; Pavlou & El Sawy, 2011). In Kraatz & Zajac's (2001) 
opinion, the DCV is “vague and elusive one which has thus far proven largely resistant to 
observation and measurement” (p.653). Differently put, they can hardly be observed and 
empirically proven (Burisch & Wohlgemuth, 2016) and thus an ‘elusive black box’ (Pavlou 
& El Sawy, 2011) without a commonly clear measurement construct (Wang & Ahmed, 
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2007). Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) however responded to this charge by arguing that DCs are 
identifiable. They list examples of DCs to include new product development, decision-
making, resource allocation, knowledge creation routines, alliances, and acquisition. 
 Other scholars suggests that DCs can be assumed where congruence with change in the 
environment is influenced and empirical result achieved in terms of e.g., improved efficiency, 
adaptation, competitive survival or success in an environmental context is provable (Zollo & 
Winter, 2002; Peteraf & Reed, 2007; Teece, 2007; Augier & Teece, 2009). Helfat et al (2007) 
theorisation appears to have elicited most support. They proposed two intermediate measures 
for dynamic capabilities, namely, technical fitness and/or evolutionary fitness (Helfat et al 
2007). Technical fitness refers to how well a DC performs its intended function, while 
evolutionary fitness refers to ‘how well a DC match the context in which the organisation 
operates’ relative economic outcomes. 
DCs are also depreciative    
Scholars also argue that DCs akin to VRIN resources may quickly depreciate in terms of 
value (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000:1105; Narayanan, et al, 2009) and if unused (Helfat et al, 
2007; Helfat & Peteraf, 2009). DCs can also depreciate because of their equifinality 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) and as the case may be, go out-of-fashion due to changes in the 
business environment (Helfat, et al, 2009). Not only that, it is also argued that the ‘dark side 
of capabilities’ is that they may even become counterproductive or liability especially when 
not regularly monitored (Winter, 2003; Schreyöegg & Kliesch-Erbel, 2007:916). This means 
that DCs in itself must continue to be honed even as they are deployed in order to ensure the 
value of DCs are sustained in the face of environmental changes. How DC may be 
continuously developed remains the big question (Dixon et al, 2010; 2014).   
DCs does not guarantee SCA  
As earlier mentioned, another key argument against the DCV is that DCs does not guarantee 
competitive survival/advantage let alone their sustenance over time (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Helfat et al, 2007; Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009). The initial intent of Teece et al 
(1997) was to address how firms can sustain competitive advantage especially in a rapidly 
changing environment (Burisc & Wohlgemuth, 2016). Section 3.12 above already highlights 
the comments by Teece and his colleagues (1997) in this regard. However, Eisenhardt & 
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Martin (2000:1105) countered this view by arguing that in high-velocity environments, ‘DCs 
are highly experiential and a fragile process with less-predictable outcomes’.  
Other scholars expanded on Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) by arguing that DCs sometimes 
could lead to no or even regrettable outcomes if unused, deployed incorrectly/untimely (Zott, 
2003; Zahra et al, 2006; Narayanan et al, 2009). For example, Danneels (2011) found that 
untimely resource cognition and adaptation to new age typewriters contributed to the demise 
of Smith Corona. DCs are only potential sources of new strategies and efficiency that if well 
deployed could lead to competitive advantage (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Zahra et al, 2006; 
Helfat et al, 2007). Therefore, whether firms would derive no advantage, temporary 
advantage or sustainable advantage depends on how astute, quickly and effectively the DCs 
are deployed (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Zott, 2003; Helfat et al, 2007; Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2009).  
Limited empirical evidence/grounding  
Notwithstanding the impressive flow of research interest on DCV (Barreto, 2010), scholars 
have consistently argued that their empirical support remains limited (Ambrosini & Bowman, 
2009; Pablo et al, 2007; Easterby-Smith et al, 2009). Ambrosini & Bowman (2009) 
articulated three reasons for this situation. First, they note that theoretical work on DC did not 
start until Teece et al (1997). Secondly, they also think it is because scholars have specified 
dynamic capabilities poorly such that it was difficult for interested new researchers to know 
exactly what to look for. Thirdly, they agree that DC is a concept that is hard to observe or 
has proven hard to measure. Helfat et al, (2007) acknowledged that core DC contributions 
such as Teece et al (1997), Teece (2007), Eisenhardt & Martin, (2000), and Winter (2003) 
have all used illustrative examples rather than empirical data objectively gathered to 
understand the framework. And indeed, till present, conversation in literature continues to 
emphasise the need to focus on how to achieve consensus and stronger development of the 
concept through empirical research (Pablo et al, 2007; Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Vogel & 
Güttel, 2013; Day & Schoemaker, 2016; Schilke et al, 2018; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018).   
Methodological limitations 
Empirical research on DCV varies regarding the research design and methodologies 
employed (Erickson, 2013) as well as scholars’ position about the more useful method. 
Whereas scholars e.g. McKelvie & Davidsson (2009) suggest that, quantitative research 
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methods are suitable for studying DC. Others such as Ambrosini & Bowman (2009) 
questioned the bias towards quantitative research, arguing that such methods are unsuitable 
and often short of the details required for advancing the knowledge of DCV from its current 
state of development.  In particular, scholars argue that many underlying mechanisms related 
to DC and their linkage with firm performance are causally ambiguous (Pavlou & El Sawy, 
2011; Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009) intractable and may remain abstract with quantitative 
studies being used (Danneels, 2008). To address this problem, Ambrosini et al, (2009), 
Easterby-Smith et al (2009) in their extensive reviews have called for researchers to try to 
employ most suitable research methodologies that would help to uncover better 
understanding about processes of DC development and deployment in practice. This is also 
an important consideration in this research.  
Overconcentration on organisational analysis 
One more criticism discussed here partly inspires the focus on this study. This charge 
according to Adner & Helfat (2003), Helfat et al (2007), Ambrosini & Altintas (2019) and 
Salvato & Vassolo (2018) is that DC research has largely focused on the organisation 
analysis rather than individual managers who drive DC through strategic decisions making. 
Scholars argue that capabilities (whether dynamic or operational) works through individuals 
that perform them and strong DCs are impossible without the essential role of the managers 
(Schoemaker et al, 2019). As Helfat et al (2007:46) unequivocally declares, “Without 
considering whether and how executives act in ways that… modify resource 
base…discussions of dynamic capabilities risks remaining in the abstract, removed from the 
lifeblood of organisational life”. Researchers are therefore being redirected to research effort 
focusing on understanding what, and how managers deploy and develop capabilities 
(Ambrosini et al, 2009; Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009) allowing them to address strategic 
problems facing their firm (Pisano, 2015) especially under conditions of environmental shifts 
and volatility (Schoemaker et al, 2019).  
To contribute to the understanding of DCs deployment broadly referred, the review in this 
chapter thus far highlights a number of salient observations and critical considerations. First, 
DC deployment and development involves both organisational and managerial processes 
(Teece, 2018; 2017). However, given that, DCs are a multi-level construct, the question of 
how do the different levels interact still requires better understanding (Eggers & Kaplan, 
2009; Ambrosini et al, 2009) in novel contexts (Easterby-Smith et al, 2009). Then, secondly, 
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is the question of what should be the appropriate level of analysis that would best underpin an 
empirical investigation to bring new insights on DC (Mackay, 2010)? Thirdly, what 
philosophical perspectives could support the investigation of a multi-level construct and the 
specific level of interest (Mackay, 2010; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007)?  
Insights from this review imply that the question of the appropriate level of analysis is 
fundamental in the DMC idea briefly discussed in this chapter and therefore adopted. This 
study also holds that an answer to the question of what may be an appropriate philosophical 
perspective for the study of a multi-level construct such as DMC evokes the critical realism 
philosophy (Sayer, 1992; Bhaskar, 2008) addressed in chapter four. Discussion continues in 
the next section with an overview of the DMC concept and thereafter the research 
framework.  
3.14 Dynamic Managerial Capabilities (DMC): Definition & Overview  
This study focuses on dynamic managerial capability. Adner & Helfat, (2003:1012) 
introduced the concept of DMC, defined as the ability of managers’ to integrate, build, and 
reconfigure their organisation’s resource base, mainly to highlight the central role of 
corporate-level managers or decision-makers on DC in practice. This definition notably 
builds on Teece et al (1997) definition of DC, and an idea consistent with Rosenbloom's 
(2000) thesis. Peteraf & Reed (2007) thereafter defined DMC as the “exercise dynamic 
capability for maintaining fit over changing conditions” (p.1107). Helfat et al (2007:24) also 
built on their definition of (organisational level DC), defining DMC as “the capacity of 
managers to purposefully create, extend, or modify the resource base of an organisation”. 
Based on these definitions, argument in literature implies that DCs are a latent process (Tai et 
al 2019) without the impact of managers and as the source of its dynamism (Martin & 
Bachrach, 2018; Salvato et al 2018). 
In line with the above definitions/views, scholars have considered DMC as a “direct analogy” 
(Adner& Helfat 2003), typology, subunit or an aspect of dynamic capabilities view 
(Ambrosini & Altintas, 2019; Helfat & Martin, 2015; Helfat et al, 2007, Teece 2018) in 
which the unit of analysis is managers (Schilke et al, 2018). In their review article, Helfat & 
Martin (2015) explains that DMC is distinct only because of its focal attention on the 
significant role of managers on DCs development and deployment. Managers are 
fundamental to the process of change and DMC is the mechanism for ensuring coherence 
between organisational capability and environmental change (Correa et al, 2019) and 
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improved performance by the firm (Kor & Mesko, 2013) especially when the environment is 
in the state of flux (Fainshmidt et al 2017).  
Helfat et al (2007) suggests that another way to think of DMC is in terms of asset 
orchestration - described as decision making involving ‘search and selection, opportunity 
identification, inventing and implementing new business models, assets alignment, 
complementary and co-specialised assets accessing, and making astute investment choices’ 
(p.25). The asset orchestration idea is expounded in the idea of resource orchestration by 
mainly integrating asset orchestration and resource management (Sirmon et al, 2011). Martin 
& Bachrach (2018:29) adds that “…manager’s capability to make novel resource decisions is 
inseparable from the organisation context within which the manager is situated”. And when 
expressed in these terms, it means that DMC can be considered as a series of action 
reflecting, a pattern of managerial behaviour that are needed to create and support a resource-
based advantage (Huy & Zott 2019) and a process approach to adapting to dynamic 
environment (Schriber & Lowstedt, 2018) or competitive survival, through better strategic 
decisions making (Beck & Wiersema, 2013).  
For clarity, this study also follows Helfat et al (2007) DMC abstraction because it specifies 
what the DMC does (i.e. asset orchestration), how it does it, and who does it. As with the 
baseline definition of DC, Helfat et al (2007) definition also avoid tautology, and any attempt 
to limit the constructs sphere of utility. Schilke et al (2018) recent review acknowledged the 
contribution of Helfat et al (2007) abstraction in addressing the concerns over tautological 
definitions, which arguably affected the understanding of the Teece et al (1997) original DC 
conception. It is also considered that following Helfat et al’ (2007) understanding is good for 
consistency. In practice, strong DMC are related to entrepreneurial, decision making, and 
resources management skills (Teece 2007; 2012; Helfat et al, 2007) and particularly 
important because they are central to organisational performance (Ambrosini & Altintas, 
2019). According to Adner & Helfat (2003), there are three underlying drivers of DMC, 
namely: Managerial Human Capital (MHC), Managerial Social Capital (MSC) and 
Managerial Cognition (MC). Figure 4 below is illustrative. 
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Figure 4 The Underlying drivers of DMC (adapted from Adner & Helfat, 2003). 
3.14.1 Managerial Human Capital 
According to Adner & Helfat (2003), the effective implementation of DMC or otherwise 
partly depends on managerial human capital (MHC). MHC consists of learned skills, 
knowledge and experiences of individual managers in an organisation (Adner & Helfat, 
2003). Scholars agree that managers naturally draw from the depth and breadth of their 
individual-life, geographical, education and professional experiences and learning to conduct 
their affairs (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Kor & Mesko, 2013; Beck & Wiersema, 2013; Martin & 
Bachrach, 2018). And because managers have different trajectories and levels of education, 
training, experience, skills, and learning (Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Tai, Wang & Yeh, 2019). 
Such differentials often reflect for example on the extent of their capacity to sense and seize 
opportunities via decision making, and on how and when they may select/reconfigure 
organisational resource base (Martin, 2011; Helfat & Martin, 2015). Martin (2011) for 
instance demonstrates that MHC reflected in the way that general managers in high dynamic 
software industry worked episodically in teams to achieve organisation’s goals. See also 
McKelvie & Davidsson (2009). However, there remains little empirical understanding of e.g. 
how general vs. firm-specific MHC influence DMC (Martins & Bachrach, 2018).  
3.14.2 Managerial Social Capital 
 
Adner & Helfat (2003) considered managerial social capital (MSC) as another important 
driver of DMC.  Managerial social capital refers to “the goodwill available to individuals or 
groups. Its source lies in the structure and content of the actor’s social relations. Its’ effects 
flow from the information, influence, and solidarity it makes available to the actor” (Adler & 
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Kwon, 2002:23). MSC includes the capacity of a manager to access support through internal 
and external, ties, networks of relationships and connections available to him/her (Kor & 
Mesko, 2013; Adner & Helfat, 2003). Scholars consider that such relationships are valuable 
and can be used by a manager to for example access to external financing their firm may need 
to operate with; obtain information about practices in other firms (Adner and Helfat, 2003), 
facilitate strategic decisions towards strategic change (Helfat and Peteraf (2015) and business 
success in a given context (Kor & Mesko, 2013).  
 
Beck & Wiersema (2013) for instance, documents how Reid Hoffman (co-founder of 
LinkedIn) by being a director/partner in different internet-based new start-ups including 
Mozilla, Zynga, and Greylock Partners exploited his experience and personal connections 
with other internet businesses within the industry to support each of the new start-ups. 
Similarly, internal sources of MSC may help to facilitate adjustments in e.g. personnel, 
organisational structure, and physical assets as well information from colleagues, which can 
relevant to sensing opportunities and threats and important reconfigurations (Martin & 
Bachrach, 2018; Helfat & Martin, 2015). It means that under changing business environment, 
MSC can enable the firm to leverage both internal and external relationships and goodwill to 
facilitate important and timely resource base decisions and strategic change required for 
business survival and success (Cao, Simsek & Zhang, 2010; Tai et al, 2019). However, 
according to Helfat & Martin (2015), conceptual and empirical research with a focus on the 
impact of MSC remains limited.  
3.14.3 Managerial cognition (MC) 
 
The third driver theorised about in the DMC construct is managerial cognition. According to 
Adner & Helfat (2003:1021), managerial cognition refers to the “managerial beliefs and 
mental models that serve as a basis for decision making”. It comprises knowledge structure 
and assumptions about opportunities, the future, alternatives causes of action, and 
consequences of the alternative causes of action that altogether shape corporate decisions 
(Adner & Helfat, 2003; Harris & Helfat, 2013). Scholars consider that managerial cognitive 
capabilities are particularly critical for DMC because it ‘influence the manner in which 
managers frame problems and search for solutions’ (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2015). It also determines the manner in which a manager for instance, conceives their 
firm’s resource base (Danneels, 2011), their business environment (Ambrosini & Bowman, 
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2009), interpret information and events (Beck & Wiersema, 2013) and thereby respond to 
opportunities and threats in the business environment (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2009 Peteraf & Reed, 2007) through strategic changes (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015).  
 
Other scholars also relates cognition to emotional intelligence, (Hodgkinson & Healy (2011) 
framing (Raffeaelli, Glynn & Tushman, 2019), and regulation (ER) (Huy & Zott (2019) about 
how managers mobilise resources and capabilities. Because MC shapes managerial 
perceptual, rationality and definition of their operating space (Martin & Bachrach, 2018), 
vital resource base (Danneels, 2011), and strategic decision making about whether, when and 
how change processes can be implemented (Koprax & Konlenchner, 2014; Helfat et al, 
2007). Scholars suggest that cognitive capabilities can be linked to an organisation’s 
dominant logic (Kor & Mesko, 2013) strategic intelligence, change and competitive survival 
ultimately (Levine et al, 2017; Teece, 2012; Helfat & Martin, 2015).  
However, contributing to the role of cognition DMC, Helfat & Peteraf (2015), Eggers & 
Kaplan (2013), Martin & Bachrach (2018) and Huy & Zott (2019) all laments that managerial 
cognition despite its relevance for strategic decisions, change and firm success remains 
perhaps the least understood aspect. In particular, scholars have called for more, empirical 
research about managerial cognition (e.g. Danneels, 2011, Eggers & Kaplan, 2009, 2013; 
Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Ambrosini & Altintas, 2019).  
3.15 Intertwined Nature of DMC in Practice 
 
As figure 4 above illustrates, a further viewpoint in DMC literature is that, although that 
managerial human capital, managerial social capital, and managerial cognition are different 
as explained already.  In practice, the three drivers are intrinsically interrelated and having 
mutual influence in managerial decisions (Adner & Helfat 2003; Badrinarayanan et al, 2019). 
Scholars posit that those ‘three drivers operate in an interactive way to influence managers' 
dominant logic, i.e. the way in which top managers conceptualise their business and make 
critical resource allocation decisions in their organisation’ (Kor & Mesko, 2013:235). The 
three drivers can act together to shape the management’s decision to invest or give attention 
to e.g. emerging technologies (Kaplan, 2008; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009), improvement on 
extant resources (Danneels, 2011) and in response to changes in the external business 
environment (Sirmon & Hitt, 2009; Peteraf & Reed, 2007; Martins & Bachrach, 2018).   
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Beck & Wiersema (2013) for instance explained that all three components derive from one’s 
past-experience and innate abilities. The authors went on to provide example by suggesting 
that a manager’s work experience in a given industry is likely to provide not only the specific 
industry experience and skills-set (managerial human capital) but also lead to developing 
important relationships with people in the industry (social capital) and a change in one’s 
perspective (managerial cognition) (Beck & Wiersema, 2013). Badrinarayanan et al 
(2019:32) agrees that internal/external MSC enables MHC and MC in making decisions.  
 
As mentioned hitherto, analysis of DCV from a managerial perspective or micro-level has 
thus far received lesser attention in research (Beck & Wiersema, 2013; Helfat & Peteraf, 
2015; Kor & Mesko, 2013) compared to the broader DCV (Helfat & Martin, 2015). And 
indeed, while more recent contributions e.g. Ambrosini & Altintas (2019) and Martin & 
Bachrach (2018) have echoed this observation and now helping to increase the conceptual 
understanding of the influence of managers in DC development and deployment, however, 
the empirical evidence remains limited  (Helfat & Martin, 2015; Huy & Zott, 2019; Schilke et 
al 2018). Until present, only a few highly ranked empirical articles featuring dynamic 
managerial capabilities as title, keywords, or within its abstract exists.  
Correa et al (2019) based on their study which focused on scale development and validation 
for DMC suggests that the reason is that there has been a lack of reliable instruments to 
measure DMC and empirical works on the concept did not start until 2011. MacLean, 
MacIntosh & Seidl (2015:340) also attributed this to “inherent limitation of the way in which 
human actions have been conceptualised”.  
Until recently too, only three review articles (i.e. Helfat & Martin, 2015; Eggers & Kaplan, 
2013; Ambrosini & Altintas, 2019) with DMC as title/keyword appearing in top-ranked 
journals were located. This further highlights the paucity of sufficient research on DMC 
compared to the DCV to warrant a dedicated review. However, similar to Helfat & Martin 
(2015) approach, a reflection on empirical contributions is next beginning with the few 
articles by 2015, directly addressing evidence of the influence of DMC deployment to firm 
performance and thereafter, other articles with contributions and more recent DMC studies.   
3.16 Empirical Studies highlighting dynamic managerial capabilities  
 
 By the way, it is notable that Adner & Helfat (2003) seminal theorisation was also based on 
an empirical study. Adner & Helfat’s (2003) quantitative study focused on corporate effects 
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on dynamic capabilities in 30 US major petroleum companies’ performance from 1997-2007. 
Their study found that differential in decisions making by top executives about and when to 
commence downsizing in the US petroleum industry significantly led to 4.5% cumulative 
variance of the firms’ performances. They concluded that such variances in both decisions 
and in economic performances thereof are consequences of dynamic managerial capabilities.  
In other words, aggregate managerial human capital, social capital, and cognition determines 
managerial strategic choices, which in turn may lead to differentials in firms' performances 
under conditions of environmental changes. As mentioned, they called for more research into 
the theoretical model in order to provide a ‘fuller understanding of DMC, and how they 
contribute to the time-varying corporate effect’ (p.g.1023).  
Peteraf & Reeds (2007) examined the effects of regulatory constraints and their relaxation on 
managerial discretion and internal fit in the US airline industry. Using a quantitative research 
method involving counterfactual analytical technique, they found that ‘fit trumps best 
practice’ and that the ability to achieve fit under changing environmental conditions 
expresses the DMC required for adaptive organisational change (pp.1106). Their study 
suggests that it will be necessary to examine whether organisational responses to institutional 
changes; in terms of how individual firms manage their internal alignment, have differential 
efficiency consequences, and to explore how managers develop and exercise the DC for 
maintaining fit over changing conditions (p.g.1107).  
Sirmon & Hitt (2009) study of the US regional banks from 1998 to 2002, found that ‘firm 
performance suffers when manager’s investment decision deviates from the norms of rivals 
for both human and physical capital but on the other hand, the performance is enhanced by 
making congruent resource investment and deployment decisions as opposed to maximizing 
either decision independently’ (p.g.1375). Their research concludes that “significant 
investment in resources that are not deployed effectively can actually reduce rather than 
enhance performance” (pg. 1391).  This study called for empirical investigations on how 
managers effectively deploy resources to influence quality performance.   
Martin's (2011) investigation of six software firms in the US found that dynamic managerial 
capabilities enabled the general managers to work episodically as a team to sense and seize 
business opportunities through quality decisions, improved information flow, reduced 
barriers, and innovation. The author called for future research that could further explore 
DMC at different management levels, and in periods of significant changes. In particular, the 
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authors believe that consideration of DMC at the middle management levels could yield fresh 
insights regarding the process of strategic change.  
Koprax & Konlechner (2014) based on case-study data from two high-tech start-up firms in 
an unnamed industry/geographic context examined how top management teams' cognition 
and managerial decisions making facilitates adaptation and proactive change. The study 
shows that the diversity of dynamic managerial capabilities cognitions, configuration and 
assets orchestration practices of senior executives yielded the absorptive capacity of the top 
management teams, which enabled the firms to drive proactive change, rather than always 
reacting to environmental pressure. The study calls for more empirical studies to further 
explore details of the linkage between strategizing (which involves managerial cognition) and 
execution, which involves (organisational routine).  
 From the above contributions, observation indicates that three of those studies are 
quantitative research while two are qualitative. Each of those studies has been conducted 
based on data from developed economies. Thirdly, each highlights the importance of 
cognition DMC as the principal ingredient of strategic decisions making amongst executive 
managers in relation to their business environment albeit somewhat implicit in Martins 
(2011). However, despite limited empirical contributions, comprehensiveness is often 
important when assessing the literature and one should aim to be robust. Drawing from the 
idea applied by Helfat & Martin (2015), the researcher extended review to other empirical 
papers that have not directly used DMCs as title but also provides considerable insights 
reflecting managerial level DCs. For example, Rosenbloom (2000) significantly highlights 
the impact of leadership in the DC construct but does not particularly use the term DMC.  
By extending the review to those articles; although it was possible to review more articles, 
parsimony remains necessary, hence, it is not possible to elucidate all details of each article 
here. Table 3.5 below provides a synthesis of 57 empirical contributions with useful analysis 
related to DMC and some depth on the cognitive aspect. The table highlights the author/date 
of publication, the research context, the key findings, and suggestions for future studies.    
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Author(s)/date Research method 
& context 
Table 3. 5 Summary of findings/key massage(s) 
 
Areas for future research and 
development 
Helfat (1997) Quantitative/US 
petroleum industry 
Identified the important role of complementary technological knowledge, and 
R&D in DC accumulation and deployment.   
How firms identify and promote 
opportunities and asset sharing        
Rosenbloom (2000) Qualitative/ US 
electronic industry (a 
case of NCR) 
CEO’s have DCs when they can influence strategic change.  How top 
management interpreted NCR business negatively affected their transition to 
computers but positively influenced their transition after a change in leadership.  
Need to examine the fortune of firms 
under conditions of change in 
technology and innovations  
Tripsas & Gavetti 
(2000) 
Qualitative/US/the 
case of Polaroid 
Cognitive representations influence the way managers frame problems and seek 
solutions (p.1148). 
“How environmental factors affect 
cognition and capabilities” (p.1159)  
Sharma (2000) Quantitative/ 99 oil & 
gas firms in Canada 
Found a significant relationship between managerial interpretation of 
environmental issues and corporate choices/decisions. 
The role of institutional forces on 
cognition at different stages in a firm’s 
evolution & environmental awareness’ 
Martian (2001) Qualitative/US  - a 
single case  
Demonstrates that ‘different managerial decision processes are used to invest in 
both existing and new capabilities’ (p.513) 
Going beyond identifying to looking 
at how capabilities are managed  
King & Tucci (2002) Mixed method/ Disk 
industry 
Incumbents can survive … because their managers use the experience to navigate 
market waves, despite technological and market change" (p.185) 
There is a need to apply multiple 
empirical methods.  
Danneels (2002) Qualitative Exploitation and exploration learning underpins new products development Mechanisms & structures that 
facilitate the transfer of knowledge 
Adner & Helfat (2003) Quantitative/US 
petroleum firms 
Differentials in top executive decisions about and when to commence 
downsizing was significantly related to 4.5% performance variance by firms in 
the US petroleum industry. Introduced the DMC concept.  
Need for “fuller understanding of 
DMC and how they contribute to the 
time-varying corporate effects” p.1023 
Balogun (2003) Qualitative UK   How middle managers interpret strategic change intent helps to keep the business 
on-going during periods of transition  
What enables or inhibits middle-level 
managers as change intermediaries 
Kaplan et al (2003) Quantitative/US 
Pharm industry  
“Recognition of key environmental uncertainties …shapes certain types of 
enduring strategic change” (p.229) 
Qualitative data source to measure the 
mental framing  of senior managers 
Lampel & Shamise 
(2003) 
Quantitative/US Regulatory change in Hollywood changed the industry dynamism and in turn 
influenced DC evolution.  
Implied  
Salvato (2003) Qualitative/Italy Firm leadership facilitates strategic evolution through a sequence of intentional 
recombination of a firm’s core micro-strategy with new accumulated resource 
bundles and access to external elements.   
Need to explore the concept in other 
national context and other contextual 
settings 
Ethiraj et al (2005) Quantitative/India 
software firms 
Learning from clients and projects helped to improve the firm’s software 
development process  
where capabilities comes from or what 
kinds of investment in money, time 
and managerial effort required” (p.25)  
Kor & Mahoney 
(2005) 
Quantitative/US 60 
technology firms 
Manager’s firm-specific experience and knowledge of resources-base positively 
moderates the link between R&D and market deployment intensity and economic 
returns on investments   
Try to obtain knowledge of the link   
between industry, firm’s resource 
deployment and performance  
Gavetti (2005) Simulation  Manager’s cognitive representations of their strategic decisions drive 
organisational search and accumulation of capabilities.  
How routine-based and cognitive 
logics of action co-exist 
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Gilbert (2006) Qualitative/US   Found that ‘opportunities presented by discontinuous change do not trigger 
organisational response until the opportunity is perceived as threat’ (p.150). 
How to manage the coexistence of 
competing frames 
Cho & Hambrick 
(2006) 
Quantitative/US 
airline industry 
Demonstrates that the decision and commitment to deploy dynamic capabilities 
depends on the perception and attention of the firm’s top management team 
about the conditions of their internal and external environment  
How management team knowledge 
interacts, its linkage to attention on 
certain opportunities threats, not other  
Moliterno & Wiersema 
(2007) 
Quantitative/US  Resource divestment is managerial DC that influences the firm’s performance. 
Argues that managers' judgment, perception, and contextual feedback are critical 
to dynamic capabilities deployment. 
“Mechanism by which DCs operate 
remain somewhat less clearly 
specified” (p.1065).  
Morrow et al (2007) Quantitative/US “strategic actions that use existing resources in new ways contribute to the most 
influential organisational recovery” 
Implied  
Rothaermel & Hess 
(2007) 
Panel data over 22 
years (1980–2001) 
DC exists at individual, firm and network levels and altogether having 
compensating or reinforcing effect on innovation  
Need for deeper understanding of the 
mechanisms driving innovation  
Helfat et al (2007) Book/narrative DMC function is asset orchestration. CEO’s mind-set (cognition) caused 
Rubbermaid’s difficulty in adjusting to marketplace dynamics. Managers are 
largely been ignored in scholars thought on DC development and deployment 
To investigate how DCs are developed 
and deployed to achieve fit under 
changing environmental conditions 
Kale & Singh  (2007) Quantitative/US Focuses on alliance learning processes and their relationship with firm-level 
success. Found that knowledge management is critical to DC 
Examine whether alliance learning has 
adverse or declining effects  
Harreld  et al (2007) Qualitative/US, the 
case of IBM 
Success derives from a clear commitment by a firm’s leadership to identify and 
compete in emerging markets. Managers’ core function is to develop DCs. 
Implied  
Pablo et al (2007) Qualitative/Canada Leadership skills/learning helped to manage the tension between support for 
local experimenting and controlling DC/fit with organisational need. “Managerial 
skills are required in identifying, enabling and managing the use of a DC as a 
strategic approach” (p.703).  
Develop and test the three stages DC 
(identifying, enabling, and managing 
the use of DC as a strategic approach).  
Peteraf & Reeds 
(2007) 
Quantitative/US 
airline industry 
Managerial adjustment of fit and the achievement of fit under regulatory 
changing environmental conditions is DMC 
How managers develop and exercise 
DC for maintaining fit 
Nadkarni  & 
Narayanan (2007b) 
Quantitative/ 255 
firms/industries 
Strategic schemas including complexities and focus (attention) fosters strategic 
flexibility, persistence, and success 
How managers use  strategic schemas  
to make decisions 
Nadkarni & Barr 
(2008) 
Quantitative/US 7 
high-velocity 
industries 
Top management attention and causal logic in relation to industry velocity shape 
how strategic decisions quickly marshalled out in response to strategic change. 
Other boundary conditions for the 
relationship between cognition and 
strategic responses.  
Kaplan (2008) Quantitative/US ICT 
industry 
CEOs that paid greater attention to new optical technologies committed greater 
investments on them. The study also discovered that cognition can compensate 
when organisational level factors are lacking 
More contingency analysis  
Lee & Kelly (2008) Qualitative/Korea DC for innovation are not routines rather managerial practices related to using 
entrepreneurial resources, relational/decision support enabling problems solving  
Further studies across other  types of 
organisation and national context 
Bruni & Verona 
(2009) 
Qualitative/Europe Cognition is relevant to creating and integrating market knowledge, and market 
knowledge helps to trigger innovations and NPD. Builds on Adner & Helfat 2003 
to conceptualise dynamic marketing capabilities view.  
The extent to which performance 
related to DMC depends on the actual 
alignment of beliefs among managers.   
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Sirmon & Hitt (2009) Quantitative/US 
banking industry 
Best performance results can be achieved when there is ‘fit’ between managerial 
decisions on resource investment & resource deployment.   
How executives/firms manage their 
resources in different environments.  
Capron & Mitchell 
(2009) 
Mixed methods Selecting appropriate sourcing/acquisition mode are key mechanisms by which 
firms can change when faced with capability and social issues 
qualitative studies about individual 
rationality and firm sourcing strategies  
Eggers & Kaplan 
(2009) 
Quantitative/US Executives who devoted more attention to the new fibre optics technology were 
quicker to venture into the new product market than the executives who did not. 
Managerial cognition reflects attention on the environment and new resources.  
More studies need explore how 
managerial cognition works in 
practice.   
Salvato (2009) Simulation/Italy Managers in Alessi based on mindfulness and focus on prior internal and external 
knowledge and cues to reshape existing organisational routine and structure and 
in turn, enhanced NPD evolution in the firm.  
How individual actions shape 
organisational capabilities and firm 
performance 
Laamanen & Wallin 
(2009) 
3 Software firms  Cognition of CEO and senior management team which includes instrumental 
cognition, shift in management attention and managerial foresight helped to 
develop capabilities at operational, firm and extended enterprise levels 
Research providing more 
understanding of managerial cognition 
in capability development   
Narayanan et al (2009) 2 Pharmaceutical 
firms  
Managers undertook strategic initiatives based on their own orientations and that 
senior managers played a key role in DC development by imprinting organisation 
with their specific cognitive orientation and orchestrating multilevel routine’p.25 
“How replicable managerial 
action …accumulate to generate 
imitable capability” (p.38).  
Kunc & Morecroft, 
2010 
Experiment Demonstrates that decisions-making for managing resources (creative resource 
conceptualisation, and resources configuration) can lead to firm heterogeneity  
More research on decision making 
under diverse context/ resources types 
Baum & Bird (2010) Mixed method /US Reasoning and problem solving as “successful intelligence” (cognition) are 
positively related to speedy response and improvements that led to growth.  
Examine cognitive strategies deployed 
by management as teams/ individuals  
Martin (2011a) Qualitative/US GMs working as episodic team in business units influenced the quality of 
managerial decisions  and actions and led to positive performance  
Examine DMC at middle/lower level 
management  
Ludwig & Pemberton 
(2011) 
Qualitative/Russia DC building involves managerial capability for enabling uniqueness from 
optimisation processes, speedy decisions making and path-dependent detachment  
DC building constructs and industry-
specific exercises and their limitations 
Danneels (2011) Qualitative/US The mental representations of top management at Smith Corona in relation to 
‘resource cognition’ (value/use) contributed to the demise of the firm. 
How managers assess and understand 
their own resources and competences   
Mitchell et al (2011) Mixed method/US Found that when and why managers are inconsistent/erratic with strategic 
decisions making are related to their metacognition  
‘Thinking about strategic thinking that 
leads to metacognition’ p.695  
Marcel et al (2011) Quantitative/US 
domestic airline 
Managers show more proclivity to retaliate when  they perceive a causal link 
between competitive attack and their performance 
Other studies linking managerial 
cognition to competitive response 
Koprax & Konlechner 
(2014) 
Qualitative/US 
High-tech firms 
Absorptive capacity and decision making  by top management team enabled the 
firms to drive proactive change rather always reacting to environmental pressure 
Link between strategizing involving 
managerial cognition and firm routine 
Maitland & 
Sammartino (2015) 
Mixed/ unnamed  
African country 
 Examined the role of cognition of decision-makers in one inexperienced MNE in 
assessing a potential acquisition. Found heuristics as decision enhancing tool. 
How individual-specific heuristics 
may evolve to firm-level heuristics 
Day & Schoemaker 
(2016) 
US/Case study/ 
Qualitative 
Found that successful sensing was underpinned by “peripheral vision (which 
helped in detection of weak signals from boundaries of the business) and vigilant 
learning related  to “heightened state of awareness and curiosity, characterized by 
alertness, curiosity, and a willingness to act on partial information” 
“The contingent nature of DC as well 
as the crucial role of leaders … in how 
organisations can and should adapt 
when facing deeply uncertain futures”  
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Vergne & Depeyre 
(2016) 
US/mixed method Found that neither DCs nor superior cognition need be present in order to adapt. 
Identified four types of adapters: anticipative, responsive, opportunistic and 
decisive, as well as a possibility of non-adaptation 
How cognition variables drive the 
choices to reconfigure assets 
externally vs. internally 
Roberts et al (2016) UK/Survey Investigated the extent to which managerial IS use behaviour: routine use and 
innovative use influence a manager’s volume/diversity of ideas for organisational 
innovation. Innovative IS use is related to idea volume and idea diversity.  
Investigation into how IS use shapes 
the type of opportunities a manager 
sense  
Buil-Fabrega et al 
(2017) 
Survey of 339 
managers in Spain 
Found that IDMC helps managers to be alert, to quickly detect changes in times 
of unpredictable changes in the market and further promotes a greater social and 
environmental commitment enabling  business sustainability   
Further empirical research to confirm 
the findings 
Fainshmidt et al (2017) 
 
Empirical/Quantitative  
(854 MNEs) 
Managers in more resource scare setting may increase resilience by not pursuing 
systematic activities to extract more value from resource configuration – they 
may be better of relying on ad hoc change (p1097). DMC may be an evolutionary 
outcome of operating in a dynamic task environment 
Studies focusing on DMC during the 
upswing years. 
Levine et al 2017 Experiment  Argues that strategic intelligence (SI) is crucial if the right choices hinge on the 
action and reaction of competitors. SI is related to how cognition/DMC affects 
firm performance and may explain the puzzle of strategy 
How strategic intelligence can be 
learned? And how SI migrate from 
individuals to team and organisation? 
Dominguez-CC & 
Barroso-Castro (2017) 
Qualitative/10 firms 
listed on Spanish SE  
Found that TMT reorganisation is a sufficient condition for strategic change, not 
necessarily having to dismiss a member of TMT 
Identify more variables that may bring 
about strategic change 
Pandit et al (2018) 
 
Qualitative/ India 
Auto Industry 
Examined how Disruptive Innovation manifestation in emerging economies is 
influenced by capability for DI at the firm level. Found that VUCA environments 
helps in identifying disruptive opportunities in emerging economies 
Research to explore other emerging 
economies 
Schriber & Lowstedt 
(2018) 
Qualitative/ Finland, 
Sweden, Italy, and the 
US 
Organisational structure and decision-making practices are related to the rate in 
which firms are able to renew, retrench or retire resources.  ‘A culture allowing 
easy communication and openness to sharing or lending assets between functions 
and hierarchy layers are important for successful asset orchestration’ p.316  
Implied  
Huy & Zott (2019) Qualitative/UK Differentials in managers’ attention to ER influence the extent to which they can 
mobilise resources to pursue market opportunities. Managers in addition to their 
own emotion to deal with challenging situation, also have to pay attention to the 
emotion of other stakeholders 
Research about other emotion-related 
managerial behaviour could constitute 
DMC; whether they are innate or 
acquired? 
Correa et al (2019) Brazil/Mixed method  Focused on scale development to measure DMC, validate Adner & Helfat (2003) 
abstraction, further discovered that DMC includes relationship network.   
Further research on relationship 
network 
Tai et al (2019) Taiwan/Quantitative – 
Survey 
Identified four IS assets as antecedents of IS ambidexterity (DMC), namely: 
understanding business situation, acquiring new technology skills, interacting 
with users, and flexible technology   
Research with broader scope;  whether 
DMC of the organisation influence IT-
Business alignment 
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3.17. Key findings and themes from the empirical articles reviewed 
Based on the assessment of the above empirical works, this section briefly highlights 
important findings related to the consensus in knowledge and gaps in DMC literature. The 
first observation is that, while the DC still has many theoretical oversights, one consensus is 
that the role of managers especially their cognition, mental model or knowledge structure are 
crucial. However, there remains a paucity of empirical research explaining the influence of 
DMC in the context of developing economies/countries. A concern earlier on expressed by 
Athereye (2005) in his study of India software industry, and recently by Maitland & 
Sammartino (2015) following their study of acquisition in an unnamed African country. So, 
not only that there remains the need for DC and DMC research in different types of firms 
(Barreto, 2010) but also studies focusing on different national context (Easterby-Smith et al, 
2009; Lee & Kelly, 2008) or regions e.g. Africa, because of the crucial role such contexts can 
play in shaping cognition and organisational fate (Salvato, 2003; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). 
This gap deserves attention. Powell et al (2011) and Fainshmidt et al (2017), Pandit et al 
(2018) are all reminiscent of recent recommendations for future research to examine DMC 
through empirical data from emerging economies e.g. Nigerian context.  
Secondly, one commonality observed is about the domination of emphasis on managerial 
cognition aspect of DMC to firm strategic actions and heterogeneity. Studies differently show 
the significant influence of cognition on decisions making about resource base, environment 
and organisation path from positive and negative outcomes (e.g. Danneels, 2011, Tripsas & 
Gavetti, 2000; Schriber & Lowstedt 2018; Huy & Zott, 2019). Aggregate perspectives from 
the above empirical contributions mainly highlight how managers perceive, interpret and give 
attention to issues in their environment and/or resource base, emotional intelligence and 
regulation in and through problems solution that mediates the performance differentials. 
Discussion about these observations has been kept brief here because the explanation about 
the research framework developed for the study also expands on the key themes/constructs.   
In all, the key message as Eggers & Kaplan (2009; 2013) maintain implies that managerial 
cognition represents a very useful lens for analysing and understanding DMC deployment 
and development processes because it forms the basis for strategic decision making. In terms 
of gaps identified, the recommendations are numerous. Altogether, this can be captured in 
Tripsas & Gavetti's (2000:1157) suggestion that there is a need for more research focusing on 
“the role of managerial cognition in driving dynamic capabilities”. As Beck & Wiersema's 
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(2013) conceptual contribution also suggests, there remains a need for enquires with a focus 
on managerial cognition that can be characterised as DMC. 
A third observation in the above and other studies is that they have mostly followed 
quantitative methods to study the concept and that is one of the concerns expressed by 
Ambrosini & Bowman (2009), Danneels (2002) and Barreto (2010) just to mention a few. 
The most use of this method arguably links to why previous studies have offered fewer 
details about how dynamic capabilities are deployed in practice (Ambrosini et al, 2009). 
Danneels (2008) also believes that the charge that DCs are ‘abstract and intractable’ as earlier 
noted in this review may remain true unless the number of qualitative investigation is 
increased. This is particularly important for DMC studies in the emerging economies context 
where not many studies on the topic exists (Fainshmidt et al (2017) and it is important to 
allow for a method that can enable the researcher to probe the concept more deeply in order 
to generate rich data (Yin, 2009).  
3.18 The adopted theoretical framework of the research  
 
For clarity, this study follows Helfat et al (2007:24) definition/conception of DMC as, “the 
capacity of managers to purposefully create, extend or modify the resource base of an 
organisation”. In following Helfat et al (2007) conception, this study also aligns with the 
understanding of DMC as “asset orchestration” (p.24). Asset orchestration has been described 
as decision making involving ‘search and selection related to opportunity identification, 
inventing and implementing new business models, assets alignment, complementary and co-
specialised assets accessing, and making astute investment choices’ (Helfat et al, 2007 p.25).  
For simpler understanding, according to Helfat et al (2007) asset orchestration constitutes two 
primary processes: (1) decisions-making – that is the search for and selection of what, which, 
how and when to do or not to do something (Helfat et al, 2007). In this context, search and 
selection represent decision-making processes involving identifying critical assets and 
investing in them, along with developing governance for their effective use. (2) Configuration 
and deployment processes – which involves co-ordination of co-specialised assets and using 
them in the most productive ways (Sirmon & Hitt, 2009; Hitt, 2014; Helfat et al, 2007). 
Based on these measures and clarifications, in the research, one knew what to look out for in 
regards to DMC. For clarity, this study focuses on search and selection. 
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Assessment of literature by this research also leads to an understanding of DMC for asset 
orchestration or strategic change processes as dependent on especially on the cognitive 
capabilities of managers (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Danneels, 2011). 
Managerial cognition refers to “managerial beliefs and mental models that serve as a basis for 
decision making” (Adner & Helfat 2003p.1012). This definition is simple and essentially 
specifies its role and linkage with decision-making.  
As Egger & Kaplan (2009:474) suggests, this study also accepts that “dynamic managerial 
capabilities such as managerial cognition can create or reconfigure organisational resources 
so that the firm can adapt in the face of environmental change”. This is consistent with the 
earlier referred viewpoint that managerial human capital, social capital and managerial 
cognition are intertwined and influence each other (Adner & Helfat, 2003) to shape the 
dominant logic at play in an organisation (Kor & Mesko, 2013). Consideration in this study 
alludes to previous studies e.g. Eggers & Kaplan (2009) that cognition aspect of dynamic 
managerial capability is most critical because it dovetails ultimately to key strategic decision-
making for competitiveness by firms.  
The framework for this research thus develops on the premise that managerial cognition 
would influence how and the extent, in which organisations in a given context selectively 
deploy and develop new resource base configurations. In less developed/emerging economy, 
a further thought in this study also entails that DMC requires effective interpretations and 
perception of both resources and environment, strategic decisions making and learning under 
a complex, uncertain, and dynamically evolving business environment (Day & Schoemaker, 
2016; Danneels, 2011; Pandit et al, 2018; Schoemaker et al, 2018; Teece, 2017). 
To begin to explore how cognition influences DMC in the context of this study. The decision 
of the researcher based on comprehensive insights from both empirical and conceptual works 
was also to build Helfat & Peteraf's (2015) operationalization of managerial cognition as 
behaviour and activities involving managerial perception, attention, and problem-solving 
capacity. The decision is based on the practical relevance of their work to DMC function in 
terms asset orchestration (Helfat et al, 2007) earlier defined and consistency with other 
contemporary understanding of microfoundations of DC in terms of abilities for sensing, and 
seizing business opportunities and reconfiguring organisations resource-base (Teece, 2007; 
2012; 2017; 2018).  
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3.18.1Manager’s Perception  
Perception refers to the mental processes and activities that managers employ in recognition 
of patterns and in construction of useful and meaningful information about their 
organisation’s environment e.g. extant/emerging technology, and resource base e.g. brand or 
customers (Ambrosini et al, 2009; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Danneels, 2011; Eggers & Kaplan, 
2009). The above definition shows that perception involves two key mental functions: pattern 
recognition and interpretation of information (Ambrosini & Altintas, 2019).  
Perception allows managers to focus on ‘organising information and interpreting it as having 
being produced by properties of object or events in the external world’ (Helfat & Peteraf 
2015: 838). It requires steering mental alertness (Gavetti, 2005) related to sense-making 
(Pandza & Thorpe, 2009) given the environmental contingencies (Peteraf & Reed, 2007; 
Sirmon & Hitt, 2009) that are perceptible (Salvato, 2009; Ambrosini et al, 2009). Ambrosini 
et al (2009) maintains that managers deploy DC according to their managerial perception of 
reality, which in some cases may not actually represent the reality itself. Baum & Bird (2010) 
suggest that getting it right requires ‘successful intelligence’ and further opine that it is 
necessary to empirically examine the cognitive strategies (perception patterns) deployed by 
management teams and their individual managers in different settings. It means that how 
managers appropriately perceive the need for change can act as a trigger to the exercise of 
DCs (Ambrosini & Altintas, 2019; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Peteraf & Reed, 2007). 
Other empirical evidence supporting this viewpoint that was captured in the literature 
assessment by this research, (see table 3.5). For example, Danneels (2011) documents that 
managerial perceptions negatively affected resource cognition/management in Smith-Corona 
but positively. Tripsas & Gavetti (2000) also found that managers’ perception of their 
business led to slow adaptation to digital imaging technology by managers at Polaroid. 
Marcel et al (2011) demonstrate that when managers have an appropriate perception of what 
aspect of their business and resources that is crucial to their competitive survival and success, 
they are more likely to respond when they are threatened. Implication of this for this current 
research is that managers’ ability to effectively recognise emerging opportunities and threats 
(Helfat & Peteraf, 2015), create change and/or respond to opportunities in the environment 
depends on their perception of both their internal and external environment.   
3.18.2 Managers’ Attention    
Attention pertains to focused awareness on perceptual information, developments and events 
in the environments (Egger & Kaplan, 2009; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). If perception can 
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facilitate recognition of emerging patterns in the environment, it means that attention depends 
on perception. Attention is useful in (a) ‘orienting to sensory events, (b) detecting signals for 
processing, and (c) maintaining a vigilant or alert state’ (Posner & Petersen, 1990 cited in 
Helfat & Peteraf 2015:839). The orienting capacity of a manager often determines the extent 
of attention or inattention to relevant information, and which in turn can facilitate 
environmental scanning, whereas the alertness element of attention can help in the detection 
and creation of new opportunities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015).  Ocasio (1997) regards such 
managerial attention schemas as the intervening mechanism between environmental cues on 
one hand and organisational response and their corresponding performance on the other hand.   
In dynamic environment, in fact, several empirical observation suggests that managers 
through attention on for instance emerging technology or customers demand can enable the 
firm to quickly obtain the promise of the market by implementing valuable innovations or 
defensive mechanisms (Peteraf & Reed, 2007; Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Egger & Kaplan, 
2009; Danneels, 2011).  For example, Egger & Kaplan (2009) show that executives’ who 
paid greater attention to imminent technology ventured into the new product market quicker. 
See also Nadkarni & Barr's (2008) insightful analysis of attention focus, and environment-
strategy causal logics, and Laamanen & Wallin's (2009) discussion of attention to customers' 
needs. Huy & Zott's (2019) recent contribution also shows that differentials in managers’ 
attention to their emotional regulation (ER) influence the extent to which they can mobilise 
resources to pursue market opportunities. Managers in addition to their own emotions to deal 
with a challenging situation, also have to pay attention to the emotion of other stakeholders 
(Huy & Zott, 2019). This contribution suggests that attention needs to be given to both 
internal and external stakeholders. 
3.18.3 Problems Solving Capacity 
Once opportunities, threat or even weak signals are recognised and relevant attention placed 
on them, problems solving capacities are required in order to seize the opportunities or to 
address/mitigate the threats (Day & Schoemaker, 2016; Teece, 2007; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; 
Ambrosini & Altintas, 2019). Gazzaniga, Heatherton, & Halpern (2010:342) defined 
problem-solving as “finding a way around an obstacle to reach a goal”. Closely related to 
problem-solving is the mental activity of reasoning, described as the critical examination of 
information, opinions, options, and beliefs to arrive at a conclusion, strategic decision or 
problem solution (Gazzinger et al, 2010; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). According to Pisano 
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(2015), problem-solving should be the primary attention of dynamic capabilities research, as 
with businesses in practice. 
Managerial cognitive capability for problem-solving would involve “decision to seize 
opportunities through strategic investment” (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015:841), sometimes 
irreversible (Teece, 2007), designing and implementing new or modified business models 
(Peteraf & Reed, 2007; Teece, 2017; 2018). In unstable/unpredictable environments, such 
decision-making requires efficient reasoning encapsulated in the problems solving capacity of 
strategic managers to develop investment options and try to determine their profit potentials 
ex-ante (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Baum & Bird, 2010). Successful design and deployment of a 
business model requires fitting together the different components of the business model and 
facilitating strategic fit or alignment, and complementarities among activities (Peteraf & 
Reed, 2007; Teece, 2018). Baum & Bird (2010), Teece (2007) concludes that the efficacy of 
these requires an “entrepreneurial right brain”, willingness to act on partial information and 
vigilant learning (Day & Schoemaker, 2016), even learning from failures can be valuable 
(Cope, 2011). A baseline framework developed to guide this research is presented below. The 
framework builds on Helfat & Peteraf's (2015) managerial cognition capability idea and 
Helfat et al (2007) understanding of dynamic managerial capabilities and asset orchestration 
as related to competitive advantage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Baseline framework of DMC. Source: Author  
 
Having clarified the above, in line with the argument by Ambrosini et al, (2009) that “to fully 
understand dynamic capabilities we need to consider what they (i.e. managers) perceive, act 
upon in terms of their environment and resources” (p.g5). From the empirical evidence 
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above, this study also accepts that managerial cognition offers a useful lens to investigate the 
way in which managers might try to exercise dynamic capabilities in different contexts 
(Danneels, 2011; Sirmon & Hitt, 2009; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009). Table 3.5 shows that out of 
57 empirical papers examined, only 21 are based on qualitative methods, thus confirming the 
earlier observation by Ambrosini & Bowman (2009) that thus far, quantitative studies 
outnumbers qualitative studies. The need for more qualitative methods in DC research given 
the current state of development in the field has been emphasised by Danneels (2008).  
Given the insufficient attention to less-developed contexts as this study reveals; as Helfat & 
Martin (2015: 1305) suggests, it means that thus far, little is known about the conditions 
under which managerial cognition may “have a positive, negative or no impact on strategic 
change” and competitive survival of an organisation. Therefore, the gap responded to by this 
research is the fact that only a few studies have examined DMC from the emerging 
economies context (Maitland & Sammartino, 2015; Fainshmidt et al, 2017). In consideration 
of the fact that DMC can have negative or no impact, it is considered that Tripsas & Gavetti 
(2000) recommendation for “How environmental factors affect cognition and capabilities” 
(p.1159), and Helfat & Peteraf (2015) calls for research exploring organisational factors that 
may place limits on DMC. In this regard, there is a need to “discover how an unexpected 
critical event or a series of events can cause shifts in belief and knowledge systems of 
executives” (Kor & Mesko, 2013:242) to support DMC deployment and its further 
development. Beck & Wiersema (2013) also suggests that it would be helpful to identify 
what might constitute drivers of better decision rather than simply, different decision.   
3.19 Summary of the chapter 
As stated at the beginning, the focus of this chapter has been to discuss the concepts of DCV 
and DMC in order to determine what is known about the concepts, to identify gaps in 
knowledge and thereby justify the basis upon which further research like this one may be 
worthwhile. And so, based on the review of the literature documented in this chapter, it has 
been determined that the DCV extends the IO perspective and the RBV by linking resources 
and capabilities improvement to environmental dynamism and firm’s competitive advantage. 
Discussion in the chapter after tracing the theoretical foundation of DCs also reflected on the 
variety of definitions and conceptions about the concept. It noted the lack of a unified 
definition of DCs, and nonetheless, some progress being made to address the definition issue 
and for clarity even in other aspects to emerge. The chapter continued with a discussion of 
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the accepted definition of DC in this study has been specified and for further clarity show, 
how scholars have distinguished DC from ordinary capabilities, and some examples. 
 This review also shows that DC involves organisational and managerial processes that 
underpin their development and deployment. It identified DC as a multi-level construct and 
captures current knowledge about how DCs can be developed and deployed. The exercise and 
value of DCs are context and path-dependent and as part of this review, analysis in the 
chapter identified that a critical issue is that the DC while necessary, does not guarantee SCA. 
The review also captures themes relating to other critical concerns and debates about the 
DCV as well as suggestions on how to address them. A vital portion of the suggestions 
consists of the need to focus on developing a better understanding of the key role of managers 
in DC development and deployment. 
 Discussion shows that one construct now addressing this concern is the DMC perspective. 
This review covers the definition of the DMC, its underpinning drivers, interrelated nature 
and the utility of managerial cognition as an important lens to studying how and the extent 
DMC may influence organisational DC. Following a synthesis of relevant empirical 
contributions, and gaps in the literature, it emerged that there remains a paucity of empirical 
research addressing the role of DMC in underexplored contexts e.g. emerging economies. 
Discussion also highlights scholars’ calls for empirical research investigating the DMC 
deployment in such contexts, and give attention to the conditions in which key elements of 
DMC and cognition may have positive, negative or no impact on firms’ strategy and their 
competitive survival. To address this gap, the chapter also specified and discussed the 
theoretical framework adopted. The succeeding chapter discusses the research design and 
methodologies employed in the field of this study. 
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                      CHAPTER 4 
                            Research Design and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter elucidates on the research design and methodologies adopted in the study. 
Creswell (2014) describes research design as plans for carrying out research while 
methodology refers to the approach, methods, and techniques used to generate data and 
analyse research findings. In other words, design gives you the plan while the methodology 
explains how you use/d the plan. As suggested by well-established research scholars, e.g. Yin 
(2003; 2009), the design and methodology of any given research often require appropriate 
considerations of the nature and objectives of the research. The stated aim of this research can 
be characterised as theory elaboration (Vaughan, 1992), in line with the contemporary 
arguments and gaps highlighted through literature review in the preceding chapters.  
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to provide details accounts about choices and steps 
adopted in order to help answer the question of this research. In this regard, the succeeding 
sections to this introduction has been organised to include, section 4.2, which addresses the 
philosophical perspectives of this research. Section 4.3 discusses the research approach, and 
in section 4.4, present the research method followed, and in section, 4.5 explain the research 
strategy. Section 4.6 discusses the research context/setting explored, while 4.7 further 
explains the sample selection process. Section 4.8 discusses the data collection process and in 
section 4.9, explains the data analysis process. Section 4.10 discusses the validity and 
reliability of the research findings and then a summary of the chapter in section 4.11.   
4.2 The Philosophical Perspectives 
Burrell & Morgan (1979:5) makes the point that “all theories or organisation are based upon 
a philosophy of science and a theory of society”. Relatedly, Powell (2002) also argues that 
strategy research is “an arena where philosophy matters” (p.879). This brings to fore the 
question, what is philosophy? And why is it important in research? Philosophy refers to “a 
basic set of beliefs” a person holds about the world (Proctor, 1998:74), regardless of whether 
we are aware of it or not (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Miles & Huberman (1994:4) suggests thus 
that “It is good medicine we think, for researchers to make their preferences clear …to know 
how a researcher construes the shape the social world and aims to give us a credible account 
of it is to know our conversational partner” and where one is coming from.  
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In other words, there are different philosophical options or perspectives and in research, 
clarification of a researcher’s basic beliefs or philosophical perspective can help to know the 
interrelationships between “what is the nature of reality, what can be known, and how the 
researcher can discover what he/she believes can be known” (Proctor, 1998:74) that are 
unknown. In this research, to make clear the researcher’s philosophical position, it became 
necessary to engage relevant literature to evaluate the different perspectives in order to 
understand them. Based on engagement with literature, it was established that there are two 
main concepts, namely, ontology and epistemology often used to contribute to conversations 
about research philosophy. Ontology refers to ‘the way we think the world is’ (Fleetwood, 
2005:197), the “assumptions that we make about the nature of reality” or …the subject of an 
inquiry (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002:31). Epistemology, on the other hand, refers to “a general 
set of assumptions about the best way of inquiry into the nature of the world” or the focal 
subject/phenomenon of an inquiry (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002:31; Burrell & Morgan, 1979).  
Crotty (1998) suggests another way to understand those concepts simply by explaining that 
ontology is concerned with a certain way of understanding ‘what is’ the nature of existence 
and structure of reality; while epistemology is concerned with ‘how we know what we 
know’. According to Fleetwood (2005:197), an important starting point is for a researcher to 
ensure that their ontological stance is right and clear. In this regard, therefore, this study has 
followed some important ideas by scholars including, Kwan & Tsang (2001), Proctor (1998) 
and Burrell & Morgan (1979) to try to make its position clear.  Figure 6 below is illustrative.  
Subjectivism                                                                                             Objectivism 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Dimensions of Philosophical Perspectives (Adapted: Burrell & Morgan, 1979) 
The above figure shows that a researcher’s ontological perspective often follows either 
objectivism (realism) or subjectivism (nominalism) (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Proctor 1998). 
It also shows that a researcher by sharing an objectivism perspective is likely to share 
positivism as epistemology while a researcher sharing subjectivism is likely to share anti-
positivism - also known as social constructionism (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Kwan & Tsang, 
2001). As such, ontological and epistemological assumptions are often interwoven. However, 
Nominalism 
Anti-positivism Positivism 
Realism Ontology 
Epistemology 
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Burrell & Morgan (1979) further explained that objectivism and subjectivism depict bi-polar 
ends of a continuum and because of that, apart from holding a perspective on either end, a 
researcher’s perspective can also be located somewhere within the continuum.  
Figure 7 below is used to clarify the philosophical perspective accepted in this research. It 
highlights the concepts of positivism, social constructionism as two extreme philosophical 
traditions and, another, the critical realism philosophy, which occupies the middle ground 
(Proctor, 1998). The explanation of these philosophical perspectives is next.  
Figure 4.2 Critical Realism as middle-ground between positivism and Social Constructionism  
 
 
 
                   
                                                              
Figure 7 Positivism, Constructivism, and Critical Realism 
The positivism philosophy 
The positivism philosophy has been traced back to the opinion of a French philosopher 
Auguste Comte (1853), who observed that “all good intellects have repeated, since Bacon’s 
time, that there can be no real knowledge but that which is based on observed facts” 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2002:28). Scholars’ view of Comte’s opinion entails that ‘the social 
world exists externally, and its properties should be measured objectively in terms of 
observable facts, rather than being inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection or 
intuition’ (Easterby-Smith, et al 2002:28).  
However, scholars have since emphasised some limitations of the positivist philosophy. Like 
Trevino & Weaver (2003) and Durand & Vaara, (2006) explained, positivism philosophy has 
been faulted for often relying only on observable facts, claiming objectivity but then leaves 
open the question about variances, causalities and proxy measure of causalities e.g. 
‘behaviours, abilities, or processes’ which may have plausible consequences.  So, in fields 
like strategic management with less focus on tangible objects rather on unobservable 
phenomenon e.g. beliefs, values and behaviours of people, scholars posits that while not 
 
Positivism  
 
Social Constructionism 
Critical Realism  
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entirely unscholarly, how positivism might bring people closer to the ultimate truth remains 
unexplained and yet to be firmly established (Durand & Vaara, 2006; Powell, 2001; 
Easterby-Smith et al, 2012). 
In line with the above, consideration in this study is consistent with Powell (2001:884) 
argument that the demands of positivism in terms objectivity, falsifiability and experiments 
are unlikely to be satisfied/useful for a construct like DMC which by now have continued to 
be described as an abstract concept (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Danneels, 2008). Therefore, 
social constructionism is not followed, as it may not offer appropriate fit to derive novel 
insights about the DMC especially at its current state of development. Some scholars who 
questioned the positivist philosophy promote the idea of social constructivism as a better 
alternative (Mir & Watson, 2000). Next is a reflection on social constructionism.   
Social Constructionism  
Social constructionism philosophy in Burrell &Morgan's (1979) words, is an anti-positivism 
perspective.  Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson (2012) traced the idea to Berger & 
Luckman (1966) and others like Watzlawick (1984) and Shorter (1993). The philosophy 
claims that ‘reality’ is not objective or external but rather constructed and given meaning by 
individuals or people (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002:28). Note that some authors also used terms 
like subjectivism, relativism and even interpretivism as proxies for social constructionism 
(Fleetwood, 2005; Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012; Silverman, 2013). Social 
constructivists believe that there are many truth and for ‘reality’ to be established, it is more 
important to try “to understand and appreciate the different experiences that people have 
rather than search for external causes and fundamental laws to explain behaviours” (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2012:28).   
Mir & Watson (2000) made a strong case for social constructivism as a useful 
methodological frame of reference to make sense of strategy’ especially when the endeavour 
is ‘to understand the context-driven nature of strategy, and the active role of the researcher in 
shaping a theoretical perspective’ (Mir & Watson, 2000:950). The authors’ consideration is 
that ‘strategic management research is a social practice, and knowledge is the product, not of 
isolated individuals, but of inter-subjective relations between members of research 
communities’ (Mir & Watson, p.950). As such, the authors consider social constructivism as 
a suitable alternative for avoiding the dangers of overgeneralization (Mir & Watson, 
2000:950) as positivism often claim. However, as with positivism, despite some promise in 
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the constructivism perspective, scholars have recognised some limitations of this 
philosophical standpoint.   
One of the critical charges against the social constructivism philosophy entails that if ‘reality’ 
is determined only through people’s construction of their experience, thinking, feelings and 
findings rather than through objective and external factors (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & 
Jackson, 2012) ‘no research findings can be neutrally assessed, criticized or falsified’ (Kwan 
& Tsang, 2001:1164). In other words, ‘every theory or claim on truth’ would suffice as 
reality (Powell, 2001:884). In sharing these observations also, Gavetti (2005:614) put it that 
“although a constructionist approach is plausible, assessing the extent to which reality is 
given or enacted is a sufficiently important and complex issue that it merits separate 
treatment”. This study also aligns with the view that not all claims to truth can be valid and 
particularly agrees that uncovering social reality requires evaluations beyond merely peoples’ 
constructions about truth (Gavetti, 2005; Powell, 2001).  
In the light of the above, the researcher came to a philosophical decision that neither 
positivism nor social constructivism despite their promises is best suited for generating new 
insights about an emerging phenomenon such as DMC – a subfield and example of DC 
(Helfat & Martin, 2015; Proctor, 1998; Teece, 2018) given the controversy around its 
foundation earlier discussed. In line with Powell (2001), consideration implies that positivism 
by focusing mainly on objectivity seems less suited for understanding reality about human 
experiences and behaviours, which fundamentally is what the DMC preaches. While the 
social constructionism contrasts the positivism, perspective by advocating rather, that 
‘reality’ is determined mainly through people’s construction of their contextual experiences 
and suited for investigation on strategy (Mir & Watson, 2000). It is also not particularly 
followed by this study in order to avoid what the researcher consider as “speaking from both 
sides of the mouth” by social constructionism often disguised as many truth and that may 
further exacerbate the already contradictions trailing the DMC phenomenon as charged by 
e.g. Arend & Bromiley (2009). 
 Therefore, beyond positivism and social constructionism, according to Sayer (1997:453), 
“while it may be best to avoid concepts of essences which assume that the distinguishing and 
generative objects of must coincide, we still need to distinguish classes of objects and 
identify causal powers which enable or constrain what those objects can do”.  This means that 
neither of the above philosophical positions may claim to be very correct. In sum, as figure 7 
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above illustrates, the consideration of the researcher was to reflect on the critical realism 
philosophy given its alternative viewpoint compared to the positivism and social 
constructionism extreme perspectives. Next is a reflection on the critical realism philosophy.   
Critical Realism Perspective 
Critical realism philosophy has been traced to the many works, especially, Roy Bhaskar 
(1975; 2008), Margaret Archer (1998; 2000), and Sayer (1992; 2000). The thrust of the 
critical realism perspective entails that reality exists at different levels (Bhaskar, 2008) and 
“characteristically emergent” (Sayer, 2000:12). According to Bhaskar (2008:3) “…. real 
structures exist independently of and are often out of phase with the actual patterns of life 
event [….] I will argue that I will call the domain the real, the actual and the empirical are 
distinct. [….]. The real basis of causal laws is provided by generative mechanisms of nature. 
Such mechanisms are, it is argued, nothing other than the way of acting of things. And causal 
laws must be analysed as their tendencies” (Giudici, 2013). This simply means that reality 
can be studied and identified from the three strata or levels where they exist, which includes 
empirical (experiences, observable events) actual (events which may or may not be observed, 
and real (structures and processes which make reality and produces events) (Proctor, 1998). 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, (2012) interpreted Bhasker’s argument to imply that 
‘causality exists as potential which cannot be automatically correlated with specific events as 
positivism tends to’.  This suggests that the observation of a researcher may be an aspect of 
an event or what is happening depending on the level explored. It also suggests that what is 
happening is often the result of their underlying or ‘generative mechanisms’ (Mutch, 
2010:508; Easton, 2010). ‘The underlying mechanisms may not work in the interests of the 
concerned individuals, people or organisation but the knowledge of them and their causes can 
provide potentials for the emancipation of their effects’ (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 
2012:29). As such, the focus of critical realist research is often that of trying to uncover the 
underlying or generative mechanisms involved in order to provide richer and better 
knowledge or theoretical explanations. As Mutch (2010:509) suggests, the nature of the 
uncovered underlying mechanism, the way they act could be “provisional, reversible, and 
corrigible” or possibly change over time (Reed, 2005).  
Critical realism also suggests that the ideas of positivism and social construction are 
essentially complementary and as a researcher's own experience and understanding could 
help to define and delineate the concept being examined although not to dominate empirical 
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data (Easton, 2010).  Scholars holds therefore that the critical realism perspective not only 
addresses the limitations of positivism and social constructionism but can be quite useful for 
research in the management field and strategy research especially (Gavetti, 2005; Godfrey & 
Hill, 1995; Kwan & Tsang, 2001; Miller & Tsang, 2011; Sayer, 1997). 
This thesis in chapters two and three highlighted that the DMC and dynamic capabilities view 
have both been decried as being resistant to observation and measurement (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000; Pavlou & El Sawy, 2011). Whether this is true or not, a critical realists, 
especially in the strategy field, holds that ‘we cannot reject theories just because they contain 
key constructs that are unobservable’ (Godfrey & Hill, 1995:527) as often argued in the 
‘empirical or naïve realism of positivism’ (Fleetwood, 2005). A growing support for critical 
realism application in strategic management research was noted in contributions like Godfrey 
& Hill (1995), Kwan & Tsang (2001), Fleetwood (2005), Gavetti (2005) Durand & Vaara 
(2006), and Miller & Tsang (2011). This philosophy ‘recognises that social conditions such 
as competitive advantage as the ‘holy grail’ of strategy research (Helfat & Peteraf, 2009) 
have real consequences whether they are observed or not and social life is both generated by 
actions of individuals, and also has an external impact on them’ (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & 
Jackson, 2012:29). But despite that critical realism as a growing intellectual movement holds 
great potentials for management research, scholars’ regrets that it still falls short of being 
widely leveraged to empirically inform knowledge (Gavetti, 2005; Miller & Tsang, 2011).  
4.2.1 The Philosophical Perspective of this Research  
By evaluating and contrasting the core tenets of the above philosophical perspectives, it was 
accepted in this study that critical realism is a balanced, modest and compelling perspective 
with apposite potentials for uncovering, affirming or even rejecting assumptions based on 
empirically supported evidences (Maxwell, 2012; Mutch, 2010; Miller & Tsang, 2011). As 
Crotty (1998), Yin (2009), Miles & Huberman (1994) Creswell & Poth (2018), and several 
other scholars suggest, this choice is based on the researcher’s world-view, the nature, and 
objectives of this research. Literature assessment in chapter three identified DC as a 
multilevel construct (Winter, 2003; Helfat et al, 2007) notably because, DC exists at 
organisational, individual and network levels (Rothaermel & Hess, 2007). As such, scholars 
are being re-directed to try to explore, analyse and facilitate better understanding of DCs 
through its microfoundations (Teece, 2007) or managerial level/processes (Helfat et al, 2007) 
given the significance of human agents as causal factors or determinants on whether and how 
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DCs are deployed in practice (Narayanan et al, 2009; Ambrosini et al, 2009). In this study, 
the consideration is that this stratified nature of DCs evokes the critical realism philosophy. 
In sum, the rationale for following the critical realism perspective to address the questions of 
this research includes first, it is accepted that DCs are a meta-construct, characteristically 
hierarchical/stratified (Ambrosini et al, 2009; Winter, 2003) and currently requires 
examination at a micro or managerial level (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Helfat et al, 2007; 
Teece, 2007). Secondly, DCs are often the consequence of underlying mechanisms 
(causalities) that exists both at organisation and managerial levels and even network levels 
(Helfat et al, 2007; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007; Teece, 2007). Thirdly, the critical realism 
helps to uncover ‘empirically supported statements about causation, how and why an 
event/change is happening’ (Wynn & Williams, 2012:789) or not happening (Eggers & 
Kaplan, 2009) and suitable for research with interest in building chains of causality (Easton, 
2010). As Easterby-Smith et al (2002:33) suggests, following a particular philosophical 
perspective usually leads the researcher to also adopt research approach and ‘methods that are 
characteristic of that perspective or position’. The next section discusses the research 
approach adopted in the study. 
4.3 The Research Approach 
The research approach often involves crucial decisions as well (Creswell, 2014). Blaikie 
(2000:101) outlined four different approaches often used for empirical research, namely: 
deduction, induction, abduction, retroduction. Of these approaches, the author also highlights 
that critical realism is associated with retroductive logic of inquiry (Blaikie, 2000:108). 
Therefore, consistent with the choice of critical realism perspective adopted by this study, a 
decision was also made to follow the retroduction reasoning/logic of inquiry. Blaikie (2004) 
defines retroduction as involving “going back from, below, or behind observed patterns or 
regularities to discover what produces them” (p.972). Discussion in the preceding chapter 
already positioned DMC as a model of causal mechanisms of DCs (figure 3.3), to suggest 
that ‘if they (DMC) exists would generate which would be explained’ (Mingers et al, 
2013:797).  
In line with Tippmann et al, (2014:210), the rationale for the retroduction approach is also 
because the “preconceptions and frames of references” are important in contributing to a 
knowledge field, and when used along with analytic induction may help to capture or tease 
out surprises in certain cases. Consideration in the retroduction approach is also that “a 
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researcher may have some idea of the direction to go …but no clear idea of what to expect” 
(Blaikie, 2000; 109). In other words, ‘unlike the basic inductive researcher, ‘the retroductive 
researcher has something to look for’ (Blaikie 2000:109). In this study, the researcher derived 
insights from the literature review but remained open-minded about emergent insights. Dixon 
et al (2010; 2014) also confirm the utility of retroductive logic for DCs inquiry. The next 
sections will discuss the actual processes used for data collection and analysis in this study. 
4.4 The Research Method  
By now, it is already common knowledge that qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods 
(Creswell, 2014:3) are three popular methods for empirical data collection and analysis. 
Qualitative method often refers to a method involving the collection and analysis of non-
numerical data, while the ‘quantitative method, on the other hand, refers to a method 
involving numerical data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2014:3). The mix method refers 
to a method that is somewhere in the middle of the qualitative and quantitative continuum by 
way of combination (Creswell, 2014:3). Although that research methods literature is replete 
with arguments for and against each research method, it is well known that each of these 
research methods have strengths and weaknesses associated with it. This research is 
particularly not drawn into the “ardent dispute” (Johnson & Onwegbuzie, 2004:14) about the 
best method. Rather, consideration in this study is that the best method for a particular 
research depends on the nature, aims and objectives of the research, the philosophical 
perspective of the researcher (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002; Creswell, 2014) and of course the 
most compelling and up to date opinions in the field of study in relation to the research 
method (Maxwell, 2012).  
Maxwell (2012) suggests that the critical realism philosophy adopted by this study offers 
great value for qualitative research. According to Creswell (2014), qualitative research helps 
to examine the context and specific settings along with its participants. The method is 
suitable when exploring questions and processes involving individuals or groups, 
organizational, social or human problems whereby in-depth, rich and defensible explanations 
of facts are needed from natural settings (Creswell, 2014; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Miles 
& Huberman (1994) also put it that the strength of qualitative method of research lies in its 
tendency for richness, holism and strong potential for revealing complexity and for tracing 
the meaning that people place on events, processes, and structure related to their work, 
responsibilities and life experiences.   
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Accordingly, in view of the exploratory nature of this research, the qualitative method was 
adopted (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009). This decision also reflects 
the recent calls in the dynamic capabilities research field for more qualitative research 
(Danneels, 2008; Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009, Teece, 2012; Peteraf et al, 2013). In 
particular, based on methodological issues identified in DC research (Eriksson, 2013), 
scholars have established that dynamic capabilities development and deployment involves 
some opaque and idiosyncratic processes that may be context-dependent both in terms of 
application and in terms of value (Teece et al, 1997; Winter, 2003; Easterby-Smith et al, 
2009; Barreto, 2010). As against the domination of quantitative research methods in DC 
research (Wang & Ahmed, 2007), and given the nascent stage of development in the DC 
concept (Helfat & Peteraf, 2009).  Scholars are being encouraged to rather employ a 
qualitative research method because that would help to conduct a more “fine-grained 
investigation to obtain contextualised data” (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009:37) that might 
provide a better understanding of micro-level processes underlying the exercise of DCs and 
their effects in practical business realities. 
As earlier stated, the choice of qualitative method by this study does not trivialise the strength 
of the quantitative and mixed methods. However, based on the current state of development 
in the DC concept, this study agrees that the quantitative methods would provide knowledge 
that may be “too abstract and general for direct application to specific local situations, 
context, and individuals” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004:19). Quantitative methods are not 
only inflexible but also less effective in understanding processes, meanings and implications 
related to certain managerial actions and through it, it can be hard to ‘infer what changes and 
why about actions’ that may be implemented in the future (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008:71). 
Although some scholars argue, that the mixed method is essentially a pragmatic method by 
combining the strengths of both the qualitative and quantitative methods to eschew their 
limitations (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Scholars, however, have also observed that ‘life 
is not that simple’ (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008:73). Like the quantitative method, a key issue 
with the mixed method is that only large samples may allow the credibility of its findings 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2008). Apart from that, it can be cumbersome and difficult to reconcile 
discrepant data sources heading seemingly in the direction of variant conclusions (Easterby-
Smith et al, 2008). Even known advocates of mixed methods e.g. Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 
(2004:21) also admit that such methods always have the problem of paradigm mix, 
conflicting results and sometimes can be difficult for a single researcher to carry-out.  
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In the light of the above , without just outright disregard for some logical considerations often 
related to quantitative and mixed methods of research, it is believed that the qualitative 
method as key scholars like Ambrosini & Bowman (2009), Danneels (2008) all argues offers 
more relevance for novel contributions in the DMC research domain and by this study in 
particular. Consistent with the qualitative method, this study employs the case study strategy.  
4.5 Case Study as the Research Strategy 
Creswell (2014:187) suggests that qualitative research undertakers should aim to choose from 
research strategy options including “narrative, phenomenology, ethnography, case study, and 
grounded theory”. A number of other options include action research, experiment and 
archival research (Saunders et al, 2012:173). To select a suitable strategy, researchers are 
encouraged to consider their philosophical stance, nature/purpose of the research and the 
strengths and limitations of each strategy in terms of deriving the evidences needed to address 
the research question(s) (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008; Yin, 2009; Easton, 2010).    
This research follows the case study strategy defined by Yin (2003:13) as “an empirical 
enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. A case is 
often used to refer to an entity (single or multiple), which may be studied in detail using a 
selected technique or strategy and time horizon (Blaikie, 2010; Creswell, 2014). Bergh & 
Ketchen (2009:139) also suggests that “cases …may be defined by individuals, a group, 
organisation, a community, nation episode or encounter, event, period of time, or a sustained 
process or spatially and temporally”. Table 4.1 sums well-known voices on the case study.    
Table 4. 1 Case Study Research Strategy 
Author  Theoretical contribution 
Eisenhardt (1989a); 
Eisenhardt & Graebner 
(2007) 
Develop concepts, theoretical constructs, conceptual framework, propositions, or mid-
range theory. Reveals an unusual phenomenon, replicate or  counter the replication of 
findings in other cases, eliminate alternative explanations, elaborate emergent theory 
Flyvbjerg (2006) Generate and test hypotheses 
Miles & Huberman 
(1994) 
Ground a construct empirically in a new context 
Siggelkow (2007) Generate new ideas to build theory, provide a violation of theory, sharpen existing 
theory, get closer to theoretical constructs and illustrate causal mechanisms. 
Stake (2005) Refine theory, suggest complexities for further investigation, establish the limits of 
generalizability  
Vaughan (1992) Contradict or confirm theory, create new hypotheses, add details to the theory, model, 
or concept, specify the theory more fully 
Yin (2003) Confirm, challenge, extend, explore, expand, generalize, and modify theory. Revise 
original theoretical propositions, build theory by making theoretical breakthroughs, 
develop hypotheses and proposition for further enquiry 
Source: Ridder et al cited in Bergh & Ketchen (2009:144) 
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As table 4.1 above shows, there are many compelling arguments about the “potentials of case 
study research in making a theoretical contribution” especially in the strategic management 
(Ridder et al in Bergh & Ketchen, 2009:144). A common standpoint discerned from the 
above voices is that case study strategy has potentials to contribute to theory, when a 
phenomenon is still at its emerging stage (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), complex (Yin, 
2003) and can yield more understanding or details (Vaughan, 1992), from new contexts 
which one may further explore (Yin, 2003; Miles & Huberman, 1994). From a philosophical 
standpoint, Easton (2010:119) also argues that “critical realism is particularly well suited as a 
companion for case research”. In other words, it suggests that the case study is the primary 
research strategy consistent with the critical realist philosophy (Wynn & Williams, 2012:803) 
adopted by this study.  
As Yin (2009: 4) starkly put it, “the distinctive need for a case studies arises out of the desire 
to understand complex social phenomena” e.g. organisational and managerial processes, the 
questions of “how” and “why” about the phenomena in its real-life context (Yin, 2009:8-10). 
It emerged from literature review (in chapter 3) that DC consists of organisational and 
managerial processes (Teece et al, 1997); are a meta-capability and complex construct (Helfat 
et al 2007; Teece, 2007), with the need for more knowledge about the managerial processes 
that underpins DCs especially (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). In line 
with the above views, as this research examines the influence of managers or managerial 
capabilities in relation to DCs and competitive survival, success and otherwise in arguably an 
underexplored context (emerging economies), it was accepted that the case study strategy is 
relevant, useful and appropriate for the study and thus adopted.  
In research literature, there is also a debate about whether a single or multiple-case study is 
best. This study follows the latter based on the exploratory nature of the research question: 
“to what extent DMC are deployed and further developed in Nigeria”. Whilst some scholars 
argue that a single case study may yield rich findings, many also concede that that is often 
best in extreme cases (Siggelkow, 2007; Yin, 2003). However, multiple-case studies adopted 
by this study often support wider exploration of research questions, contexts and allow 
comparisons that can clarify whether the emergent findings are simply idiosyncratic to a 
specific single case or consistently replicated across several cases (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007:27). The researcher believes that comparing cross-case evidence enhances the validity 
of findings (Yin, 2009) and can enable good contributions to knowledge (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
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Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) by a study. As discussed below, the use of the case study 
strategy in this research is not without consideration of the limitations associated with it.  
Until present, criticisms, and concerns about case studies research always relate to the 
generalizability of the results (Tsang, 2014; Yin, 2009). However, recently, scholars have 
started to address these concerns (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2006, Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010; Easton, 
2010; Tsang, 2014). According to Tsang (2014), “a major factor causing the debate about 
generalizability of case study results is that the concept of generalisation itself is often 
misconceived” (p. 370) in terms of “statistical representativeness” (Easton, 2010:119). In 
fact, Tsang (2014), Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007) and Gibber & Ruigrok (2010) all provide 
examples of case study research which are (1) highly rated publications and (2) offering 
validly generalizable results.  
According to Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007:25), the ‘most interesting, highly cited pieces, 
and past winners of AMJ best articles award have relied on case studies’. Gibbert & Ruigrok 
(2010: 711) also reminds us that some of the “most ground-breaking insights” from the 
strategic management field (e.g., Penrose, 1960; Chandler, 1962; Pettigrew, 1973; Peters & 
Waterman, 1982; Burgleman, 1983; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) have all been provided by case 
studies. From the literature review (chapter 3) by this research, it was also noted that some of 
the most influential DMC and related contributions made thus far, including Rosenbloom 
(2000), Danneels (2002; 2008; 2011); Adner & Helfat (2003), Sirmon & Hitt, (2009) Martin 
(2011) all used case studies. Consequently, the conviction by Easton (2010) from a 
philosophical standpoint, Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007), and Gibbert & Ruigrok's (2010) 
support for case studies, and its fruitfulness in previous DC research have all influenced the 
choice of case study by this research. Insights from those contributions were useful in 
focusing on demonstrating chains of evidence and rigor in terms of concrete actions taken in 
the process and the justification of the decisions made (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010). The next 
section discusses the context, sample and case selection for the research.  
4.6 The Research Context/Setting 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, an important area of debate in DMC theorisation and 
DC research generally is about the applicable environmental contexts of the concepts (Adner 
& Helfat, 2003; Peteraf et al, 2013; Salvato & Vasollo, 2018). DCs idea was developed with 
emphasis particularly on the concepts’ potentials for facilitating firms’ competitive success in 
a rapidly changing business ecosystem (Teece, 2007). And while it has been argued that DCs 
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can be useful in moderately changing and even stable environments too (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000); scholars (e.g. Salvato, 2003; Pablo et al, 2007; Easterby-Smith et al, 2009) all 
observed that there is a paucity of research extending the DCs research to new socio-cultural 
and regional context. Literature review by this study already shows that empirical studies thus 
far are dominated mostly by analysis and studies conducted based on evidence from Western 
Europe and North America.  
In fact, this also resonates with earlier observation in literature that historically, research 
linking strategy and competitive advantage has always been dominated by studies conducted 
mainly from developed economies (Makino et al, 2004; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015). 
Accordingly, scholars have recently called for DC and DMC research with attention on 
emerging economies because such contexts have tendency for more complexities, instabilities 
and unfavourable conditions (Dixon et al, 2014; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015; Fainshmidt 
et al, 2017; Schriber & Lowstedt, 2018) than their developed counterparts do. As Maitland & 
Sammartino (2015:1554) suggest, the research community appears to be “underestimating the 
effectiveness of experts in the complex environments and underplaying the adaptive capacity 
of human cognition” enabling success in developing countries. Other DMC related studies 
e.g. Pandit, Joshi, Sahay & Gupta (2018), Fainshmidt et al (2017) and Powell et al (2011) all 
agree that more research attention on emerging economies context is necessary in order to 
facilitate the confirmations, advances, and novelty required on extant knowledge about DMC.  
Consistent with the above viewpoints, this research focused on the emerging economies, with 
Nigeria particularly selected as an interesting context to explore the DMC concept for many 
reasons. First, Nigeria is an emerging economy with considerable potentials and yet, one of 
the rarely researched contexts (Hoskisson et al, 2000). As earlier hinted in the introduction 
chapter, a report by World Bank shows that Nigeria's population of 184 million as of 2017, 
accounts for 47% of the West African population (Worldbank.org). Based on this 
demographic fact, Nigeria is both Africa’s largest and most populous black-country in the 
world (Amaeshi et al, 2006). IMF also projects that Nigeria could become the third most 
populous country in the world by 2050 (IMF, 15 March 2018). The country is influential both 
within sub-Sahara Africa and in the global economy – not least in the proven capability of her 
internal events to destabilize the global oil market” (Amaeshi, et al, 2006). 
As one of the strongest emerging forces in Africa, Nigeria has been attracting key interests 
both locally and globally (Azolukwam & Perkins, 2009). In 2014, Nigeria was named the 
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largest economy in Africa, and the 26th largest economy in the world following what was 
then a long-overdue rebasing of the country’s GDP, which saw her leapfrog, South Africa, 
economically (The Telegraph April 7, 2014). PwC Economics (2013) in acknowledging the 
rising economic potentials of Nigeria also projected that Nigeria in terms of GDP would rank 
among the world’s twenty largest economies by 2050. According to Nakpodia (2016), 
Nigeria’s economic potential is mainly enhanced by its cosmic natural resources. The most 
prominent is crude oil and in fact, the huge economic derivative of crude oil for a country that 
owns such natural resources is well known (Okotie, 2018).  
The Economist (April 12, 2014) also reports that Nigeria has become a colossus of the 
African continent with statistical wands emerging from some of the earlier neglected sectors 
of the economy including the telecom industry, banking industry, and movie industry 
(Nollywood as popularly called). Taken together not surprisingly, PwC (2013), and 
UNCTAD (2014) more recently reported that Nigeria has been a major Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) attraction destination in Africa. With this growing economic profile of key 
sectors of the economy, another interpretation is also that the country has a population of 
viable firms, retooling and improving their business processes to harness and seize 
opportunities available to it in ways most likely abated by the way they go about building and 
developing managerial capabilities (Aduloju, 2014). As Maitland & Sammartino (2015) 
suggest, this interesting performance in underexplored context as such provides a defensible 
rationale for assessing her corporate managers' behaviour and decision-making activities.  
However, it was also shocking that Nigeria with such an impressive record by 2016 was 
reportedly battling with economic recession largely attributed to slump in crude oil price and 
poor economic policies by the country’s new government (IMF country report, 2017). In 
short, the choice of Nigeria for this research was purposeful in that the country’s economic 
potentials, size, high stakeholder’s expectations, and unstable political environment, 
compared to other countries compels her inclusion for DC research.  
While the country represents a significant market with huge economic opportunity for firms 
to exploit, the economic and socio-political concerns in a country like Nigeria is central in the 
DC research debate as Teece (2017) has more recently emphasised. The increasing FDI in the 
country means that domestic firms currently and in the coming year might have to face stiffer 
competition from international competitors with perhaps larger financial war-chest, 
innovative and managerial competences (Sanni, 2018).  On the other hand, MNE faces 
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critical decision making under uncertainty (Maitland & Sammartino, 2015). Thus as Teece 
(2017) suggests there is little doubt that deploying and developing DMC is crucial for 
organisations and managers in Nigeria in order to maintain competitive survival and success 
both currently and in the years ahead. In addition, empirical evidence suggests that there has 
been a growing change in local consumption patterns in most African countries, especially 
Nigeria (Sanni, 2018). Nigerians are more sophisticated today, more educated and aware of 
the impact/level of the products and services they consume and demand (Sanni, 2018). 
Accordingly, a consideration by this research is that firms in Nigeria essentially must aim to 
confront these emerging trends through creativity and innovation in order to compete. 
In fact, this study responds to earlier calls for DC studies from new sociocultural, regional 
and national contexts (Easterby-Smith et al, 2009, Salvato, 2003). Although it is interesting 
that recently few empirical studies from emerging economies e.g. India (Pandit, et al, 2018), 
Russia (Dixon et al, 2014; Ludwig & Pemberton, 2011) are slowly emerging. This research 
considers it worthy to explore the implementation of DMC from the Nigeria context since 
DMC is task environment-related (Fainshmidt et al 2017) or context-dependent (Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2015).  And if so, it is difficult to generalise studies from one country to other 
geographic regions given the disparities in national culture and institutional frameworks 
(Nakpodia, 2016; Pandit, et al, 2018). In sum, indeed, these factors make Nigeria an 
important context to explore in order to contribute novel insights on the DMC discourse.   
Industry Context 
As a baseline for any generalisation of the research findings, this study follows the idea by 
Rouse & Daellenbach (1999), which suggests that resources-based/capability studies should 
importantly start by concentrating on a single industry and choosing the relevant firms from 
different strategic constellations in the industry. Di Stefano et al (2010) also suggest that 
exploring the deployment of DCs depends on ‘looking at the right places’. Consideration by 
this study is that the Nigerian Banking industry offers salient characteristics that fit the 
purpose of the broad question of the DC construct and by extension the interest of this study.  
First, the industry is an intensely competitive and tough business arena to play in; it’s 
dynamic and has an interesting history. While The Economist (April 12, 2014) report earlier 
cited, rightly suggests that the banking sector has been one of the most thriving or promising 
sectors in Nigeria, this may be questionable when matched against other indices. For 
instance, compared to 89 banks prior to the 2005 banks consolidation programme – a 
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regulatory change implemented by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) at the time in order to 
strengthen the resource/capital base of the banks and facilitate a robust environment overall; 
there is at the time of this study only 21 surviving commercial banks in the industry 
(www.cbn.gov.ng). In other words, over 75% of Nigeria commercial banks, unfortunately, 
could not survive the consolidation after the 2005 shake-up, or other subsequent reforms to 
remain in business. More details of what went wrong is outside the remit of this study (see: 
Sanusi 2010, 2012; Ezeoha, 2007), and the CBN website, www.cbn.gov.ng for the list of the 
existing commercial banks in Nigeria. 
However, of the existing 21 commercial banks, while only 9 or 49% ranked among the 1000 
global banks (Dailypost.ng 29 July 2015) at the start of this study. Previous studies suggest 
that, indeed, the existing ones have emerged as stronger institutions from that consolidation 
exercise when measured in terms of size of balance sheet or financial resource base, and 
structure (Ezeoha, 2007; Sanusi, 2010; 2012). Evidence of their size and strong financial 
performance and growth was reinforced when The Financial Times in 2016 named six 
Nigerian banks among the top twenty-five banks in Africa. 
From a theoretical standpoint, in terms of survival and performance levels of those banks, 
both on technical and evolutionary fitness, it is thinkable that that can hardly be distanced 
from the influence of dynamic managerial capabilities (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Helfat et al, 
2007; Sirmon & Hitt, 2009). Although survival/advantage arguably does not necessarily 
imply the presence of DMC (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), their survival and continued 
success are exemplar. The Nigerian banking industry after the consolidation also boasts of 
publicly listed institutions for which useful information is available and publicly accessible. 
The industry is consistently at the centre of media attention not surprisingly due to the 
industry’s salience, relevance, and relatedness to all other sectors of the nation’s economy. 
Therefore, how and the extent DMC influence organisations’ success or otherwise in the 
banking business in Nigeria was needful.      
4.7 Sampling and Case selection  
A purposive sampling method suggested by Rubin & Rubin, (1995) was used to select five 
influential cases (Seawright & Gerring, 2008) (i.e. banks) in the industry, that can allow for 
replication (Eisenhardt, 1989), and of course research participants that can provide useful 
insights on the question and objectives of this study. As Eisenhardt (1989) suggests, no exact 
number of cases can be claimed as perfect but research exploring something between four to 
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ten cases is appropriate. Therefore, the decision to select five case studies (banks) is 
consistent with Eisenhardt (1989) suggestion and it was also considered that the five cases 
(24%) are an appropriate representative of the 21 surviving commercial banks in the country 
at the time of this research (www.cbn.gov.ng). Four of the selected cases have consistently 
ranked among the top 1000 global banks over the past five years by The Banker 
(www.thebanker.com) and among the top 10 positions in the Nigerian banking industry by 
the CBN (www.cbn.gov.ng). General information about the selected banks is summarised in 
table 4.2 below. Note that the selected banks were not named exactly for ethical reasons. (The 
study has used the following pseudonyms throughout the report). 
Table 4. 2  General information about the selected cases 
Case Date Range 
established  
Asset base in Naira Estimated 
Workforce  
Branches  Countries 
present 
Abia 1980 -1989 N3.0 – 3.5 Trillion 4000 –4500 300 – 400 8 
Bayelsa 1990 – 1999 N2.0 – 2.5 Trillion 3500 –4000 200 – 300 5 
Cross-River 1970 – 1979 N1.0 – 2.0 Trillion 3000 –3500 200 – 300 2 
Delta 1990 – 1999 N3.0 – 4.0 Trillion  9000-11000 200 – 300 11 
Ebonyi 1990 – 1999 N3.5 – 5.0 Trillion 7000 –8000 500 – 600 6 
 
As captured in the above table, all five banks selected vary by dates established, ranging 
between 1980 and 1999. These dates and other information were captured in ranges mainly to 
preserve anonymity. Bayelsa, Delta, and Ebonyi are relatively more recent in terms of the 
date established compared to Cross-River and Abia respectively. One may also note that 
despite being among the younger cluster, Ebonyi and Delta boast of the largest asset base 
with Abia third in line, then Bayelsa and lastly Cross-River which happens to be the oldest by 
date established. As earlier mentioned, while all five cases are among top ten in the industry, 
Abia, Delta, and Ebonyi are graded as Tier1 capital base while Bayelsa and Cross-River are 
graded Tier2 capital base by the CBN but all together constitute what the CBN referred as 
domestically systemic important banks (www.cbn.gov.ng). The selection is consistent with 
Seawright & Gerring's (2008) suggestion that the choice of influential and diverse cases 
following a cross-case design can improve robustness and help to gain useful insights.   
Each selected case has between 3000 and 11000 employees with Delta and Ebonyi 
particularly having a larger workforce compared to Cross-River, Bayelsa, and Abia. Ebonyi 
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also has more branches, nearly 600 workforce, followed by Abia with over 300 branches 
while Delta, Bayelsa, and Cross-River also has branches ranging between 200 and 300, each. 
Each selected case also has apart from their Nigeria operations, between one to ten 
international banking and branch operations in other countries, especially the UK where all 
five cases have a branch presence. As evident in the table, together with their Nigeria 
operations, Abia operates in eight, Bayelsa 5, Cross-River 2, and Delta eleven, and Ebonyi 6 
countries respectively. Consistent with the research data sources and literature (e.g. Makino 
et al 2004), criteria used to define international banking here is, a bank operating in more than 
one country (Nigeria).  
Although one has not particularly used performance level as core measure for the evidence of 
DMC, in line with the dominant perspective that DMC is not a guarantee for SCA (Helfat et 
al, 2007) as discussed earlier. It was also considered based on preliminary observation even 
before the formal data collection to include higher performing and somewhat lower-
performing cases as to make the investigation more interesting and perhaps more insightful. 
As table 4.2 above indicates, it was considered instructive that one can aim to analyse the five 
cases in a group of the higher-performing and the lower performing cases, with Bayelsa and 
Cross-River in the latter group while Abia, Delta, and Ebonyi in the former group. Note that 
the primary consideration at the time was the organisations’ asset base as table 4.2 indicates.   
4.8 Data collection process  
This study relied on multiple empirical data sources including semi-structured interviews, 
CEO’s letter to shareholders, and relevant press releases and media interviews/reports. For a 
qualitative case study involving interviews, Yin (2009) advised that an important role of a 
researcher is to try to ask good questions. The interview protocol/guide was developed in the 
form of open-ended questions with consideration to the objectives of the research. To ensure 
that the questions are good (Yin, 2009), the interview guide was shared with established 
strategy experts including first, the research supervision team and another leading voice in 
DC research (name withheld). Constructive comments received about the draft 
protocol/interview guide helped the researcher to sharpen the questions and prepared useful 
prompts that together aided the semi-structured interview approach employed. Nonetheless, 
some flexibility became necessary during each interview. For example, in some cases, 
respondents carefully avoided or clearly declined some questions put to them. The researcher 
respected such situations but rather find alternative subtle way to get more information 
helped. For much of the interviews, the researcher explored and controlled the direction of 
  
108 
 
the conversation as necessary to generate rich and contextual data required to address the 
question and objectives of this research. 
Access to interviewees/participants was through personal contacts and third parties 
(gatekeepers). The researcher contacted the interviewees in the first instance to negotiate a 
suitable time for the interview proper. The initial contacts were also used to try to build some 
rapport and to encourage and strengthen the confidence of the participants about the study, as 
they were mostly people that the researcher has never met one-on-one. This facilitated what 
one considers a relaxed atmosphere on the day/time of the interview. However, some of the 
participants were ready to speak even during the initial contact haven been pre-informed to 
expect a contact through a gatekeeper or referrer. Those participants seem to have derived 
sufficient confidence from the detailed explanation provided in the research consent form 
sent to them and/or the strength of ties they have with the gatekeeper or referrer used to 
access them. The researcher was prepared at all times and so maximised such opportunities. 
Following Rowley's (2012) suggestion, a snowballing strategy was used as well by asking for 
recommendations to participant’s colleagues in order to get additional interviews. One 
participant eventually cooperated by introducing two other colleagues. In total, the researcher 
conducted twenty-four (24) semi-structured interviews with senior and middle levels 
managers from the selected cases/organisations. One of the senior managers was interviewed 
twice. The interviews happened at different times between summer 2016 and January 2018 
mainly through telephone conversation on accepted dates and time via telephone 
conversation. Telephone interviews can be helpful data collection means especially when 
access to face-to-face is proving difficult (Rowley, 2012), thus adopted. And indeed, 
literature shows that some high impact contributions in DC research e.g. Danneels (2011) 
derived from empirical data generated through telephone interviews. 
The interview guide (see appendix 4) was designed to reflect the key objectives of the 
research and in a way that allowed the interview process to have three main phases, 
beginning with an introduction. The introduction phase in each interview often involved a 
short briefing or reaffirmation of the purpose and focus of the research; to give the participant 
a reassurance about anonymity and obtain permission to record the interview. Once those 
aspects have been discussed and accepted, the conversation often proceeded with formal or 
rather general questions about the participants’ background, experience, position and their 
roles in the organisation. Table 4.3 below captures the anonymised profile of the participants. 
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Table 4. 3 Profile of Participants Interviewed 
Organisation/Interviews Participants Position/management level Experience   
Abia (4) ASM1 Senior manager 10 
ASM2 Senior manager 14 
AMM3 Business Manager 7 
AMM4 Business  Manager 9 
Bayelsa (7) BSM1 Senior manager 16 
BSM2 Senior Executive manager  35 (retired) 
BSM3 Senior Executive manager 18 
BMM4 Middle manager 14 
BSM1 x2 Senior manager 16 
BSM6 Senior manager 19 
BSM7 Senior Executive manager 20 
Cross-River (4) CRSM1 Senior manager 16 
CRSM1 Senior manager 21 
CRSM3 Senior Executive manager  25 incl. 8 in SA 
CRMM4 Middle manager 9 
Delta (5) DSM1 Senior Executive manager 26 
DSM2 Middle manager 8 
DSM3 Senior Executive manager 18 
DSM4 Senior manager 16 
DMM5 Senior manager 13 
Ebonyi (4) ESM1 Senior manager 15 
ESM2 Senior manager 17 
EMM3 Middle manager 21 
EMM4 Middle manager 15 
 
As table 4.3 above indicates, the twenty-four interviews involved six managers with senior 
executive role experience; eleven senior managers and seven middle-level managers. The 
managers have on average 16 years’ experience between them – notably a considerable 
experience that enhances the validity of this study. Mostly represented include Bayelsa (7), 
Delta (5) Abia (4) Cross-River (4) and Ebonyi (4). Note that the actual name, positions, and 
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organisations of participants were kept confidential. In the data analysis, the above 
pseudonyms have been used. This is for ethical reasons and anonymity as promised.  
The second stage in each interview served as core. It focused on the main interests 
(objectives) of the research. Participants were asked open-ended questions about the Nigerian 
business environment, the challenges the managers and their banks were facing and why. 
This was intended at getting information to address the first objective of the study, and in 
what followed, explored for knowledge about different aspects of DMC implementation in 
the Nigerian banking industry, probing on how, why and why not. In the concluding phase, 
participants/interviewees were asked to comment on any additional perspective they have 
related to their organisation’s key success factors. The aim was to get further opinions about 
any aspects that were not covered by the researcher’s questions.  
On average, each interview lasted for about 50 minutes excluding the time used to introduce 
each other and to talk about any concerns. In the course of each interview, the pragmatic use 
of the semi-structured interview as earlier stated also involved, ‘varying the sequence of the 
questions’ (Bryman, 2015; Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018) where necessary and building on 
answers to probe for more information where more explanations were needed (Saunders et al, 
2012). All 24 interviews were recorded electronically with the consent of the interviewees, 
and transcribed verbatim, personally by the researcher. In all, there were 288 pages in 
transcripts, and so deemed to be an appropriate amount of interview data.  
Interviews if triangulated with other data sources often enhance validity (Yin, 2009). As 
mentioned earlier, data collection for this research involves other instruments namely, the 
banks CEO’s letters to shareholders over the three years period 2014 to 2016, relevant press 
releases, and media interviews/reports. Nadkarni & Barr (2008:1404) defines CEOs letter to 
shareholders (CLS) as ‘public statements made by chief executives responsible for charting 
their organisation’s futures and are official documents that discuss the strategic themes that 
the senior management believe are important to the firm’. The researcher retrieved CLS from 
the company’s annual report accessed from the investors’ relation portal on the selected 
organisations’ websites. For the CLS, the focus was mainly on the 2014 to 2016 documents. 
The reason is that it represented one of the most recent environmentally turbulent periods for 
the organisations, with a number of critical events and experiences e.g. the introduction of 
Treasury Single Account policy (Zubairu, 2015) and this research was particularly interested 
about how the manager’s perceived and responded to that.  
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Secondly, based on CBN regulation at the time of this study, all Nigerian banks have adopted 
31 December as uniform end of year accounting period, and are allowed a further four 
months at the end of each financial year to make their financial statement available to the 
CBN for approval and then to the public (see appendix 10). By January 2018 when the 
researcher formally ended data collection to focus on data analysis, it appeared that the 
selected banks’ annual report for the year ended 31 December 2017 were not ready and a 
decision was made to focus on those readily available. Nonetheless, observation shows that 
the CLS and annual report for the period obtained significantly reflected key statements about 
the organisations’ (banks’) performance, activities and managements’ strategic responses to 
dynamics in the business environment at the time.       
The use of CEO’s letters to shareholders as important evidence and valid measure of dynamic 
managerial capabilities e.g. perceptions, attention, and capacity for problems solving have 
been confirmed by Cho & Hambrick (2006), Nadkarni & Barr (2008), Eggers & Kaplan 
(2009) to mention a few. Eggers & Kaplan (2009) for example demonstrates that the CEO’s 
letter to shareholders could be useful to ‘capture time-varying attention to strategic issues’ by 
a firm’s management team (p.468). Nadkarni & Barr (2008) also used content analysis of 
CEOs letter to shareholders to reveal that managerial attention affected how the managers in 
24 US firms responded to change in their industry. Consistent with these previous studies, 
this study also believes that CLS provided reasonable insights and true reflection of not only 
strategic choices but also the rationale for the choices of especially the senior management 
team of the cases explored.  
Pisano (2016), and Martin (2011) also highlight the importance of involving other data 
sources like press releases and media interviews to shade more light on DC and DMC 
knowledge. Press release often refers to media reports about an event, person or entity, while 
media interviews are interviews with individuals (e.g. practitioners in an industry) by 
press/media organisation. Similar to Martin’s (2011) data collection method, the researcher 
accessed press release statements available on the organisation’s websites, and media 
interviews/reports; those related to the cases (Banks) strategic decisions, actions, and 
achievements. Reputable financial including Bloomberg and The Business Year (TBY) have 
transcripts of relevant interviews with the CEO/top executives of the selected firms on their 
website, Martin (2011), as well as evidence by this study, show that such subjective reports 
are usually salient in research. 
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Therefore, in all, the use of these different methods of data collection/sources availed this 
study of the quality of data required at the outset. It helped to avoid biases often related to a 
single data source to generate quite massive and robust data within the period available for a 
qualitative study (Blaikie, 2010; Yin, 2009). Through a combination of these data sources, 
this study also confirms that it can be more important to triangulate data in order to enhance 
the validity and reliability of the research outcomes (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002; Yin, 2009).  
4.9 Data Analysis Process 
As Flick (2014: 9 – 10) remarked, ‘…analysis of qualitative data often comes after data have 
been collected, recorded, transcribed and prepared’. Data analysis can be defined as “the 
classification and interpretation of linguistic (or visual) materials to make statements about 
implicit and explicit dimensions and structures of meaning-making in the material and what 
is represented in it” (Flick 2014:5). Data analysis in this research follows the qualitative 
content analysis (QCA) technique suggested by (Schreier, 2012; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; 
Vaismoradi et al, 2013/2016). QCA is analogous to the theme-based content analysis (TBCA) 
discussed by Neale & Nicholes (2001) and arguably, one of the finest qualitative methods 
currently available for analysing data and interpreting its meaning (Elo, Kaarianen, Kantste, 
Polkki, Utrainen & Kyngäs, 2014). Bengtsson (2016) also confirms this.  
A number of key considerations and benefits influenced the use of QCA in this study. Firstly, 
QCA is an extension of both the ordinary (quantitative) content analysis (Elo & Kyngäs, 
2008) and the standard thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) in that QCA seeks to weave 
the two techniques into a cohesive qualitative analytical model (Schreier, 2012). QCA 
extends the standard thematic analysis by integrating frequency of contents identified in the 
data, considering that that, itself may be a vital message (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Schreier, 
2012, Vaismoradi et al, 2013). Content in the context referred, may include: “words, 
meanings, pictures, symbols, ideas, themes or any message that can be communicated” 
(Holcomb, Okumus, & Bilgihan (2010:319). In this study, pictures were not used. 
However, not restricted to quantitative interest/identification, according to Schreier (2012), 
and Nakpodia, Shrives & Sorour (2018) QCA takes on many characteristics of qualitative 
research especially, interpretivness, inductiveness, reflexibility, and flexibility. ‘All 
qualitative research deals with some interpretation but are varied in depth and levels of 
abstraction depending on the method’ (Bengtsson, 2016:8). The QCA essentially allows for 
subjective and in-depth interpretation of contents in the data through a systematic 
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classification process of coding and matching themes and patterns (Heish & Shanon, 2005; 
Nakpodia, 2016). QCA similar to the thematic analysis confers the benefit of flexibility 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006) as it “is not linked to any particular science, and there are few rules 
to follow” (Bengtsson, 2016:8). Schreier (2012) also explains that the QCA allows data 
condensing in ways that can make it easier for the researcher to focus on the specifics. And as 
Vaismoradi et al, (2013) noted, QCA is consistent with the critical realism philosophy 
adopted by this study.  
4.9.1 QCA Practical Process and the utility of CAQDAS 
The data analysis process was aided by the Nvivo 11 software package, which is widely 
known for assisting in qualitative data analysis. Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis 
software (CAQDAS) helps to manage the data obtained and to automate some aspects (Dixon 
et al 2014; Nakpodia et al, 2018). Saldana (2013) acknowledges the utility of different 
CAQDAS available today but also notes that despite their usefulness, they remain only tools 
because they do not complete the analysis process. For instance, Nvivo can be used to 
support, and speed up the process but it does not replace the analysis process (Nakpodia, 
2016; Bengtsson, 2016). It is still the responsibility of the researcher to find a way through 
the data (Saldana, 2013) in order to make meaning from the materials (Flick, 2014). As Miles 
& Huberman (1994) suggest, Nvivo helps in data organising, reduction, the listing of codes 
and identifying patterns. Elo & Kyngäs (2008) also suggested three encompassing stages of 
data analysis namely: preparation, organising, and reporting. Figure 8 below is illustrative.    
Figure 8 Coding/Data analysis process 
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To find a way through the data in order to make meaning from the materials, the emerging 
themes and what is represented therein (Flick 2014; Saldana, 2013), three interrelated 
analytical stages/processes consistent with Elo & Kyngäs (2008) recommendation were 
followed. However, in this study, the researcher supported their idea with taxonomy similar 
to the technique employed by Dixon et al (2014) by incorporating retroductive reasoning in 
the process. Elo & Kyngäs (2008) espouses induction or deduction reasoning only.  
Section 4.3 earlier on discussed the relevance of retroductive reasoning in this study stressing 
that it allows a researcher to develop “preconceptions and frames of references” (Tippmann 
et al 2014:210). Retroductive logic, if used with analytic induction can help a researcher to 
have an idea of the direction to go, although not too clear about what to expect (Blaikie, 
2000; Dixon et al, 2014). The data analysis process in this study was by no means linear 
especially because of the nature/focus of the research, and DMC literature (in the Nigeria 
context examined by this study) is scarce. Table 4.4 below highlights that retroduction 
reasoning was relevant in the organising and reporting stage in the data analysis process. 
Table 4. 4 Data Analysis Process/Taxonomy Incorporating Retroductive Reasoning 
Stages Research Analysis 
objectives/focus 
Data analysis 
process 
The role of 
extant 
theory 
Research 
Approach  
 Theoretical   
Output 
Stage 1 
Preparation  
What are the 
keywords and 
themes emerging 
from the dataset 
and their 
frequencies? 
Transcribed interview 
Read through all the 
data; run auto coding, 
querying/ visualising 
keywords, themes 
In the 
background 
and existing 
knowledge 
 
Inductive 
Concepts  
  
Stage 2 
Organising  
What are the key 
stories or narratives 
addressing the 
question of the 
research: what, 
why, how, when? 
Open coding, 
grouping and 
categorising the 
emergent themes and 
abstraction based on 
research objective 
Writing up cases 
In the 
background 
and existing 
knowledge  
 
Inductive 
and 
retroductive  
Categories  
Causal 
relationships 
Rich 
explanations  
Stories/narrative 
Stage 3 
Reporting 
What new insights 
emerged compared 
to extant theory? 
Relations with extant 
theory; differentiate 
concepts               - 
break-back concepts 
Iteration 
between 
literature 
and dataset 
Inductive 
and 
Retroductive  
 
DMC/drivers 
Source: Adapted from Dixon et al (2014) 
As indicated above, the first stage was about preparation. In chapter three, it was earlier 
determined based on DMC literature that the main unit of analysis in this study is managers: 
their perception, attention, and problems solving actions in relation to the business 
environment and their organisation’s resource base. Clarity on that meant that the preparation 
stage simply proceeded with effort towards making sense of the data obtained. In this regard, 
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scholars suggest that generating best insights often requires immersion in, and deep 
interaction with the data (Maher, Hadfield, Hutchings & Eyto, 2018).  
In this study, ensuring deep interaction with, and immersion in the data began with the 
processes of listening to and transcribing the recorded interview personally by the researcher. 
Bengtsson (2016) suggests that transcribing is an interpretative process and it is preferable for 
the researcher to perform the transcribing procedure. Next in the preparation was reading 
through and familiarising oneself with contents of the interview transcripts, and other data 
sources (CLS, press release statements, media reports) accessed by the researcher. At that 
stage, it is important to note that Nvivo 11 was not yet involved. It was rather after that that 
the researcher imported all the materials into the Nvivo 11 software for the coding to start. 
Coding refers to the process of asking analytic questions in the data, searching for and 
selecting relevant codes or segments in the data (Maher et al, 2018). In a qualitative study, a 
code can be a ‘word or short phrase’ that identifies, represent or summarise salient, interest-
catching or suggestive ideas/understanding in a data (Saldana, 2013). The essence of coding 
is to reduce data whilst capturing the significant ideas, and understanding about a concept in 
the social situation/context being studied, and thereby develop novel concepts (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Saldana, 2013; Maher et al, 2018).  
Although coding can be part of activities in the organising stage, in line with Elo & Kyngäs 
(2008) idea, this study considered some preliminary interaction with the software 
functionalities as part of the preparation stage – sense-making aspect of the data obtained 
ahead of the organising process. In particular, the querying function and auto coding was 
used at the preparation stage in querying, visualising, familiarising with, and identifying the 
most frequently used words, themes/concepts in the dataset. See figure 9 below captures 
word-cloud retrieved in the process. 
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Figure 9 Word Cloud of data 
As evident in figure 9 above, the process allowed the researcher to generate a word-cloud 
displaying words, themes, and concepts mostly represented in the dataset. The size of words 
within the word-cloud reflects the density or frequency of the words, themes, or concepts in 
the dataset. However, the size of the words does not reflect particularly their relevance to the 
research objectives. For example, the word “Bank” appeared most prominent in the data (and 
word-cloud) because of the industry context explored and the frequency with which managers 
expressed issues about the industry and their organisation. In another example, the word 
“also” featured prominently not particularly because of its significance but due to the pattern 
of speaking or use of English by most managers interviewed. However, words like 
management, people, decisions, and retail whilst appearing relatively in smaller sizes 
compared to “bank” embodies ‘pregnant words’ as the organising phase revealed. 
The next stage in the analysis was the organising phase. This involved exploring and probing 
the dataset extensively in order to pull pertinent abstractions. In other words, questioning the 
data with more focus on understanding and selecting stories or narratives addressing the 
what, why, how, when about the stated objectives of the study. Abstraction implies 
interpreting the narratives or stories and generating categories in ways reflecting the concerns 
of the research (Nakpodia et al, 2018). In line with the retroductive reasoning followed by 
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this study, and as Tippmann et al (2014:210) suggests, the process often requires having 
“preconceptions and frames of references” or coding frame development (Schreier, 2012). 
Having that ensures that whilst one may not have a clear idea of what to expect, the 
researcher can have an appropriate sense of direction (Tippmann, 2014; Blaikie, 2000). In 
other words, it helps to maintain appropriate focus on identifying and selecting relevant 
aspects of a theory from the empirical data because it is possible to get lost in the data if the 
researcher has generated a huge volume of data (Nakpodia, 2016). In this study, the 
preconceptions and frames of reference developed from DC and DMC literature review (a 
priori) served as conceptual direction,  with the expectation that the preconceptions and 
theory would be enhanced (Vaughan, 1992) by the emerging themes and findings from the 
empirical data. 
Thus, after auto coding at the preparation phase, and with the preconceptions and frames of 
reference about DMC in mind, the organising phase involved the first cycle (open) coding 
process. More specifically, a process of opening up codes/themes, reading over again the 
managers’ comments/opinions in the interview transcripts and other data sources uploaded on 
Nvivo, interpreting and selecting aspects that were relevant to the question and objectives of 
this research by coding them. As Saldana (2013:4) rightly noted, “Coding is not a precise 
science and “rarely is the first cycle of coding perfectly attempted”. In this study, the process 
was characterised of moving forth and backward and trying to get better and more accurate 
with the coding. Thus, there can be multiple coding processes in the organising stage.  
The second cycle coding is always an opportunity to not only improve on the first cycle but 
also to begin to categorise emergent themes and abstractions developments in order to 
facilitate and consolidate meaning (Saldana, 2013). In this phase, the researcher looked for 
similarities in subcategory themes, sorted, and grouped them as generic categories based on 
the relationships observed. From the second cycle coding process, three coding strands (or 
main categories) became prominent: complex business environment, innovation and capacity 
building, and impact of management and cognition. Figure 10 is illustrative of the coding 
frame showing, complex business environment as one main category. See figure 13, and 
appendix for coding processes capturing asset orchestration, and cognition as other main 
categories. 
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       Subcategory (themes)                    Generic Category (themes)              Main Category 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Figure 10 Sample coding frame - Complex Business Environment 
As Bengtsson (2016) suggests, the main categories reflect the different areas of focal interest 
in the research based on assumptions in DMC literature, and the questions asked during the 
data collection stage. That is managers’ perception about their organisation’s business 
environment, responses to the environmental issues they emphasised, asset orchestration 
processes, and the underpinning (driving) behaviour allowing or constraining managers’ 
efficacy on those roles (Helfat et al, 2007; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Martin & Bacharach, 
2018).  
Macro-
economic 
challenges 
Regulatory 
headwinds 
Stiffened 
Competition  
 Inflation and rising interest rate 
Liquidity problem/crude-oil price 
Lack of FOREX/Exchange rate  
 Competition from Fintechs/Telcos 
No credit rating agencies   
GDP fall/Recession/income decline  
TSA/effects on liquidity   
Changes in monetary policies  
Insecurity   
Highly competitive industry  
Sociocultural 
challenges  
Institutions Gap  
NPL/decline in asset quality 
Difficult to identify credible clients 
 Corruption  
Unstable 
government   
 Peoples’ lifestyle/culture  
 Illiterate people  
Government policies somersault 
Unstable governments/leadership 
Complex Business 
Environment 
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The coding, grouping, and categorisation of data embody the abstraction process that served 
as the basis for the conceptual system in the reporting stage. In the reporting stage, contained 
in chapters 5 to 11 of this thesis, the researcher mainly structured the data analysis by using 
tables to show patterns and categorisation of common themes/ideas/opinions in the data. 
Themes, categories and actual linkages to DMC from the manager’s perspective were 
inferred, redefined and used as the conceptual system and organising structure. The important 
comments and quotes observed in the data were highlighted verbatim in the reporting process 
in order to strongly underpin the analysis of findings. This thesis continues with the analysis 
of findings in the next chapters. The focus is mainly on aspects relevant to the scope and 
objectives of this research as earlier delineated in chapters one and three. After completing 
the within-case analysis, a synthesis chapter was used to compare findings through cross-case 
analysis. 
In all, the researcher believes that QCA flexibility benefit ensured that the researcher “did not 
throw away the bathwater with the baby” unlike the standard thematic analysis that considers 
the frequency of codes as unimportant or ordinary content analysis with its tendency for 
taking away meaning from its context (Vaismoradi et al, 2013; Schreier, 2012). Before the 
presentation of findings, as Bengtsson (2016:13) suggests, all research must be open to 
criticisms and evaluation. The next section addresses this.  
4.10 Limitations of methods 
Despite the strength of the design and methodology of this research, it also has several 
limitations as most other research often do. First, although the researcher believes that the use 
of telephone interviews worked well. However, it would have been useful to also involve a 
face-to-face interview, which could allow the researcher to observe non-verbal cues in the 
process, and through that, determine if something different could be learned. Apart from that, 
some participants interviewed seemed quite careful and would not be drawn to answering 
some relevant questions. Based on ethical consideration, and assurances already provided, it 
was only necessary to respect that. Nonetheless, it is believed that the semi-structured 
interview technique used by this study aided the researcher to probe the participants in other 
ways that made it possible to obtain rich details while also respect the wishes of each 
participant.  
Thirdly, the use of the CEO’s letter to shareholders (CLS) would have been expanded to 
incorporate a wider timeframe – about ten years, including 2017. However, only annual 
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reports for up to the year ending 31 December 2016 were available at the time the data 
analysis commenced by January 2018. This is mainly because the financial regulation in the 
country allows one end of year financial reporting, (see appendix 10). Nonetheless, other 
materials/data sources beyond 2016 e.g. press releases were also used to strengthen data. The 
use of Nvivo was a learning experience for the researcher. Whilst supportive in data analysis, 
it was also time-consuming with many aspects to learn about the software. Furthermore, the 
onus still lies with the researcher to find his way through the data (Saldana, 2013).  This thus 
shows that some degree of subjectivism cannot be ruled out. However, the utility of Nvivo 
especially in helping to search and retrieve data was great. The auto coding not only makes it 
quicker but also helpful in facilitating a better understanding of the evidence that can be used 
to enhance the richness of research outcomes. The final chapter provides a comprehensive 
limitation of the study.  
4.11 Chapter Summary 
Discussion in this chapter documents the research design and methodology applied to address 
the question of this study. In particular, it shows that this research follows a philosophical 
perspective reflecting critical realism based on its consistency with the multilevel nature of 
dynamic capabilities and the managerial level focus of the research. In line with the adopted 
philosophical standpoint, this chapter also discussed and justified the choice of retroductive 
reasoning approach, qualitative research methods, and multiple case studies as a strategy for 
the study. This chapter has also discussed and justified the choice of Nigeria as the 
geographical context for the study and further detailed the data collection and analysis 
processes.  
As explained in Chapter 3, the main unit of analysis is managers’ behaviour/perspectives 
regarding asset orchestration or strategic change on an organisation’s resources base. The 
stated unit of analysis reflects the consensus gleaned from the assessment of theoretical 
assumptions in literature and represented in the proposed research framework in this study to 
show that DMC deployment and development are evident or otherwise through causal powers 
that embody it. The influence of DMC on DC was analysed with consideration to asset 
orchestration and the extent to which the managers feel responsible/contributed to the 
strategic decisions and implementation of the strategic responses referred. The succeeding 
chapter discusses the findings of the study.  
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                                            Chapter Five  
                         RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS  
5.1 Introduction   
This chapter begins with the analysis of findings by this research in relation to its overarching 
question of this study “to what extent are dynamic managerial capabilities deployed in the 
Nigerian banking industry”. Based on methodological preferences involved in the study, 
specifically, a combination of data collection techniques and instruments used for the 
research; availed the researcher with enormous data. The analysis of findings has been 
organised to show first, within-case analysis i.e. findings obtained from each case and lastly a 
cross-case analysis for all five cases investigated (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Haven explained that space matters, managers’ interpretation of space or environment and to 
what extent it may contribute to making a difference (Sayer, 1992; Salvato, 2003; Tripsas & 
Gavetti, 2000; Sharma, 2000; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015) constitute an interest for this research. 
This research begins with analysis from the managers’ perspectives about the Nigerian 
business environment in terms of banking business. This is also consistent with the critical 
realist approach being followed by this research because of its holistic interest in building 
chains of causality (Easton, 2010), evidence (Yin, 2003) and uncovering the generative 
mechanisms of a phenomenon/event (Bhaskar, 2008).  
Further to the participants' perspective about the environment, next in the analysis is a focus 
on the central aspect of the study this study, simply put: the extent/how-dynamic managerial 
capabilities are deployed and further developed in the study context. The analysis thus 
embodies findings capturing the strategic actions and responses by the management in 
relation to dynamics in the business environment, their intents or motivation. The third 
section focuses on the management roles and attributes managerial cognition that underpins 
DMCs uncovered by the study. For parsimony, note that discussion about the country’s 
profile, the Nigerian banking industry – history, developments, and key issues are all 
contained in the appendix. After this introduction, analysis in this chapter focuses mainly on 
the case of Abia (pseudonym).  
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                                    The case of Abia Bank 
5.1. Case Profile – see appendix 3 
5.2. Business environment – challenges and opportunities  
In the case of Abia, managers generally consider Nigeria as a “volatile macroeconomic 
business environment”. Table 5.1 below shows the emerging themes about environmental 
challenges faced by managers from all data obtained in Abia’s case. It also highlights the 
implications of the challenges referred to and some opportunities based on the perspective 
shared by managers. 
Table 5. 1 Environmental challenges in the case of Abia 
Focal Inquiry  
 
Emerging themes/concepts Categorisation Implications for Abia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business 
environment  
Economic downturn which led to: 
Liquidity problem 
Shortage of  FOREX and exchange 
rate problem 
High-interest rate, inflation,  
Decline in GDP, low household 
spending and recession 
 
Regulation and political problem 
TSA implementation 
CRR requirement changes 
 
Sociocultural problem 
Peoples’ lifestyle – low acceptance 
of new technology/innovation            
                                                                               
Business environment 
challenges  
. Dwindling income 
.liquidity problem 
. Rising NPLs and 
strains in asset quality 
. Declining profits 
. Low capacity for 
lending 
 
 
 
Finding a novel and 
acceptable way to create 
value 
Nigeria’s population:                  
youth, unbanked and                           
under-banked customers         
  
Technology  
Business opportunities  Tap opportunity  
 
5.2.1 Macroeconomic challenges 
In the case of Abia, managers explained that one of the biggest challenges was the economic 
downturn they have experienced since 2014. In particular, managers shared sentiments about 
the economic effects of the fall in crude oil prices, suggesting that that led to stifle business 
growth, liquidity problem, and scarcity of FOREX, inflation and declining GDP in Nigeria’s 
economy.  
 
For Abia, the business implications of these issues were expressed in terms of decline in 
revenue, strains on asset quality, rising non-performing loans (NPLs), low-capacity for 
lending and drop in profits achievable. Two of the managers explained as follows:  
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“You know the oil prices we sell have ripple effects on our foreign currencies, our exchange 
rate. We have issues because …most of the people that we give big loans to are usually 
multinationals and oil companies. We now have situations whereby you have given …let’s 
say $20m to XYZ Company two years ago at 130 Naira – that was the exchange rate then. 
…But now, the exchange goes for like N380, do you see that the loan itself has automatically 
doubled to like $40 million?” [ASM2]. 
“…that same facility I granted to that customer in dollars, let’s say $10m …is now at about 
N300m. What it means is that without giving any facility, my risk-asset portfolio has grown 
thereby affecting my capital adequacy ratio. There is a threshold requirement. Therefore, 
there is a need to run around and beef-up capital so that you won’t run afar of the law and 
ensuring that you still remain relevant in the banking system” [ASM1].  
This meant that in Abia, managers found themselves having to find new ways to deal with (a) 
creating risk-assets and (b) non-performing loans (NPLs) already availed to customers, (c) 
how to source alternative funds to maintain the liquidity and (d) ensuring that the relevant 
regulatory provisions are consistently met. It was notable that when the participant was 
talking about “there is need to run around and beef up capital” [ASM1], he was not talking 
about operational activity rather a major step to increase/extend their capital base. 
5.2.2 Regulatory and political challenge  
Another key challenge significantly evident in the Abia dataset was the introduction of the 
treasury single account (TSA) policy in 2015 by CBN. TSA is a policy directive that required 
all government agencies to have one single account with the CBN as against the usual 
practice of having deposit accounts with commercial banks. Appendix 9 contains a copy of 
the CBN circular and more explanation about the policy. Regarding the TSA issue, 
participants saw it as partly political and partly regulatory. They consider it as political 
because the TSA implementation was at the instance of the new government that came into 
power 2015 and their anti-corruption policy.  
It was also regulatory because the CBN has the sole mandate to enforce compliance with the 
policy. This meant that Abia returned all government deposits to CBN. The CEO in his 2016 
letters to shareholders explained:  
“…the Treasury Single Account (TSA), intended to ensure greater public sector 
accountability and efficiency, adversely impacted liquidity increasing pressure on the asset 
side of the balance sheets of banks” [Abia-CLS, 2016].  
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One of the managers interviewed by the researcher shed light on the above comment by 
explaining:  
 “…our major contributor of deposits is the federal government but the federal government 
introduced the treasury single account. …we have less money to do business because it’s like 
your major investor or your major depositor pulling out all their cash or most of their cash” 
[ASM2].   
This meant that Abia as with other rival banks had their financial deposit base significantly 
diminished and consequently needed to rebuild its capital position. To what extent the bank 
prepared for it can be crucial.   
5.2.3 Sociocultural problem   
 
Managers in Abia talked about challenges in driving innovative banking strategies due to the 
low level of acceptance by the less enlightened segment, which incidentally also constitutes a 
more significant proportion of the country’s population. As one of the senior managers 
explained:  
“When you talk about innovation, e-banking, and all that, you will notice that our level 
acceptability in this country is very low because you know the population of Nigeria is about 
170 million; but if you work on that population, …the bankable Nigerians should be about 70 
million. I am just trying to be conservative here.  …people in the rural area, most of them are 
not well informed, about electronic banking, you need to put them through; you need to teach 
them. …most of them are not using the sophisticated phones that can be used to do most of 
these transactions” [ASM1]. 
This highlights the challenge of how to create value for people with such segments.  It shows 
that the level of literacy and income level of people in a given society may constitute a 
challenge for DMC implementation. However, of the three categories of challenges discussed 
above, one of the senior managers also emphasised that:  
“…most of the problems we have in the banking sector are either or between these two things 
I just mentioned to you. They are the root cause of our problems. Every other thing links to 
them; leads to them, or …arose from them because if you think back to before the 
introduction of the single treasury account and the oil price falling, the banking industry was 
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liquid; there was money …but now everybody is just trying to cut costs, and focus on their 
retail” [ASM2].  
Despite the stated challenges, Table 5.2 below captures key performance highlights (KPH) of 
Abia reflecting a growing and consistently good-looking performance by the organisation.   
Table 5. 2 KPH in Abia between 2014  and 2016 
Year 
 
2014 (billion Naira) 2015 (Billion Naira) 2016 (Billion Naira) 
Gross Earnings  245.3 337.4 381.3 
Profit Before Tax 52.0 75.0 90.3 
Profit After Tax 43.0 65.8 71.4 
Customer’s Deposits 1.45T 1.68T 2.08T 
NPL ratio in % 2.2% 1.7% NA 
Total Assets 2.104.3T 2.591.3T 3.483.8T 
Source: Annual report (2014, 2015, 2016).  
 
The KPH in the table above shows that the results of Abia maintained a positive look in terms 
of earnings, profitability, customer deposits and total asset base despite the challenges. 
Buoyed by these achievements the CEO also declared:  
“Despite the challenging economy, 2016 was a year of progress for [Abia] Bank. Many of 
the strategic choices we made over the years were validated when tested by the economic 
recession. These critical decisions included our business mix, our risk management culture, 
and our capital and liquidity strategies” [source: annual report, 2016].  
As the above comment show, the management decisions as related to Abia’s business mix, 
risk management culture, capital, and liquidity strategy were a key reference. In this regard, 
observations on more probes by this research are analysed in the next section.  
  5.3 Strategic Actions/Responses and DMC 
Consistent with the above declaration by the CEO, table 5.3.1 show categories of themes 
capturing key strategic choices/response by the management especially against the backdrop 
of the stated environmental challenges from 2014 to 2016. The criteria applied in selecting 
the themes inter alia are based on managers’ perspectives, and themes0 consistently 
identified in the dataset as related to the organisation survival, success and planned future 
actions. Note that the categorisation is only generic. Discussion in chapter 10 containing the 
synthesis and cross-case analysis of findings expands on the categorisation below in order to 
arrive at the main categories revealed by the study.000 
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Table 5. 3 Related DMC themes and categorisation 
 
Theme  
 
Category  
. Building Africa’s most respected bank – project 
2013 to 2017 
. Becoming the number one bank in Africa 
. Africa/global outlook 
. International banking operation  
. Implementing global best practices  
 
 vision/renewal and reputation 
building (setting high goals) 
. Rights issue/$400 Euro bond in 2014 
. N41.7b via rights issue in 2015 
. $300m unsecured notes/N35 commercial paper in 
2016;  
. 36% increase in deposit via new customers’ 
acquisition 
. Optimise capital structure – debt/equity   
 
 
Optimising/building financial 
capital base  
. Strong focus on retail banking  
. Implementing a balance between corporate and 
retail banking strategies (business mix) 
. Implementing a value chain model 
Implementing a diversified 
banking model 
. Investments in digital and technological 
infrastructure  
. Lunched “Basement” in 2015 
. Redesigned IT architecture    
. Upgraded core banking application FCUBS 12.0.2 
 
Building digital and technological 
Infrastructure  
. Co-creating partnerships with Fintechs  
  
Collaboration and partnerships 
/Learning  
5.3.1 Strategic vision renewal and building global respect/reputation   
One of the most densely represented themes in the case of Abia data was about the vision of 
the management towards a “corporate strategic objective to become the World’s most 
respected African bank by 2017. For this goal, findings show that in Abia, a five-year rolling 
plan for the project was already in place before the macroeconomic issue that began in 2014.  
The goal-setting approach in the context described in this case is consistent with DMC and 
Agarwal & Helfat (2009) idea of strategic renewal as a critical strategic change process. 
Before 2013, Abia has had different ‘strategic goals’: (a) to be ranked among the top ten 
banks and once that was achieved, (b) they aimed to be among the top five banks in Nigeria, 
which they have since achieved as well. It means a periodic review of corporate strategic 
objectives has become a norm in the organisation. The following comments support this: 
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 “We did not target being one of the top three in the first five years, but rather in the top 10. 
Right after that, we wanted to be in the top five and be seen and known as the world's most 
respected African bank”[source: CEO interview with TBY].  
“We have corporate visions and missions that everybody in the bank needs to know. At every 
five-five years, that corporate mission or vision is reviewed. So at that time is when you know 
where the bank wants to focus on” [ASM2].  
 “In [Abia Bank] we have a five-year plan that we have been working on 2013 to 2017 
targeting to be the most responsible African bank you want to bank with. So we are just 
looking for a way to achieve that. We want to be the likes of Bank of America, Barclay's bank 
– so we have a goal. We want to be number one bank in Africa; number one not just in 
Nigeria, in Africa” [AMM3]. 
There was a clear intent to deploy a new corporate vision/strategy to search for/build respect, 
and the size of the organisation to regional and global reckoning. There is a commitment to 
renewing the project/vision every 5 years and a commitment to benchmark against the best in 
the world. It shows that the attention of the management is well beyond local competition.  
5.3.2 Optimising Financial Capital Base    
As an ambitious organisation, aiming to become the world's most respected African bank, in 
Abia, the management understands this and has been taking steps to build/strengthen the 
organisation’s financial base. As explained by the CEO: 
 “A company needs a solid financial background to be the world's most respected African 
bank. It must have strong numbers, a global outlook, and a strong presence on the continent” 
[source: CEO interview with, TBY]. The term “strong numbers” refers to financial capital. 
Table 5.3 highlights a number of financial capital raising initiatives by the management in 
recent years – 2014 to 2016.  In the 2014 CLS the CEO in his opening remarks also declared 
“in 2014, we concentrated on reinforcing the financial health of the organisation in line with 
the corporate strategy of becoming the World’s most respected African bank by 2017”. Thus, 
the rationale is clear.  
As further explained in the 2014 CLS, “The first of the capital raising initiatives was a debt 
issue through a $400m Eurobond in June. We supported this with a rights issue which we 
initiated in the last quarter of the year”. Abia followed the rights issue and Eurobond in 2014 
with another rights issue in August 2015 which enabled them to inject a further N41.7b to the 
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organisation’s capital base. In 2016, Abia further increased her capital base by “$300m senior 
unsecured note and N35b commercial paper”. According to the CEO, altogether, these capital 
raising efforts helped to maintain what he described as ‘a robust balance sheet’ by the end of 
the 2016 financial year.  
Another way the organisation optimised its resource base was through new customers’ 
acquisition projects. Analysis of the bank's business model shows this. As a financial 
institution, efforts to maintain a stronger financial capital position on an on-going basis in 
terms of growth and structure are reflective in other themes as well.  It is also clear from the 
capital raising initiatives are strategic.  
5.3.3 Building a Diversified bank  
This is one of the most dominant themes in the case of Abia. This is consistent with what the 
CEO earlier on called “their business mix”. The CEO and management team generally 
believes that they have continued to achieve strong financial performance mainly by 
sharpening their focus on creating a “diversified bank with a strong retail base”. Before 
2014, Abia has had its main concentration on corporate banking sector with only marginal 
interest in retail banking. However, the CEO in his 2014 maiden letter to shareholders 
declared:  
“Our retail represents the major growth opportunity for us as this will allow us to 
consolidate and diversify the returns of the existing business through our value chain 
strategy. We will in the coming year place more emphasis on our retail business” (Source: 
Annual Report).  
 From this statement, it was evident that the new leadership identified and drove the retail 
segment as an area of significant opportunity. It also signified a modification of the 
organisation’s business model in order to play an active role in that segment.  Fundamentally, 
the reason was to have diversified or an expanded income structure and the way to go about it 
was to increase their drive for customer service, acquisition, and retention. One of the senior 
managers interviewed by the researcher shade light on this strategic initiative quite 
elaborately by: 
 “…we started a campaign – a very big campaign, and the big campaign is focused on 
driving the retail. Most of the people that gave big money are government and international 
companies. Those companies are few; it is more like 80/20 ratio – that is 20% of your 
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customers give you 80% of your deposits and the 20% are the big companies: the federal 
parastatals, the oil & gas – Total, Mobil, Shell, and Oando, you know all those big 
companies. What we are trying to do is instead of getting a big deposit from customer X, 
customer X is one person – he is giving me 1 billion, why can’t I go and meet one hundred 
people that will give me the total sum of that 1 billion – because those 100 people cannot 
remove their money at the same time.  
When you drive retail, if your retail comes up you are going to be very okay because you 
don’t need all the big-big money. You’ll want them but you won’t need them. Or even if you 
have those big monies, if they are removed, it is not everybody that will remove the money at 
the same time because they are plenty. So we have a campaign to drive retail and that is what 
we have been doing all the year and it is what we want to do in the next two to five years – to 
drive retail and improve on service. Service is going to be what differentiates you from your 
competitors. …Those are the two ways we are trying to solve our liquidity challenge and 
fluctuation in price. Once you drive retail – once you have retail you are okay. So my bank 
has always been focused on corporate, now we are driving retail” [ASM2].  
Questioned and probed further to determine why the organisation has not has had less interest 
in retail banking prior to 2014, the recent initiative for retail banking model, two senior 
managers/participants in Abia differently commented as follows:  
“We have always tried to drive retail but we have not focused on it this much because there 
were always funds from government and all those big companies. But now, that those funds 
are depleting, the business must go on and that is when you go back and you now sit and re-
strategize – and you now think okay, where can we substitute these funds that are going 
from? And retail is a gold mine if you can tap into it because we have something to our 
advantage – we have a lot of population. …just think about it, Lagos itself is bigger than most 
countries in Europe. Think about where you have 60% of Lagos population banking with 
you; that alone is going to make you very-very okay out of the crisp” [SMA 2].  
The above comments were quite revealing in many aspects. The rationale for a stronger drive 
on retail banking is to have a diversified model with not only diverse but also stable income 
stream. The discussion above also linked the strategic change to the challenge in the 
environment in terms of the lost deposit and income and on how to leverage the opportunities 
presented by the Nigerian population. This study also identified the effect of the new business 
model in terms of financial returns. The following comment by the CEO bears this out:   
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“Revenue rose across all operating divisions with significant support from the retail 
business, posting N12 billion in profit before tax and contributing 11 percent to Group 
profits. The retail business also contributed significantly to the 66 percent growth in fee and 
commission income, ensuing from the increased adoption and utilisation of our e-business 
channels and digital offerings”. We grew total deposits by 36 percent year-over-year, despite 
the increasingly competitive deposit market. Total deposits at year-end were N2.09 trillion, 
reflecting our resilient efforts at growing market share”. 
As differently explained by the managers, this strategic response, to have a diversified 
business structure or business mix with a strong retail base is helping the organisation to 
navigate their way through the events they have faced. The financial contribution is evident. 
It is also evident from the above narrative that the implementation of the business model is 
driven, by the management’s consideration to have diversified attention rather than a 
concentrated on corporate banking alone.  
5.3.4 Regional and International expansion 
For an organisation seeking global reckoning, observation shows that managers in Abia are 
committed to extension of their operations beyond Nigeria. The idea is to seek opportunities 
in other African countries and beyond, and essentially to match their vision to become the 
most respected African bank. The following comments highlight this:  
 “…we are not just in Nigeria … we have branches in some African countries too; we have a 
branch in the UK and they are doing well. We want to be the likes of Bank of America, 
Barclays bank – so we have a goal [AMM3].  
“We have a hit map of places that we could possibly expand to. …We will add one or two 
new locations; though the contributions from all of those countries are marginal in 
comparison to Nigeria. We will, however, do them over time”. [Source: CEO interview with 
TBY].  
More information accessed from the organisation’s website and annual report by the 
researcher shows that Abia currently operates in six African countries including Ghana, 
Rwanda, DR Congo, Zambia, Gambia and Sierra Leone, and one country in Europe, UK. 
This finding underlines the managers’ commitment to a diversified attention that is not about 
playing only in Nigeria. The management continues to search for opportunities locally and 
internationally. 
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5.3.5 Innovative Technology and Digital banking capabilities  
Abia in recent years has been using technology as an alternative banking approach. This 
according to the management involves “building capacity to innovate through technology and 
digital banking”. This is according to the management is driven by their strong conviction 
and shared belief that technology and innovation would remain the key drivers of 
competitiveness in the Nigerian banking space and beyond. The following comment bears 
this: 
 “…we are building the capacity to innovate …taking advantage of the latest advances in 
Fintech, innovation and big data. …we upgraded our core banking application to enhance 
optimal service delivery across all customer touchpoints” [Abia-CLS in 2016 annual report] 
In an interview with the research participants, one of the senior managers expounded on the 
basis of the investment as follows: 
 “…we want to drive our service through innovative technology. Innovative technology in the 
sense that banking operations that are manually done before, we want to make it what we can 
take to the customer and the customer can do for himself or herself. You want to transfer, you 
don’t need to come to the bank to transfer; you can use your internet banking. If you don’t 
even have internet banking, and you only want to transfer, you can use or if you want to 
transfer and you don’t have internet on your phone, we have another platform for that. So we 
are focusing on driving service through technology, improving our platforms – making out 
platforms better; That is the major way we are improving the service” [ASM2]  
One of the key insights is that even in the investment and development of the digital 
platforms, in Nigeria, the management provides for people who may not be able to afford the 
internet or sophisticated phones separately. The whole idea is to provide alternate banking 
platforms different from the normal banking hall transactions; allowing customers service 
options and for the banks giving attention to a diverse set of customers.  
Table 5.3 above shows that some of the recent upgrades to the bank’s core application to 
include: Flexcube Universal Banking System (FCUBS 12.0.2), Basement. In the 2015 CLS, 
the CEO reflects on the impacts of those applications by declaring for example that the new 
FCUBS 12 “…has led to improved turnaround time, enriched customer interaction and 
enhanced the reliability of all our platforms in line with our mantra of speed, service, and 
security. 
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The CEO reaffirmed this commitment in his LS, which declares, “We continue to prudently 
invest in the right digital and technological infrastructures that result in a better customer 
experience, improved risk management and lower costs”. This declaration thus suggests a 
commitment to more investment in technology and upgrades on the digital banking 
capabilities of the bank on an on-going fashion.  
Astute investment in technology infrastructure as evident in Abia’s case is consistent with 
asset orchestration as Helfat et al (2007). Analysis also includes the modification of the 
business model of Abia; the international expansion, a commitment to having a diverse 
financial structure and then the management’s vision to lead Abia to become the most 
respected African bank. This study has uncovered that attention diversity is relevant in the 
above strategic choices and investment. Findings addressing the third research objective.    
5.6 How managers balance between routines and better strategic decision  
In Abia, in relation to the research objective about how managers balanced between existing 
organisational routine and better decision enabling strategic change. The emerging themes 
mainly include; strategic thinking, self-belief, employee empowerment, communication, and 
learning. The understanding and context in which these terms were expressed in the data are 
next discussed.  
5.6.1 Strategic thinking   
In Abia's case, consideration implies that robust strategic thinking at the individual managers’ 
level enables managers to find a balance between organisational routine and consideration or 
proclivity for process change. Related to the events that characterised the industry and its 
implication for the bank, perspective shared by managers was captured in the comment:  
“The most tasking thing there is you have to put up strategic thinking and come up with 
something. Your strategic thinking might not go in line with what other people want. …You 
have to sit down and think about the project, the implication, what our customers expect, and 
customers’ satisfaction. You have to look at the regulatory body, you have to look at 
implementation cost and procedure; you have to look at return on investment on that 
particular project. So there are a lot of things you have to look at. Strategic thinking is 
something that is key; one has to ensure that you capture a lot of areas that are challenging” 
[ASM1].  
This means, first, that a manager must take responsibility involving an intentional effort to 
think strategically on a project, reflecting on all aspects. This may enable a manager to 
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further learn about potentially questionable areas, hone them and based on that convince or 
leverage the support required to implement the touted strategic change. This is consistent 
with Di Stefano et al (2014) idea of learning-by-thinking, and hypothetically a creative 
thinking capability.  
5.6.2 Self-Belief and Issue selling 
Another concept was about self-belief on the project by the project initiator or the team 
looking to drive it. Typical perception expressed by one of the senior managers in the 
following comment:  
“It is about believing in a project. You cannot sell what you do not believe in? You cannot 
make people accept what you do not believe in. you have to accept and believe in that thing 
first to enable other people to buy into it. That’s the truth” [ASM1].  
There are two aspects to the above comments. The term self-belief was used in the dataset to 
show that strategic change initiative must be underpinned first of all by a strong belief in 
what the team or project initiator wants to do. A manager can be able push through a strategic 
change initiative/project by demonstrating strong belief in it in ways that would elicit support 
of the board and the executive management team as the ultimate and penultimate decision-
makers for the organisation. The second aspect highlighted is issue selling. The idea of issue 
selling was discussed in the data to reflect having to convince other people to agree with 
one’s proposition. This means that in addition to the manager’s belief, the communication 
aspect is critical.  
5.6.3 Employee empowerment  
Employee empowerment in the case of Abia reflects training and allowing people/managers a 
sense of responsibility. The understanding is that that would enable the manager to know 
what decision can receive support and which cannot. As the following managers explained:  
“One thing I can say about [Abia] is they empower their staff. …you give relatively junior 
people leadership positions earlier. For instance, I became a team lead at the level of an 
ABO and I was running a whole branch. In the industry, at that time, people that ran the 
branch are SBOs and above. So to answer your question; is just to empower the staff through 
independent decision making. Make sure that the staff have the competency to improvise if 
say the situation the system is down or that you have to get extra approval to a transaction 
especially if the approval is not or if the transaction is not infringing any CBN regulation” 
[ASM2].  
  
134 
 
 “That is why I said to empower employees is part of our core values. When you are 
empowered to take decisions in line with your responsibilities, there are decisions you have 
to take because you are a professional; you know how these things run. So those that are 
within your own power to do, you do not need anybody because you have been trained as a 
professional and you have been empowered as an employee of the bank and what is within 
your ambit you can go on with it” [ASM1]. 
In talking about “not infringing on any CBN regulation” [ASM2] it can be understood that 
some of the decisions referred go beyond just operational activities to also decisions that tilts 
more towards overall corporate responsibility of the organisation. The comment also 
highlights the term “improvise”. One may recall Zahra et al (2006) argument, which holds 
that improvising is less of dynamic capability in established firms. In particular, the keyword 
emphasised is about managers of staff empowerment - used to show that how managers go 
about their proclivity for strategic change while maintaining a balance with extant routine is 
to leverage on the fortified managers' capability to make the appropriate call.  
5.4 DMC attributes and Influence/role of managers Cognition 
 Based on Helfat & Peteraf's (2015) operationalisation as adopted, some themes identified 
from the dataset provide insights relevant to cognitive underpinning DMCs in Abia’s case. 
Table 5.4 below highlights the themes. 
Table 5. 4 Themes related to Cognition and DMCs in Abia’s case 
Managerial Cognition Related influence on DMC and Innovation culture  
Leadership Vision/Belief  - Set high goals and inspired the strategic decisions and commitment 
which led to the  achievement of key milestone noted  in table 5.3.1 
- as underpinning the project 2013 - 2017 initiative to become the most 
respected African bank and international banking operation 
- enabling sustainable banking with emphasis on the triple bottom line   
Perception/attention 
 
-perception and attention change led to the decision to implement a 
diversified business model with a stronger focus on retail banking 
- perceived opportunity in the Africa & Nigeria unbanked population  
Problems-solving 
capacity  
-demonstrated through search for alternative capital via rights issuing 
that cushioned the effect of TSA, NPLs and the liquidity challenge  
- initiative to purposefully embark on new customers acquisition as a 
strategy for building stronger customer and capital base, creating better 
quality risk assets, and risk management 
Communication 
Buying-in 
-highlighted as key competencies used/needed to obtain executive 
management commitment (buy-in) to a process change or innovation 
-it encompasses self-belief and convincing communication of own ideas   
 
Attention Diversity 
 
Towards modified business model, culture and Capacity building  
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                     Chapter Six 
                                         The Case of Bayelsa  
6.1 Introduction 
The organisation profile for the case of Bayelsa is contained in appendix 3. Analysis starts 
with the first objective of the research: to determine the environmental challenges faced by 
managers related to deployment of DMC in the context of Bayelsa.   
6.2 Business Environment – unpredictable, challenging and headwind 
Table 6.1 below captures themes and concepts reflecting managers’ perspectives about the 
business environment in the case of Bayelsa. 
Table 6. 1 Themes related to the Business Environment in Bayelsa’s Case 
Focal 
Inquiry  
 
Emerging themes/concepts Categorisation  Implications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business 
Environment 
Downturn in the oil & gas sector 
- Economic downturn – with effects 
on e.g. GDP, foreign exchange 
shortage, rising interest rate, 
devaluation of currency, inflation, 
liquidity, and low household 
demands 
 
Regulation – TSA; CRR; Changes 
in financial reporting standards 
Government policies summersault 
and Corruption  
 
Sociocultural challenges: 
- Fraudulent customers and 
inadequate supporting agencies 
- Security concerns    
- People’s beliefs, lifestyle & 
illiteracy 
Evolving customers’ needs  
  
Unpredictable 
and challenging 
business 
environment  
-uncertainties  
-Rising cost of 
doing business 
-Pressure on asset 
quality 
- A lot of NPLs 
-Liquidity problem 
-Fall in profit 
margin 
-less ability to fund 
businesses 
- so much risk 
- intensified 
competition  
 
High youth population         Retail 
space; unbanked/under-banked  
FINTECH/Technology 
 
Business 
opportunities  
Grow customer base 
Leverage on 
technology to 
improve service, 
cost, and efficiency  
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6.2.1 Downturn and headwinds in the economy 
Similar to the case of Abia, in the case of Bayelsa, managers generally expressed sentiments 
about environmental ‘headwinds.’ The term “headwinds” because managers differently used 
it to emphasise the environmental situation and the tension arising. In particular, as table 6.1 
indicates, the specific concern was about the “downturn in the economy” due to the drop in 
the price of crude oil, which began in 2014. As one of the senior executives interviewed by 
the researcher explained: 
 “The major challenge is the fact that the environment is unpredictable. There is a lot of 
headwind in the economy. You could make a decision today that could be rubbished by one 
decision that a regulator or the (country’s) economic team will take tomorrow” [BSM3].  
Notably, this comment mirrors also the two key issues referred to by ASM2 in the case of 
Abia. From all the data sources, managers were also more specific on how the issue has 
affected them. The following comments bear them out:  
“It has really affected our economic fundamentals such as foreign exchange, interest rate, 
GDP. …As the banking industry, and a bank, we live within the confines of the economic 
system itself. So when the system is down definitely the banking industry will also be down. In 
the last 3 to 4 years, we have been on an economic downturn in the country” [BSM7].  
 
“…contacts are not being awarded, companies are not working, contractors are not being 
paid money; workers are being laid off because they are not able to pay salaries. You want to 
give a loan; you are not sure whether the business is going to survive the next one-year 
[BMM4]. 
“….most of the loans availed to the oil and gas industry went bad (they became non-
performing loans) because when you avail facilities to people, and they are not able to pay 
back…” [BSM1].  
“…It is an offshoot of what has been like a mono-economy; where most of our foreign 
exchange is earned through oil, export of crude oil. …Of course, that affected the banking 
sector because the economy generally is largely import-dependent. …it will affect every other 
thing. …At a point, the level of inflation in the country was about 17% - 18%. So, you can 
understand what I'm talking about and the consumer price index also went up seriously. So, 
you can understand the biting effect” [SMB6].  
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From the above comments, the challenges faced by Bayelsa managers are notable. The 
managers share about similar issues, which all mainly suggest that it was a tough operating 
environment mainly by depending on the income from the stated sector. Then, of course, 
BMM4 also linked it to government inability to meet their obligations to contractors and 
worker, all of which appears to affect them significantly as clearly BSM7 admitted.  
6.2.2 TSA and Industry regulation  
As earlier mentioned, another unprecedented aspect was about the CBN regulation regarding 
TSA. Managers interviewed in Bayelsa’s case also rued this recent development, and 
typically declaring: 
 “It impacted on liquidity of all banks depending on how significant government funds are in 
the business of each bank. …it put pressure on interest rate because banks had to struggle to 
get funds to replace what has left through TSA. Over 4 trillion left the banking sector to CBN 
because of TSA” [BSM3].  
“…it affected us so much because we had more than 5 billion dollars if I am not mistaking, 
that we returned” [BSM1].  
From the above, comments it was evident that Bayelsa lost significant deposits due to TSA, 
which became a huge problem for them. Bayelsa CEO in an interview [press] also reflected 
on other significant regulatory changes:  
“Quite a few regulatory policies came into play, there were three in the first half of the year 
[2016 refers]. The cash ratio played a large role in the harmonization of private and public 
sector funds, which hurt us due to our portfolio. Then, of course, the new foreign exchange 
laws have not helped. We command quite a lot in terms of the trade and business that goes 
on, and there has been a vast drop in trade as a result of the availability of funds, especially 
in light of the economic situation and the drop in oil prices”[CEO in TBY interview].  
 
“…a couple of changes have been happening especially in terms of some key statutory ratios 
like capital adequacy, liquidity, and cash reserve requirement. All those things change and 
they put some kind of regulatory requirements that are having implication for the reporting 
and performance monitoring activity of the institutions” [BSM3].  
 
The impacts of the statutory/cash ratio aspects are reflective in the CEO lamentation that it 
“hurt us due to our portfolio”. In the context of banking, the portfolio simply refers to the 
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financial assets of the bank. The regulatory changes on capital ratio requirement (CRR) and 
other statutory ratios mainly referred to by ASM3 despite their attendant impact were always 
expected given that reforms/changes in the local banking system has been more or less an on-
going phenomenon since 2004/2005 bank consolidation. However, the capital ratio/adequacy 
requirements pressures, one in terms of compliance, and two, in terms of business 
exacerbated the less predicted issues/changes, partly touched on in the CEO comment above.  
 BSM2 summarised these issues as follows, “Now that there is a downturn in the oil and gas 
sector, now that government has ruled that all public sector institutions should keep a single 
account with the CBN. It immediately affected the liability. … - “so the deposit available to 
the bank was grossly inverted in terms of how much money available for lending and how 
much we could make available to the real sectors of the economy”.   
6.2.3. Systemic corruption/ muzzling out the real sectors  
In the Bayelsa dataset, another key issue pertains to sociocultural factors. Participants in the 
study discussed about systemic corruption in different forms. Understanding also emerged 
that that is contributory to why the real sectors of the economy appear to suffer neglect. The 
following observations were insightful: 
“Prior to this time, the system was so corrupted that government officials for which bank that 
pays them the highest returns, not as government organisation but as individual managers in 
those public sector organisations. …One government department could have up to 40/50 
accounts. It was inefficient in terms of managing the liquidity of those public sector 
institutions. It was the greatest problem because of inefficiencies in the system of the 
organisation keeping it; it corrupted the system so badly, it also stunted the growth of the 
real sectors because there was perhaps inadvertently what I will call a muzzling out of the 
real sector from credit by government and by the activities of bankers” [BSM2].  
“You may not be able to do much because you know also that dealing with government in this 
country we require you to do something outside banking; you know what I'm talking about, 
bribes and all those things on the ground before…” [BSM7]. 
 
 “…why should I go and spend my money to fund the real sector when I can carry the money, 
get it from the government at zero%, go to CBN buy treasury bills at 15-20% make a lot of 
  
139 
 
margin? Or, give government loans, state governments, federal government – give them 
loans with their own money and you make a lot of spoils from it” (BMM4).  
How the systemic corrupt practices also shaped the management’s thinking was also 
reflective in the comment shared by BMM4. One of the managers also told the researcher that 
even when CBN announced the TSA policy, based on systemic corruption; many did not 
believe that the government could do that. It seems that consideration in many quarters 
including Bayelsa was the tendency for government summersault on the policy as hinted in 
BSM3. The influence of this goes well beyond the impact on liquidity but on the cognition of 
managers.   
6.2.5. People’s Beliefs/lifestyle and education/literacy levels 
 
Data from the Bayelsa case also include sentiments related to people’s beliefs, lifestyle and 
levels of education in different parts of the country. Managers expressed their frustration with 
peoples’ indifference and reluctance to embrace technology-driven banking due to illiteracy, 
strongly held beliefs and approach to things. The following comments bear this out: 
“…it was a big challenge, taking into consideration the kind of people involved here. Some of 
them are uneducated people. Some of them do not have some of these android phones with 
which you can transfer money from the phone from one account to another. … They transact 
business in cash only…They do not want to embrace this new technology of apps… (BSM5)”.  
“Nigerians in general always have a short-term approach to things. You can hardly find 
people taking decisions that would transcend one year two years because you cannot define 
what is on the horizon…” [BSM3].  
In other words, with much suspicion among people of a possible sinister or fraud made easier 
through technology. Managers’ faces considerable challenge of having to try to think and 
figure out how to educate and encourage people to embrace novel technology and digital 
banking process. This was viewed as a peculiar challenge for their industry compared to 
countries where they believe technology has taken over and helping to make banking less 
expensive and risky.  
BSM3 pointed out, because of a short-term approach to things by individuals as a matter of 
culture, it is difficult to plan. In sum, it has been a more difficult period and a challenging 
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business environment for Bayelsa. That also translated to subpar financial performance. 
Bayelsa’s KPH below reflects this. 
Table 6. 2 KPH in Bayelsa's Case between 2014 and 2016 
For the year ended, December 
 
2014 2015 2016 
Gross Earning  208.4b 217.1b 212.4b 
Profit Before Tax (PBT) 28.1b 7.1b 5.0b  
Customer’s Deposit 1.493T 1.23T  1.42T 
Customer Base (million) 4.4b 5.5b 6.5  
Non-Performing Loans (NPL) NA NA NA 
Total Asset 1.933T 1.75T 2.11T 
                                                                                                                                                                            
As the above table show, Bayelsa only managed a PBT of N5.0b by the end of 2016 
compared to N7.1b in 2015, and N28.1b in 2014 respectively. Total assets dropped from 
N1.933 trillion in 2014 to N1.75 trillion by the end of 2015 but also show a rebound of total 
assets to close at N2.11 trillion by the end of 2016. There is no doubt that the numbers 
indicate a significant dip reflecting the most challenging period for the organisation.  
However, the numbers also reflect some signs of resilience by the bank and the management.  
Notably, customer deposit, customer base, and total asset all showed improvement by the end 
of 2016. This signifies a commitment to rebound and continue to create value for all 
stakeholders. Implication of this as one of the senior executive commented was that: 
 “…you must continually put on your thinking cap, read the situation right and come up with 
responses” [BSM2].  
The CEO in a CLS in 2016 also surmised: “The operating environment is evolving and the 
survival of service institutions is being determined first by the ability to anticipate market 
demands and secondly, the agility in responding with the right solutions within acceptable 
risk thresholds and in compliance with governing regulations and global best practices”. 
Consistent with this viewpoint, the next section focuses on key strategic actions, responses, 
and solutions identified in the case of Bayelsa.   
6.3. Strategic Actions/Responses – from the management’s viewpoints 
This section presents findings about dynamic managerial capabilities deployment in the case 
of Bayelsa. Table 6.3 below presents a summary of concepts/themes reflecting strategic 
change and DMC in the Bayelsa case.  
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Table 6. 3 DMC related themes and categorisation in Bayelsa’s Case 
 
Theme  
 
Category  
. A leading retail Nigerian bank through  
. Becoming number one bank in retail banking 
. to become the fastest-growing retail bank  
 
Vision /Identity seeking  
. Raised N50.4b via rights issue; $US147m via FDI 
in 2014 
. Increased/mobilised deposit via new customers 
acquisition – grew by 15% from N1.23T by 2015 to 
N1.42T by end of 2016;  
. Financial inclusion/banking the unbanked/under-
banked 
. Improving liquidity position    
 
Building strong/diversified balance 
sheet  
. In 2016, created new regions/directorates e.g. retail  
. Reduced span of influence/control 
. Redesigned business operating systems  
Restructured business operations 
and structure  
 
 
. Stronger focus on retail banking strategy 
. Implementing value chain model/supporting start-
ups  
. Leveraging on mobile agents to enhance access to 
banking  
Redesigned/Implementing 
diversified business model 
. Deployed CRM project 
. Upgraded core banking platforms  
. Invested in POS and ATMs 
. More investments in digital IT platforms/ banking 
strategy   
Investments in technology and 
digital banking strategy    
. Developed new partnership and co-creating with 
Fintechs  
. Mobile agents used for wider and quicker customers  
. Collaboration with 
employees/customers/suppliers/Fintechs 
Collaboration and partnerships 
/Learning  
 
Source: Annual report 2014 – 2016; press releases and interview  
 
6.3.1 Strategic Vision and Identity/Brand  
In Bayelsa, first, data show that the shift in the business environment coincided with a change 
of their CEO in 2014 following the resignation of the Ex-CEO. Under the new leadership 
since 2014, for Bayelsa's, theirs is a “strategic objective of becoming the fastest growing 
retail bank”. It suggests a paradigm shift with the imprint of the new leadership/management 
team appearing influential because this objective was a bit different from what the website 
declared. Questioned about how this strategic objective changed; one of the participants 
interviewed who served within the executive management explained as follows: 
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“… we call it the decision of the board but it is the CEO that determines the vision, take it to 
the board for approval; so, it is actually your vision as approved by the board that you have 
the responsibility to deliver on. …The first challenge is to convince your team, whether it is 
the board or management that this is an area we should play in because you analyse the 
economy and …is the way everybody is looking and there are business opportunities 
activating [BSM2].  
From the stated strategic objective, the message is clear. It signified an attention shift.  It also 
reflects the problem-solving capability of the new leadership given the dynamics in the 
environment and its effect on the organisation's performance as evident in table 6.2 above. 
The leadership used the new retail mantra to transform the mind-set of their workforce. It also 
talked about convincing your team.  Next is a focus on exactly what the management did.    
6.3.2 Building a healthier balance sheet   
Related to the liquidity problem discussed in section 6.2, Bayelsa responded by a 
commitment to building what they referred to as “building a healthier balance sheet”. A 
balance sheet often refers to the assets, liabilities, and capital of a business. The idea was to 
try (1) to grow its financial base essentially to replace funds lost to the TSA policy, (2) to 
have a more stable capital base structure to guard against another negative experience in the 
future. Data sow different approaches adopted. Through seeking for capital/equity 
investments, the bank, successfully raise N50.4b (via rights issue) by 2014. This was 
followed by a further $US147m [FDI] equity investment in 2015. The 2014 Bayelsa--CLS 
confirms about the N50.4b: 
“Distinguished shareholders, I am proud to announce to you that your bank successfully 
raised …N50.4 billion via a rights issue in the second half of the year 2014. …the success of 
our capital raising exercise was amidst macroeconomic headwinds underscores your bank's 
strong industry positioning and growing confidence in our brand. …The additional capital 
has proved useful towards our business expansion initiatives especially increasing our 
capacity to finance ‘major deals’ across our business segments as well as fund our footprint 
initiatives further deepening our retail banking penetration amongst others”.   
Further comment related to the FDI is not included here just for space. It means that prior to 
that financial injection; the bank was not able to fund big-ticket projects. Other approaches 
involved seeking cheap deposits from retail banking and ‘value chain management’ 
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(discussed next). Another thing was to implement cost reduction/containment and cautious 
lending strategies. 
6.3.3. Redesigned/created Innovative Business model  
As mentioned earlier, Bayelsa managers responded by shifting their attention to almost a 
100% retail banking model. Management expressed belief that the retail-banking model 
would facilitate their competitive survival through more (a) liquidity and stronger asset base, 
considering that (b) there is no more government deposit, and (c) the situation of the 
economy, and (d) recognition of the opportunity presented by the nation’s huge population. 
The redesigned business model of the bank entails that Bayelsa now has a stronger focus on 
retail, value-chain and mass-market banking model also called financial inclusion and agency 
banking. The following comments sum this: 
“We know that this is going to be a problem - The oil and gas sector of the economy was 
going to have a big problem because it is foreign exchange driven. … So, what we did was 
that we began to position ourselves to be the best in terms of retail business because there is 
a lot of volatility in the economy with respect to the oil and gas sector, with respect to power, 
with respect to corporate banking” [BSM7].  
 
“…before we were running this structure of corporate – that is the big players. …because of 
the huge income that was coming from the corporate banking and business banking aspects 
of the bank, we were not paying much attention to the retail segment. But when we now set up 
a strategic team that now investigated; reviewed the market and saw that we have huge 
opportunities in the retail strata of the economy. ….that we have many people that are not 
banked at all – we call them unbanked …That’s when the bank decided to go into full 100% 
retail because we saw several opportunities there. We saw several emerging businesses there 
that are doing very well – that if we can be able to focus our attention on some of these 
emerging businesses, we will do better and we will earn more income coupled with the fact 
that they are many in number” [BSM5]. 
 
“Our banking model is purely retail. …We are channelling our effort in creating customers 
in the mass-market space because, of a country of over 170 million people, retail is the way 
to go. …we had to position ourselves for it; we mop-up deposits from all these mass-
customers. [BSM3].  
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Note that in the case of Bayelsa, the mangers explained that theirs is a 100%, retail-banking 
model. Beyond the need for immediate survival, central in the initiative for the retail business 
model in Bayelsa was also to ensure business sustainability and survival over time. 
Consideration implies that it was best to concentrate on the retail banking model and build a 
sustainable capital base and income structure. The following comment brings it more 
interestingly:  
“We are not in for a dash, we are in for a haul, a long walk; and if that is the case, you must 
also begin to find out what will I do today that my business will be sustained 
tomorrow.  …Supposing that today we are not even selling petrol again, how will I still 
continue with business?” [BSM7].  
It thus represents an attention shift with a clear constructive and strategic agenda. In the data, 
the managers also used the concept of value chain management and a number of other terms 
as I mentioned mainly to highlight the different dimensions of the retail-banking model. The 
following comments show this:  
  
“If I take a corporate, I am not thinking of the vanilla transactions – how do I lend to him? 
Those are basic everybody could do that. I look at how does he operate, if he produces – 
what is their route to market, who does he sell to, who are the people involved in that chain? 
Do they need finances? Do they need support? Do they need some training, how do I get 
involved? Some of the distributors, the suppliers, the sub-distributors, all the retailers, what 
values can I bring to them? So, I am not just thinking of the corporates as conglomerates, am 
actually thinking of all his value chain …those are the areas we are deploying resources in 
terms of technology, in terms of lending and all that – because is less risky [BSM6].  
“I will consider myself as one of the pioneers the idea of providing support services in the oil 
and gas sector. If you understand the oil and gas business, it’s quite a heavy ticket item, 
that’s number one; …if you identify credible service providers for Shell, you will be part of 
the …value-chain making the operations of Shell successful.  And given the size of my 
balance sheet, I may not be able to lend money to Shell directly for drilling its wells but I can 
support the vendor who is providing Shell with water, catering services or security services 
in the offshore location” [BSM2]. 
The above suggests that the idea is to diversify the attention. Rather than focus on one major 
oil provider, which is risky. Relatedly, Bayelsa also embraced the concept of ‘financial 
inclusion’ recognising that going “beyond banking” (to use their own term) to provide 
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support to the real sectors of the economy is a win-win to itself and customers. To them, it is 
a social responsibility for them to contribute to building a stronger economy by supporting 
individuals and small businesses. Bayelsa demonstrated a stronger commitment to this project 
when it created a financial inclusion division to manage both its recorded milestone and 
future endeavour on the project. In a letter to shareholders in 2015, the CEO explained: 
“We created the financial inclusion division to consolidate on the success achieved thus far 
in … propositions and other inclusive banking products. This is in line with our belief that 
retail banking implies providing lifestyle financial services and supporting individuals and 
small businesses” [CLS, 2015].   
Some success of the strategy was also identified in the dataset as the bank reportedly 
maintained resilience on the back of which grew by over 300% after “acquiring a total of 
5,920,190 in 2015” alone [press release]. The management is strongly convinced about this 
strategic focus as the CEO in a press release explained: 
“We believe the macro conditions and other external factors will remain challenging for the 
rest of the year and well into 2017. However, by pursuing our …retail strategy and with our 
focus on innovation and scalability, we believe the Bank is well-placed to benefit in the 
medium to long term from the favourable fundamentals in Nigeria, namely a large 
population, many of which remain unbanked. This strategy stands to benefit all stakeholders, 
including our shareholders and customers in the long run” [Bayelsa Press Release]. 
6.3.4. Restructuring/reorganising business operations/structure  
As an organisation aiming to become ‘Nigeria’s fastest-growing retail bank’ the management 
took a deliberate step to restructure the organisation in line with the stated aspiration. Related 
terms like restructuring, remodelling, and reorganisation of business structure and operations 
are significantly represented concepts used in the data to describe this effort in the Bayelsa 
case. Two of the contexts in which those concepts were-used are particularly relevant here. 
First, the bank’s management as against its original four business segments identified in the 
company’s profile (see Appendix 3) now focuses on three core banking segments with the 
retail-banking component as prime. Secondly, the restructuring involved creating a retail-
banking directorate to ensure effective management in terms process, scope, and control of 
each division. As evident in the CEO’s letter to shareholders:  
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“We remodelled our operating structure to be more responsive to speciﬁc needs of our 
expanding and well-diversiﬁed customer base, signifying the commencement of the next 
phase of our medium-term growth strategy” [CLS, 2016]. He wrote further: 
 “We restructure our retail directorate, creating five distinct divisions that are manned by 
senior specialists, and focused on serving key segments of the retail market” [Bayelsa-CLS, 
2016].  
In other words, this structural adjustment was needed in order to “ensure managers have closer 
supervision of the business areas in order to build a stronger customer relationship”. This is 
understandable as retail banking deals with the mass market. Two of the senior managers 
interviewed buttressed on the intent of the management more interestingly by explaining:  
“You structure your business in line with your strategy. If your business structure does not 
align with your strategy then you can’t do much. Our system internally is now structured to 
support the retail business that we are doing. …We are driven by that mind-set; the 
operational system, the IT architecture, the branch network, the individual procedures of the 
institution; they are all geared towards supporting the franchise, that’s what we are 
pushing” [BSM3].  
“We want to be the number one retail bank in the country. And that is how my own role now 
came in that I am now in charge of the performance of retail business in the …Nigeria 
[Bayelsa Bank]” [BSM7].  
 
The mindset of the management team as fundamental in modifying the bank’s operating 
structure was clearly reflective in the above comments. It also reflects a clear purpose for 
what was done. Efforts towards orchestration and reallocation of resources as deemed best to 
support their concentration on the retail banking model as key functions of top management 
team (Helfat et al, 2007) was evident too just as the involvement and responsibility of some 
participants in this study in the process was clearly highlighted. Another aspect captured 
within the restructuring theme was about the management’s decision to operate a flat 
structure against the bank’s traditional hierarchical organisational structure. Central to this 
strategic initiative was the need for better communication, quicker decisions making, to foster 
better working relationships to support the new retail-banking model of the bank. As the 
followings comments confirms:  
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“During the year 2016, we embarked on a functional reorganization of our business 
development model by reducing the span of control of the heads of branch clusters. This new 
structure has improved our agility in responding to the needs of our diversiﬁed customers by 
providing niche services at respective branches” [CLS, 2016]. What that means was that: 
 
“…even though we have our delegated authority, our organogram, and our structure is 
flat.  We can easily reach the next line manager; it is very easy. …We create freedom of 
expression within the system - in such a way that if somebody is a manager and you don’t get 
your immediate line supervisor/manager; he's not available, you can go to the next person” 
[BSM7]. Another senior manager interviewed in the study similarly confirmed: 
 
“We run a very fluid structure that tries to encourage a lot of engagement and that kind of 
relationships such that one, there are no barriers, there is no fear – we try to relate, 
communicate easily and then try to make sure business decisions are taken faster and all that 
[SSB6]. The cognitive underpinning the decision for this reorganisation and to implement 
fluid/flat structure was summarised in the CEO’s comment: “We are convinced that this 
realignment will enable us to consolidate on the gains of our past performance and 
proactively respond to future market needs in order to deliver on our strategic objectives 
over the coming years” [CLS, 2015].  
6.3.5. Investments in Innovative technology and digital banking strategy 
Another densely represented theme in the data was the focus of Bayelsa on the deployment of 
innovative technology. This is in terms of both digital processes, products that are customer-
centric and infrastructure upgrade Much of the consideration expressed in the dataset entails 
that implementing digital banking approach has helped to facilitate wider reach and increase 
in their customer base, reduce cost of operations, superior customer engagement and services, 
and profitability. The management cognition and commitment towards innovation and digital 
technological was captured quite interestingly in the Bayelsa-2014 CLS as follows:  
“…We are convinced that the banking business has evolved into one that utilise broad 
customer-centric channels to deliver superior customer experience. From the ‘brick and 
mortar’ footprint, technological has availed us the opportunity to explore other means of 
delivering quality service to the banking community…. (2014 Annual-report).  
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“At [Bayelsa], we believe that technology is the future and digital banking is the way to go. 
We will accelerate digital banking through information and communication technology to 
help people move to easier, more convenient and more secure ways of carrying out financial 
transactions instead of carrying cash. We believe this can be achieved with the amount of 
infrastructure that we have invested in technology”. 
 In Bayelsa, participants in the study commented about the strategic efforts of the 
organisation on digital positioning and provisions. As one of the senior managers [BSM6] 
expatiated:  
“We took an intentional decision to digitalise our process; …, everybody went back and did 
some work, …an evaluation of your processes for instance, internally and the question is 
which of these processes can we immediately digitalise or move out of manual processes and 
then you come up again, you set timelines and then you are the originator, you carry it on, 
then the IT guys will look at it – what is involved? …it’s an intentional drive to use 
digitalisation to enhance profitability, to derive customers and reduce costs. It’s an 
organisational drive so to speak. So anything I do today, I ask myself why I don’t use a 
cheaper, easier, more efficient digital way to do it. Why do I have to do it? So it’s like a 
consciousness that has been created”.  
Continuing on this subject/theme, [BSM6] further explained as follows: 
 “…internally too we’ve gone paperless more or less, the paper we use very-very minimal, a 
lot of things are monitored electronically and digitally such that you do not do a lot of 
manual things, and then meetings are held with Skype business with all kinds of technology; 
so we really don’t need to move too much, I don’t need to leave my office go to another place 
am supervising, and that essentially reduces your cost because there is not too much 
movement.  
…So we keep looking at each process, approval processes are digitalised; so I don’t have to 
send a mail, you know there are work processes – workflows, you want to do a credit there is 
a workflow. You go there write your request and it comes. So there is tracking, efficiency 
comes in; so if I have a workflow come to me, you know when it came. So, you can’t wake up 
and say oh I didn’t see it, if it stays with me two days everybody knows and everybody get 
some alter that I can tell you where my requests are, and who is sitting with and what actions 
are being taken on it; so those processes, credit processes, approval processes, they are all 
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digitalised now; you don’t send mails, you don’t carry papers around and it brings in 
efficiency, reduces cost and all that. So a lot is going on, we keep looking at the processes 
and modifying and improving them” [BSM6]. 
On digital products by the bank, the managers also explained that productive partnerships 
have been developed with telecom firms e.g. MTN and financial technology firms e.g. VISA 
and being deployed to try to push these products and services to the target markets. 
“In retail banking, they come in trickles. So as a bank, we drive it using technology, we use 
technology to reduce the crowd in the bank. You see that most banks now have mobile apps, 
ATMs are being deployed all over the place so that people bank outside their bank; they can 
use their phone to transact business. People buy recharge cards through their phones; people 
do transfers through their phones. All these channels are now being created because when 
you recruit that large army of customers; it becomes very expensive to schedule or keep them 
within the banking halls” [BMM4]. 
“What we are trying to do is to migrate from ‘Brick and Mortar’ so that bank can be in your 
hand through your mobile phones, through your iPads, through your online and so many of 
those things” [BSM7].  
 
“In the digital space, we have done quite a lot, again if you look at the population, the youth 
population, the upcoming population – everything is mobile these days. I mean people use 
their  
So, in line with the above, at the time of the data collection in 2016 – 2017, there was already 
a change in the mind-set in Bayelsa reflecting that the future would no longer be about branch 
network expansion rather taking banking to customers with technology providing the 
interface.  
The commitment of the management to upgrading Bayelsa’s core banking systems and 
infrastructure was also evident in the data. The banks invested considerably in modernised 
ATM and POS terminals in terms of both the addition of new units and active digital 
platforms. For example, POS was increased from 5162 in 2014; 8252 in 2015 to 10975 in 
2016, while ATMs also increased from 840 in 2014; 974 in 2015 to 1059 in 2016. This was 
intended for helping to promote efficiency, and cost optimisation by keeping as many 
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customers as possible away from the banking hall (Source: annual report/CLS 2014, 2015 
and 2016).  
Relatedly, Bayelsa managers upgraded their mobile App with additional service and security 
features. To support all that, the bank also deployed a new Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM) platform which was aimed at data storing, tracking and managing 
customers’ relationship and interaction with the bank to continue to enhance the experiences 
of existing and potential customers. As CLS in 2014, 2015, and 2016 revealed:  
“…we upgraded our flagship mobile banking application …with exciting features such as 
event search function and payment features for online shopping, flight booking… 
“Since the deployment of the CRM, the Bank has recorded a lot of positives in the way we do 
business with our customers. We have recorded significant improvements in the handling of 
customer enquiries resulting in significant upgrade in our data collection and analytical 
capacity” [CLS, 2016]. In all, the above underscores commitments towards digital 
technology and alternative ways of maintaining competitiveness. Underlying these 
commitments is also the mindset of the managers.   
6.3.6. Collaboration and Partnership with FINTECHs  
Evidence in data also reflects management thoughts on how collaboration with FINTECHs 
and telecommunication firms now plays a critical role in financial product provision and 
value co-creation. One example of this strategic partnership and on-going relationship with 
one FINTECH was contained in the press release statements which announced the launch of 
one of the products earlier mentioned; as in the following comment:  
“Nigeria’s retail giant, [Bayelsa] Bank Plc in partnership with Visa is set to revolutionize 
payment system in the financial services sub-sector as the Bank launches into the financial 
market mVisa, a payment channel that gives the customer full control of multiple financial 
transactions” [press release].  
Another specific example identified in the data is a partnership with MTN – one of the largest 
mobile telecommunication giants in the country. As evident in the comments below:  
“… [Bayelsa] also is the first to introduce the [Bayelsa] Y’ello account in partnership with 
the mobile telecommunications giant MTN” [press release]. 
 
“We partner with organisations like MTN to make sure that we capture those areas and take 
banking to the doorstep of those people in the local villages. There is no way we can be able 
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to do that if we do not have a very strong backup in terms of telecommunication companies” 
[SMB7]. Therefore, the above confirms the commitment of the management to searching and 
selecting strategic partners enabling innovation and co-creation.  
6.4. How managers balance between routines and better strategic decision   
In relation to the Nigerian business environment in terms of threats and opportunities as 
explained, and some internal constraining factors identified by this study, dataset uncovered 
Communication and teamwork; creativity and ability to convince others are some of the ways 
in which managers’ made non-routine decisions when faced with especially entrenched 
norms, rules and standard processes in the organisation. One of the managers talked about 
‘whistleblowing’ and others differently talked about routine forums in which issues are 
discussed on a routines basis example monthly, quarterly and annual meetings in order to 
review activities and performance, brainstorm and thereby make critical decisions. 
Whistleblowing was used to refer to where one thinks he has good ideas or important 
transaction which needed quick action but not getting it. As evident in the following 
comment: 
“We have what is known as whistleblowing, if you know that this thing needs attention, you 
can blow a whistle so they can quickly attend to it and then you can move on.  ... And also, we 
always have meetings, general meetings, business meetings, and so those meetings help to 
address issues”. 
 It is considered that the idea of the whistleblowing is basically to communicate to relevant 
authority about a concern, perhaps the need for urgent attention rather than about raising 
alarm. When talking about meeting to address issues, it became clear that the need to engage 
and interact with one’s team is part of the communication process as most of the participants 
also talked about this. However, from a critical perspective, a consideration also entails that 
the scenario painted by the participants is more closely related to operational problems and 
decisions rather than a strategic decision. The latter constitutes the interest of this study. 
 
Bayelsa managers also talked about ‘creativity and ability to convince your team’ as a 
critical. These terms and in the context they were used by the manager are significantly 
relevant to dynamic managerial capability and quite insightful. The following comment bears 
this out:   
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“One thing that you have to learn is how to be creative as go up the corporate ladder. That 
creativity has different components to it. … You have to read the signals, come up with the 
strategy; be able to sell to your other parties. Your other parties could be your board 
members whom you will have to convince on why you will have to form a syndicate with 
another bank. That is part of the challenge you have as a leader. You want to take action and 
you think that it is unassailable; …You have some policy constraints; …the first challenge is 
to convince your internal people that this is the only way you can do this transaction, and put 
together a team that would midwife that syndication. It is a norm in the industry, but you 
must keep the right partners to go with. So having convinced your internal team that this is 
the way to go, you then have the challenge of identifying the right partners out there and 
selling your idea, convincing them but like I said some of them may have different greed 
levels” [BSM2].  
6.5 DMC and Influence/role of managerial cognition – the case of Bayelsa 
Analysis in the preceding sections already shows that DMC in the Bayelsa case can be 
identified in terms of innovation and scalability (to use the CEO’s terms) processes. Table 6.4 
provides a synthesis of cognitive underpinning DMCs from managers’ opinions. 
Table 6. 4 Themes related to Managerial cognition and DMC in Bayelsa’s Case 
Managerial Cognition Related influence on DMC and Innovation and Scalability  
Management’s Vision 
and Philosophy  
Reinventing philosophy  
Inspiring commitment to become the fastest-growing retail bank 
Stronger belief on innovation and scalability 
Strategic thinking  
Perception/attention stronger focus on retail  
Opportunities in Africa 
Nigerian unbanked population  
Problems-solving 
capacity  
Search for alternative capital via rights issuing 
Implement a diversified business model              
New customers acquisition 
Building healthier balance sheet 
 Restructure organisation 
Enhanced risk management and retail 
Creativity  
Communication Convinced board to develop retail as business model  
Self-belief  
Freedom of expression/open communication   
Attention Diversity Focusing on retail as core and capacity building 
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                                         Chapter Seven 
                                    The Case of Cross-River 
7.1 Introduction 
As with other cases examined, a brief organisation profile of the case of Cross-River is 
contained in appendix 3 due to space. This thus allows analysis to continue here straight-
away with the first objective of the research: to determine the environmental challenges faced 
by managers as related to deployment of DMC in the context of Cross-River.   
7.2. Nigerian business environment: Cross-River Managers’ perspective  
Similar to Bayelsa and other cases examined, the most densely expressed perspectives in the 
data obtained from the case of Cross-River were about the challenges presented by Nigeria’s 
“buffeted economy”, political and regulatory changes that have affected the Nigerian banking 
industry since 2014. Comments were also made about the socio-cultural issues and the 
implication of these factors for the industry and Cross-River. Table 7.1 below presents a 
summary of key findings about the business environment.  
Table7.1  Themes about the Business Environment. in the case of Bayelsa 
Focal Inquiry  
 
Emerging themes/concepts Classification  Implications for CRB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business 
Environment 
Political – New government  
 
Regulation – TSA, other stringent 
regulations. Rise in CRR/MPR 
 
Buffeted economy  – due to drop in 
prices of crude oil with effects on 
balance of payment, drop in GDP, 
inflation rise, low fiscal activities, 
inactive market for public offers,  
lack of FOREX, illiquidity and 
diminishing revenue lines, rising 
cost of funding, drop in aggregate 
demand; changing needs of 
customers 
Intensified competition – evolving 
customer’s need  
 
Sociocultural challenges: 
- Militancy in Niger Delta    
Challenging operating 
environment  with 
market turbulence and 
economic policy 
uncertainties    
Liquidity problem 
Revenue decline  
Pressure on cost of fund   
High cost of risk asset 
Reduced profitability 
e.g. 70% from 22.4b in 
2014 to 6.1b in 2015 
(CLS, 2015) 
Nigeria’s population   
High youth population unbanked 
and under-banked customers 
FINTECH/Technology 
Business opportunities  Need to leverage the 
opportunities presented 
by the population and 
technology  
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7.2.1. Macroeconomic headwinds – buffeted economy 
 As indicated in table 7.1, terms such as macroeconomic headwinds and a buffeted economy 
were repeatedly used in the CLS to reflect on the adverse effects of fall in the price of crude 
oil on the Nigerian economy and the banking industry. He described the economy as 
“buffeted” due to a shortage of FX, liquidity problem, rising cost of capital, low GDP, 
double-digit inflation in recession by 2016. As the CEO following comments confirms:  
…the economic front was buffeted by a number of factors….largely due to the sharp drop in 
commodity prices, including crude oil. As a result of these fragilities, overall growth was 
retarded, with GDP down to 2.11% as at the end of December 2015 [CLS, 2015]. The 
attendant impact of that was reiterated in 2016 CLS and for the Cross-River:  
 “….uncertainties around the foreign exchange markets made it extremely difficult to fund 
new projects …” [CLS, 2016].  
One of the senior executives of Cross-River interviewed by the researcher corroborated the 
CEO’s sentiments as well as he explained: 
“You know our mainstay in the economy is FX from oil sales, and this has dipped 
considerably on two fronts; one, price of oil, and two, on the volume we are selling because 
of militants and civil unrest here and there.  So, now FX is hard to come by” [CRSM1]. 
For Cross-River, the implication of the economic situation was reflective in revenue/income 
decline, liquidity problem and as the CEO indicated, difficult to fund projects and 
transactions which understandably are the primary role of commercial banks. 
7.2.2 Regulatory changes  
Apart from the crash in the crude oil price and the resulting negative economic effects 
mentioned; regulation was another key issue largely expressed in the dataset. Cross-River 
managers lamented especially about the introduction of TSA. The CLS 2016 bears this out:  
“…the withdrawal of Federal Government funds from banks in furtherance of the Treasury 
Single Account implementation was noteworthy; deposits from this source, in local currency, 
dropped by 93% from N764.5 billion to N53.8 billion, the consequence of replacing this 
outflow was a drive-up in the cost of funding” [CSL, 2016].  
The CEO’s comment was quite revealing as it shows that public sector deposit in CRB’s 
books was arguably a lifeline and such a significant loss for the bank and thought about how 
to replace the fund became a key priority. 
  
155 
 
7.2.3 Intensified Competition  
Intensified competition in the industry was another key theme revealed in the data. The 
expressions entails that most banks compete for the same set of customers and largely 
implementing similar strategies. Consequently, they tend to undercut each other in efforts to 
win over customers and business deals. As two of the senior managers interviewed reflected:  
“The first thing that is central to the industry is that it is highly competitive. We compete on 
the basis of size, and on the basis of strategy in itself, we compete on the basis of customer 
acquisition because virtually, we tend to struggle and compete for wallet share of the same 
set of customers” [CSM1]. 
“Today, what most people do …is what I call the red ocean strategy. The red ocean strategy 
talks about cutthroat in strategy were if somebody offers a kind of offering, another person 
will say, I will do better in that” [CSM3]. 
Therefore, the most emphasised clustered mainly around three themes a) macroeconomic 
factors, b) regulation and c) intensity of competition. The effect of these challenges especially 
with the study period is better understood with a look at the key performance highlights of the 
bank at least for the aforementioned period. Table 7.2 below presents a summary of the 
organisation’s performance to show how the stated environmental challenges were acclaimed 
to have led to sublevel performance against potentially achievable results by the bank.  
Table 7. 2 KHP in Cross-River between 2014 and 2016 
For the year ended, December 
 
2014 (N’ billion) 2015 (N’billion) 2016 (N’billion) 
Gross Earning  148.6b 152.5b 176.3b 
Profit Before Tax (PBT) 23.942b 7.78 16.3b  
Customer’s Deposit 733.7b 700.2b 657.6b 
Customer Base (million) - 3.5m (+33%) - 
Non-Performing Loans (NPL) 22.9b 25.3b  25.4b  
Total Asset 1.169T 1.159.5T 1.172T 
 
From the above table, it can be observed that in Cross-River, while the gross earning of the 
bank saw a progressive increase, the PBT show a dip from N22.4b PBT in 2014 to N6.1b in 
2015 and then a rebound from N6.1b in 2015 to N16.2b by the end of 2016. Of that stated 
PBT however, on closer observation, it can be noted that NPL in CRB stood at N22.9b, 
N25.3b, and N25.4b by the end of 2014, 2015 and 2016 in that order. The above facts and 
figures would likely be a concern for any management. It was presented here just to show a 
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link between the effect of the environmental challenges discussed in 7.1 above on Cross-
River and why it became a race for competitive survival and more importantly the strategic 
responses that have followed. As the CEO reassured in his letter to shareholders:  
“…while these results reflects the difficulties our business have faced over the year, I want to 
assure you that we have moved swiftly and decisively to address these issues, and in the 
fourth quarter of 2015, we began to see early promising signs from the actions we have taken 
so far to reset the business and restore our growth” [CLS, 2015].  
So, next, the analysis continues with a look at the research findings regarding the 
managements’ strategic responses in the case of Cross-River.  
7.3 DMC and Strategic Response/ Management Actions  
The study identified seven areas of the strategic response of Cross-River to the stated 
environmental challenges. It includes the organisation’s strategic vision, building retail-led 
commercial bank, growing revenue and financial base of the bank, expansion and 
diversification initiatives, and investment in IT, partnership/collaboration building and 
business operation restructuring.    
7.3.1 Strategic vision 
The declared strategic vision of the CRB is “to be the premier financial services group of 
Africa’s origin” (source: website). On closer observation, however, it was noted that the 
vision was seemingly worded carefully to reflect Cross-River’s interest in other financial 
services areas. This can be understood better when contrasted with some of their strategic 
initiatives discussed later in this section. As mentioned in the organisation’s background (see 
Appendix 3), Cross-River was established originally as a stockbroking firm. It developed to a 
merchant bank and now a commercial bank. However, evidence shows that the organisation’s 
path dependence (Teece et al, 1997) is reflective in the firm’s strategic choices.  
For instance, Cross-River operates as a (holding company) with active interests in other non-
banking financial services including stockbroking, capital market, pension fund and, a 
recently established microfinance subsidiary. While being managed as separate entities, the 
above stated vision appears to be all-embracing rather than just that of Cross-River. However, 
evidence also shows that commercial bank constitutes over 85% of the group’s portfolio, with 
other subsidiaries together representing less than 15%. So, one may also consider that the 
stated vision best represents the core aspiration of the bank.  In all, table 7.3 below contains 
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ten categories of themes representing the strategic actions or responses reflecting DMC in 
Cross-River. 
Table7. 3 DMC related themes and categorisation in the case of Cross-River 
Themes  Categorisation  
Evolved philosophy/vision with retail banking 
touted as central to CRB’s vision  
Strategic vision/objective   
Focusing on accelerating customers acquisition                              
Implementing financial inclusion                                
Investing in customer service experience 
Growing revenue/financial base 
Focusing on transaction/mass-market                           
Value chain strategy                                                          
Agency banking;                                                          
Enhanced framework for SMEs               
Building a retail-led banking model  
In 2014 established first international operation 
in UK;     In 2015 established micro-finance 
subsidiary to drive retail Invested in pension 
fund and private trusteeship    
Expansion/diversification 
initiatives 
Divested interest in public sector banking                   
Created new divisions including retail, and 
electronic banking                                    
Appointed new regional heads   
Restructured business operations 
Increase from 245 ATMs in 2014 to 755 by 
2016; From 6300 POS terminals in 2014 to 
13000 in 2016                                                  
Building robust electronic banking platforms   
Investments in innovative 
technology 
.Partners e.g. Interswitch, IBM and KPMG Partnerships and Collaboration 
Source: interview transcripts, press releases and annual report 2014 to 2016  
 
In particular, notably, the management Cross-River provided some restatements of the 
organisation’s vision (earlier referred) with palpable evidence of the CEO’s cognitive 
imprints and expression of responsibility in relation to the strategic responses contained in 
table 7.3 above.  The following comment in the 2014 CLS confirms this:  
“I laid out three priorities for our bank during the period 2014 to 2016 which supported our 
mission for superior and sustainable returns. The first was to grow revenue by accelerating 
our market share in retail banking… Secondly, to invest in our customer experience as a 
means of growing our customer base. And, third was containment of our operating expenses 
growth”. The CLS by the end of 2015 reaffirmed and expanded on the above as it was 
declared: 
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“A leading retail presence is central to our vision as we seek to build more businesses in the 
retail space; we hope to fully launch a microfinance business as a full subsidiary of the 
Group and seek opportunities to improve controlling participation in the pension fund 
industry; …a combination of these initiatives will reduce the pressure on the bank’s balance 
sheet and steer activities to less capital intensive businesses” [CLS, 2015].  
The above comments are clearly reflective of what the management has done and planned to 
do, why, and a sense of responsibility to the stated vision and decisions. How the 
management translated the ‘vision’ and decisions to action is further explained.  
7.3.2. Building a retail-led commercial bank/business model 
By far one of the most densely evident themes in the Cross-River dataset is ‘building a retail-
led commercial bank’, transaction banking and ‘a turnaround plan’ by the CEO. The clear 
intent was to purposefully grow the revenue and financial base of the organisation through 
customers’ acquisition and mobilising cheap deposits seeking at the retail segment in contrast 
to their previous business model. Three other related concepts including value chain strategy, 
financial inclusion, and agency banking were differently used to buttress on the processes of 
deploying the retail banking model. More reasons for adopting the business model were given 
to include, the opportunity presented by the country’s huge population, much of which 
remains unbanked. One may argue that the population has always been there, why now?  
Another reason given was about using the model to address the risk and problem of NPLs. 
The 2016 CLS declared:  
“A major objective of the bank is to create a low-risk business in the next few years. …Our 
retail and transaction banking focus will drive fees and commissions and ensure continuous 
improvement in liquidity and cost of funds. Lending activities will be focused and strategic, 
with an emphasis on diversification of our portfolio. [CSL, 2016].     
Three Cross-River senior managers interviewed all buttressed on the CEO’s idea, as follows:  
 “We found out that in the industry here, we compete on the basis of size. So we needed to 
scale-up the size and we decided to carve a niche in retail banking outside or rather in 
complementing that our traditional investment and corporate banking niche. We also decided 
to start cultivating expertise in retail banking [CRSM 1].   
The attention of the bank is to increase what we call OBI (other banking income) from 
transaction-based income. …As against what we use to focus on like trade-related 
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transactions where you give the customer an import finance facility, you make your income 
[CRSM2]. 
“The new CBN …actually stipulated that about 70% of our populace, I mean bankable 
population are unbanked and there are in the rural area. So, when you talk about retail 
banking, it is not a business of big-ticket, but it is a business of volume. So we are focusing on 
the retail aspect of the market” [CRSM3]. 
The above comments thus reflect the management’s belief that the retail banking model was 
an appropriate strategic response. As earlier mentioned, the concept of value chain strategy 
emerged significantly in the data as well as part of the retail banking initiative. When talking 
about implementing value chain strategy, opinion from data mainly suggests that it was all 
about the effort of the bank in customer acquisition, lending and ramping up deposits from 
the SMEs especially. One of the senior managers was captured the shared opinion as follows: 
“…in the oil and gas industry, you mention shell, Halliburton, Addax. In the manufacturing 
industry, you mention NESTLE, GSK, Nigerian Breweries; all those large companies actually 
have what we call retail derivative. … So banking those people, the entire value-chain is 
more important to us in that way…. [CRSM3]. 
Financial inclusion was not Cross-River’s management idea rather the central bank. 
However, all commercial banks are encouraged to contribute to promoting the idea while 
drawing from its benefits.  When talking about financial inclusion as an intervention, it 
means, attention to lending to the real sectors of the economy that were often deprived of 
support. Like other banks, managers in Cross-River consider it amenable to their revenue 
drive and risk management strategies. As confirmed in the following comments:   
“…we now realised that statistics in Nigeria show that financial inclusion is still very low. 
There is still a large green place to cover in terms of getting Nigerians to have bank 
accounts. …So, as a strategy, the bank (Bayelsa) decided to go into the mass market. ….We 
decided to go through a unique segment of the market (salaried employees) who hitherto has 
not been banked because everybody feels that government employees are poorly paid and all 
of that. But in our case, we looked at that and figured out that yes, they may be poorly paid 
but they actually need that financial intervention much more. And as far as security is 
concerned, we are dealing with them as a block” [CRSM1].  
  
160 
 
The CEO also sums it, “we are now acquiring 55 new customers’ monthly and disbursing 
20,000 new loans, with over 2000 monthly to women-owned micro-enterprises” [CLS, 2015]. 
Part of the customers' acquisition project of the Cross-River bank and its retail model is the 
use of ‘agency banking’. This approach involves identifying and using commission-based 
agents in villages and communities to attract customers by providing the organisation’s 
products and services around a specified remit. The CLS summed as follows:    
“…our agent banking initiative is on course; we currently have 71 agents nationwide, with a 
plan to grow 800 agents by 2017” [CLS, 2015]. This was confirmed by one of the senior 
managers by declaring that:   
“Another major initiative that we have done to hasten our customer acquisition process 
strategy is the use of what we call direct sales agents. They are just like what we call 
commissioned agents for the bank” [CRSM1].  
The agents are used mainly because their services are cheap and therefore consistent with 
cost optimisation strategies Cross-River. So, by leveraging on the services of agents, they are 
now accessing and bringing customers to their books in an efficient and cost-effective way. 
Here, you see a redirection of attention by the management.    
7.3.3 Restructuring and Decentralisation of Authority  
In line with the vision for retail banking, restructuring, decentralisation and regionalising are 
the other significant themes appearing in the Cross-River case data. As the following 
comments confirms:  
“We restructured around the business and our operations. And what do I mean? We had to 
go into geographical restructure, we had regional head of sales, and regional heads of 
operations so that at the region, they have the authority and power to manage quite a number 
of retail endeavour instead of everybody coming to the centre at the same time which will be 
overwhelming.  …I was actually brought …to do the regional structure of operations of the 
bank…. because we could not manage that number of branches from the centre anymore, we 
had to regionalise. I actually headed the regional operations, putting the structure in place, 
putting the procedures, manuals, the processes in place; the regional structure” [CRSM3].  
It was interesting that the rationale and responsibility for the initiative was reaffirmed by one 
of the key participants in the project and another senior manager also agreeing that: 
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“It was obvious that beforehand, the way we were structured, everybody was doing 
everything at the same time, we realised that we needed to develop competencies and skills. 
We were also split into units, also based on the roadmap we were given. There is a separate 
division that powers the electronic banking, essentially because we needed to devolve 
resources, especially to our alternate channels to support our major divisions as far as 
business is concerned. The public sector until recently used to be a division but it’s been 
deemphasised, it’s been subsumed into existing divisions essentially because of the way the 
public sector business has slowed down in recent years. [CRSM1].   
In sum, Cross-River, the restructuring initiative have multiple aspects. First, data revealed 
that the management decided to de-emphasise on public sector banking, and created a new 
division that now manages the new retail and mass-market banking strategy, and another 
separate division that handles electronic banking transactions that now play a critical role in 
the bank operation. Another aspect of the restructuring involved regionalisation, reallocation 
of resources and decentralisation of authority by creating heads of regional operations 
especially to drive the retail banking strategy of the bank. The management believes a 
devolved structure and authority would enhance efficiency and span of control rather than 
centralised decision-making approach as they were.   
7.3.4 Expansion and Diversification  
Cross-River has taken 3 key expansion initiatives in the last 3 years. First, Cross-River 
expanded by establishing a microfinance subsidiary of the bank which was aimed at enabling 
concentration on advancing the retail banking project of the bank. Apart from that, Cross-
River established its first offshore branch operation in the UK in 2014 – an initiative probably 
taken not expecting the headwinds that hit the industry since 2014. However, there appear to 
less focus on local branch network expansion as no addition to their existing local branch 
network in the last three years was identified in the data. The management noted that both 
areas of expansion projects have begun to make useful contributions given the impressive 
result the organisation has recorded from those strategic initiatives. As the CLS 2015 
reflected: 
“Our micro-lending subsidiary witnessed a 9% growth in profitability …in 2015. [Cross-
River] UK broke even in its second year of operation as a licensed deposit-taking bank in the 
UK, with a PBT of … Following this milestone …we will be pursuing a variation of 
permission from a wholesale deposit-taking bank to a retail deposit taker” [CLS 2015].  
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In addition to the above, Cross-River has also diversified into another related provisioning 
with a recent investment in the pension funds sector. A key consideration of the management 
is that the sector provides similar opportunities as the retail banking sector with much of that 
yet untapped. As such, they believe that would be useful to deploy their retail banking 
capability to serve the segment effectively. As declared in the 2015 CLS:  
“We invested …in a leading Pension Funds Administrator, Legacy Pension; we continue to 
follow the strategic issues in this sector with keen interest. It is a sector that is amenable to 
our Retail thrust and fits into our strategy with potentials to leverage our distribution, cross-
sell into our over 3 million customers and tap our retail know-how. …we expect our non-
pension asset management and private trusteeship business to grow more steadily; a 
combination of these initiatives will reduce the pressure on the bank’s balance sheet and 
steer activities to less capital intensive businesses” [CLS, 2015]. 
 
In fact, out of that mass-market customer segment, we are spinning-off a microfinance bank, 
a separate subsidiary, and entity of the holding company, which will further deepen that 
financial inclusion strategy; the bottom of the pyramid approach in terms of both liability 
generation and asset creation [CRSM1]. 
“Before the FG started with this issue of diversification, we have started collaborating with 
the Agric and agrarian commodity market; the entire value-chain, the out-growers, 
distributors, and all those people to go into agriculture. Another thing is about small and 
medium scale enterprises, we are developing a better framework for SMEs. So, while the 
challenges on the FX side are going on, we are developing capabilities in the Agric sector 
and among the SMEs” [CRSM3].  
7.3.5 Innovative Technology deployment 
…We have built a solid business model around retail and transaction banking to deliver 
sustainable profit growth, effective use of technology to boost efficiency, reduced risk 
appetite and a greater customer experience”. 
Innovative technology deployment was identified in the dataset as another key strategic 
initiative in the case of Cross-River. Participants discussed innovative technology upgrading, 
their website with new functionalities enabling some of their new digital/electronic products 
and services and processes to be conducted online via the website. In other words, the 
processes of serving customers are being automated. Things like account opening bank 
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account have become seamless with customer able to do that all by themselves online and 
send in supporting documents on a later date/time. As some participants explained:   
“…to cope with customers’ acquisition, at the rate we are running now, we have innovated; I 
think we pioneered it in the industry, instant account opening in the sense that you can 
actually do account opening by yourself; go to the website of the bank and create or send in 
your details and you can initiate the process of account opening [CSRM1].   
In addition, more investment in technological infrastructures are seen as inevitable. 
Therefore, new technology infrastructures are being rolled out continuously in order to help 
drive retail banking. As the CLS explained: 
“We rolled out an additional 108 ATMs across different locations to increase the tally to 755 
and on-boarded about 370,000 new customers on the mobile banking platform. …During the 
course of the year, we deployed over 3,600 point of sales terminals to increase the number to 
13,000. Increasingly, our SME customers are embracing a cashless economy” [CLS, 2016].   
Senior managers interviewed also confirmed as follows:  
“We have been aggressively deploying our ATMs, we’ve been deploying our POS terminals, 
we’ve been enrolling our customers on internet banking, and all that believing that as they 
use those services, as we create those conveniences for them, in turns you will be making 
your money” [CRSM2].     
“When we decided to go retail, we knew we needed a robust electronic banking platform, in 
terms of electronic products. We knew we were dealing with the mass market, a lot of people, 
a lot of time. We needed to migrate a number of services to electronic channels to make the 
service a pleasant experience for our now many customers. So those investments are driven 
by our committed focus and strategy of customer acquisition” [CRSM1].   
7.3.6 Partnerships and Collaboration with external partners 
As already mentioned Cross-River has developed a number of strategic partnerships to 
support them in terms of human resources capacity building. In addition to that, the 
management also recognised the importance of collaboration in relation to technology 
deployment. Data show that Cross-River has been partnering with technology firms to help 
develop and maintain relevant technology infrastructure and innovations required in order to 
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support the new retail banking model as well as skills to deploy the technology effectively. 
As explained in the following comments:  
“Operating these strategies required that we collaborate with external partners. For 
instance, you can’t build the entire technology infrastructure, you need a collaborating 
partner. So, one of the things we do is that we get innovation partners to collaborate with us. 
They sit with us and as we take technology innovations from them, we build internal 
capacities as well to understudy them. So that when you buy those innovations from them, 
you are able to treat it as required to suit us as we move on. I will mention a few, maybe on 
the infrastructure side, we have Interswitch; we have IBM that does a lot of technology 
infrastructure for us [CRSM3].  
7.4 How managers balance between routines and strategic change 
Perspectives expressed in the data show that managers in Cross-River tend to be finding the 
necessary balance between existing organisational routines and managers' proclivity for 
process change and better strategic decisions by processes involving engagement, 
communication; selling-idea, convincing and buying-in. By reflecting on the comments 
expressed and the context in which managers have used the above terms, it became clear that 
the messages are similar albeit the different terms used. The researcher has used three themes 
to capture those concepts. 
7.4.1 Engagement and Convince 
Managers talked about engagement in terms of having to communicate with the relevant 
stakeholders and having to get their opinion, and having discussions about what one may 
want to do and why. This can also be looked at in terms of negotiation as to understand why 
the project initiator wants a particular project to be executed. The following comment reflects 
this:  
“…the most important thing is that you articulate your idea and try to convince people about 
your idea or sometimes you just present it without even having to discuss it with anybody. Let 
everybody look at it from his professional and passionate standpoint. …The formal means 
that I just put it down in a memo and it goes through circulation. Then the informal one is 
that you call somebody and say look, there is this thing I’m thinking of, I trying to push 
through this with you...this is the benefit, blah blah blah, and all that. By the time, it gets to 
him at the point of signing, because he is already in the picture, he’ll sign” [CRSM2]. 
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7.4.2 Buying-in 
As mentioned before now, similar to the above is the concept of buying-in. The manager has 
led some key innovative projects and was responding based on his experiences. As he 
recalled in the following comment: 
“Another thing that I did for CPC and even for some of the innovation we have 
deployed …apart from showing data of about where this has worked before; you take a 
portion of the business and deploy them and showcase. For instance, if you want to do 
something for the entire bank, I will say let us take a trade zone, and we use it as an example. 
So when the trade zone now comes out and says, we are making a revenue of x before you 
deployed this innovation, now you are making x+2 because of this innovation. By the time 
you deploy it with two or three more, oh! It is working, it becomes a very easier conversation 
and the entire bank will buy into it”. [CRSM3]. 
Considering the above, one can understand that the common thing between the comments is 
about getting others to agree to a project/initiative. Central to that also is about articulating 
one’s argument to be convincing, selling the idea in the form of communication and based on 
that expect the relevant stakeholders to buy into the project. 
7.4.3 Knowledge and learning  
In the dataset, apart from the above, other concepts expressed are about knowledge and 
learning. In this context, professional development was considered to be helpful because the 
project initiator could draw on their knowledge to sponsor or initiate mainly viable projects. 
Again, the concept of engaging was emphasised. The following comments confirm this:  
“We are speaking …based on knowledge and understanding; based on analyses that are 
cutting-edge, that make sense. We build analysis from a risk perspective, so the 
people/business might not have actually thought through all the risk dimensions. …We focus 
on things that are important to the bank as a whole. …we have developed subject-matter 
expertise in different areas of the business. We go to the training they go too, we engage them 
extensively, challenge their assumptions and they receive our contributions better because 
they know it is coming from an informed standpoint” [CRSM1]. 
“…if people could see what is in it for them as individuals and as a team, then it is easier to 
let them see what the value in it for the institution as a whole. So, you need to train, you need 
to constantly engage, you need to constantly get feedback and all things” [CRSM3]. 
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7.4 DMC and Influence/role of managerial cognition  
Table7. 4 Cognition and DMC related themes in the case of Cross-River 
Managerial Cognition 
 
Related influence on DMC in the case of Cross-River  
Management’s Vision 
and belief  
- seeking to become a premier finance group in Africa                                                      
-leading retail presence is central to our vision 
Perception/attention  
 
-  Nigeria population  as an opportunity                                                                                                                         
- attention to retail segment as largely untapped   
- Africa, and international expansion e.g.UK 
- Identified opportunity for diversification to pension and 
microfinance 
Problems-solving 
capacity  
Investments in customer service/acquisition               
Planned moderation/cost containment 
Restructure; Improved risk management framework 
Communication Engaging, buying-in, convincing, knowledge/learning 
Attention diversity Focusing on retail business model, OBI and capacity building 
No more a commercial bank 
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                                            Chapter Eight 
                                                 The Case of Delta 
8.1 Profile of Delta Bank 
Similar to other cases examined, a brief organisation profile in the case of Delta is contained 
in Appendix 3 due to space. Therefore, the analysis of data continues here straight away with 
the first objective of the research: to determine the environmental challenges faced by 
managers as related to deployment of DMC in the context of Delta. 
8.2 Delta managers’ perspectives on the Nigerian business environment.  
The macroeconomic headwinds were largely related to the effects of depressed oil earnings, 
liquidity problems, inadequate supply of FOREX, and weakness of the Naira and economic 
recession in the country. Table 8.1 below summarises key findings about the environment in 
the case of Delta.  
Table 8. 1 Themes related to Environmental challenges in the case of Delta 
Focal Inquiry  
 
Emerging themes/concepts Classification  Implications 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business 
Environment 
 Regulatory headwinds – monetary 
and fiscal policies, CRR upward 
adjustment and  FX regime by 
CBN,  
Economic uncertainties and 
problems in the business 
environment  – due to depressed oil 
earnings, liquidity issue, inflation, 
multiple exchange rate, inflation, 
devaluation/weakness of the naira; 
recession, stiffened competition   
Sociocultural challenges:                 
- People’s culture                                
- illiterate people                                   
- Niger Delta avengers/civil unrest    
“heightened economic 
uncertainty & regulatory 
headwinds” 
 
   
Fall in revenue/income   
High asset risks 
Pressure on  profits  
Need for appropriate 
strategic responses to 
ensure competitive 
survival and growth 
  
African and Nigeria’s population  
Unbanked/under-banked customers    
Digital revolution, Technology; 
Telcos & Fintechs  
Business opportunities  Need to leverage on the 
opportunities presented 
by Africa’s population, 
digital revolution, 
Telcos and Fintechs  
Poor leadership; lack of vision, lack  
of empowerment; insensitivity, lack 
integrity, poor communication 
Proxy description of 
Internal environment 
constraints/inhibiting 
factors 
Need for sensitivity 
about both internal and 
external factors  
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8.3. Economic uncertainties/challenges 
In Delta, managers differently expressed concerns about the depressed economic situation, 
challenges, and uncertainties. As table 8.1 shows, this was largely attributed to the fallout of 
the significant drop in the global price of crude oil – the main source of the country’s revenue 
and foreign exchange earnings. Implications of that comprised low liquidity in the economy, 
weakness of the naira, and shortage of FOREX and multiple exchange rates as a result. With 
that also, inflation shot up, the GDP nosedived and by 2016 the country was officially 
confirmed as being in an economic recession. Given their impacts on businesses, the banks as 
intermediaries were adversely affected. As managers interviewed in the study confirmed:  
“…the economy is heavily tied to crude oil, so as the price of crude oil moves up, things tend 
to function better in the country and as the price of crude oil crashes, a lot of things 
crashes. …due to the recession, in the last three years now, e.g. construction business has 
been heavily challenged. But we didn’t get to that point suddenly” [DSM4].  
“…because of our exposures in dollars to those in oil & gas particularly the marginal field 
owners in Nigeria. …For us, we saw a reduction in their revenue because it dropped to about 
half, in fact even less than half of that [DMM2]. 
“…what’s up now is just income really; the economy is challenged, there was contraction for 
almost two years, we were in recession for almost two years. And then, because the 
government wants to re-inflate the economy due to instability in the FX market, they then jack 
up the income rate”. [DSM4].  
The CEO in his 2016 end of year letter to shareholders also reflected: 
“We knew that the business environment in 2016 would be particularly challenging given the 
weakness of the Naira, depressed oil earnings and inadequate supply of foreign exchange, all 
of which culminated in the eventual slide of the Nigerian economy into recession” [CLS, 
2016].  
The terms (“we knew”) as expressed by the CEO reflect the importance of knowledge and 
anticipation. This was based on the build-up of these problems since late 2014 when the 
crude oil price began to show significant decline, continuing in 2015 and then 2016. It means 
that the management perceived the signals and perhaps helped them to prepare and respond 
as necessary to cushion the effects.  
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8.3.1. Regulatory Headwinds  
Another significant environmental challenge that the organisation has had to deal with in the 
recent past was what the CEO referred to as “regulatory headwinds”. The concept was 
particularly used in relation to tighter monetary and fiscal policies - foreign exchange 
regimes, and related reforms by the CBN. Managers also talked about changes in transaction 
charges allowed for banks and TSA policy. As one of the senior management executives of 
the bank interviewed in the study explained:  
“… If you look at the FX regime, that had an impact on the industry, and obviously almost 
every other – I mean you will have a CBN circular that would have an impact to a large 
extent on how we operate in the industry as banks. So, we’ve had quite a squeeze, I am 
looking at the industry now not necessarily focusing on my bank but focusing on the Nigerian 
banking industry. Banks have struggled, some with liquidity issue; in the last, two to three 
years – quite a number of banks had issues around having to lay-off because again it was a 
bit challenging” [DSM3].  
Another senior manager interviewed also shared a similar view, citing the CBN policy in 
relation to the interest rate changes by stating: 
“…because the government wants to re-inflate the economy due to instability in the FX 
market, they then jacked-up the interest rate” [DSM4]. As one may expect, it implies that 
there would be a corresponding rise in the cost of funding or borrowing both for banks and 
clients. 
However, one of the senior managers interviewed, saw the issues as not unpredictable per se 
as he explained: “…the usual things are complaints about charges; complaints about 
service”. …They come in different forms and all that. Today it is TSA, tomorrow it is 
something else but substance over form is still the same thing; exchange rate increases –it is 
not the first time that the exchange rate issue is happening and therefore it’s the duty of every 
organisation, the top level of a bank to understand these cyclical changes and adapt to 
it...[DSM1].  
This suggests that as much as those issues occur, managerial capability for understanding and 
predicting enabled their organisation to handle those changes as they occur. 
In all, the above perspectives meant that Delta as with other rivals in the industry found 
themselves having to find ways to cope contain the effects of regulatory changes and policies 
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introduced by the CBN, one, on their customer’s businesses and two, to the bank as an 
institution in terms of businesses loss. Much of the change on the FX regime was related to 
effort to manage pressure which arose due to less inflow of FOREX usually from crude oil 
sales and on the other hand an increasing demand for it and capital flight as the economy was 
largely import-dependent. Notice that in both comments, the issue of liquidity was 
highlighted as well and that in part was about the effects TSA which affected customer’s 
deposit with the bank, and banks needed to alternative deposits to replace public sector 
deposits returned due to TSA.  
8.2.3 Government policies Summersault  
Related to the above, another challenge for managers located in the dataset was what was 
described as “government policies summersault”. This concept was also uncovered and stated 
exactly in Bayelsa’s case. While this aspect was not particularly traced to the recent 
challenges in the economy, the point the managers make entails that government policies in 
Nigeria are historically unpredictable and unstable with their policies such that you can 
hardly rely even on your own decisions as a manager. As one of the senior managers 
explained:   
“…at times you move forward and some decisions are taken and then you have to move 
backward again, and your customers are wondering ah! Don’t you know what you are doing 
when you said let’s move? So, this moment you said fine, let’s go but all of a sudden there is 
policy summersault from somewhere and then you have to react to that. So, that’s the real 
problem that one faces on this job” [DSM4].  
It means that the cognitive capacities of managers were often under constant pressure and 
managers have to make decisions under such tension. 
8.2.4 Inadequate infrastructure/institutions   
Another significant environmental challenge uncovered in the case of Delta’s data has to do 
with inadequate infrastructure or supporting institutions. How to ensure that customers are 
provided with important services in terms of lending was seen as a problem without the 
necessary infrastructure to support appropriate/best decisions making. Critical decisions 
including project funding are often made relying only on organisation’s policy framework 
and managers’ intuition and expertise. As one of the senior managers commented:  
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“….there are complaints about services and am also trying to keep up ensuring that 
customers get the ultimate services that they deserve in an environment where infrastructure 
is really not perfect” [DSM1].  
This implies that the challenge the managers often face includes how to make the right 
decisions/judgment and to consistently demonstrate professionalism by taking on only quality 
risks and on the other hand not to ignore good business opportunities due to insufficient 
supporting infrastructure enabling wider checks. 
8.2.5 Sociocultural challenges  
Another challenge identified in the dataset has to do with sociocultural problems, particularly 
the low level of literacy, and lack of trust among people in the country. Dealing with the less 
educated population was seen as a herculean task for managers and one that requires 
significant effort towards educating people to understand or appreciate the unconventional 
banking practices as they evolve. As summarised by one of the senior managers:  
“…in our environment, the level of literacy in Nigeria is not necessarily where it should be. 
So, in as much as you are pushing out alternative channels whether its internet banking, you 
have automated teller machine, you have POSs, you have USSD banking where you just use 
the mobile pins, …but the average man still want to come into the banking hall and talk to a 
human being. So, of course, …a lot is changing on the global level, etc., but the general 
Nigerian person is still a bit suspicious about all these funky means of transacting that we 
are now talking about” [DSM3]. Another senior manager interviewed also affirmed:  
“You know some people are even illiterate, they say what is this thing called internet? So, 
your feedback and your pushback to say, look, this product is good but hey, nobody is using 
them. I mean, internet connection is still poor in the country.  So, out of our 10 million 
customers, probably 250,000, probably 500000 are using smartphones; you may not be able 
to relate with this. You leave in the UK, but then that’s the fact, the reality in the country. The 
bulk of the people still don’t use the smartphone. So, it was just a normal thing to look for a 
way to serve or to take banking to those guys” [DSM4].  
8.2.7 Stiffened Competition 
Another significant challenge found in the Delta data was what they described as stiffened 
competition. Findings show that the managers were concerned that competition has become 
more tensed as they now not only have to compete with fellow banks or normal rivals but 
also non-traditional banking institutions. The CEO’s comment below was reminiscent:  
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“Digital technologies have dissolved the boundaries between industry sectors and Banking 
has not been spared from this disruption. Non-bank digital players could become as integral 
in the banking value chain as we are to our customers, and competition from these nonbank 
players could erode as much as one-third of traditional retail banking revenues in the coming 
years” [CLS, 2016].  
One of the senior managers interviewed in the study also shared their CEO’s observation and 
concerns as she explained:  
“…competition has been very stiff. If you look at our industry, we are now having to compete 
with technology firms – with FINTECH. This is business that traditionally was ours in terms 
of even lending, you are having back-up just with an app to challenge…you know all sorts of 
things. So, we are having to evolve some of our traditional ways of doing business to being 
more agile, and so we are able to respond very quickly; we can possibly foresee okay where 
are the areas we can begin to compete” [DSM3]. 
The effect of the environmental challenges and the strategic choices by the management 
especially within the studied period can be more sensible with a look at the key performance 
highlights of the bank as presented in table 8.2 below.  
Table8. 2 KPH in Delta between 2014 and 2016 
For the year ended, December        2014 (Naira) 2015 (Naira) 2016 (Naira) +/- % 
Gross Earning  278,520,814 301,850 414,616 +37% 
Profit Before Tax (PBT) 1 16,385,843 120,694,804 165,136 +37% 
Customer’s Deposit 1,618,208 1,610,350 1,986,246 +23% 
Non-Performing Loans (NPL)  3.15%  3.21% 3.66% NA 
Total Asset  2,355,876  2,524,594 3,116,393 23% 
 
From the performance highlights in table 8.2, it shows that Delta maintained incremental 
growth and appreciable results for the period 2014 to 2016. In all, the above highlights 
summarises that it has been a relatively strong year-on-year performance in Delta bank 
despite the difficult business environment and challenges faced by the bank. Notably, also, 
this achievement is evidently linked to the significant role of the management team.  As the 
CEO in his 2016 letter to shareholders summarised: 
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“We successfully navigated the heightened economic uncertainty and regulatory headwinds, 
which dominated the year without losing sight of the reason we are here: to serve our 
customers and to create value for our shareholders” [CLS, 2016]. The next section focuses 
on the second objective of the study and how they successfully navigated those challenges.  
8.3. Strategic Change, Actions/Responses – the management’s viewpoints 
The second objective of the study was to examine how dynamic managerial capabilities 
influence purposeful strategic change to the firm’s resource-base in the case of Delta. Table 
8.3 below presents a summary of concepts/themes related to DMC identified. 
Table 8. 3 DMC themes and categorisation in Delta's Cases 
Themes 
 
Categorisation  
To be African and truly international bank                                
International best practice/benchmark/global 
standard                                                                              
To be competitive anywhere in the world  
African Vision/High goal setting   
Being proactive and agile                                              
Innovative, adaptive and flexible                               
Creating enabling work environment, teamwork 
and collegiate system                                               
Promoting spirit of leadership and accountability                                                       
Continuous learning culture and information 
seeking         
Organisational culture/values  
Expanded to Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda in 
2015. Increase international banking operation in 
Africa    Having African Inspiration                                                        
Good returns from UK operations 
Regional/International expansion  
 
Stronger customer base/diversifying and retail                                                          
Focusing on SMEs and value chain management         
Focus on getting 23 million customers over the 
next 4yrs                                                                
Maintaining core interest in corporate banking 
Adapted Business model 
Investing in up-to-date ATM models       
Upgrading Apps/electronic banking platform  
Investing/leveraging on digital technology                                                        
Improved processes and self-service systems  
Financial technology and digital 
banking 
Created directorate for digital banking, 
Fintech/Innovation                                                                   
Implementing relevant integration and  
realignment enabling flat organisational structure 
Structural reorganisation 
Seeking productive collaboration with Fintechs    
Developed Partnerships with downstream 
retailers 
Strategic Partnerships and 
Collaboration 
 
Source: interview transcripts, press releases and company’s annual report 2014 to 2016  
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8.3.1 Strategic Vision and Setting High Goals 
 As earlier mentioned, the declared strategic vision of [Delta] is to “build an enduring Proudly 
African and Truly International Bank that plays a fundamental role as a platform for 
enriching lives of people by building strong, value-adding relationship with their customers, 
stakeholders and the communities in which they operate” (Website; annual report, 2016). As 
re-affirmed by the CEO in the following comments:  
“Our vision has always been to create an African institution that can compete anywhere in 
the world in terms of good corporate governance, innovation and superior service delivery” 
[Press release, January 2017] – three concepts also identified in the data as embodying the 
organisation’s values and culture.   
“Recognizing that we operate in challenging business environments, we set high goals, 
benchmark ourselves against global standards and aggressively pursue our key objectives 
…which are focused mainly on adding value to all stakeholders and improving the customer 
journey” [Press release, Q3 2016].  
“…because we know what we are going; we are very clear about what we are doing. You 
know there’s a saying that “the world stands apart for the man who knows where he is 
going”. From day one, we know what we are doing, we know what is required of us and we 
are working towards it and that’s why I said, we are not a Nigerian bank” [DSM4].  
A key component of this vision as articulated is to be “African and Truly International bank”.  
Rather than focusing on Nigeria only, the vision also reflects the management’s perception of 
Africa in general as a land of enormous opportunity, much of which remains untapped. There 
is consideration of the international space as the needed platform to establish a competitive 
imprint and a brand to be proud of. Whilst acknowledged that the stated vision maybe a “high 
goal” understandably so based on its history (see section 8.1) however, managers in Delta 
believe that the vision is both deliberate and strategic and have been one of their key success 
factors. The above reflects cognition regarding competition and attention beyond Nigeria. 
8.3.2 Adapting to changing market variables and building a stronger customer base  
As a bank with a strong interest in being “truly international bank”, understandably, findings 
show that Delta was biased towards corporate and commercial banking. However, based on 
dynamics in the external business environment, the management was persuaded about the 
need to modify/adapt its business model. Recall as earlier noted that CEO explained:  “we 
knew it would be a challenging year and we prepared for it by focusing on …adapting our 
business model to changing market variables”. The intention was to develop alternative and 
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more stable income sources through growing their customer base from SMEs, retail, and 
consumers' banking segments. The new business model resonates with the concept of value 
chain management – a term used by participants in the study to explain the bank’s strategy 
involving banking SMEs linked to corporates. While the retail/consumer banking element of 
the business model has to do with a deliberate effort to growing customer/asset base from the 
retail and consumer banking segment. As one of the senior managers remarked:  
“Going forward, I think it’s really geared towards of course a lot of focus in the retail and 
SME space and also looking at financial technology and digital transformation. Really, those 
are the key areas we are focused on as an organisation” [DSM3].  
“…now we are diversifying. We are looking at other streams of income. We’ve changed how 
we manage our IOCs …the Chevron, Agip, and the Shells. Instead of focusing on these major 
means, we are now looking at banking the entire value chain; we are chasing up their 
contractors so that when we pay, we have the total accounts. …we are looking at the IOCs, 
the contractors, and the sub-contractors …so that even when we give out loans, the monies 
are still in our books. …diversifying into contractor businesses, trying to grow through your 
own customers (i.e. your IOCs) so that we are not losing money” [DMM2]. 
“…if I talk about retail, I think of individuals – me and you...If you are looking in terms of 
your balance sheet; yes, you may have large corporates,… bringing money but there are not 
going to let the money sit in your bank. They’ll use it for something. But individuals, yes it 
might not be a lot if you look at it in terms of the value each individual is bringing to the 
table. But, if you look at the critical mass, and the fact that the funds are a bit more stable, 
then your drive will then be to increase your customer base significantly to give you that 
reliability that you require in terms of having stable funds. So, I mean from inception, we 
were more focused on commercial and corporate; …but the truth about it is that there is a 
point at which you would stagnate somewhat in our environment if you don’t play in the 
retail space. So, that’s why a couple of years ago, there is deliberate focus to look at retail 
and build a solid retail business; with your focus to drive your numbers up – getting maybe 
up to 23 million customers in the next four years or something, so it’s deliberate”[DSM3].  
By implementing the business models explained, findings also indicate that Delta bank 
successfully (1) increased its customer base (2) increased its capital base through low-cost 
deposits, and (3) maintained low NPL and diversified its risk assets as earlier explained. As 
confirmed by the CEO in his 2016 letter to shareholders:  
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“…our customer base has tripled over the last five years to  9.68 million customers as of 
December 31, 2016, and we have also seen tremendous growth in customer adoption of our 
digital services” [CLS, 2016]. Customers deposit grew by 14.36% or N144 billion to 
N1.65trillion by 2014, and “increased by 29% to ₦2.111trillion” in 2016 from 
“₦1.637trillion in December 2015” [CLS, 2016], and as the management acknowledged in 
the data are “strong deposit growth driven by the continued growth of our retail franchise” 
[PR, 2014]. This implies that the bank through adapting its business model has found a way 
to remain resilient in the face of the environmental dynamics as they were. Opinions in the 
data also reflect the strategic role of the Delta bank’s management team in the process. As 
senior manager commented: 
“I think for the bank it is just really the ability to adapt and be resilient to absorb all these 
cyclical changes. And therefore, it’s the duty of every organisation; the top level of a bank to 
understand these cyclical changes and adapt to it. [DSM1]. 
On the other hand, however, it was also revealed that will continue to maintain core interest 
in commercial and corporate banking. This is mainly driven by its profitability appeal. As 
one of the senior managers explained:    
But we are not losing sight of our core high earning commercial banking, corporate banking 
because obviously in terms of profitability it is a lot more profitable [DSM3].   
This later comment also meant that Delta bank’s bias towards corporate banking remains core 
to the bank but then has orchestrated the necessary balance on its asset base and sources. 
Therefore, the retail and value chain banking model reflects the management’s problem-
solving capability and initiative as a response to shifts in the business environment.  
8.3.3 Organisational culture and values  
Organisation culture is one of the most significant themes uncovered in the Delta’s dataset 
analysis process. Section 8.1 above earlier on noted that the organisation’s vision is 
embedded into practice in the organisations through eight core principles also known as the 
‘orange rules’ of the bank. Those rules or principles were differently discussed by all 
managers interviewed in the study to represent the values, DNA and culture of the 
organisation and essentially what sets Delta apart from their rivals. The following comment 
best reflects the views shared by the managers:  
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“The real big thing for us I think is our organisational culture, the way we work, the way we 
do things, the way we achieve results. That’s really what sets us apart because at the end of 
the day we are all doing the same business” [DSM3]. This concept of organisational culture 
as used is therefore all-embracive. More specifically, the research participants expressed the 
organisational culture as evolving to include: 1) being proactive and agile 2) innovative, 
adaptive, and flexible ; 3) having enabling work environment with 4) flatter organisational 
structure; 5) anti-bureaucracy 6) employee empowerment; 6) promoting the spirit of 
leadership and accountability; 7) good corporate governance and professionalism; 8) having a 
clear plan and not having to react to everything 9) passionate/prioritising customer focus and 
listening to stakeholders; 10) continuous learning culture  11) teamwork and collegiate 
system 12) always seeking information and 13) ultimately being result-oriented. The 
following comments are typical:   
 “…we are having to evolve some of our traditional ways of doing business to being more 
agile, and so we are able to respond very quickly; we can possibly foresee okay where are the 
areas we can begin to compete” [DSM3]. 
“…we are very proactive and therefore most of the changes, we saw them coming ahead and 
wherein our strategy make plans on how to thrive even in the light of those changes” 
[DSM1]. 
“…we have a very enabling environment in {Delta} that really promotes that spirit of 
leadership in everything that you do. I think bureaucracy is also non-existent, there is no 
perfect system, so I won’t say non-existent – I will say almost not. And there is this high-sense 
of ownership. You just feel like it is my business, I am running my own business” [DSM3]. 
“…for us we try and get information as in you just try to know what is happening around you 
and sometimes you get the information through your customers. That’s why one of our major 
goals is to be as close to our customers that they become your friends, and they can talk to 
you” [DMM2]. 
“…it’s a very flat structure whereby your voice is heard and whatever you have in mind is 
discussed. There is no one person that can shout you down or say no to you. There is no one 
person can say no to what you want to do. It’s something close to a collegiate system in 
taking some decisions” [DSM4].  
As one may note, firstly, the described strategic vision and organisational culture are 
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considered in this study as pregnant concepts with many related things that need to be 
clarified. In Delta, the managers think that they (organisation) are no longer a Nigerian bank 
and so must act to reflect that self-assessment. In that regard, the organisational culture and 
values and a commitment to their evolution were accentuated. The role of managers’ 
cognition is significantly reflective. In the data, observations also show that the stated 
attributes, vision and thinking all mirrors much of the strategic actions, initiatives, and 
responses of the organisation in the studied period. The most significant aspects relevant to 
this research have been included in the analysis that follows.  
8.3.4 Regional/International Expansion  
As a bank with an eye for being “truly international”, strategic actions of Delta involve 
regional and international expansion and business operations. While the expansion projects 
were not exactly because of the headwinds that affected the Nigeria business environment, 
given the already existing subsidiaries of the bank by 2014. Managers’ thought in Delta 
entails that the strategic decision of the bank as earlier made to explore and play in the 
international space, not Nigeria alone, was nonetheless validated by recent experiences in the 
latter. As evident in appendix 3, apart from Nigeria, Delta have increased their operation to 
ten other African countries and UK in Europe – the latest being their adventure to East 
African nations including Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda in 2015 after the encouraging results 
and performance in their West African subsidiaries. The commitment, motivation, and drive 
for further international expansions were uncovered in this case. As confirmed in a press 
statement in March 2016 by the CEO that: 
“…we remain committed to maximising shareholders’ value and delivering superior and 
sustainable returns whilst actively expanding our franchise in select, high growth African 
markets where we believe we have a competitive advantage”.   
One of the senior managers also asserted that: 
“In the next five years, we are going to be known African wide. We have African inspiration, 
we are no more a Nigerian bank; we hope to be everywhere in Africa; to be one of the most 
profitable banks in Africa, number one or number two. …we’ve conquered Nigeria; there is 
nothing for us to prove again in Nigeria. For the past five years or six years, we’ve been the 
most profitable bank. I mean the next bank to us profit-wise is probably 60 or 70 billion 
away. So, really we’ve moved, we are looking at Africa, we want to be the most profitable or 
second most profitable bank in Africa in absolute digits” [DSM4].  
  
179 
 
These comments are significantly consistent with the DMC in terms of, the management’s 
belief and commitment. It also shows the management to be selective in their commitment 
and the clear intent for continuous international outlook include maximising profitability – a 
sin qua non for increasing an organisation’s asset base, regional recognition and reputation 
building. The validity of the management’s strategic decisions is also reflective in data as 
claimed. Data show that the contribution of the regional operations to the organisation’s 
balance sheet constitutes 8.29% of the declared PBT of Delta in 2016 up from 6.8% in 2015. 
In other words, the management’s belief, attention and perception of the Africa market as 
untapped or under-tapped “land of opportunity” [CLS, 2016] as drivers of organisations 
resource base expansion is confirmed. Arguably, therefore, the management’s interpretation 
of the environment can be a key driver to the organisation’s possible takeover and aim to seek 
dominance of the African space in terms of customer base. 
8.3.5 Building Digital Capabilities and Business Systems Upgrade 
To support the new business model/strategies focus on retail and SMEs, and banking wider 
operations, Delta has been investing significantly in digital technology infrastructure and 
upgrades. The shared understanding by the management entails that “as a bank that wants to 
continue to win and dominate”, it is quite crucial to quickly move beyond traditional banking 
processes also referred as “bricks and mortar” to playing more into the digital and 
‘commercial lives of their customers’. As differently explained in the following comments:  
“If you look at the industry, we are trying to push out a lot of alternate banking channels; 
you know we are saying, we have to move beyond bricks and mortar – to now focusing on 
electronic banking, etc.” [DSM3].  
“…we believe that the banking of the near future will be fought and won in the digital space. 
We created a whole directorate for digital banking which is headed by an executive director. 
That’s where we believe it’s going to be fought and won” [DSM4].  
“We are investing and building our digital capabilities, and also actively seeking to 
collaborate with Fintech companies” [CLS, 2016]. 
 
“We played to our strength by leveraging technology to deliver superior payment solutions, 
grow our customer base and enhance our service delivery channels to make banking with us 
simpler, faster and better”[CLS, 2016]. 
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“As part of our strategy to grow our retail business, we are continuously making our banking 
processes and touchpoints simpler, easier and faster, irrespective of where and when our 
customers choose to bank. This has enabled us to improve the customer experience across all 
our touch points; from expanding the range of functionality we offer on our internet, mobile 
and USSD banking platforms, to ensuring better  experience  in  our  branches  and  
providing more intelligent Automated Teller Machines (ATM) to allow customers save time 
through efficient self-service” [CLS, 2016]. 
 
Apart from using digital technology to grow customer base and making banking simpler for 
customers, another aspect found in data relates to using digital technology to enhance internal 
business management functions, to save time and cost and facilitate communication. One of 
the middle managers talked about how they now have to have business meetings and 
decisions made and disseminated remotely. The following comment confirms this:  
“We also have meetings that we hold by teleconference or digital streaming where different 
groups and divisions come in so they can hear what the MD is saying, and what the other 
people are saying even though they are not physically present” [DMM2]. 
In all, it shows the focus of managers is driven by their belief that banking business for now 
and in the future would be largely driven by technology and only aligning with that would 
make the bank to remain competitive. Buoyed by this understanding, Delta bank has invested 
in up-to-date ATMs and digital touchpoints; upgraded their mobile and electronic banking 
platforms with expanded functionalities and services. Fintechs are partnered with to develop 
and hone its banking apps for even more efficiency.  
8.3.6 Created New Divisions and Structural realignment  
Given that digital capabilities and technology have become key enablers for exceptional 
customer service, products offering, and competitiveness, Delta not only invested in them but 
also created new divisions and to facilitate structural realignments aimed at taking full 
advantage of digital revolution and innovation. This strategic change initiative meant that the 
bank created and integrated for instance the Fintech and Innovation division into its structure 
to drive innovative provisioning and co-creation. Data show that the main focus of the 
division involves identifying and partnering with software developing firms and other Fintech 
firms to create new products and services for their customers and maximise the opportunities 
they present.  As confirmed in his 2016 letter to shareholders by the CEO that: 
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“…mindful of the inherent competitive advantages that we possess in the digital world, we 
have created new divisions and aligned our structure to ensure that we are positioned to take 
advantage of the opportunities birthed by the digital revolution” [CLS, 2016]. This was 
reaffirmed by one of the senior managers interviewed as he declared: 
 
“Apart from what is happening now, we believe that the banking of the near future will be 
fought and won in the digital space.  …and we created a whole directorate for digital 
banking which is headed by an executive director. That’s where we believe it’s going to be 
fought and won” [DSM4].  
 
One of the senior executives/managers interviewed by this study happened to be playing a 
leading role in one of the new divisions/directorate referred. Shading light on what the 
division does and his role as a key member of the division, the mangers explained that: 
“…broadly, I am creating new products and services, and partnering with Software 
developers’ [Fintechs’] to create services for our customers” [DSM1]. By this structural 
realignment, the management consideration summarises that:  
“With the repositioning of our business structures and significant investment in our digital 
abilities, we are confident in our capability to deliver differentiated products and services to 
our customers whilst enhancing cost-efficiency and reducing risk” [CLS, 2016]. Notable in 
the above comments is the emphasis regarding the management’s belief as an influential 
factor in the decision to create the division.  
 
When talking about structural realignment, apart from creating new divisions, it also involved 
implementing a less-hierarchical organisational structure that supports consistent innovation 
and value creation ideas of the management in terms of superior products and services 
offering of the bank. More specifically, the bank took a decision to shift from its traditional 
hierarchical organisational structure to now implementing flat structure as a way to facilitate 
cross-pollination of ideas, freedom of expressions, collegiate decision making, efficiency, and 
quality services delivery. As confirmed in the following comments: 
 
“…for the purpose of the usual traditional structures, we have divisional head, we have 
group head, we have unit head, team members and all of that. But also, in terms of how we 
then operate, it is more from a flatter type of model than …a lot of hierarchy” [DSM3]. 
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“…ours is typically a very flat structure. And it is also role-based; so, that’s why you see 
things moving very fast and decisions are made very quickly. There is no typical hierarchy of 
structure and all that; everybody knows what they need to do and they know who to interact 
with to get things done” [DSM1].  
8.3.7 New Collaborations/Strategic Partnerships  
Traditionally, banks for some reason including confidentiality and security were often averse 
to collaborations, especially with intermediaries. In the case of Delta, this has changed. As 
mentioned hitherto, the new business models of Delta with focus on retail and value-chain 
banking strategies involve new collaborations and strategic partnerships with Fintechs, and 
telecoms firms, retail merchants, service stations and customers as well. The purpose of the 
strategic partnerships as all dataset indicates include (a) to help with innovations in terms of 
developing new or honing existing products and services and payment solutions (b) to 
leverage, facilitate or enhance access to untapped frontiers and better distribution (c) to serve 
as learning, knowledge sharing and feedback channels for novel ideas for improved customer 
services and experience. Asked about his role in the organisation involves, one of the senior 
managers (DSM1) interviewed in the study explained simply: 
 “I am creating new products and services and partnering with software developers 
(Fintechs) to create services for our customers. Probed further, he went on to add: 
…We are collaborating with other entities and trying to prioritise what are the most 
important things to do at any particular point in time; …we are taking customers’ feedback 
very important, and we share that feedback internally and based on that we come up with 
processes, products, and services for our customers [DSM1]. This aspect highlights that 
engagement and partnership with customers constitute part of the processes.   
As earlier noted, whereas this also confirmed their CEO’s comment to shareholders that:  
“We are investing and building our digital capabilities, and also actively seeking to 
collaborate with Fintech companies” [CLS, 2016]. Prominent examples among recent 
strategic partnerships of Delta in the data include collaboration with one of the 
telecommunication giants in the country on one hand and on the other hand with downstream 
sector retailers and merchants to launch one of the organisations recent flagship products, 
‘737 cash-out service’. As the CEO 2016 letter to shareholders confirmed: 
“We partnered with Downstream Retailers to launch our 737 cash out service; a service 
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initiative that allows our customers to withdraw cash at Service Stations across Nigeria using 
our 737 banking platform”. With the service stations, it shows that the partnership involves 
multiple parties.  Probed further to understand not only what led to the 737 project but also 
how the idea emerged. It was discovered that the managers perceived the emerging telecom 
industry in Nigeria as an important opportunity. Comments by two of the senior managers 
were insightful:  
 
“…it was just this phone thing that really brought the idea that you know what, let’s see how 
we can partner with the Telcos (i.e. telecommunication companies) and come up with 
something that would also enable us to serve our customers better and more conveniently” 
[DSM3].  
“Basically, what happened was that we have about 10 million customers now. And clearly, 
we don’t want them in our banking hall. We want to look for a way to service them. And then 
we started with the internet-enabled funds; then later we realised that the bulk of the 
Nigerian populace does not carry the internet-enabled funds. They actually carry domi funds 
(domiciliary funds), your regular normal funds. So, we then have to look for a product that 
can talk to those regular funds, and that’s how the *737 came by.  You don’t need internet 
access, they don’t need data, they don’t need anything; all you need is to have a phone and 
you can do your banking. So, it’s taking banking to the hinterland, to the rural land, to where 
- nobody needs a smartphone; a teeming population of the country does not have a 
smartphone. So, we had to look for something that can work with normal phones. That’s how 
*737 came to be” [DSM4].  
The above comments have significant implications for DMC and cognitive capabilities for 
perceiving Nigeria Telcos and other partners as useful resources and the problem-solving 
capability by which the product was honed and deployed to suit the business environment. 
Discussion earlier on highlighted the expressed success Delta bank made of this project.  
8.4 How managers balance between routine and better decision-making/strategy  
Findings show that organisational culture involving promoting creativity and innovation, 
flatter organisational structure and collegiate decisions making processes, employee 
empowerment, communication, negotiation and ability to convince other stakeholders were 
often leveraged on by managers to implement strategic change and effective actions. 
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8.4.1 Creativity and Innovation  
All managers interviewed in Delta claimed that their organisation is known for innovation; 
that it is the language they speak and the value they share. Therefore, it comes to them 
naturally that the organisation is open to ideas from employees across different levels even as 
they all are encouraged to be creative and to think of innovation as fundamental to the 
organisation focus on superior customer service. As one of the senior managers explained:  
“…we promote creativity and innovation. It can come from the down, it can come from the 
top; it can come from the middle. So, I would say …collective idea from across the 
organisation looking at the key stakeholders in managing that customer experience” 
[DSM3].  
 This means that in as much as anyone can be seen as offering good ideas, acceptable to the 
important stakeholders e.g. the executive management, the board, and regulators, and 
ultimately would contribute to good customer experience, a change in existing norms can be 
allowed. Therefore, one can also think of DMC as comprising being creative.      
8.4.2 Negotiation, communication and ability to convince stakeholders 
Another aspect revealed by the study as differently expressed by managers interviewed 
relates to using communication, negotiation, engagement, stakeholder management, and 
convincing presentations as tools for influencing strategic change. The following comments 
confirm this: 
“It’s all about negotiation at the echelon and in order for you to get people to see your point 
of view about the way to go; you have to be absolute in your delivery to ensure that your 
terms are not confusing” [DSM1].  
“I think really …the primary thing for everybody is what is in it for me …you know people 
once they understand what you are trying to achieve. …Then in terms of ensuring that you 
communicate appropriately. Maybe breaking things down so that people have a good 
understanding. But I think if people at the end of the day understand what you are trying to 
achieve and understand that it aligns with the overall objectives of the organisation, 
then …they may buy into it. So sometimes you need to do a lot of engagement, stakeholder 
management to sell that idea, so that needs to come to play” [DSM3].  
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8.4.4 Flatter organisational structure and collegiate system 
Discussion in the section 8.3.3 already marked flatter organisational structure as relevant to 
DMC. Findings in the case of Delta also show particularly that implementing flatter 
organisational structure and “collegiate system” are relevant to finding a balance between 
established organisational routines and manager’s proclivity for strategic change. Related to 
8.6.2 above, participants in the study expressed that that facilitates freedom of expression 
with idea/project initiator not having to think of being embarrassed or intimidated even if the 
idea would not be allowed. It also enables greater involvement, participatory and more 
convincing decision-making.  As DSM4 and DSM3 confirmed: 
To a reasonable extent, the way we set up the bank like I said it’s a flat structure, it’s a very 
flat structure whereby your voice is heard and whatever you have in mind is discussed. There 
is no one person that can shout you down or say no to you. …It’s something close to a 
collegiate system in taking some decisions and you can push the bandwidth, the points … 
your case … yes, this guy really-really want this thing and we’ll all look at it and by the time 
you are saying yes or no to it, you will be convinced that the best decision has been taken at 
that time [DSM4]. 
“…a lot of the time we operate from a team type of structure depending on what we want to 
achieve; and then we say okay, how can we drive that agenda?” [DSM3]. 
8.6.5 Enabling environment Trust and Spirit of Leadership  
Concepts such as trust, and spirit of leadership were used by managers interviewed to talk 
about the atmosphere in the environment in which managers are meant to feel well-assured of 
their capability and personal responsibility to anchor relevant projects and to make 
appropriate judgment based on their professional development, and support available to them. 
DSM3 summarised as follows:  “We have a very enabling environment that guarantees trust; 
that really promotes that spirit of leadership in everything that you do. I think bureaucracy is 
also non-existent, there is no perfect system, so I won’t say non-existent – I will say almost 
not. And there is this high-sense of ownership. You just feel like it is my business; am running 
my own business” [DSM3].  
It thus became clear from this view that with less bureaucracy and enabling environment 
available, managers are confident to quickly respond to opportunities, taking personal 
responsibility as exemplified in the earlier cited comment by DSM1“I am …partnering with 
software developers (Fintechs) to create services for our customers.                
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                                                      Chapter Nine 
                                              The Case of Ebonyi  
9.1 Profile of Ebonyi Bank 
Due to space, a brief profile of Ebonyi is contained in Appendix 3. Analysis of data thus 
continues in the next section with attention on the first objective of the research: to determine 
the environmental challenges faced by managers in Ebonyi in relation to DMC deployment. 
9.2 The Nigerian Business Environment 
Table 9.1 below presents a summary of key findings about what was summarised as 
“macroeconomic, regulatory and market-specific challenges faced by the Nigerian banking 
industry” [PR, 2015] in the case of Ebonyi.  
Table 9. 1 Themes related to Environment in Ebonyi’s Case. 
Focal 
Inquiry  
 
Emerging themes/concepts Classification  Implications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business 
Environment 
Economic 
uncertainties/downturn – Drop 
in the price of crude oil with 
effects on e.g. GDP,  FOREX, 
inflation, liquidity and  interest 
rate, low household 
demands/spending  
 
Regulation – e.g. - TSA 
- tightening monetary policies 
Lack of organised risk 
identification strategy/supporting  
institutions 
Inconsistent government policies  
Systemic problem 
 
Sociocultural challenges:  
- People’s behaviour and 
lifestyle  
- Evolving customers’ needs  
Uncertainties and 
challenging business 
environment   
Heightened risk of 
lending  
Increasing NPLs 
Reduction in deposit 
base 
 
 
Nigeria’s population   
Over 150 million people 
 
Technology 
Agriculture and other real sector 
FGN new diversification policy 
Business opportunities  Opportunity to 
harness retail/SMEs 
segment 
 
Leverage on  
technology 
advancements  
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As with other cases examined, the challenges mainly emphasised about include industry 
regulations and economic downturn due to the drop in the commodity price of crude oil that 
began in 2014 and its resulting effects on the banking industry. Data also highlights the 
challenges to include lack of organised risks identification institutions, inconsistent 
government policies, and systemic problems. 
9.2.1 Economic Factors/downturn in the oil & gas sector 
One significant challenge in the case of Ebonyi was about the state of the nation’s economy 
and its implication for the banking industry. The picture given of the country implies that it is 
a highly uncertain business environment:  As evident in the comments below:  
 “…ours is a spongier economy – you have a lot of room for improvements; the physical 
inconsistencies, they are not working in isolation. We are working in an economy that is 
highly uncertain, policy inconsistency” [ESM1]. 
 “The economy is not a good one so to speak; … we have been in recession, it has been a big 
problem” [EMM2].  
 “The challenge that we face is not the fault of any specific actor…The prices naturally 
fluctuate and at some point, they will peak and then fall. The way that markets react is what 
really matters. Naturally, it is bound to affect us, and the price of crude oil has dropped from 
over $100 per barrel, to on average $55, a decline of about 50%” [CEO in an interview with 
TBY]. 
While the above comments all confirm the economy as being challenging and have had 
negative impacts on Ebonyi’s business as with other banks in the industry.  The CEO in that 
interview (with TBY) posits that the challenge should not be considered as that that was 
caused by any particular sector as it was more related to the consequences of neglect of other 
real sectors hitherto. However, the CEO believes that it is how players in the industry reacted 
that is crucial. That implies that regardless of whatever, the onus lies with the management to 
ensure that appropriate decisions/response.  
9.2.2 Regulation/Policy Inconsistencies   
Although that challenges from changes in industry regulations were among the most referred 
concepts in the case of Ebonyi, the opinions expressed by the managers appeared mixed. As 
the following comments indicate: 
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“…things like COT that we normally charge our customers have been cancelled by the CBN 
completely and now introduced what is called maintenance fee which is like 1% where we 
normally charge 5%. So the income lines have also been sealed up which is also a major 
challenge” [EMM3]. 
“Before now, we actually have something I call a boom; let me say boom because before the 
era of the TSA … we had so-much funds with us to trade with. So with the announcement of 
the TSA …that now poses a big challenge on banks and the need to source for more funds 
because if you want to retain your level or maintain your position, you need to really fight 
and work harder. So that really brought a big challenge to us, all of us” [EMM2]. 
 However, a senior manager of Ebonyi interviewed in the study, and the CEO of Ebonyi 
based on media interview accessed by this study both shared a different perspective in 
relation to changes in regulation and CBN monetary policies. While admitting that the 
policies generally became more ‘stringent’ or ‘tighter’, they both believe that they are steps in 
the right direction by the regulatory body (the CBN) and particularly necessary for a healthier 
banking system. Their positions also imply that the CBN monetary policies are rather 
partnering commercial banks to become more stable in terms of income lines, prudence in 
lending, better supervision and protecting the system from unforeseen negative events. The 
following comments bear these perspectives:   
“…the CBN has determined that no bank will fail, so that has also reflected in their level of 
supervision. They are being stringent in their regulatory scope now, they are partners in 
progress unlike it used to be. They are more involved and I think together with the banks, we 
are achieving results; I think Nigerian banks are stable and they are okay. …And even from 
the regulatory point of view, there are limits, there are threshold that has been set. Take for 
instance you cannot do more than a percentage in a particular sector. And to manage 
concentration too, you cannot lend more than a particular percentage to a single obligor.  
So, these are things that have been put in place to really guide and protect the system from 
unforeseen events that are catastrophic in nature” [ESM1].  
“I am not opposed to the Forex restrictions…The CBN has taken a step in the right direction, 
and they have the backing of the entire banking industry. If we look inwards, we can actually 
conserve a lot of foreign exchange, and we can employ more people who are going to go 
back into agriculture. We cannot continue to import endlessly. It is really important to make 
the distinction,” [the CEO in an interview with TBY].  
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Note that the CEO response was with regards to the CBN policy change in relation to foreign 
exchange. This regulatory policy, however, was partly a response of the CBN to the pressure 
on FOREX following the drop in the commodity prices of crude oil. So, these issues are 
interlinked and the opinions of mangers regarding their effect on the economy are next.  
9.2.3 Lack of risk identification strategy/Institutions  
Another significant challenge identified in the dataset was the lack of supporting institutions 
to assist with the risk identification strategy for banks. This can be considered as part of what 
the press release statement of the bank cited above in 9.2 consider as “market-specific 
challenge”. Ebonyi managers expressed frustration with the lack of institutional framework in 
place to aid risk management in the country’s banking sector. As explained by one of the 
senior managers, that: 
“Unlike the developed climes, you know the business of banking is entrenched on risk-taking. 
You take from area of surplus to the area of need. You are just serving as an intermediary 
and this intermediary is entrenched with many risks. You collect depositors/fixtures money, 
you lend out in terms of you create risks assets. Unlike developed climes where you have very 
organised identification strategy, where you have a unique number that is unique to an 
individual, but here because it is an emerging economy, to identify risk is a challenge; to 
really know the right person you are dealing with, the right borrower is a challenge” 
[ESM1].  
The managers’ frustration was observed. It is often a source of pressure on managers in the 
Nigerian banking sector and for them as a bank. Managers tend to be helpless yet the primary 
responsibility of a bank remains that of creating risk assets. Consequently, the decision 
making and cognitive capabilities of the management are often called into action much more 
than what banking should be as in the developed economies, else, competitive survival and 
profitability would be unlikely.    
9.2.4 Sociocultural problems/systemic Issues  
A related factor to the lack of institutional support discussed above was what one of the 
managers in an interview described as ‘systemic thing’. Thought was given to the context in 
which the issue talked about by the researcher while reading through the transcript over and 
again and it was believed that the manager was alluding to the sociocultural problems in 
terms of lack of trust, lifestyle or negative behaviour of some individuals. As the manager 
explained:  
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“…if you give loan to somebody, instead of him to go and use it for what it is meant for, the 
person will go and marry another wife; …change his TV from 21 inch screen to 75 inch 
screen TV, at the end of the day, the money has not been used for the purpose for which it 
was taken and then the repayment now becomes a problem. It is a systemic thing.” [EMM3].  
It suggests that with available organised risk identification strategy as alluded to by ESM1, 
managers would have less challenge with decisions-making in creating quality risk assets.  
In sum, it implies that the Nigeria business environment presented tighter regulation and 
macroeconomic, sociocultural and market-specific challenges for Ebonyi between 2014 and 
2016. The consequences of the challenges were said to have affected the risk asset quality 
and achievable profits of many banks in the industry, including Ebonyi. Table 9.2 below 
presents a summary of the key performance highlights of Ebonyi between 2014 and 2016 in 
order to support the analysis of findings in this case study. 
Table 9. 2 KPH in Ebonyi's Case between 2014 and 2016 
For the Year ended 
December 
2014 2015 2016 +/- % 
Gross Earning  
 
403.3b 432.5b  507.9b 17.4% 
Profit Before Tax (PBT) 
 
119.7b 125.6b 156.7b 24.8% 
Customer’s Deposit 
 
2.53T 2.55T 2.98T 16.6% 
Loans and advances  
 
1.75T 2.03T 2.36T 16.2% 
Non-Performing Loans (NPL) 
 
1.75% 2.18% 3.02% 38.5% 
Total Asset  
 
3.755T  4.007T 4.739T 18.3% 
 
From the above table, it can be observed that despite the challenging business environment, 
Ebonyi compared with other cases examined by this study maintained impressive 
performance in terms of profitability, customer’s deposit, gross earnings, and total equity. 
While the NPLs, on the contrary, indicates a negative trend; compared to competitors in the 
industry including the other case studies explored by this study, and based on the increase in 
loans and advances created by the bank, the percentage ratio still represents one of the best 
under the tough environmental conditions discussed above. The succeeding section focuses 
on the management’s strategic responses in relation to those environmental challenges.  
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9.3 Strategic Response/ Management Actions  
The strategic responses/actions of managers in Ebonyi are presented in table 9.3 below.  
Table 9. 3 Themes/concepts related to DMC in Ebonyi's Case 
Themes/concepts  
 
Categorisation 
Benchmarking operation with international best practices 
Aiming to always be the best                                                    
customer acquisition approach and service                                               
Vision and reputation building 
Customer-centric and quality service as hallmark 
Innovation as core in product, process/customer service                        
Giving attention to details 
Innovation/Excellent customer 
service 
Modified/extended business model to cater for personal 
banking and SMEs segments to enhance client base and 
revenue through retail, value chain, financial inclusion and 
agency banking                                                                                       
Adapted in a cautious manner 
Increasing market share via 
innovative business model 
Opened new branch in Dubai Geographical/International 
expansion 
Automation processes                                                                            
seeking cheap deposits,                                                    
Reduction in cost of borrowing 
Cost Control Initiatives 
Contingency funding planning test                                        
Threat testing, scenario analysis,                                       
information seeking,                                                                
managing NPL 
Robust/Proactive Risk management 
Upgraded core banking application;                                    
Promoting online banking                                                                            
Additional units of POS, ATMs, systems  
Investing in Technology, Business 
Systems/Application Upgrade 
 Top-notch workforce entry-level – minimum of first 
degree with 2:1 – seamless in training                                   
Adequately and consistently trained staff                                        
Having motivated workforce                                            
Employees having a  sense of premium placed on them 
Quality/Committed/Motivated 
Workforce Culture 
Source: interviews, press releases by firm website 2014 to 2016; media interviews  
 
9.3.2 Innovation and Excellent Customer service  
 In Ebonyi, managers talked about innovation and superior customer service as what has 
enabled them to maintain leading positions in terms of capital base, market share, and 
profitability despite the recent challenges they faced. Managers’ claim doubled their effort in 
looking to improve in terms of their processes, products offering, and quality customer 
service, the CEO commented as follows: 
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“It all boils down to innovation. At [Ebony bank], we try to look at how to do things better, 
and differently. The bottom line is, understanding how to connect with our customers and add 
value to their business. We have seen that, over time. Once a customer believes that there are 
values derived from our business they will come to us. Our improvements in profitability 
between the previous and the current year boil down to what we have been able to do with 
our customers. Besides this, we have also gained market share because of the quality of our 
service” [CEO interview with TBY, 2016]. One of the senior managers also confirmed: 
“…we try as much as possible to surpass our customers’ expectations in terms of customers’ 
service delivery. Things that people will overlook, we try to give that service that will 
guarantee another visit. So, these are strategies that have worked for us over the years and 
we are not relenting; we are building on it, coming up with newer strategies that at least will 
make us competitive in the space of banking services in Nigeria” [ESM1]. Probed further, 
ESM1 explained as follows:  
“…it is a culture of the bank we are always the best. So, when you have that at the back of 
your mind, you can’t settle for less. That is the hallmark of the institution I work for”. 
In the above comments, the CEO was responding to how the organisation achieved 17% year 
on year profit in 2015 at a time some other competitors reported profit decline and fighting 
for survival. The response highlights innovation central in the organisation’s success. ESM1 
also supported this view by talking about how they are building and coming up with new 
things. But according to ESM1, the ability to consistently innovate and maintain a culture of 
being always the best is traceable to the management’s ‘mindset’ to not settle for less and 
which employees are meant to develop and deploy. It is thus notable that this view is relevant 
to the concept of cognition and DMC discussed in chapter three of this thesis.    
9.3.3 Increasing Market share via innovative business model  
Data show that until recently, Ebonyi in line with its stated vision has core interest in 
corporate, public sector and personal banking operations, especially in the Nigerian space. 
The success of the bank is strongly attributed to the customer base of the bank in the 
corporate banking segment as the CEO declared “Our success is largely a product of our 
client-base. We have the largest number of multinationals as customers, and that is a major 
endorsement for the brand and for the bank. “…we have a greater number of multinational 
clients than any other bank in Nigeria” [CEO interview with TBY, 2016].  
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In fact, when referring to their customer base, a statement on the organisation’s website at the 
time of this study still reads “the bank’s customer base comprises mainly corporate entities”. 
This meant that despite the recent environmental challenges, and while acceptably altering 
their business model to play in the retail banking segment, corporate banking remains for 
them their core model. As one of the senior managers interviewed explained: 
“Before now we don’t use to be a retail banking fit like that …But of late, we just believed 
that okay there is a need for us to cautiously come down the ladder. Mark my word 
‘cautiously’ come down the ladder, strategically come down the ladder so that at least we 
can also meet our customers' needs at that segment of the market. So we have our own 
strategy and it is working for us” [ESM1].  
Ebonyi CEO also shared the above notion albeit succinct as he explained: 
“From a banking perspective, we mirror the economy. When the economy is under pressure, 
it resonates in the financial system. We are committed to looking at innovative ways to gain 
even more market share” [CEO interview with TBY, 2016]. 
It is clear from the above that the management made a shift mainly to play in the retail market 
but would play on it like others. There remains focused more on the corporate banking 
business model as reflective in the senior manager’s comment that they are “cautiously 
coming down the ladder”. In contrast to the perspective shared in other banks explored by 
this study, it also means that managers in the organisation previously perceived the retail 
banking segment as a more risky segment compared to corporate banking hence, their 
concentration in the corporate segment. Therefore, the consideration to play in the retail 
segment was a recent strategic choice as the public sector banking has seemingly become 
hampered from the regulation standpoint and the corporate banking segment challenged as 
well due to the economic downturn earlier explained.  
Consistent with this reasoning shared by the CEO about “innovative way to gain even more 
market share”, this study also identified that ‘SME banking’ has now become a new addition 
to the focal business segment of the bank as evident on the bank’s website. The concept of 
financial inclusion and value chain discussed below elucidates on this.  
Financial inclusion was an initiative of the CBN which encourages banks to promote and help 
to develop the country’s economy by lending to especially SMEs in real sectors of the 
economy e.g. Agriculture, often neglected by banks while giving more concentration sectors 
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considered more lucrative sectors like the oil and gas. As alluded to by the CEO, Ebonyi 
notably has adopted this business strategy to grow her market share by focusing on creating 
risk assets from SMEs. That implies deriving income from the value chain of corporate firms 
much of which is already being serviced by the bank.  
In the data, the concept was also used to reflect banking the unbanked – another term widely 
used even in other cases explored. The unbanked are individuals that do not even have a bank 
account while the under-banked refer to individuals/micro-businesses who may have bank 
accounts but not hitherto given adequate attention in terms of products and services e.g. 
pensioners, farmers and women entrepreneurs. Most of these people are in rural areas. In all, 
admittedly, albeit cautious, Ebonyi modified their business strategy and embarked on 
mopping up deposits from those earlier neglected sectors and in turn growing their capital 
base in the short to medium term. As evident in the following comments: 
“…we sat down and …said what was it that these guys (competitors) are doing that we are 
not doing. And one of the major things was to make sure that we take the banking down to the 
grassroots to make sure that everybody maintains an account so that even if it is 1000. 
Before, I mean some 10 to 15 years ago, for instance, my organisation will not open a 
savings account with you if you do not have one million naira as the initial deposit. After 
some time it was brought down to N500,000, after some time it was brought down to 
N300,000 naira, after sometime N100,000, after sometime N50,000 but as of today as I am 
talking to you, you can open an account with zero balance and fund it later.  … So, those are 
some of the strategies we are doing to make sure that everybody is now in our book. Okay, 
one-one thousand naira everywhere, we believe that one-one thousand from everybody is 
better than one million from only 30 people; that’s part of the strategies that we introduced 
so as to continue to maintain a lead; have a clear cut leadership position – those are the 
things we are doing” [EMM3].  
“If you look at all the other banks, you see that we need innovation to gain adequate 
coverage. We were one of the first banks to launch mobile money. We are investing in this 
area because we believe the benefits will come quickly and help in terms of enhancing the 
payment system. One of the ways in which we promote financial inclusion is by leveraging 
agency banking which offers banking services to villages. …We have over 400 locations but 
in a country as big as Nigeria with a population of over 150 million people that is not 
sufficient,” [CEO interview with TBY, 2015]. 
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From the above, it can be noted that a shift in the management’s mindset influenced the 
decision of the organisation play in the retail/SME banking segment and agency banking 
model. The reasoning is first on the basis of competition, secondly, to mobilise more deposits 
(to increase their financial asset) through new customers acquisition and third, to enable them 
to sustain industry leadership. It was found that the impact of this change of mindset was 
evident not only on modifying the business model of the organisation but also on the 
immediate/short-term contribution it has made to Ebonyi’s balance sheet. As declared by the 
management in a press statement: 
“The impressive growth of non-interest income is primarily attributable to the banks … retail 
drive and derivatives income. The increased focus on the retail drive resulted in a 46% Y-o-Y 
growth in savings deposits” [Ebonyi’s press release statement, December 2016].   
9.3.4 Technology, Business Systems, and Application Upgrade 
Another way Ebonyi, is responding is by investment in technology. However, deploying 
innovative technology in relation to its banking operation predates the year 2000 when the IT 
infrastructure in Nigeria was still at its low state. The management has continued to invest in 
IT, which in their view is not because of the recent challenge in the business environment but 
because it has been a core interest of the management from the start. The following 
comments support this:  
“At [Ebonyi], we are deeply interested in technology. Prior to 2000, teledensity in Nigeria 
was less than 1 million, while today, it is at around 100 million. Aware of this infrastructure 
deficiency at the time, we established the necessary services to enable us to provide a 
telecommunications network for all of our branches. This helped in terms of our real-time 
banking at that time. And if we were able to accomplish that then, you can imagine what we 
can do now” [CEO in an interview with TBY in 2016].  
 
“Presently, we are implementing a core banking software. It was because we felt …there is a 
need for us to move from where we were, to a higher level in meeting number one; 
customers’ need, and also meeting the need of a bank of our size. So, that is one major 
decision that has really cut across all the segment of the bank – changing our core banking 
application to a higher version, to something that is more robust than we have been using 
before” [ESM1]. 
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In relation to the decision to implement the core banking software, when probed further on 
how the decision was made, the management responsibility of having to buy-in a number of 
stakeholders who needed to share their idea or believe first on the need for the technology 
itself and secondly, the timing of the project given the huge investment required. The 
rationale for the project was further explained: 
“If you check globally now, it is not limited to Nigeria. The incidence of cyber-attacks or 
risks is on the increase. To mitigate this we need to invest heavily in IT. So, the reason why 
we have decided to do some of this project is that we need to promptly respond to this. So, 
you need to build firewalls, you need to get formidable gateways, so that is just that. You call 
yourself an international bank and you cannot attend to a customer even beyond your shore – 
it is a problem. The bank can go down. Or if they seize your system you need to be paying a 
certain amount to be able to have access. So these are critical factors that warrant prompt 
immediate response” [ESM1].  
The management in a press release statement, in terms of numbers, also confirmed this 
importance of the investment in IT as follows: 
“…In spite of the macroeconomic, regulatory and market-specific challenges faced by the 
Nigerian banking industry. Driven by our innovative processes, cutting edge technology and 
committed staff, the group recorded total revenue of N432.5 billion which represents a 7.2% 
increase over the same period last year. The group also recorded an increase of 4.9% (YoY) 
in Profit Before Tax (PBT) to N125.6 billion from N119.7 billion” [Bank’s Press release 
statement, 31 December 2015]. Note that central to the three drivers of the organisation’s 
profitability as declared was about technology deployment. 
In all, the bank has been using those bespoke schemes to create value for the bank by having 
both the manufacturer and the SMEs/distributors in their book. Access to credit line also 
entails that the bank derives profits from the scheme and the quality of the product implies 
that the bank would continue to enjoy the customers’ loyalty over time.  
9.3.5 Quality and Motivated Workforce Culture 
The quality of the workforce was found in the dataset as a significant aspect of Ebonyi's 
strategy for its achievement in the industry. The management of the organisation strongly 
believes that as an organisation seeking to build an international brand and reputation that the 
quality of her workforce remains critical. Consideration entails that their quality employees 
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based on intellect, creativity, and knowledge would consistently be the key driver of 
innovative products and improved customer services with which it can maintain competitive 
leadership in any market they play in. Evidence obtained in the study entails that the 
management believes that the importance and value the organisation places on the quality of 
its workforce should start first with the entry-level qualification, then training and motivation. 
One of the senior managers interviewed by this study best articulated on the organisation’s 
shared beliefs in relation to their workforce (people) as he commented:    
“From the peoples’ point of view, there are banks in this same economy that do not use the 
quality of staff that we use. Fine, it is coming at a cost but you cannot express the value 
addition in monetary terms alone. The quality of our workforce, as I told you, you can’t work 
in where I work and have less than a first degree. But there are institutions that will employ 
something lower than that. But it is also a business strategy for us to say, let us go for the 
top-notch workforce. In a way, all these things would dovetail to quality service delivery 
which would always endear our customers to us” [ESM1]. 
“…when you have the right workforce, training will not be an issue. Training will be 
seamless. So, these are factors that would guarantee the success of any business venture like 
that of core banking application implementation even at this time” [ESM1]. 
“We try as much as possible to evaluate our performance management to the extent that 
motivation is key. You know that when your workforce is motivated they give more. So that is 
also a critical part of our business strategy. We look at what is obtainable; what is happening 
in our environment, we respond to it promptly so that our workforce can be motivated to 
work optimally” [ESM1]. Based on qualification/selection, training, and motivation, there are 
also conscious efforts to ingrain into the spirit or subconscious of the workforce the culture of 
being the best and to know that they have that attribute. As explained by one senior manager: 
“Just say the attribute of being the best in anything you are doing. We have that attribute. It 
is a culture of the bank that we are always the best. So when we have that at the back of your 
mind, you can’t settle for less. That is just the hallmark of the institution I work for” [ESM1]. 
One of the middles managers interviewed by this study confirmed as follows: 
“…we give ourselves a high premium in the industry and I know it is working for us. 
Sometimes we are forced to compare notes and we ask what is happening in other banks and 
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see how they treat them and sincerely I will not be happy working in some of those banks. So, 
I think one of the major things is the sense of value that they give us” [EMM3].  
 Thus, based on this mind-set of being valued, and being regarded as the best, employees and 
managers alike are propelled to give nothing but their best in what they do, and that in turn 
dovetail to the level of performance the organisation desires.  
The above was also confirmed by the CEO in a press release statement announcing their 
successful result by attributing “the group’s sustained superior performance to highly 
motivated staff, state-of-the-art technology, and excellent customer services” [Source: 
organisation’s website].  
9.6 How managers balance between routine and better decision enabling change 
Findings show that knowledge and creativity, engagement/communication, and buying-in are 
some of the processes through which managers enabled DMC for decision making to 
implement strategic change.  
9.6.1 Convincing communication   
Managers talked about being creative to come up with factual and convincing propositions to 
necessitate strategic change or business decision change that would be accepted for 
implementation. As one of the business managers (in middle-level management) explained:  
“We follow it up and with facts and justifications that will make it sell” [EMM3].  
9.6.2 Communication and enabling environment for engagement  
Another significant concept relevant in the data was about engagement. Managers talked 
about having a flat structure of sort, an atmosphere that enables engagement, critical 
discussion and decisions are taken based on mutual understanding and collegial input. It often 
encourages people to come forward with their ideas. As two of the managers explained: 
“We go by flat structure, let me put it that way, and so is believed to be made equal such that 
you can express yourself; you are not afraid of one big Oga provided that what you have 
upstairs they know is not (…you know)” [EMM3].  
“We have committees for each strategic aspect of the bank. Like this one that I just talked 
about, that angle that we discussed was during our IT steering management committee 
meeting, we took a decision immediately, and that has been address” [ESM1].  
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                                     Chapter Ten 
                           Cross-Case Analysis and Synthesis of Findings  
10.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to compare and synthesise key findings from the five cases 
explored by this research. Analysis in the chapter reflects three broadly interrelated 
sections/questions, beginning with 10.2. That is the cross-case analysis of findings regarding 
the external business environment challenges, the identified challenges and triggers to DMC 
among the Nigerian banks explored. Analysis in section, 10.3 addresses the key findings 
about how managers responded to perceived challenges and opportunities in the external 
business environment. In particular, concentration is given to responses reflecting the 
management’s effort to create, modify or extend their organisation’s resource base or 
ordinary ways of earning their living, or put differently, asset orchestration as operationalised 
by Helfat et al (2007) and adopted by this study.  
 Furthermore, the chapter will synthesise perspectives about how the organisation and their 
managers find appropriate balance between existing routines and managers’ proclivity for 
process change (that reflects better decision making). Building on findings discussed in 
sections 10.2 and 10.3, analysis in section 10.4 concentrates on managerial cognitive 
capabilities aspect. To highlight inter-case similarities and contrasting views, and for 
parsimony, pseudonyms as earlier indicated in table 4.3 and applied in the within-case 
analysis (chapters 5 -9) have been used to attribute perspectives/findings to sources. Cross-
case analysis and discussion about the external business environment is next.  
10.2 Complex Business Environment and Resources Cognition 
Considerations regarding the external business environment dynamics are central in the DCV 
and DMC frameworks (Teece, 2007; Adner & Helfat, 2003). This also reflects the first 
objective of this research. In all five cases: Abia, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta and Ebonyi, it 
emerged from the managers' perspectives that they are facing what was differently referred to 
as extraordinary challenging, unpredictable and complex business environment compared to 
developed countries. In their opinion, the situation became exacerbated more recently due to 
events that characterised the Nigeria business environment and the banking industry since 
2014. Table 10.1 below synthesises the significant concepts/challenges and related tension 
identified from the data across all five cases in order to make the evidence more observable.    
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                                               Extraordinary Business Environment Challenges and Tensions 
 
Cases A-E Macroeconomic challenges   Regulation  Stiffened competition  
Abia ..” the oil price we sell has ripple effects on our 
foreign currencies, our exchange rate…”[ASM2] 
“…headline inflation reaching a double-digit 
high of 18.6 percent by December 2016”[CLS] 
“…an environment with economic uncertainty 
from the volatility of oil prices to the scarcity of 
FX” [ASM1]  
“…our major contributor of deposit …the federal 
government introduced the treasury single 
account [ASM2] 
“…TSA …adversely impacted liquidity 
increasing pressure on the asset side of the 
balance sheets of banks” [CLS, 2016].  
“Increasingly competitive deposit 
market” [CLS) 
“As a result of competition and the 
greater skill levels in the industry, we are 
likely to...” (CEO, TBY interview).  
 
Bayelsa 
“…income to the bank has gone down” [BSM7] 
“…tough operating environment for 
banking …with associated cost of doing 
business…” [CLS] 
At a point in time, the level of inflation in the 
country was about 17% - 18% …“…It’s an 
offshoot of what has been like a mono-economy” 
[BSM6].  
“…the new foreign exchange laws have not 
helped” [CEO, TBY interview] 
Over 4 trillion left the banking sector to CBN 
because of TSA” [BSM3].  
“We see increasing competition in the 
years ahead, particularly from 
technology-driven non-banking 
institutions” [CLS, 2015] 
 
Cross-River 
“…economy buffeted by a number of factors, 
largely due to the sharp drop in crude oil price 
[CLS] 
the exchange rate is affecting a lot of businesses 
today”[CRSM3] 
“…issues around capital adequacy is very-very 
key now” [CRSM3] 
liquidity…now is a big challenge because about 
N3trillion have been moved to the CBN in line 
with the policy of TSA [CRSM2] 
“…central to the industry is that it is 
highly competitive” [CRSM1] 
“…we tend to compete for the wallet-
share of the same set of 
customers…”[CRSM] 
 
Delta 
“The economy heavily tied to crude-oil, so as … 
the price of crude-oil crashes, a lot of things 
crashes …we saw a reduction in revenue 
- it’s been a tough environment” [DSM4]  
“…our regulators – if you look at the FX 
regime” [DSM4] 
“…today it is TSA, tomorrow it’s something 
else” [DSM1] 
“...we are now having to compete with 
Fintechs” [DSM3]. 
 
 
Ebonyi  
“…from a banking perspective, we mirror the 
economy” [CEO, TBY interview]. 
 
“…we have been in recession” [ESM2] 
“The announcement of TSA …now poses a big 
challenge” [EMM2] 
“…things like COT we normally charge our 
customers have been cancelled” [ESM3]. 
 
Table 10. 1 Extraordinary Business Environment Challenges and Tensions 
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As table 10.1 indicates, across the five cases investigated, six categories of the most 
commonly perceived environmental challenges include macroeconomic headwinds 
characterising what Cross-River-CEO described as a “buffeted economy”. This was mainly 
attributed to the decline in crude oil price which started in the last quarter in 2014. Linked 
and in addition to that are industry regulation issues. Other key challenges identified include 
sociocultural issues, government policies somersault, lack of institutional infrastructure, and 
stiffened competition. Of those six “external walls” (as Delta-SM4 called them), in all five 
cases too, managers’ gravest concerns include the poor economic situation, regulation shifts, 
stiffened competition. 
 10.2.1 Macroeconomic headwinds                                                                                                                
As evident in table 10.1, opinion by managers generally reflects sentiments about the poor 
state of the Nigerian economy at the time, noting especially that “it has been like a mono-
economy” [Bayelsa-SM6] due to its major dependence on revenue from crude oil sales. It 
meant that Nigeria’s economy booms and declines with the commodity price of crude oil in 
the international market. IMF's (2018) country report from an independent standpoint also 
acknowledged this by declaring that the most recent fall in crude oil prices coupled with 
inadequate policy response (next discussed), adversely affected the Nigerian economy. Figure 
11 below captures the trend since 1991 and indeed portrays that the drop in crude oil price 
from the last quarter in 2014 was historic for the nation’s economy and the GDP level.  
 
Figure 11 Drop of Oil. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database (www.imf.org).  
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Against this backdrop, perspectives generally expressed across all five cases suggest that the 
Nigerian banking industry often mirrors the state of the nation’s economy. This means that 
when the oil companies and Nigeria government are making huge revenue from crude oil 
sales, banking businesses and banks, as the financial intermediaries tend to flourish through 
huge deposits/revenue inflow and profits therefrom. On the other hand, when the oil 
companies and government revenue drops, the economy gets weakened and consequently, 
banking businesses tend to struggle and profits decline.  
Observation shows that the economic downturn since 2014 was less expected by the 
managers. In particular, the sharp drops in price seemed unexpected given the consistent 
boom in the preceding years to 2014 as figure 11 above indicates. Also, figure 12 below is 
illustrative of Nigeria’s GDP trend in five years from July 2013 to July 2016.  
 
Figure 12 Nigeria GDP trend 2013 – 2016 Source: tradingeconomics.com  
In figure 12 above, data shows that in July 2013, the country’s GDP, the largest economy in 
Africa with a growth rate of 8.99%, suddenly began to decline significantly and in fact 
nosedived to -9.88% by Q1 2014. IMF (2018) observed that effort by the country’s economic 
team to rescue the dwindling trend (at the time of this study) yielded only temporary 
palliatives or rather insufficient. The economy continued to fluctuate rapidly and by January 
2016 the GDP growth fell to its record low by -13.98%. As IMF already announced, it was 
then officially admitted by the Nigerian authorities that the country was in economic 
recession. (See: CBN communique no. 109 of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting of 
19-20 September 2016). So, at a GDP of -13.98% compared to 8.9% growth two years 
earlier, it can be understood why CEO-C described the Nigerian economy as “buffeted”. 
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The scenario painted above provided a key step towards understanding the nature and source 
of the challenges experienced in the economy.  As the revenue and foreign exchange earnings 
mostly from the oil and gas sector declined, managers in all five cases commonly expressed 
that that became a significant problem for them. It led to low liquidity, shortage of FOREX, 
poor asset quality in terms of rising NPLs and considerable pressure on achievable profits. 
The comparative effects of this problem on the balance sheet of the five organisation 
explored by this study are evident in table 10.2.  
Although differently affected in terms of performance level/measure, one of the key 
revelations by this study was about the extent in which the cognitive frame of managers can 
be individually and collectively influenced by the natural resources or factor endowment in a 
given country – to use Porter (1990) terms. Probes on why managers have concentrated more 
on the oil and gas sector given the negative impact of the drop in crude oil price as generally 
lamented was notably revealing about how environmental factors or conditions may affect 
managerial cognition (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). Indeed, the reality of 
these pervasive cognitive frames as linkable to strategic choices, actions or inactions by 
managers in the Nigerian banking industry is reflective in the following comments:                                                                
“…You know when I hear people say that our problem is over-dependence on oil and all 
that... There is no country in the world that is privileged to have oil that will not take 
advantage of the oil they have” [Cross-River-SM2].  
“…banks react to where it thinks that easy money can be made” [Delta-SM4].   
“…if your customer-base is predominantly players in the oil and gas sector …the strength of 
your balance sheet cannot be divorced from …the oil and gas sector…” [BSM2].  
“…you take what is before you first” [Ebonyi-MM4].   
“…there were always funds from government and all those big companies. But now that 
those funds are depleting, the business must go on and that is when you go back and you now 
sit and re-strategize – and you now think okay, where can we substitute these funds that are 
going from us?” (Abia-MM3) 
The above finding was somewhat unexpected by the researcher and is notably important for 
DMC and managerial cognition literature. Firstly, this is because there was surprisingly, a 
lack of significant distinction on managements’ perspective across all five cases investigated 
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regarding the concentration they had on inflow from crude oil sales. It revealed how the 
mental model and attention of mangers were strongly shaped and inadvertently constrained to 
the reliance on crude oil income sources perhaps because the crude deposit is natural in the 
country and would always be available as Ebonyi-MM4 comments suggests.  
There appeared to have such strong assurance of consistent windfall from the oil and gas 
sector and consequently commit little attention and opportunity search towards other real 
sectors with good income potentials. This reflects in Cross-River-SM2 comment above 
questioning the need for alternate attention on other sources but for the recent events and 
adverse experiences because it is natural to the country. It also shows that the oil money 
(income) was not only a matter of priority and focal attention but was even considered rightly 
so because the country is naturally blessed with that natural resource and leveraging from it 
should ordinarily be a priority. Secondly, with little anticipation of the event and little 
preparation for it, it also underlines the managements’ myopia, through ineffective cognition 
towards the country’s resources in relation to how organisations’ income base and structure 
became significantly confined to the boom or doom of one particular segment of the nation’s 
economy. This study considered this as a ‘natural resource trap’.  
However, the reality of this natural resource trap can be explained by the later realisation of 
the compelling need for change in managers’ cognition and firms’ strategy as further revealed 
by this research. This finding, therefore, signifies that there can be another dimension to the 
earlier theorisation by Danneels (2011), precisely, natural resources and de-facto financial 
resources. This thus leads this study to posit that natural resources available in an emerging 
economy context as uncovered by this study can have a significant moderating effect on 
managerial cognition in relation to DMC deployment and development. A related implication 
of this natural resource cognition was also exposed in relation to regulation. 
10.2.2 Regulatory Headwinds/Changes  
Regulations and periodic changes on them have always been synonymous with banking 
business not only in Nigeria but anywhere in the world. Historically, apart from the pre-1952 
era and prior to the 1958 CBN Act when banking operations in Nigeria had less formal 
governing legislation (Alford, 2010). In all five cases, the period 2014 to 2016 marked other 
years of regulatory changes acknowledged by the have significantly affected their banking 
business. While not entirely unpredicted as they already know the industry to be a highly 
regulated one, based on common sentiments shared across all five cases, the TSA aspect was 
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particularly unprecedented in the industry annals and hurtful. Other regulatory changes 
commonly highlighted in all cases were about monetary policies as related to cash ratio 
requirements, and new foreign exchange regime. 
For clarity, Treasury Single Account (TSA) policy was a policy directive of the CBN which 
required commercial banks to return all public sector deposits with them to the CBN by 15th 
September 2015. Appendix 9 is a copy of the CBN circular on TSA accessed by this study. 
As evident in the circular, all banks were required to comply with the directive within the 
stated date. A shared perspective in all cases entails that the implementation of this policy 
directive compounded the severity of the already “buffeted” economy and the liquidity 
challenges faced by banks. The following comment well-summarised views in all cases about 
what this new reality meant for them:  
“…regulatory policies such as the …TSA …adversely impacted liquidity, increasing pressure 
on the asset side of the balance sheets of banks. This led to strains in asset quality in the 
banking industry (Abia-CLS, 2016 annual report).  
The CBN regulation with respect to cash ratio requirement (CRR) and the new foreign 
exchange regime were both monetary policies by the CBN in attempt to cushion the effects of 
the crash in commodity price of crude oil on the economy and to defend the weakened naira 
against the backdrop of dip in foreign exchange and revenue inflow. Examples include: (a) 
increase in public sector CRR from 50% to 75% (b) increase in private sector CRR from 12% 
to 15% and later on to 20%; (c) removal of some import items from the Retail Dutch Auction 
System (RDAS) (d) devaluation of the Nigerian naira by 8.4% and (e) also an increase in the 
Monetary Policy Rate from 12% to 13% (Source: Bayelsa-2014 annual report). In this 
regards, the following comments by two CEOs well sums sentiments shared by the 
management in all cases, by suggesting that:   
“Several measures and policies were administered by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to 
alleviate currency pressures; notable of these was the restriction of access to foreign 
exchange to importers of selected items. Despite stabilization efforts by the government and 
regulators, economic prospects appeared challenging and investor bias remained bearish, 
thus translating to a subpar performance” (Source: Abia-CLS in 2015 annual report).  
Bayelsa CEO also confirmed: “…these developments had attendant impact on the banking 
sector liquidity, market and credit risk and operating cost” (Source: 2014 annual report).  
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Another key finding from the study was about the extent to which the five cases examined 
seem to have relied significantly on government deposits. Table 10.2 shows that in all but 
Ebonyi and Abia, TSA contributed significantly to declines in customers’ deposits compared 
to their results in 2014. In Delta's case, the decline was quite marginal as their deposit 
dropped from N1.618T in 2014 to N1.610T in 2015 but quickly bounced back beyond the 
figures in 2014 and 2015 respectively to N1.986T by 2016. Even in Abia and Ebonyi, despite 
their positive numbers, the managers admitted the effects of the TSA on customers’ deposits, 
on creating risk assets and profitability were significant. Probed further on why the banks 
tend to have had much focus on government deposits rather than the real sectors, given the 
negative impact of the TSA. The following comments further reflect managers’ perspectives:  
“…we are coming from an era where you hold government fund at zero and you lend it to 
government and probably 16/17% - you make free money.  And at times, you play the 
treasury because these funds stay with you idle, you throw them into treasury bills at 
16/17%.…why should I go and spend my money to fund the real sector when I can get it from 
government at zero, go to CBN buy treasury bills at 15-20% make a lot of margin? Or, give 
government loans, state governments; federal government; give them loans with their own 
money and you make a lot of spoils from it. So it’s been very easy, nobody will leave an easy 
way of banking to a difficult alternative. It is when the situation now became as it is now that 
we are now looking at all that” [BMM4].  
“…you don’t blame anybody, once you are awash with cash, the one-one naira doesn’t make 
sense to you …so if I can go to the ministry and get one billion, even though I will do small 
retail, but I won’t concentrate on it (ASM2). 
“…it is actually one of those scenarios we tested before it happened. …when we came up 
with the idea that we are going to test it, some people felt you are crazy, it is not possible, in 
this kind of environment! Do you want to snuff out the banks? But when the TSA came, they 
said you guys are too much (ESM1).  
In sum, the above comments show that Nigeria being a public-sector driven economy shaped 
managers’ cognition and affected the way the managers went about search and selection for 
financial resources. As explained by Bayelsa manager (BMM4), the ease of making huge 
profits with less investment from government funds over the years appears to have blurred 
the attention of their management and other banks to other real sectors of the economy. 
Expression by ASM1 and BSM4 also meant that in Abia, Bayelsa and as confirmed by 
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managers in Cross-River, Delta and Ebonyi as well, the government fund was always there 
and good enough to think that going after (or searching for) what was referred as “one-one 
naira doesn’t make sense”. The funds are held by the banks confidently as de facto capital 
base and called upon to always meet their business responsibility at will. With such an age-
long practice, managers in the industry believed that government funds provided them a 
stable income/resource-base but again that consideration was faulty as the unprecedented 
TSA proved. This finding shows how DMC in the emerging economies can be negatively 
affected by incorrect cognition of government-funds that are always available to managers 
because the economy is more often public sector driven compared to developed economies.  
If measured (cautiously here) by the evidence represented in form of KPH in table 10.2, in 
terms of total asset base, the customer’s deposit, and PBT declared, it is notable that the 
impact of TSA was different across the cases investigated. While Bayelsa and Cross-River 
were most negatively affected, Abia, Delta, and Ebonyi seemed more resilient and better. In 
particular, Ebonyi provides an interesting case of the management’s proactive to prepare 
against such eventuality. Managers’ in the risk management team in thinking ahead suggested 
that the scenario be ‘stress-tested’, to the wider members of the bank, the question was to 
them, unthinkable. However, as ESM1 explained, stress-testing the organisation to some 
extent insulated them against the effect of TSA. This suggests that in some cases, 
organisation’s fared better depending on foresight and if proactive by the managers.  
10.2.3 Stiffened competition  
Another significantly expressed perspective across the five cases investigated entails that 
Nigerian banks are facing stiffened competition beyond the traditional banking rivalry they 
know. As evident in table 10.1 above, in the case of Cross-River, the narrative involve first 
that the industry “is highly competitive” [CRSM1]. In the industry, banks compete for the 
wallet-share of the same customer segments. The problems admittedly encountered in all five 
cases due to the TSA policy, and challenges in the oil and gas sector makes this apparent. 
However, competition has become more intensified in the industry in a new context 
characterised by the financial technology firms (Fintechs) who banks now rely on to provide 
products and services that would match the demographic needs, then, of course, the changing 
needs and perception of customers in terms of value creation. These findings resonate with 
Porter’s (1980; 2008) argument that forces outside a given industry often contribute to the 
nature of competition in the industry.  
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In this regard, managers across the cases investigated also believe that future profitability in 
the banking industry would continue to be threatened by Fintechs as technology innovations 
are taking a disruptive trend and blurring competition boundaries. The concerns as commonly 
shared across the five cases are as follows:  
“…if you look at our industry we are now having to compete with technology firms – with 
FINTECH; so, this is business that traditionally was ours in terms of even lending, you are 
having back-up just with an app to challenge…you know all sorts of things” [DSM3]. 
“I have shared with you how digital technologies have changed our competitive landscape. 
Digital technologies have dissolved the boundaries between industry sectors and Banking has 
not been spared from this disruption. Non-bank digital players could become as integral in 
the banking value chain as we are to our customers, and competition from these non-bank 
players could erode as much as one-third of traditional retail banking revenues in the coming 
years” (Source: [Delta] CLS; 2016 annual report). 
 
“We see increasing competition in the years ahead, particularly from technology-driven non-
banking institutions. The successful delivery of our business priorities over the next four 
years will ensure that we are strategically positioned to proactively respond to these events. 
This will correspondingly enable us to retain our position as Nigeria's leading retail 
franchise and deliver impressive value to our customers and shareholders (Bayelsa CEO in 
2015).  
 
Thus, in relation to the evolving competition, it can be argued that while being a significant 
challenge as identified, and an exercise of DMC by recognising this development, it is also 
obvious that that is not peculiar to the industry or the emerging economies. On a positive 
note, however, it was also observed that that has been one significant factor that has triggered 
opportunities search and investments in technological innovation and relevant partnerships 
with Fintechs in order to remain competitive. And indeed, together with other challenges 
highlighted, it appears that that may shape the way DMCs may be deployed in those 
organisations in the foreseeable future. It is particularly considered that the distinct triggers 
and a major surprise that dovetails to the some of the contributions that this study provide lies 
with the effects of the nation’s natural resources – precisely crude oil, and the public sector 
driven nature of Nigeria’s economy on managers’ cognition in the Nigerian banking industry. 
A brief summary below further explicate how these findings add to the previous theorisation. 
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Natural-resource and government-deposits related cognition 
This study argues that the finding discussed in section 10.2.1 and 10.2.2 can be related to 
Danneels (2011) concept of “resources cognition” and further allows this research to 
contribute to the knowledge of resource cognition as consisting of two other aspects omitted 
by the earlier development, namely: country’s natural resources and government-funds. 
According to Danneels (2011:21), resource cognition can be defined as the extent to which 
managers can understand their resources and the potential uses or fungibility. “Managerial 
resources cognition helps to explain which path firms do take or do not take”. The author 
observed that ineffective cognition of resources including its brand and customer 
understanding by the executives at Smith Corona contributed to the demise of the company. 
Danneels (2011) also called for further studies to explore the cognition of managers about 
their organisation’s important resources. The finding by this study responds to this call. 
This study share similar revelation by Danneels (2011) in two ways: (1) as with the case of 
Smith Corona, managers perception about crude oil inflow as a regular income-stream and 
government funds/deposits which are always available and used as de facto capital base were 
not only faulty` but also served as constraint to other opportunities that were ignored. (2) The 
cases explored by this study widely admitted to having been negatively affected albeit not 
equating the case of Smith Corona but as the KPH below show. However, aspects captured in 
this study are novel to past theorisation because both resources were never owned by those 
organisations’ but wrong cognition about them: crude-oil revenue and government deposits 
constrained the managers from searching and identifying opportunities closest to them. Thus, 
in the emerging economies context, the extent of deployment of DMC can be significantly 
dependent on managers’ cognition of the country’s natural resources, and government-fund.  
10.2.4 Key performance Highlights and Impacts of the Environmental Challenges  
Fundamentally, DMC as a direct analogy, type or subunit of dynamic capabilities (Adner & 
Helfat, 2003; Helfat et al, 2007; Teece, 2018) are conceptually linked to evolutionary fitness 
(Helfat et al, 2007), competitive survival and advantage in environments characterised by 
rapid changes such as the one investigated by this study (Teece et al, 1997). While scholars 
have persuasively argued that DC does not necessarily guarantee a competitive advantage 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). It also remains un-contradicted except for luck (Winter, 2003), 
that success consistently enjoyed by an organisation in a complex business environment like 
Nigerian can be attributed to the firm’s managers’ dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2017). 
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Table 10. 2 Cross-Case KPH in the Selected Cases  
  Table 10.2 Cross-case/comparative Performance Highlights of Selected Cases from 2014 to 2016 
Case 
study 
    Abia (N’billion) 
T = trillion naira 
  Bayelsa (N’billion) 
T = trillion naira 
Cross River (N’billion) 
T = trillion naira 
 Delta (N’billion) 
T = trillion naira 
   Ebonyi (N’billion) 
T = trillion naira 
Year 
ended 
2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
Gross 
Earning  
  245.4       337.4 381.3 208.4 217.1 212.4 148.6 152.5 176.3 278.5 301.9 414.2 403.4 432.5 507.9 
PBT 52.0b 75.0b 90.3b 28.1b 7.1b 5.0b 23.9b 7.78 16.3 116.4 120.7 165.1 119.7 125.6 156.7 
Customer   
Deposit  
1.454T 1.683T 2.089T 1.493T 1.23T 1.42T 733.7b 700.2b 657.6b 1.618T 1.610T 1.986T 2.537T 2.558T 2.984T 
Customer 
Base  
NA  7m NA 4.4m 5.5m 8.5m NA 3.5m NA NA NA 9.68m NA NA NA 
NP 2.2% 1.7% 2.1% NA NA NA 3.36% 4.15% 3.74% 3.15% 3.21% 3.66% 1.75% 2.18% 3.02% 
Total 
Asset 
2.104T 2.591T 3.484T 1.933T 1.750T 2.049T 1.169T 1.159T 1.172T 2.356T 2.524T 3.116T 3.755T 4.007T 4.740T 
Key/Indicators: 
Green – figures represented with green colour used to show increase/positive result on asset 
Amber – figures represented with amber colour used to show recovery from decline on asset 
Red – figures represented with red colour used to show the declines from the previous results 
Note that figures/numbers on the year 2014 in all cases were all shown in black to reflect a baseline and because KPH in all cases were positive 
by 2014. The decline in the prices of crude oil as mentioned started during the Q4, thus allowed them to all close the year relatively positive.
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Table 10.2 above synthesises the KPH of all five cases explored to show the effects of the 
environmental challenges in terms of financial assets, related tension and performance 
outcomes of the organisations through their strategic actions. But this study is also cautious in 
making “strong assertion about the links between actions and outcome” (Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2009).  As table 10.2 shows, four of the five cases maintained increases in gross 
earning between 2014 and 2016; only Bayelsa recorded a decline in her gross earning which 
dropped from N217.1b to N212.4 billion. The table also shows that only three out the five i.e. 
Abia, Delta and Ebonyi maintained growth in PBT over the studied period (2014 – 2016). 
Apart from that, Abia and Ebonyi maintained increasing growth in customer deposit, Delta 
had a marginal decline in 2015 but swiftly returned to an increasing trend by 2016 above their 
2014 and 2015 results. Bayelsa in 2015 also had a decline in customer deposit but began to 
show an increase in 2016 while Cross-River appears to have maintained a consistent decline. 
The generally shared perspectives in all five cases were claims of recent actions which led to 
increases in their customer base. However, the confirmatory figures were not available.  
All five cases experienced relative increases in non-performing loans (NPLs). However, 
when compared against risk-assets created and increases in total asset-base, apart from Cross-
River, and Bayelsa (NA), Abia, Delta, and Ebonyi all claim to have one of the lowest NPLs 
in the industry. From the table, it is notable that while Abia, Delta, and Ebonyi recorded 
consistent increases in total asset-base, Cross-River and Bayelsa had declines in 2015 but by 
2016 both firms recorded increases in total asset-base more than 2014 and 2015 respectively. 
In all five cases, interestingly, there were claims of having navigated or prospects of 
navigating through those environmental challenges. Typical comments include that of Abia 
CEO in annual-report 2016) that “Despite the challenging economy, 2016 was a year of 
progress for [Abia]. Many of the strategic choices we made over the years were validated 
when tested by the economic recession”. Bayelsa CEO in 2016 annual-report also claimed 
that: “Notwithstanding, it is in this phase of our corporate evolution that we are most 
conﬁdent in our medium-term strategy to steer your Bank [Bayelsa] through the turbulence 
in the operating environment…” Ebonyi CEO in 2016 PR similarly explained that “In spite 
of the macroeconomic, regulatory and market-specific challenges…Driven by our innovative 
processes, cutting edge technology and committed staff, the group recorded a total revenue 
of … which represents a 7.2% increase over the same period last year” In Delta, it was 
claimed that “…the quality of our past decisions enabled us to navigate the challenges that 
persisted in the business environment” (Delta CEO in PR, 2016). How? See table 10.3. 
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Table 10. 3 A Cross-Case Comparison of Perspectives about Strategic Change and DMC 
Concepts 
 
Abia Bayelsa Cross-River Delta Ebonyi 
Vision  To become Africa’s most 
respected bank via service, 
asset growth & sustainability 
Sustainability business culture 
central to vision – with triple 
bottom line as key imperative 
Mainstreamed into operation  
To become Nigeria’s 
fastest-growing retail bank 
To distinguish itself as a 
retail franchise of choice  
“…it was the idea of the 
board …let us categorise 
ourselves as a retail bank 
rather than international…” 
(DSM1) 
“To be the financial 
service group of African 
origin” (website)  
A leading retail presence 
as central to the stated 
vision  
“To create an African 
institution that can 
compete anywhere in the 
world in terms of good 
corporate governance, 
innovation and superior 
service” (Delta PR, 2017) 
Identified Africa market 
as untapped/an inspiration 
 
“To become the leading 
Nigerian, technology-
driven, global financial 
institution that provides a 
distinctive range of 
financial service” 
(website) 
 
Attention on 
Business Model 
Innovation 
Identified retail and value-
chain banking as growth 
opportunity and diversity 
Building a more diversified 
banking model with more 
focus on retail/ SMEs/VCM 
Continuing to strengthen 
corporate banking whilst 
develop the retail model 
Focusing on retail banking 
model both as bank’s niche 
opportunity for competitive 
survival, sustainable 
business and brand interest 
Attention purely on MSMEs 
and unbanked/under-
banked, financial inclusion, 
agency banking, and 
technology. Less interest in 
corporate banking  
Building a solid business 
model around retail and 
transaction banking:  
value-chain/SMEs focus  
Salary customers/people 
at the bottom of the 
pyramid   
Financial inclusion and  
agency banking       
de-emphasis on corporate  
Adapting business model 
to changing market 
variables  
Now diversifying with a 
focus on retail/SMEs and 
value-chain strategy 
Corporate banking to 
remain as core interest 
Increasing market share 
via innovative business 
model – retail/value chain 
‘Cautiously came down 
the ladder’ 
Success largely a product 
of client-base – having 
largest number of MNCs;  
Corporate to remain core  
Optimising/building 
a stronger financial 
base 
Capital raising initiative led to 
$400m Euro-bond; N41.7b 
via rights issuing in 2015 
Focus on new customers 
acquisition contributed 36% 
deposit by 2016 
Unlocking new revenue 
streams via retail/SMEs 
Focusing on building a 
healthier / diversified 
balance sheet 
Raised N50.4b via rights 
issuing by 2014 $147m FDI 
New customers acquisition 
led to 15% deposit growth 
to N1.42T by end of 2016   
Retail led-strategy deposits                           
N26.5 billion injected to 
balance sheet in 2016 via 
dollars saving culture 
over the past decade 
Growing revenue by 
accelerating customer 
acquisition and market 
share in retail banking  
Looking for other 
banking income (OBI) 
 
 
 
Looking at other streams 
of income 
Focused on getting 23 
million customers in the 
next 4/5 years 
Focused on gaining 
derivative income via 
support to SMEs and 
financial inclusion  
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Stronger Risk 
Management 
culture 
Has a disciplined/proactive 
approach in lending and risk 
selection 
Enhancing risk management 
via tempered risk appetite in 
some sectors e.g. oil & gas 
-Risk management integrated 
in every operation                      
Proactive risk management 
helped in avoiding exposures 
Adopting cautious lending 
and acceptable risk 
Averse to sectors largely 
dependent on FX 
Diversified banking model 
to reduce risk of NPLs 
Investing more on risk 
management infrastructure  
 
Focusing on low-risk 
customer segment: SMEs 
and retail/individuals  
Intensified recovery of 
NPLs 
Less lending to some 
sectors e.g. oil & gas and 
less capital intensive 
business more generally  
Developed stronger risk 
framework for disciplined 
and prudent approach to 
loans growth:  
Does not lend to people 
highly exposed to FX 
Diversifying portfolios 
Insists on strictly on  
cash-back dollar facility 
On-site investigation  
Has “a robust system that 
has been proven to be 
solid” [ESM1].  
Always peep into the 
future via stress testing & 
contingency funding plan  
Refuse credit line to some 
sectors; restructured loans 
proactively; Not allowing 
a post-mortem approach 
but proactive via seeking 
information and timely  
analysis of industry/trend 
 
Implementing Cost 
Control  
Eliminating non-value adding 
processes 
Automated processes  
Creating more pool of lower 
staff while reduce highly paid 
senior staff                         
Mobilising cheap deposits 
Focus on cost containment: 
low-cost/cheap deposits 
accounted for 86% of  2016 
customers’ deposit;                
-digital/online banking 
Automation processes e.g. 
15% target paperless    
Cut staff size from 4568 in 
2014 to 4245 by 2015 
Initiated a measured cost 
optimisation approach: 
Low/no interest deposits 
via individuals and SMEs 
Automated processes: 
ATMs and online 
banking 
Reduced low productive 
resources  
Enhancing cost-efficiency  
Promoting self-service 
and automation processes 
Customers’ on-boarding 
on digital platforms as 
quickly as possible  
Maintaining a sizable 
workforce 
Cost control initiatives 
embarked upon helped to 
achieved 8% reduction in 
cost to income by 2016 
Continuing focus on cost 
control via automation, 
waste elimination; cheap 
deposits via retail and 
financial inclusion 
 
  
Creating enabling 
governance 
structure and 
organisational 
culture   
Created business banking 
division to focus on exploring 
opportunities within banks’ 
corporate value-chain  
“Culture of diversity and 
collaboration of ideas” (CLS, 
2016) 
Environment that respects the 
contribution of employees 
Remodelled operating 
structure to allow for more 
responsiveness by reducing 
control hierarchy  
Created new divisions/roles 
e.g. retail banking; financial 
inclusion division, 
Implementing typically flat 
organisational structure to 
allow for a supportive 
business environment  
 
 
 
Restructured around 
business and operations 
and new heads appointed  
Created new divisions 
including retail banking 
and electronic banking  
Decentralised operation 
and authority for quicker 
decision-making  
Ensuring the organisation 
is run the way it should 
Promotes professionalism 
learning environment 
Created Innovation & 
Fintech Division  and 
realigned structure 
Organisation’s culture 
and a flat structure as key 
A culture of always being 
the best – does not settle 
for less 
 
Using a flat structure to 
encourage freedom of 
fear and self-expression  
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Innovative products 
customer-centric 
service culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Striving for leadership in 
customer service/products 
Culture of excellent customer 
service used as key 
differentiator to other 
competitors; Launched 
“Basement” in 2015 to 
leverage ideas from staff 
across groups  
 
Providing innovative/new 
products and banking 
solutions with targets on 
informal sector/SMEs  
Bespoke offerings  
Focusing more on superior 
customer service/experience  
Deeper customer relations 
Developed new products 
around the agrarian 
market  
Focusing on products that 
would suit retail/SMEs  
Pioneered instant account 
opening   
Improving customers’ 
experience via efficiency 
Transformed organisation 
to be all about creating 
value for customers   
Support retail customers 
with information/social  
Close relationship with 
customers, and ensuring 
they are happy are key 
goals “beyond banking” 
Both vision and success 
of the bank attributed  to 
“all about innovation and 
superior customer 
service” 
 
Investing in cutting-
edge innovative 
technology  
Building capacity to innovate 
via technology and digital 
banking 
In 2015, redesigned IT 
architecture to enhance 
availability and access 
Upgraded to FCUBS12  
Investments in technology 
and digital banking e.g. 
Upgraded core banking 
platform to FCUBS12 
Investing in new ATMs and 
POSs 
Developing banking apps 
Robust electronic 
banking platform; 755 
ATMs by 2016 up from 
245 in 2014 
13000 POS terminals by 
2016 up from 6300 in 
2014  
 
Investing in digital-tech 
infrastructure/upgrade 
e.g. USSD banking 
platform; intelligent 
ATMs; moving away 
from “bricks and mortar” 
banking – believes that 
future banking will be 
tech-driven/won digitally                
Social media presence  
 
Investing in cutting-edge 
technology 
Business systems and 
application upgraded to a 
higher version helping 
with risk management 
and efficient services 
delivery 
Human Capacity 
Building Quality 
workforce and 
Learning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employed and trained new 
commission-based staff to 
implement retail and VCM 
A focus on fresh, young and 
energetic staff – train them to  
become fit for purpose  
Reallocated human resources 
to align with enhanced 
technology to enable better 
customer service  
Realigned training, reward, 
and recognition to strategic 
imperative of Abia  
Transforming employee 
philosophy to align with 
retail/VCM strategy 
initiated in 2015; 
Recruited people from non-
banking background and 
integrated them with 
existing staff to help with 
creating innovative services  
Empowers employees via 
training and re-training; 
mentoring identified talents 
towards leadership roles 
Redesigned reward structure 
Staff reduced to cut cost    
Promoting diversity and 
staff motivation e.g. 
women 39% of executive 
management; 78% of 
vacancies filled internally  
Investing in training and 
continuous learning 
programmes including 
bringing in expatriates to 
teach/train employees on 
global best-practices or 
sending staff overseas 
“Our most important 
resources are human 
resources”.  
Hires/retain the best; 
provides robust entry 
programme and training 
A conscious effort to 
grow own people /talents 
by employ fresh 
graduates and embed 
them with Delta’s core 
values  
Promotes self-learning; 
strong focus on 
succession planning and 
motivation 
 
 
Quality workforce as a 
key priority and critical 
aspect of the bank’s 
strategy.  
Recruitment/selection are 
strategic – minimum of 
first degree 
Employees meant to 
believe they are the best 
and cannot settle for less 
Have a high sense of 
value  
Always ensuring that the 
workforce is motivated  
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Strategic 
Partnership and 
Collaboration  
Established partnerships with 
commission agents to drive 
retail; collaborating with 
Telcos and Fintechs to 
provide digital banking 
solutions and develop new 
products;  
engaging staff to bring on 
innovative ideas via 
“Basement” ideas lab 
 
 
Using mobile networks and 
commissioned agents for 
wider/quicker customers 
reach and efficient service  
Partnering with Fintech to 
create new products/service 
Collaboration with staff and 
customers for innovative 
ideas    
On-going collaboration 
with Interswitch and IBM 
 
Nigeria Telcos used to 
support Apps and online 
banking 
Agents used for retail 
transactions 
 
Actively seeking and 
partnering with Fintechs 
and Telcos; downstream 
retailers e.g. .service 
station and retail agents 
Seeking deeper relations 
with customer to aid co-
creation via feedback 
Collaborating with 
Fintechs to co-create and 
deliver SME banking  
International 
expansion and 
diversification  
Having a strong continental 
presence in six African 
counties, and the UK in 
Europe. 
“Hopes to add one or two 
more locations but Nigeria 
represents greatest 
opportunity in the continent” 
(CEO) 
First to establish 
international banking 
operations in West-Africa 
countries including Ivory 
Coast, Republic of Benin, 
Senegal, and Togo  
Established UK branch 
operation in 2013 
Licensed deposit-taking  
banking operation in the 
UK 
UK operation broke-even 
within its 2nd year  
Also pursuing a variation 
of permission to become 
a retail-deposit taker   
Locally diversified into 
pension funds 
administration  
Established microfinance 
subsidiary to drive retail 
 
Having Africa inspiration 
and no more a Nigerian 
bank; Expanded banking 
operations recently to 
Kenya, Uganda, and 
Rwanda in 2015 
International operation in 
ten African countries and 
one country in Europe – 
the UK 
Established new 
international branch 
operation in Dubai in 
2016 
International branch 
operations in four other 
countries including UK, 
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10.3 Cultural Innovations, Capacity Building, and Attention Diversity 
As the above table shows, significant evidence emerged to show that in all five cases 
investigated, activities reflecting the description of cultural innovation, capacity building, and 
DMC which are largely enabled by attention diversity of managers were being implemented 
not only as a direct response to the environmental challenges but as needful actions for 
maintaining competitive survival and distinction. Table 10.3 provides representative cross-
case evidence of DMC while figure 13 at the end of the chapter draws them together by 
showing the pattern of coding to arrive at categories/themes. The analysis of findings is next. 
10.3.1 Attention to business model modification and innovation 
As evident in table 10.3 above, in all five cases, innovation around the organisations’ 
business model became crucial in the face of the recent environmental challenges. Teece 
(2018) defines a business model as the architecture of how an organisation creates and 
delivers value to its customers and the mechanisms used to gain its share of that value. In all 
five cases, this study found that the utility of attention redistribution or diversity to support 
strategic change in terms of business model change/retune. The following comments 
highlight this:  
“What we did was that we did was that we began to position ourselves to be the best in terms 
of retail business because there is a lot of volatility in the economy with respect to the oil and 
gas sector, with respect to power, with respect to corporate banking” (Bayelsa-SM7).  
“…It was the idea of the board …let us now categorise ourselves as retail banker rather than 
international bank” (Bayelsa-SM1) 
“A major objective of the bank is to create a low-risk business model in the next few years” 
(Cross-River CEO/CLS).  
“We knew it would be a challenging year (2016) and we prepared for it by focusing 
on …adapting our business model to the changing variables” (Delta CEO/CLS).  
“Our retail represents a major growth opportunity for us as it will allow us to consolidate 
and diversify the returns of the existing business through our value chain” [Abia-CLS] 
“From a banking perspective, we mirror the economy. When the economy is under pressure, 
it resonates in the financial system. We are committed to looking at innovative ways to gain 
even more market share (Ebonyi-CEO in an interview with TBY, 2016).  
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The above comments were generally in admittance that the banks had greater interests in 
commercial, corporate banking models and public-sector banking; the latter mainly targeted 
government deposits. However, due to the recent liquidity problems, attention shifts became 
necessary in all five cases explored. The attention shift involves adapting or modifying their 
business models by implementing retail banking, value-chain management, and agency 
banking strategies as mechanisms to continue to create value, gain market share or to survive.  
As the managers explained, the retail banking strategy involves focusing on banking more 
individuals and mass-market segments. Value chain management or banking strategy 
involves effort towards targeting/banking SMEs e.g. distributors/sub-distributors, contractors 
and subcontractors of larger corporates and multinationals. The agency banking involves 
using agents across cities, towns, and villages in Nigeria to enhance distribution, and access 
to products and services by customers. This does not mean that the banks never had 
customers in the stated segments before now but as they admitted, each have had less 
attention to them as income and business from the commercial, corporate banking, and public 
sector banking segments were not only huge but easier, irresistible and much more profitable.  
In other words, attention to that area became a matter of survival. The following comment 
reinforces this:  
“We have always tried to drive retail but we have not focused on it this much because there 
were always funds from government and all those big companies. But now that those funds 
are depleting, the business must go on and that is when you go back and you now sit and re-
strategize – and you now think okay, where can we substitute these funds that are going from 
us? And retail is a gold mine if you can tap into it because we have something to our 
advantage – we have a lot of population” (Abia-SM1).  
Therefore, in addition to addressing the liquidity challenge they faced. Further reasons shared 
for implementing/adopting new business models or shifts in strategic focus include, (1) to 
leverage on the perceived opportunity presented by the Nigerian burgeoning and youthful 
population. (2) To have diversified, healthier, sustainable financial-base and income 
structures, (3) based on their perceptions and beliefs that the retail-banking model holds a 
better future for the banking business given the changing lifestyles of customers, competition 
dynamics and technology advancements.  
Nonetheless, much as the decision to change, adapt, modify or implement the retail business 
model was common across the five cases, findings also show differences in the approaches 
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adopted. Table 10.3a below is used to capture the observed approaches or pattern of attention 
to modifying and implementing some new business models across the cases investigated. 
Table 10.3a                Cross-Case  Attention on Business Model Innovation 
Attention 
approach 
Abia Bayelsa  Cross-River Delta Ebonyi 
Fully-focused                  X                             
More-focused         X           X          X          X 
No Focus       
X = Approach applied 
As table10.3a shows, in the case of Bayelsa, the managers evolved their banking model 
aiming to depict the organisation more clearly as a “leading retail bank of choice” (Bayelsa-
CEO) or differently put, “position ourselves to be the best in terms of retail business” 
(Bayelsa-SM7). With that as their desired identity and strategic vision, a strong commitment 
is being given to entrenching the same philosophy/culture among employees across all levels 
in the organisation. Similarly, Cross-River modified its business model to accentuate the 
retail banking model as against their traditional/core interest in investment banking and 
commercial banking but not particularly as an identity preferred. A full subsidiary was 
established in 2015 to focus on the segment described by one of the senior managers as 
“bottom of the pyramid” and so it is fair to consider that as being more-focused on retail just 
as Cross-River-SM3 explained. However, for Delta Abia, and Ebonyi, the approach entails 
seeing and implementing the retail banking as a needful balance and diversity as the 
opportunity presented by that segment given the uncertain situation cannot be wished away 
but would maintain their interest in corporate and commercial banking as core,  – if not 
sacrosanct. As confirmed in the following comments:  
“Before now we don’t use to be a retail banking fit like that because of the administration 
issue I mentioned earlier. …But of late, we just believed that okay there is a need for us to 
cautiously come down the ladder. Mark my word ‘cautiously’ come down the ladder, 
strategically come down the ladder so that at least we can also meet our customers' needs at 
that segment of the market. So we have our own strategy and it is working for us” (Ebonyi-
SM1).  
“From inception, we were more focused on commercial and corporate, we are more middle-
market, upper to the high-end of the market, but the truth is about is that there is a point at 
which you would stagnate in our environment if you don’t play in the retail space. So, that 
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why …there is a deliberate focus to look at retail and build a solid retail business …but we 
are not losing sight of our core high earning commercial/corporate banking because 
obviously, in terms of profitability, it is a lot more profitable” (Delta-SM3).   
These findings are consistent with the argument by authors discussing the critical role 
dynamic managerial cognition, perception and attention pattern (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; 
Ocasio, 1997) and competences for opportunities search and selection or decision-making 
differentials as key (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Helfat et al 2007). However, in addition to the 
previous constructs, insight derived from the data suggests that the idea of what is referred 
here, as “attention diversity” may be contributory to the differentials in the key performance 
highlights in table 10.1. This attention balancing idea became more enlightening by taking 
into critical consideration the comment by Bayelsa-SM2 (having just retired) and relying on 
his experience in Bayelsa retorted that:   
“…many banks focused their energy on mobilising deposits from the public sector and in a 
number of cases to the complete disregard to the real sectors of the economy. Then, you have 
banks who bothered to diversify – those that make conscious and deliberate effort to scan the 
real sectors of the economy. …you see a lot of international trade, in some areas they do 
business in solid minerals, mining and agricultural sectors, but many, the focus was largely 
on …pursuing deposits from the government; what I call “hot money” because it involves 
risks; focus on invoice discounting in the oil and gas sector because that’s where they could 
quickly get their money in and out very quickly”. Bayelsa-SM2 went on to suggest that “if 
you want to run a resilient financial institution given the different ups and down you should 
have a balance sheet that is not dependent on only one sector of the economy. In believing on 
that strategy, therefore, your bank should have a portfolio that is balanced across all sectors, 
from the real sector services, construction, agriculture, mining and so on”  
This study shows that attention diversity underpins the DMC related to innovative business 
models enabling the organisations to survive and prosper in the environment. 
Notwithstanding the differentials in the approach adopted, through implementing the honed 
business models, all five firms have continued to survive the environmental headwinds whilst 
seeking to stay stronger and more competitive both in Nigeria and in other markets. This also 
can be relayed back to the idea of ineffective “natural resource cognition” uncovered by the 
researcher (see, section 10.2) by noting that lack of attention diversity contributed to some 
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negative performance as KPH in section 10.1 show but latter contributed to the organisations’ 
positive performance and competitive survival when attention diversity was deployed.   
  10.3.2 Optimising and building stronger financial capital base  
Findings show that DMC in all five cases investigated involving search and selecting (Helfat 
et al, 2007) alternative ways for expanding/optimising the organisations’ financial resources 
base. The purpose includes building and maintaining liquidity and the need to have a stronger 
and diversified financial capital-base and sustainable income structure. Table 10.3b below 
summaries cross-case approaches have been using to optimise their financial/capital base. 
  Table 10.3b         Cross-Case approaches to optimising financial capital base  
Approaches/themes observed Abia Bayelsa  Cross-
River 
Delta Ebonyi 
Rights issuing, bonds/equity investment     X   X     NO       NO       NO 
Foreign currency saving    X  NO   NO X NO 
Savings/retained earnings     X     X     X     X      X       
Financial inclusion/retail customers 
acquisition: individuals/MSMEs deposit 
 X X  X X X 
X= Observed; NO = Not Observed 
As financial institutions, it is common knowledge that banks often need to have robust 
financial muscle in order to fund big-ticket projects and to be successful in their financial 
intermediary role in the economy. In that sense, optimising financial capital base should be a 
routine. However, evidence shows that different efforts to enhance the dwindling and in some 
cases depleted customers’ deposits and income was based on the recent experience and the 
need to now build stronger and robust financial base and structure to forestall similar 
experience in the future. For instance, Bayelsa and Abia both quickly increased their financial 
capital and liquidity through equity investments and rights issuing in 2014/2015. Abia raised 
$300m and N35 billion via equity investment while Bayelsa raised N50 billion via a rights 
issue and a further $147 million through foreign equity investment. Analysis in chapter six 
(Abia) and chapter 7 (Bayelsa) also supported this with detailed evidence. 
Cross-River did not report about any equity investment but also moved quickly to enhance its 
liquidity position through injection of about N26.5 billion revaluation surplus gained due the 
bank’s dollar reserve saved over the years and prior to the devaluation of naira as the Nigeria 
economy struggled, into their capital base. As evident in the following comment by the CEO:    
“…the net revenue position of our Bank increased 33% from N84.9 billion in 2015 to N112.6 
billion in 2016, though significantly driven by revaluation surplus of about N26.5 billion. 
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Over the last decade, the Bank has built a robust dollar balance sheet and retained earnings 
which are shielding our capital from the effects of naira devaluation. Specifically, 57% of our 
capital is in foreign currency”, (Cross-River-CLS, 2016 Annual report).  
This means that the management’s decision in the past to ‘build a robust dollar savings’ 
became not just a key source of income windfall but a rescue for the bank considering their 
financial performance in 2015 especially. By now, it is already a common view that luck is 
not a dynamic capability (Winter, 2003; Teece, 2012). As indicated in table 10.3b above, it is 
implied or can be considered normal to have retained earnings as part of the bank’s financial 
capital base. However, the aspect depicting DMC is about the foresight and attention 
diversity of the management to implement strategic dollars savings culture over the years and 
with that was shielded from the consequences of the weakened/devalued naira as explained.   
Beyond any quick fix and any lucky windfall, across all five cases, it was evident that what 
was critical choice generally and most management’s medium to longer terms response for 
their respective banks is to have a diverse, sustainable income structure and capital base. A 
common pattern across all cases includes: growing stronger customer base through 
customers’ acquisition processes involving mopping up deposits from the unbanked people 
(often ignored), the under-banked customers (i.e. inadequately supported ones) MSMEs 
especially. Financial inclusion albeit a CBN initiative is one concept widely used in the 
dataset in all five cases to capture both the banks’ attention to bringing in those clusters of 
smaller businesses and individuals into their book. Then, engaging with those customers and 
creatively support their enterprise needs and concerns and to portray a win-win for all 
stakeholders. These responses all reflect financial capital building involving attention 
diversity of the management in consciously searching for other sources of income. 
In the case of Ebonyi for instance, consistently identified as among the top two largest 
Nigerian banks, they would not have anything to do with low-income people; people who do 
not have or meet certain income threshold – often people in the retail segment. However, due 
to the liquidity problem/threat, they decided to mop-up income from those often neglected 
sources as an alternative for maintaining a healthier capital-base. As one of the managers 
explained:  
“…we now said lets quickly start to look for alternative – and what is the alternative? Let’s 
get everybody into our book, let’s get the retail-end of the market into our book so that all 
those small-small drops will still keep our ocean full. And that was the first thing we started 
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doing two years before the issue of the TSA now came in. …Before, I mean some 10 to 15 
years ago, for instance, my organisation will not open a savings account with you if you do 
not have one million naira as the initial deposit.  But as of today, as I am talking to you, you 
can open an account with zero balance and fund it later. …we believe that one-one thousand 
from everybody is better than one million from only 30 people; that’s part of the strategies 
that we introduced” (Ebonyi-MM3).  
Similar to the case of Ebonyi, in Abia, Bayelsa, and Delta, the managers explained as 
follows: 
“…what we are trying to do is instead of getting a big deposit from customer X, customer X 
is one person – he is giving me 1 billion, why can’t I go and meet one hundred people that 
will give me the total sum of that 1 billion – because those 100 people cannot remove their 
money at the same time” (Abia-SM2).  
“…we saw several emerging businesses there that are doing very well – that if we focus our 
attention on these emerging businesses, we will do better; we will earn more income coupled 
with the fact that they are many in number” (Bayelsa-SM5).  
“…we now realised that statistics in Nigeria show that financial inclusion is still very low. 
There is still a large green place to cover in terms of getting Nigerians to have bank 
accounts; …so as a strategy, the bank decided to go into the mass market” (Cross-River-
SM1). 
“…now we are diversifying. We are looking at other streams of income. We’ve changed how 
we manage our IOCs…instead of focusing on these major means; we are now looking at 
banking the entire value-chain” (Delta-MM2). 
In all cases thus, it was significantly evident that attention diversity by managers is enabling 
the organisations to create new quality risk assets whilst also providing low-risk lending to 
the MSMEs in the aftermath of challenges the banks encountered. In all cases, being 
proactive or not tend to have made a difference and was also attributed to the KPH in table 
10.1. This study shows therefore that in addition to managerial beliefs and attention renewal 
(Eggers & Kaplan, 2009), attention diversity is an important variable for understanding 
cognition and DMC. The examples provided by this in relation to the importance of creating 
diverse customer-base and income structure as related to different strategic choices of the 
management in the past and later when the liquidity problem threatened organisations’ 
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competitive survival and profitability helps to explain this. Implicit in the choices was also 
the key role of learning in terms of recent experience.  
10.3.3 Stronger risk management culture and Effective balance sheet management 
Across the five cases, findings show that the top management teams all responded to the 
environmental headwinds with more tightened risk management and effective balance sheet 
management. Table 10.3c below summarised key observations across cases as follows: 
 
Table10.3c Cross-case risk management culture/Balance-sheet management 
Concepts/themes Abia Bayelsa Cross-
River 
Delta Ebonyi 
Stress testing     NO    NO   NO    NO     X/P 
Cautious/rigorous approach to lending    XP    X   X    XP     X/P 
Averse to some sectors of the economy    X    X   X    X     X/P 
Review/Tempered risk appetite     XP    X   X    XP     XP 
Portfolio divestment/restructure/recall    NO    X   X    X      NO 
Sharpened risk-management    XP    X   X    XP     X/P 
Diversified business model    X    X   X    X     X 
Effective balance-sheet management     XP    X   X    XP     XP 
XP = Observed/Proactive; X = Observed/Reactive; NO = Not observed  
As shown in the above table, key aspects observed include (1) stress testing, (2) 
implementing a more cautious or rigorous approach to lending, and (3) being risk-averse to 
certain sectors of the economy. It also includes (4) frugal reviewing their bank’s risk appetite, 
(5) divestment, recall or recovery, and restructuring of risk assets (6) sharpened risk 
management, and (7) having to implement a diversified business model as earlier explained. 
Each of these approaches observed and the pattern they were represented in the data also 
indicate being proactive, reactive or not observed. These measures are based on the 
researcher’s assessment of narratives provided in the dataset and believably underpinned by 
metrics in KPH captured in table 10.2.  
In particular, the above shows that Ebonyi appears to be the most proactive in their approach 
and the only case that discussed about stress-testing. Abia and Delta also seem to be proactive 
to some extent in the areas indicated. However, both Bayelsa and Cross-River appear mostly 
reactive with the latter particularly admissive about this as confirmed in the CLS in 2015 (see 
within-case analysis). In all cases, findings show that banks commonly became particularly 
averse to lending to businesses/customers operating in sectors largely dependent FOREX and 
importation, e.g. oil and gas sector, transport, and construction. ‘Divestment of portfolio’ was 
a term used in the case of Delta bank as they had to unwind their interest in supporting 
  
224 
 
indigenous oil companies (IOCs) while also implementing a more rigorous approach lending 
to sectors considered as low risk e.g. agriculture, and MSMEs.  
As hinted already, in Cross-River, the management talked about having to tighten (sharpen) 
their “credit risk underwriting standard” following the big “hurt” they suffered given their 
NPL in 2015 especially to hedge against future occurrence. Similarly, in Bayelsa, the term 
‘cautious lending approach’ was used to express a change in its risk management framework 
while in Abia it was claimed they are implementing a disciplined approach to risk selection.    
With the cost of funds/borrowing, operation and inflation all taking upwards trajectory, in all 
five cases, it was observed that effective management of balance sheet was adopted as short 
to medium-term strategy. The term “effective balance sheet management” (Delta, Abia, and 
Ebonyi) emerged in the data in describing some sort of prudential and holistic rethink and 
forward-looking effort towards setting key performance indicators against the operating 
environment risks and uncertainties by the management. A good example was in the case of 
Ebonyi. One senior manager described their decision to conduct a stress-test against public 
sector deposits in their book. The organisation based on this became well prepared even 
before the federal government announced the TSA. The following comment confirms this: 
“…It is actually one of the scenarios that we actually tested before it happened; we had 
envisaged it that let’s say, one-day government comes and say okay all the public sector fund 
in our book, we should move it. So, when they came up with that concept, it was seamless 
because we have actually projected that ahead. …You know in risk management, you try to 
peep into the future; it is not a post-mortem approach, you are supposed to be proactive... So 
when we came up with the concept that okay we are going to test it, some people felt you are 
crazy, it is not possible, in this kind of environment. Do you want to snuff-out the banks? But 
when it came (the TSA policy), they said you guys are too much. So, we have a robust system 
that has been proven to be solid” [ESM1].  
Therefore, while different and to some extent proactive and/or reactive to show some form of 
attention diversity in relation to risk management processes as highlighted. What emerged 
from the analysis was also a connection between different learning behaviours e.g. deliberate 
search for knowledge (via stress test in Ebonyi’s case) and experiential learning (in all five 
cases) (Zollo & Winter, 2002) even in other actions/reactions expressed hitherto. More 
insights on how learning behaviours and attention diversity together underpin DMCs in terms 
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of decisions-making (search and selection) across all five cases are consistently highlighted 
all through the chapter.   
10.3.4 Cost control initiatives  
In this regard, one of the most densely emphasised aspects was about operating cost 
reduction. All five banks differently and interchangeably used terms including ‘cost-
efficiency’, ‘cost containment’, ‘cost curtailment’, ‘cost discipline’ and cost control 
initiatives to express about different initiatives to driving down the cost of business 
operations. However, from a critical analysis of key approaches across all five cases, it seems 
that in some cases e.g. Delta and Ebonyi appear to be more cost-conscious rather than cost-
driven. Table 10.3e below also summarises some approaches observed in all five cases. 
Table 10.3e                                 Cost control Initiatives across all cases  
Concepts Abia Bayelsa Cross-
River 
Delta Ebonyi 
Focusing on low-cost/cheap deposits    X     X     X    X     X 
Automation/digital processes    X     X     X    X     X 
Creating a pool of lower-carder staff     X     X     X   NO     NO 
Cutting staff size     X     X    X   Yes    NO 
Closing branch network   NO   NO    NO   NO    NO 
X = Observed; NO = Not Observed  
Operating cost reduction in both Abia, Cross-River and Bayelsa involved creating a pool of 
lower cadre staff and then reducing senior-level employees whose remunerations are high. 
This suggests that they have been driven particularly by pressure to take a significant cut on 
their staff.  In Delta, the management admitted about having to cut the workforce and talked 
about maintaining a sizable workforce. 
It was particularly noted that in the case of Ebonyi, while other approaches to reduce costs 
were employed, they maintained their staff and did not have to sack or replace them with 
lowly-paid staff. As one of the senior managers explained “we do not micro-
manage. …where others are trying to go for a lower carder staff, we try as much as possible 
to bring the best, regardless of the job function because we believe that their entire success 
on quality customer service, and we believe these are the people that can do that kind of 
service” Ebonyi-SM1). This implies that the staff aspect is so important to the organisation 
such that they could not afford considering it as the avenue to include in the cost-cutting 
initiative, unlike the other four cases. 
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Apart from that, in all cases, the management is consciously placing emphasis on automated 
ways of trying to serve especially the retail and SMEs customers. With online banking and 
automated processes, many are kept away from the banking hall, thus requiring less space, 
staff and man-hour time to attend to them. Internal operational processes are being digitalised 
to ensure efficiency e.g. targets towards paperless processes, digital approval processes and 
workflow monitoring (Delta-DSM4), and online staff training. In all five cases, it was 
admissive that each now opt for agency banking strategies rather than having to increase their 
local branch network.   
As earlier explained, across all five banks, a key strategic initiative is to drive retail and with 
that, mop-up cheap deposits from that segment of the economy as against high/rising cost of 
borrowing, bonds, and treasury bills as the country’s economy plummeted.  In all cases it was 
noted that these initiatives proved beneficial as all the CEOs differently reported year-on-year 
reduction in operating cost by 2016, implying saved expenses, and on the other hand, 
increasing in revenue through cheap deposits from retail especially. In sum, perspectives by 
the managers imply that attention to seeking diverse ways to consciously, reduce operational 
cost allows them more funds to create quality assets and consequently enhance their profits.  
10.3.5 Enabling Governance structure and Culture  
The importance of attention diversity was also reflective in the commitment to creating 
enabling governance structure and organisational culture in all five cases. In this regard, 
attention pattern and actions involving (a) creating new regions/divisions (b) functional 
reorganising, re-modelling or restructuring (c) implementing flatter structure (d) promoting 
teamwork, employee empowerment, and collegiate system are some of the most densely 
represented evidence of DMC and assets orchestration concepts uncovered across the five 
cases. Some similarities/differentials from observation are summarised in table 10.3f below. 
Table10.3f Cross-case analysis of enabling structure and organisational culture 
Themes/concepts Abia Bayelsa Cross-
River 
Delta Ebonyi 
Created new regions   NO    Yes    Yes NO  NO  
Functional reorganising, re-modelling 
or restructuring or created new divisions 
   Yes    Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes 
Implementing a flatter structure    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Promoting teamwork, employee 
empowerment, and collegiate system  
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Yes = Observed; NO = Not observed  
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Findings show that only Cross-River and Bayelsa restructured their operations in terms of 
regional control within Nigeria. For Cross-River, one of the interviewees explained that he 
was hired from a well-known bank in South Africa mainly to help with the organisation’s 
restructuring project in line with the bank’s decision to now drive/operate more as a retail 
bank. The following comment bears this out: 
“The second thing that we did was that we restructured. We restructured around the business 
and our operations. And what do I mean? We had to go into geographical restructure …so 
that at the region, they have the authority and power to manage quite a number of retail 
endeavour instead of everybody coming to the centre at the same time, which will be 
overwhelming. ..I joined in the first quarter of …so I was actually brought to do the regional 
operating structure of the bank…because we couldn’t manage that number of branches from 
the centre anymore” (Cross-River SM3).   
Similarly, in Bayelsa, one of the interviewees also talked about his role as the Head of 
(…department withheld) … (region name withheld) as one of the new portfolios created to 
underline the strategic focus of the organisation towards carving a niche for itself as a leading 
retail bank. As evident in the following comment: 
“…we have one in Lagos, and west, we have one in the southeast – where you (Researcher) 
comes from, and the one in northern Nigeria. We began to position ourselves…we want to be 
number one retail bank in the country and that’s how my own role now came in that I am 
now in charge of…” (Bayelsa –SM7).  This is further confirmed the CEO’s comment: 
Bayelsa-CLS (2015) also wrote, “…we restructured our Retail Directorate, creating five 
distinct divisions that are manned by senior specialist”.  
Across all five cases, the re-organisation was considered important in order to 
facilitate/ensure synergy with the banks’ evolving strategies and business models. It is 
expected that managers through that could have closer supervision of business units/areas and 
at the same time connect/engage/relate more with the customers within functional or 
geographical their remit. In Delta, for instance, one of the interviewees (DSM1) explained his 
new role as head of one of the new divisions established mainly to focus on developing 
partnerships with Fintechs firms to create innovative business solutions. The following 
comments contained in the CLS are evidential:  
“…mindful of the inherent competitive advantages that we possess in the digital world and 
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we have created new divisions and aligned our structure to ensure that we are positioned to 
take advantage of the opportunities birthed by the digital revolution” (Delta-CLS, 2016). 
In all five cases, observation entails that implementation of flatter structure was enabling their 
organisation to be more responsive as against hierarchical pattern implemented in each case 
in the past. While in Delta bank, it was claimed that it was an already known culture of the 
bank not because of the change in the business environment, in the case of Bayelsa, Abia, 
Ebonyi, and Cross-River, findings show that the initiative was being incorporated as a new 
realignment process and cultural shift. The following comments sum the perspectives shared 
across all cases:  
“…we run a very fluid structure that tries to encourage a lot of engagement and that kind of 
relationships such that one, there are no barriers, there is no fear – we try to relate, 
communicate easily and then try to make sure business decisions are taken faster and all 
that” [Bayelsa-SM6]. 
“We go by flat structure, let me put it that way, and so is believed to be made equal such that 
you can express yourself; you are not afraid of one big Oga provided that what you have 
upstairs they know is not (you know)” [Ebonyi-MM3] 
“We remodelled our operating structure to be more responsive to speciﬁc needs of our 
expanding and well-diversiﬁed customer base, signifying the commencement of the next 
phase of our medium-term growth strategy” (Bayelsa CLS, 2016) 
 
Consistent with the stated benefit of the flat structure as above, findings by this study in all 
cases also include a commitment to promoting teamwork, employee engagement, 
empowerment, and collegiate system. Table 10.3g below captures the evidence. 
 
Table10.3g Cross-case analysis of enabling structure and organisational culture 
Themes/concepts Abia Bayelsa Cross-
River 
Delta Ebonyi 
Teamwork  X  X  X    X   X 
Employee engagement      X        X        X      X X 
Empowerment    X       X         X         X        X 
Collegiate system    NO  X    NO  X NO 
 X = Observed; NO = Not Observed 
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Teamwork was emphasised in all cases and encouraged as a way to facilitate mutual 
problem-solving and learning. Empowerment is used in the dataset to depict allowing 
managers at different levels to own responsibility and feel a sense of trust to make the right 
choices given their experience. In all cases, the importance of implementing a collegiate 
system was considered very important. Managers believe that this system enables not only 
better understanding but also the tendency to make the best decisions acceptable and in the 
best interest of all stakeholders. Based on these findings, therefore, one can argue that 
enabling governance, structure, and organisational culture encouraging teamwork and 
collegiate decision making are contributing to competitive survival in this study context.  
10.3.6 Innovative products and customer-centric service culture 
All five cases acknowledged that competitive survival and sustainable success based on the 
changing need and lifestyle of customers depends on offering innovative products and in the 
words of one manager interviewed (CRSM1) a “top-notch” service delivery. While many 
contributions including Eisenhardt & Martin (2000), Danneels (2002) have previously 
identified new product development as examples of innovation – that relies on the managers’ 
cognitive orientation as well (Narayana et al 2009). However, it emerged from observation 
from all five cases explored that the products usually offer only little advantage as rival firms 
are always quick to offer similar products or even improve on theirs with all fighting for the 
same ‘wallet-share’ mostly. The following comments are indicative: 
 “…retail products are the same everywhere, even in the UK, HSBC, it is the same products. 
The same savings account, the same current account” [AMM3].  
 “Everybody is doing almost the same thing now. You come up with a product, the next day; 
another bank is doing exactly what you are doing. …That is why the battleground now is 
service. …Service is the distinguishing factor now” [BSM6].  
To that extent, much as effort is being given to developing/lunching novel products to appeal 
especially to the retail/MSME segments in line with the new business models adopted. What 
seems more critical includes; the cultural awareness, knowledge, agility and appropriate 
attention distribution in creating what actually constitutes value for different customer 
segments in terms of uniqueness and superior service on an on-going basis. Managers’ are 
focusing on different ways of involving customer engagement and relationship building in 
order to understand what customers’ needs are as they evolve and to consequently enact 
necessary changes tailored towards personalisation that can best meet or exceed customer’s 
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expectations. Personalisation bespoke, tailor-made solutions, superior, top-notch and 
excellent services with attention to sociocultural context and diversity of customers’ 
segments and needs were all touted as crucial. As with data in table 10.3, the following 
comments are exemplar:   
“…we come up with innovations in a dynamic manner and ways that will ensure good 
customer service, good transaction dynamics. It is a culture that has been developed over 
time …when we talk about speed, we are 100% customer-oriented, we talk about security, 
values, reliable and being responsible … a culture of excellence which has been a success 
factor” (Abia-SM1). 
One Delta senior manager recalled the attention diversity and learning process that led to the 
Delta bank’s USSD (product name withheld) flagship financial solution in terms of its 
creation and service acceptance was exemplar in the comment: 
“…we want to be inseparable from our customers, and always seek to maximise our values 
by deepening our capacity for providing solutions to the diverse needs that arise in all 
aspects” (Bayelsa-CEO, Annual report, 2016).  
“…we started with the internet-enabled fund; then later we realised that the bulk of the 
Nigerian populace do not carry the internet-enabled funds. They actually carry domi funds 
(domiciliary funds), your regular normal funds. So, we then have to look for a product that 
can talk to those regular funds, and that’s how the USSD… came by. You don’t need internet 
access …all you need is to have a phone and you can do your banking. …A teaming 
population of the country does not have a smartphone. We had to look for something that can 
work with normal phones. That’s how USSD … came to be” (DSM4).   
This means that the initial attempt to lunch the product was welcomed with little interest 
given the customer segment targeted and it became necessary to understand from people why 
the acceptance is low. Therefore, when talking about being customer-centric, and “top-notch” 
service delivery, it is about engaging with and listening to the customers, learning and finding 
a creative way to effectively address their needs in terms of quality, speed, security, integrity, 
reliability, and availability.  
10.3.7 Investing in cutting-edge innovative technology 
Table 10.3 already shows that across all five cases, managers’ are now searching, selecting 
and making considerable investments in innovative technology infrastructure. This involves 
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building and/or upgrading their organisation’s digital capacity for (1) being more responsive 
in terms of value creation and offering better services to customers. (2) Quicker/wider 
access/reach to diverse markets, (3) stronger customer engagement and relationships (4) 
better internal operational processes – time, transparency and targets delivery, (5) better data 
analytics and management (6) efficiency and cost management and (7) income generation 
and (8) belief that the future banking operation would be “fought and won in the digital 
space”. Much of the stated rationales for the investments as linkable to each case are captured 
in table 10.3I. 
Table 10.3I              Technology Investment Purposes/Use 
Concepts  Abia Bayelsa  Cross-
River  
Delta Ebonyi 
Being more responsive to value creation   X     X    X    X   X 
Quicker/wider access/reach to diverse 
market 
  X     X    X    X   X 
Stronger customer service/engagement    X     X    X    X   X 
Better internal operational processes   X     X    X    X   X 
Better data analytics and risk management   X     X    X    X   X 
Efficiency and cost management   X     X    X   X   X 
Income generation    X     X    X  X   X 
Belief in the future of banking to be digital   X      X    X  X   X 
X = Observed; NO = Not observed  
 For instance, this study shows that both Abia and Bayelsa in 2015 upgraded their core 
banking application to FCUBS 12.0.2 to include enhanced features and functionalities. 
Ebonyi also changed their core banking application to a higher version (name implied) of 
which one of the senior managers that pushed for the project explained that they need to 
proactively guard against cyber-attack and to optimise their risk management framework was 
the motivation for the investment. Abia also developed “Basement” – a digital ideas 
generation lab, enabling the management to engage staff creativity to develop new products 
and business solutions. Delta in addition to upgrading its core banking application as well, 
developed social media presence with over 4m followers on twitter alone, about 1m on 
Facebook and in that way engaging and interacting more with customers at the time of this 
study. A visit to the website of all five cases also show that each now has interactive website 
dedicated teams who are quick to invite visitors for a chat. 
In another example, in all five cases, the management recently invested in ATMs and POSs 
to add to the number of units they had and mainly with the up-to-date versions. In Delta, for 
instance, customers can withdraw cash without their cards at their new ATMs through “magic 
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cash” products available to their customers.  Using those up-to-date ATMs and POSs, banks 
are able to keep-off much of its retail customers, SMEs, and even some commercial and 
corporate banking transactions, from the banking hall. Bayelsa and Abia both invested in 
CRM in 2016 to provide a robust platform for better interaction and engagement with 
customers by listening and understanding their needs/complaints and to facilitate data 
management and analysis thereby become more responsive to the customers. In all cases, it 
was also evident in data that through technology and digital banking, banks are not only 
reducing the cost of operation but also generating income through fees and commissions on 
services provided online. This in turns helps to boost the income/capital base of the firms.  
Overall, in all five cases, data show that the investments decision were in alignment with 
management teams’ and individual manager’s realisation, beliefs and stronger conviction that 
banking for now and the future would be fought and won on digital space. The reason is that 
competitive boundaries are rapidly dissolving due to technological advancements. 
Customers’ needs and lifestyles are all evolving as well and as such, the consideration by 
managers is that it has become quite critical to reallocate attention away from “Bricks and 
Mortar” banking to focusing on different ways of leveraging on digital banking and 
technological advancements.  
As the cost of implementing e.g. core banking application upgrade is often non-trivial, 
findings also show that the ability to convince or to buy-in all stakeholders given the timing, 
cost and benefit analysis can be crucial. The following comment sums this: “you know the 
cost of the implementation of an application is usually huge. But regardless, and considering 
the nature of our business, we said okay, it is time, we can take this cost at this time. It now 
became like a concerted effort thing that this thing must work. Management was able to buy-
in us, every stakeholder in the bank from the board to the least person” (ESM1). This meant 
that the executive management influenced the implementation of the core banking application 
upgrade first by their own belief and conviction that it is right considering all parameters and 
circumstances and by convincing other stakeholders including the board – the ultimate 
approval authority.  
10.3.8 Human Capacity Building and Quality workforce 
In all five cases, beyond the central role of technology in their banking operations, managers 
commonly identified human resources as the most important resources enabling their 
organisation to thrive and remain competitive in the market. Terms including quality human 
  
233 
 
capital, workforce, people, staff or employees were all used to refer to the significant 
importance of human resources in relation to their skills, experience, and behaviour to the 
success of the bank. The following comments are exemplar:  
“I must say that our greatest assets are our high performing teams, as the continued success 
of our business will rely on the skills, knowledge, and commitment of our people” (Abia CLS, 
2015). 
A great deal of what people do is as a result of their background, training, professional 
experience, exposure, and upbringing. We want our people to confidently, stand toe-to-toe 
with other professionals in their field anywhere in the world (Abia CEO, interview with 
TBY). 
“Our human resources remain our most important asset. With this in mind, in 2015, we 
commenced the transformation of our people philosophy process and system with strong 
alignment in support of our retail strategy… (Bayelsa-CLS 2016) 
 
“We invest greatly in our people, in training, coaching, mentorship…we send our people to 
go and look at what other banks in the world are doing to innovate and to have better 
structure for the bank” (Cross-River-SM3).  
 
“Our most important resources are human resources – we hire the best and retain the best. I 
think that’s the most fundamental thing we do” (Delta-SM1).  
 
From people’s point of view, there are banks that do not use the quality of staff that we use. 
…it is also a business strategy for us to say, let’s go for the top-notch workforce. In a way, all 
these dovetail to quality service delivery which would always endear our customers to us” 
(Ebonyi-SM1) 
In all five cases thus, opinions suggest that while technology has become very important in 
banking operations, as financial institutions, the financial resources remain fundamental. 
However, the brilliance and knowledge of managers especially to make the right choices and 
to drive their appropriate execution in the emerging and unstable economies like Nigeria 
remains critical. This is central to the argument of the DMC (Adner & Helfat, 2003). As the 
above comments indicate, a quality workforce, hiring or bringing in best talents, training and 
mentoring, developing relevant partnerships, and continuous learning culture were differently 
referred to be very important. Table 10.3J captures the human capital development processes.   
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Table 10.3.3J            Human Capacity Building 
Concepts  Abia Bayelsa  Cross-
River  
Delta Ebonyi 
Entry-level hiring or bringing in best talents    X    X    X  MX  HX 
Robust entry training programme    MX MX MX HX HX 
Training and continuous learning  HX HX HX HX HX 
Transforming employees philosophy  HX HX HX HX HX 
Diversity in recruitment/staff composition     X X HX HX X 
Rewards and motivation of employees MX  X MX HX HX 
Recruit casual staff  X  X  X NO NO 
X = important; MX = moderately important; HX = highly important; NO = Not observed 
In hiring or bringing in the best talents, to some extent, the perspective seems mixed among 
the selected cases. For instance, in the case of Ebonyi, the management sees entry 
requirements as so important such that not just that a candidate must be a graduate, the person 
must hold a minimum of 2:1 honours degree for any consideration at all. Apart from Delta, in 
the other three cases, managers differently talked about having in the recent past employed 
non-graduates/casual staff who are paid lower amount to do the job in an attempt to save cost.  
In Ebonyi, the use of casual staff is simply non-existent as one of the senior managers firmly 
stated: “we don’t micro-manage”. In Ebonyi, the entry requirement goes out as strong 
message to the staff from the start such that when hired eventually, training is seamless, sense 
of value is buttressed and then it is understood that nothing but the best is expected. In the 
study, it was observed that this reflects in managers’ self-worth as each interviewee in Ebonyi 
and Delta especially all tend to conjure. Probed further on why they think they have quality 
or best workforce as claimed, managers in Ebonyi and Delta similarly responded that it is 
reflective in how they work and that their “numbers” (another term for results) confirms this.  
Apart from entry qualification, they tend to be some differences in talent sourcing approaches 
in the recent past. For instance, in the case of Ebonyi, and Delta, participants talked about 
placing premium and priority in building their own as a strategy. In other words, they tend to 
be interested in filling vacancies internally especially, unless the needed talent could not be 
identified internally. However, the shared opinion in all cases is that while there is interest in 
internal recruitment, recently, people from non-traditionally banking background are 
intentionally being employed in order to both leverage on their non-banking experience and 
creativity, and novelty, then, train and ingrain into them the values of their organisation. It 
means that the talents mix supports knowledge transfer/ sharing, creativity and culture 
evolution where necessary whilst protect aspects that are sacrosanct the organisation.  
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Apart from having rigorous entry-level training as claimed, based on their modified/adapted 
business models, in all cases, there has been strong commitment to staff are being trained in 
order to understand the global best practices and rudiments of retail banking, value chain 
management in relation to corporate and retail banking and great customer service. 
Observations also include changes in both the process of training and the contents of the 
training. Traditionally, training in the banks encompasses local and foreign workshops, 
seminars and conferences but more recently, online training is being leveraged and 
encouraged in all cases explored. Notably, this has been cost-efficient in all cases as well.  
In Delta, Abia, Cross-River, Ebonyi and Bayelsa, evidence shows commitment to mentoring 
identified talents among managers and employees, and through succession planning, enable 
them to gain the necessary skills to attain or assume higher responsibilities. In fact, it was 
noted that the CEO of Abia, Bayelsa who both assumed office in 2014 emerged through this 
process. In all, for the training content, a common perspective from all cases was about using 
their training mentoring programmes to ingrain and reinforce their cultural values onto staff 
and management at all levels while being open-minded about new ideas that fit their values.     
10.3.9. Strategic Partnerships and Collaborations 
To continuously deliver innovative products, business solution and quality customer service 
experience, as earlier mentioned, in all five cases, it was observed that effort is given to 
nurturing a variety of external partnerships enabling them to develop and leverage on digital 
technology capabilities and infrastructure, technical expertise and knowledge building for 
innovative banking processes and solutions delivery. Table 11.3K summarises key areas of 
external partnerships observed across all five cases explored and the associated rationale. 
11.3K Strategic partnerships and collaborations  
Observations Abia Bayelsa Cross-
River 
Delta Ebonyi 
Partnerships with Fintech/Telcos  to create new products  X      X    X   X    X 
Partnership with external rating agencies   NO     NO    NO   X    X 
Collaboration with consulting firms/technical experts   X       X    X   X    X 
Partnerships with commission agents to drive retail    X       X    X   X     X 
Deeper relations with customers to aid co-creation    X      X     X    X    X 
 X = Observed; NO = Not Observed 
As evident in table 11.3K, all five cases are collaborating with Fintechs and 
Telecommunication firms essentially to co-create and provide their customers with 
innovative products/services e.g. PayWithCapture/MTN (Abia), eSUSU/MTN/Visa 
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(Bayelsa), Cross-River (Interswitch, IBM; KPMG), #737/MTN/Visa (Delta); Visa/MTN 
(Ebonyi). In Ebonyi, and Delta managers (ESM1) talked about ties with external rating 
agencies in order to avail them timely information for risk management and quality decisions 
making. Bayelsa also referred to other partnerships including; Lagos Business School for 
consistent upgrade of training modules/materials at the staff training school of the bank. In 
Cross-River, the management talked about their recent partnership with IBM for technology 
infrastructure, expertise, and KPMG for training and knowledge building.  In order to 
enhance access and service delivery to customers, all five cases have recently introduced the 
concept of agency banking, which involves relationships with commissioned agents.  An 
example is Delta as confirmed in the CEO’s letter:  
“…we partnered with downstream retailers to lunch our …cash out services; a service 
initiative that allows our customers to withdraw cash at service stations across Nigeria using 
our …platform. …We are also actively seeking to collaborate with Fintech companies” 
(Delta-CLS, 2016).     
In the case of Cross-River, one of the senior managers similarly explained: 
“…operating these strategies required that we collaborate with external partners. For 
instance, you can’t build the entire technology infrastructure, you need a collaborating 
partner …we get innovation partner with us. They sit with us and we take technology 
innovations from them, we build internal capacities as well as we understudy them” (Cross-
River-SM3).  
Therefore, from the above perspectives, although previous studies already identified the 
importance of these strategic alliances or partnerships (e.g. Kale & Singh, 2007), based on the 
observation in the context of this study and as earlier explained, this new idea is all about 
looking for alternative and diverse approaches to drive their retail and financial inclusion 
strategies.  More importantly, it is about a deliberate effort to become open to knowledge and 
learning even from non-banking traditions and industries just as industries' boundaries are 
now getting more blurry. Again, the sample examined by the researcher shows that attention 
diversity strongly underpins these strategic initiatives.  
10.3.10. International expansion and reputation/brand building 
In all five cases, findings show that managers are perceptive of opportunities beyond 
Nigerian borders and through attention diversity establishing and expanding their operations 
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to international space. Table 11.3k below captures international banking operations in terms 
of the number of countries in which these banks have banking operations, Nigeria exclusive. 
Table 10.3k     Expansion/International banking operation  by the selected cases 
 Cases Abia Bayelsa  Cross-
River  
Delta Ebonyi 
Number of countries of banking operations      7      5  1    11  5 
As indicated in table 10.3k above, Delta (in 11 countries) at the time of this study has the 
highest international operation foothold. Abia is next with international operation in seven 
countries, Bayelsa and Ebonyi operates in five other countries respectively while Cross-River 
operates in only one other country apart from Nigeria. Although the international expansion 
projects were not particularly attributed to the recent environmental challenges, even for 
Cross-River who established their first and only international operation in 2014, these 
strategic choices seem to be mostly underpinned by the vision, aspiration and attention 
diversity of the management team. The following comments bear this:  
“We have African inspiration, we are no more Nigerian bank; we hope to be everywhere in 
Africa and so on; …we have conquered Nigeria – there is nothing for us to prove again in 
Nigeria…so, really we’ve moved, we are looking at Africa. We want to be the most profitable 
bank in Africa in absolute digits” (Delta-SM4).   
“A company needs a solid financial background to be the world’s most respected African 
bank. …It must have strong numbers, a global outlook and a strong presence on the 
continent” (Abia-CEO interview with TBY).  
In all five cases, it was observed that the given reasons for international expansion projects 
include: 1) wider business opportunity search 2) to promote/build a stronger brand, 
reputation, and international reputation, and essentially used by the organisations to appeal to 
local and international clients. In Nigeria, the label “international bank” also resonates with 
many as a sign of good financial strength and quality of service both in terms of value and in 
terms of aspiration by the organisation. 3) The purpose also includes learning, knowledge 
search and desire for implementing international best practices as to become recognised and 
benchmark as such. Early-movers including Ebonyi, Delta, Bayelsa, and Abia used their 
international banking operations both to learn from and to demonstrate their capacity for 
implementing international best practices such that investors, businesses and entrepreneurs 
with interest in business opportunities in Nigeria found their organisations suitable to 
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engage/deal with. Managers in Ebonyi’s case, for instance, boasted about having the largest 
MNE client-base. Observations also show that while faced challenges in the Nigerian space, 
all five cases reported positive results from their international subsidiaries to not only 
enhance the group’s income/balance sheet overall but also offering significant contribution to 
navigating through the environmental headwinds referred. 
10.4 The Role of Attention Diversity DMC  
Flowing from the above narratives and participants’ explanations about how managers and 
their organisations responded with important strategic changes. And based on the concept of 
resource cognition in the context discussed in section 10.2 and cross-case analysis of 
evidence in section 10.3 from all five cases, it was evident that attention diversity helped to 
facilitate a variety of strategic responses depicting asset orchestration and DMC deployment 
in the firms explored. Insight from across the two sections leading to this summary shows 
that managers’ cognition in the cases explored hindered DMC but lessons were learned 
particularly from the experience and effects of the economic downturn and the introduction 
of TSA. To ensure survival and to forestall such challenges in the future, the analysis above 
also shows that the managers’ cognition (beliefs, perceptions and in particular, attention 
shifts) were triggered. This essentially facilitated managerial decisions for different and better 
strategic approaches and firms’-level asset orchestration discussed in the preceding sections.  
To put the inferred attention diversity idea into context, the researcher builds on Boydstun, 
Bevan & Thomas III's (2014) idea of attention diversity in political policy to conceptualise 
attention diversity in strategy and DMC context. Thus, the concept of attention diversity can 
be described as the degree of spread vs. concentration of managers on and across possible 
opportunities and/or threats in relation to strategic change, competitive survival and success 
(Author). Although the concept of attention has been examined in DMC more generally in 
previous studies, e.g. Cho & Hambrick (2006), Eggers & Kaplan (2009) Laamanen & Wallin 
(2009), the manifestation in this study suggest that attention in terms of distribution can be 
critical because it determines what may be considered important and the extent in which 
managers may try to distribute attention as against concentrating attention across issues of 
strategic expediency and necessity regarding opportunities and congruent resources. 
 This study thus takes the concept of attention a step further compared to previous 
developments. Figure 10.3 below has been used to draw together two broad areas reflecting 
how managers demonstrated DMC through a variety of asset orchestration activities 
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consistent with Helfat et al (2007) abstraction. Being reactive or proactive has not been 
particularly measured. However, attention diversity was evidently plausible as the 
underpinning capability by which managers made congruent decisions that led to some 
cultural shifts, innovation and capacity building activities as figure 13 shows.  
Based on managers’ cognitive behaviour as analysed in section 10.2, and their response as 
captured in section 10.3, suffice to state that managers and their organisation learned some 
bitter lessons across the cases explored. However, what is also noted and hence emphasised 
by this study is the managers admittedly honed their mind-set, began to rebalance or diffuse 
attention by focusing less on crude oil and government income streams to rather spreading 
attention across alternative sources to build diversified financial resource base and 
developing new business mix or models, investment in technology and human capacity 
building and to serve customers.  In short, evidently, the manager largely called upon 
attention diversity to facilitate the actions. 
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Implementing value chain 
strategy/focus on MSMEs 
Optimising Risks 
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Management  
Optimising Financial 
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Customers’ acquisition/growing 
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Supportive technology   
Cost containment/operating 
cost reduction processes  
Adapting/diversifying/focus 
on retail banking strategy  
Cautious lending/enhanced 
risk management culture  
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Change/Modify 
business models 
Investing in cutting-edge 
innovative technology 
Upgrading core applications  
Creating Social media platforms 
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Infrastructure Building   
Customer-centric 
service and digital 
banking Culture  
Functional reorganising, re-
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and 
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Telcos and Agents 
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           Opportunities search 
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Figure 13   DMC and Asset Orchestration  
Figure 13 DMC and Asset Orchestration 
Figure 14DMC and Asset Orchestration 
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10.5 How managers balance between routines and better decision making  
As noted in the review of literature, that dynamic capability was conceived as having to do 
with an organisation’s position and historic path (Teece et al, 1997). Eisenhardt & Martin 
(2000) accentuated the understanding that the dynamic capability consists of ‘processes and 
routine’ (p.1107) – a perspective also shared by other leading voices e.g. Winter (2003). 
Tripsas & Gavetti (2000) demonstrated that an organisation’s path, routine, and beliefs at the 
top management could lead to inertia. With timely and effective response being critical in 
dynamic managerial capability deployment (Zott, 2003), empirical studies have also 
confirmed both negative, and positive effects of variance in top management’s roles and 
cognition capabilities regarding resource base perceptions, decision-making and strategic 
change at the organisational level (Danneels 2011; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009).   
What this research has done includes showing how managers find a balance between existing 
organisational routine and the need to make better decisions in relation to the organisation’s 
strategy (Tippman et al, 2014; Koprax & Konlechner, 2014). Beck & Wiersema (2013:10) 
more specifically called for empirical research addressing what might constitute drivers of 
better decision making as opposed to simply, different executive decisions. Table 10.4 below 
captures these abstractions. 
Table 10. 4 Themes related to Cognition and Decision-making   
Cases  Identified themes/processes 
Abia Strategic thinking; self-belief, employee empowerment, enabling 
environment, good communication   
Bayelsa Creativity and ability to convince your team; communication, flat 
structure, buying-in; idea selling, learning in diverse ways (culture)    
Cross-River Knowledge and learning; collaboration and engagement; whistleblowing; 
convincing presentation and communication  
Delta Engagement, communication, and negotiation; promoting collegiate 
system, enabling environment,  trust, spirit of ownership and leadership 
Ebonyi Promotes flat structure, workforce empowerment/motivation, 
proactiveness, open communication, self-awareness; knowledge search, 
creativity and convincingness, buying-in  
  
As table 10.4 shows, in all five cases, there are several recurring themes/concepts discovered 
include employee empowerment, enabling atmosphere, engaging, knowledge, learning and 
ability to convince others, communication, negotiation, creativity, and idea selling, buying-in. 
In other words, there are many things considered important. Based on a critical analysis of 
the context in which these concepts were used, it became clear that the concept of 
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communication was very crucial and thus, emphasised using the different themes highlighted. 
In particular, two keywords, collegiate system, and buying-in strongly reflected 
communication practices enabling effective and better strategic decisions making rather than 
just another or different decision by the managers. More details of these concepts is next.   
10.5.1 Collegiate system  
The use of a collegiate system was significantly reflective in the data as an effective 
communication process for generating ideas and better decision-making. Collegiate system as 
used here is because of the way the research participants used the same term to respond to 
this question and it is believed that it well-aggregates much of the views expressed in all 
cases examined. The collegiate system relates to creating an enabling and an environment of 
synergy, listening, and open-mindedness regarding decision-making. As analysis already 
shows, the process allows a manager to feel free to voice their consideration with an 
assurance of respect, being listened to and constructive engagement in relation to an idea and 
decision that could be made. This is consistent with Hodgkinson & Healey's (2011:1510) idea 
of an “emotionally secure psychological environment” as an important cognitive mechanism. 
In this study, therefore, it has been demonstrated that the collegiate system was related to 
how managers enabled better strategic decisions that allowed their banks’ to implement 
cultural evolution/transformation, capacity building, and performance improvements. For 
instance, in the case of Delta, the following comments confirm this:  
“…your voice is heard and whatever you have in mind is discussed. There is no one person 
that can shout you down or say no to you. …It’s something close to a collegiate system in 
taking some decisions and you can push the bandwidth, the points … your case … yes, this 
guy really-really want this thing and we’ll all look at it and by the time you are saying yes or 
no to it, you will be convinced that the best decision has been taken at that time [DSM4]. 
“…a lot of the time we operate from a team type of structure depending on what we want to 
achieve; and then we say okay, how can we drive that agenda?” [DSM3]. 
From the above comments, was evident that managers were practicing the collegiate system, 
and making the best decisions through that. This allows this research to make a case for 
collegiate system as communication practice enabling best/better strategic decisions in 
response to the calls by Ocasio et al (2017) regarding communication practices and Beck & 
Wiersema (2013) in relation to how to make better decision rather than just a different 
decision, as evident in the emerging economies.  
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10.5.2 Buying-in   
Another aspect revealed by the study as differently expressed by managers interviewed 
relates to using what was described as buying-in in the data. Buying-in meant that managers 
used both formal and informal communication to engage, convince and to ensure a better 
understanding regarding a decision that need be taken. For instance in the case of Cross-River 
earlier referred, one senior executive, having led some key innovative projects recalled that: 
“Another thing that I did for CPC and even for some of the innovation we have 
deployed …apart from showing data of about where this has worked before; you take a 
portion of the business and deploy them and showcase. For instance, if you want to do 
something for the entire bank, I will say let us take a trade zone, and we use it as an example. 
So when the trade zone now comes out and says, we are making a revenue of x before you 
deployed this innovation, now you are making x+2 because of this innovation. By the time 
you deploy it with two or three more, oh! It is working, it becomes a very easier conversation 
and the entire bank will buy into it”. [CRSM3]. 
In Bayelsa, Delta, and Ebonyi, it also emerged that buying-in practice was used as good 
communication systems that facilitated decisions for e.g. core application project explained 
by ESM1. The different perspectives expressed in the data imply that to buy-in the key 
stakeholders, a manager needs to have self-belief in the idea or suggestion being promoted or 
being sold to others. In addition to that, another thing is for the manager to organise the idea 
simply and supporting evidence that may be required in selling the idea. From the above 
excerpt, it also shows that the quality of the presentation is very important. Evidence must be 
used to show the promise of the idea. Previous studies including Helfat & Peteraf (2015) and 
Ocasio et al (2017) have discussed the idea of negotiation rather than buying-in.  
Based on the findings in this study, while buying-in may be akin to negotiation, and in fact, 
includes negotiation. However, this study argues that the efficacy of negotiation may vary in 
terms of context and culture. Buying-in, as identified and explained, involves stronger skills 
beyond just negotiation to include idea-selling supported with evidence, ex-ante. This thus 
allows this research to make a case for buy-in as an important practice and process that can 
enable managers to make better decisions in relation to their firm’s environment, strategy and 
resource base in ways that ultimately support enhanced performance outcomes. As earlier 
mentioned, due to space, table 10.5 below is used to capture some evidence of the influence 
of cognitive capabilities on the exercise of DMC across the cases explored. 
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Table 10. 5 Comparative evidence of managerial cognition and DMC 
Managerial Cognition 
 
Abia Bayelsa Cross-River Delta Ebonyi 
 
Perception  
 
-identified threats from the 
external environment,                     
-Opportunities provided 
by Nigeria population 
-Sustainability opportunity 
Africa project/opportunity  
-Threats from the external 
business environment 
Nigeria’s population as 
opportunity; first among 
Africa expansion projects 
-Threats from the external 
business environment 
-Nigeria’s population as 
an opportunity 
- international space as 
new opportunities 
-Threats from the external 
business environment 
-Nigeria’s population as 
an opportunity 
-Sustainability strategy as 
an opportunity 
Threats in the external 
business environment 
Nigeria population 
opportunity 
Threats by Cybercrime 
International opportunity 
 
Attention/Attention 
diversity 
 
 
Rethink their business 
model 
Focusing on retail, value-
chain, financial inclusion  
Search for opportunity on 
sustainable banking via 
implementing triple 
bottom line 
Selected retail as a core 
business model 
Divesting   interest in 
corporate banking whilst 
focusing on SMEs/VCM, 
financial inclusion 
Retail banking as a brand 
and business model 
Search for opportunity led 
to its 1st international 
operation in the UK in 
2015. Pension 
administration and 
microfinance  
Challenged previous 
thinking 
Focusing on retail 
strategy and neglected 
areas in the past 
Considering retail to be 
viable 
Searching for opportunity 
in sustainability  
Maintaining interest in 
retail and corporate 
business segments 
 
International expansion  
Rethink focusing on 
corporates alone 
Searching for opportunity 
in SMEs/corporate value 
chain segment cautiously  
Continuous focus on 
expansion that led to new 
operation in Dubai 
 
 
Problems-solving 
capacity 
 
 
Used to address liquidity 
problem via rights issue;  
customer acquisition and 
mobilising deposits; cost 
reduction; business model  
innovation and service 
Improve risk management   
Investing in technology  
 
Drawn upon to address 
liquidity challenge via 
FDI/rights issue; adopting 
diversified retail business 
model; improved risk 
management; capacity 
building including 
investing in technology 
and digital banking  
Capital base optimised 
via saving in dollars idea;    
strong drive for customer 
acquisition  and financial 
capital building 
Restructured operations 
with focus on mass-
market; deploying 
technology to drive retail  
Cost curtailment initiative 
Investment in technology 
Proactive risk 
management 
 
Investments in 
technology, innovation 
and customer service 
Implementing retail 
banking but not as other 
competitors 
 
Income-generating  
 
Investing in technology, 
innovation, and 
employees 
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   10.6 Summary  
To summarise this chapter, and as mention at the start, the purpose of this chapter was to 
provide a cross-case analysis and synthesis of the key findings from the five cases 
investigated by the study. The analysis shows that economic downturn, regulation change, 
and stiffening competition were commonly expressed as embodying the critical and complex 
environmental challenges recently faced by the organisations and their managers. Based on 
comparative views too, the analysis also shows that the recent events, challenges, and the 
associated tensions highlighted a critical lacuna related to the effect of resource cognition. 
The chapter thereafter synthesised the cross-case financial performance implication of these 
issues and then, show that the issues acted as triggers to recent the commitment to cultural 
innovations and capacity building at firms’ level. The cross-case evidence and an analysis of 
those strategic responses suggests the influence of DMC and particularly captures that 
managers called upon attention diversity to respond to those challenges. Also related to the 
attention diversity, analysis shows that processes reflecting collegiate systems and buying-in 
were significantly useful in better strategic decision making, and DMC in the way 
demonstrated across the firms explored. The next chapter provides more discussion about 
these findings, the study’s key contributions, limitations, and suggestions. 
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                   Chapter Eleven 
     Discussion of Findings, Contribution, Limitation, and Suggestions 
11.1 Introduction 
This empirical research focused on investigating “the extent of dynamic managerial 
capabilities deployment and development in Nigeria”. The aim is to contribute to the 
knowledge of DMC empirically (Helfat & Martin, 2015; Adner & Helfat, 2003; Helfat et al, 
2007) from the emerging economies context (Easterby-Smith et al, 2009; Maitland & 
Sammartino, 2015; Fainshmidt et al, 2017; Teece, 2017). Despite that external environment 
influence are more critical in less-developed countries/economies compared to advanced 
economies (Makino et al, 2004; Rugman, 1991) there remains a paucity of research 
addressing the knowledge of DMC from the emerging economies context and less-developed 
countries especially (Maitland & Sammartino, 2015:21; Pandit et al, 2018).  
This study contributes in addressing this gap by uncovering what managers perceive and act 
upon (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Helfat et al, 2007) in relation to their external business 
environment and firm’s resource base (Helfat & Martin, 2015; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Becks 
& Wiersema 2013; Kor & Mesko, 2013; Danneels, 2011; Martin & Bacharach, 2018). 
Building on the ideas from Helfat & Peteraf (2015) and Helfat et al (2007), a baseline 
framework (figure 14 below) was developed as a guide to the empirical investigation of the 
question and objectives of the research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Baseline framework 2 
Source: Author 
     Managerial cognition: 
perception, attention, problem-
solving capacity 
External environment 
Strategic change Competitive 
Survival 
 Resource-base 
            DMC 
Asset Orchestration   
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This chapter builds on the cross-case analysis and synthesis of findings in the preceding 
chapter to discuss and formalise the key insights derived about dynamic managerial 
capabilities deployment and development in Nigeria. The emergent insights led to a new 
integrative DMC framework underpinning the key contributions of this study. Next is the 
contribution summary.    
11.2. Contributions Summary  
1. This study identified six, but critically analysed three categories of challenges faced 
by managers in the Nigerian banking industry. It emerged that unexpected economic 
downturn, unprecedented regulatory change regarding TSA, and stiffened 
competition, and the concomitant tensions, during the focal period of this research 
(precisely between 2014 and 2016) were significant challenges (inhibiting) factors for 
managers, which had implication for DMC in the Nigerian banking industry. This 
allows this study to contribute in addressing the gap in research about the factors in 
the external environment that may act as enabler/inhibitor of DMC (Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2009), and “how environmental factors affect cognition and capabilities” 
(Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000: 1159). Implications of those environmental challenges and 
key events for DMC and cognition are relevant in other findings by this study, next 
discussed.  
2. This study show that managers’ cognition about the country’s natural resources (crude 
oil income stream) and government-deposits as de facto financial resource base 
influenced the extent and manner in which managers in the industry deployed DMC 
in relation to opportunities search and selection, pattern of managers’ attention, and 
organisations’ business models, financial resource-base structure and their optimising. 
More specifically, ineffective cognition about those resources undermined managers’ 
attention towards other sectors of the economy with handsome potentials to their 
organisations and the commitment to asset orchestration for harnessing those 
potentials. This is in contrast to their recent attention and commitment to 
opportunities in other sectors of the economy and income sources after the challenges 
highlighted about finding (1) above.   
This observation thus allows this study to contribute in addressing the recent calls for 
more studies about how managers “conceptualise resources and competences” 
(Danneels, 2011:26), how cognition can be further identified (Eggers & Kaplan, 
2013) and gap in research about “the limits that some organisational context may 
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place on DMC” (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015: 846). It also believed that this study 
contributes significantly to the knowledge about “how an unexpected critical event or 
series of events can cause shifts in the belief and knowledge systems of executives” 
(Kor & Mesko, 2013:242) from the context of Nigeria. 
3. This study based on insights about what and how managers in the Nigeria banking 
industry perceived, interpreted and responded to the environmental challenges, and 
the two critical events referred, introduce the concept of attention diversity (AD). AD 
refers to “the degree of spread vs. concentration of a manager’s attention on and 
across possible opportunities and/or threats in relation to strategic change, competitive 
survival and success over time” (Author). In particular, the concept of attention 
diversity allows this study to contribute to research addressing the question of “what 
might constitute the drivers of better executive decisions as opposed simply to 
different executive decisions” (Becks & Wiersema, 2013:10) from the Nigeria 
banking industry context.  
4. This study finally contributes to a more nuanced understanding of communication 
practices that underpins DMC and attention diversity, by identifying two other 
concepts including buying-in and the collegiate system as processes relevant to better 
decisions making by managers in Nigeria (Becks & Wiersema, 2013:10). This finding 
also responds to the recent call by Ocasio et al (2017) for more studies about 
communication practices enabling strategic change implementation.   
Taken together, it is believed that finding by this study compensates for the paucity of 
research addressing the knowledge of DMC in underexplored contexts, particularly, 
Nigeria. It responds to calls for more research addressing the roles of managers in the 
exercise of dynamic capabilities (see: Adner & Helfat, 2003; Ambrosini & Bowman, 
2009; Becks & Wiersema, 2013; Helfat et al, 2007; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Eggers & 
Kaplan, 2013; Peteraf & Reed, 2007; Teece, 2012, 2017; Shoemaker et al, 2018). The 
succeeding section continues by expatiating on these findings.  
11.3. Environmental Complexities and Managerial Cognition 
The contributions provided by this study builds on earlier propositions in literature suggesting 
that it is important to further explores what managers perceive and acts upon in different 
environmental contexts (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009), and “how environmental factors 
affect cognition and capabilities” (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000: 1159; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). In 
other words, what are the key enablers and inhibitors of DMC deployment and development 
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in new underexplored environmental contexts (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009)? These 
suggestions led to the first objective of this research: to determine the key environmental 
challenges managers face that are relevant to dynamic managerial capabilities deployment 
in Nigeria. Discussion of findings addressing this objective is next explained and relied on in 
highlighting one of the key surprising findings by this research about resources cognition 
(Danneels, 2011), and its implication for DMC in the context omitted by previous 
developments.    
This study uncovered six categories of external environmental challenges managers face in 
the Nigerian banking industry. As detailed in the preceding chapters, the key environmental 
challenges include economic downturn, unprecedented regulatory change, stiffened 
competition, inadequate institutions, government policies summersault, and socio-cultural 
related challenges. However, of these six categories of environmental challenges, findings 
also show that three categories (aspects): economic downturn, regulatory changes, and 
stiffened competition and their associated tensions, were seen as having the most significant 
implication for DMC and the firms’ competitive survival in the industry since 2014 
especially. While the analysis of the three other aspects remains sketchy in this thesis due to 
space, they also highlight salient insights, which the researcher hopes to incorporate in 
subsequent developments. Concentration on three aspects accentuated by the research 
evidence i.e. economic downturn, regulatory change, and stiffened competition is necessary 
mainly to highlight the connection between especially the unexpected events identified and 
its implication for DMC in the context of this study.  It will also show how the contributions 
provided by this research responds to the research gap/suggestion by Kor & Mesko (2013) as 
earlier highlighted in the introduction chapter and in the section above as well.      
At the core of some tensions/implications of those three categories of challenges for Nigerian 
banks and managers include the problem of liquidity, risk asset quality decline (and rise in 
non-performing loans), and pressure on achievable profits. However, while probes and 
answers as comparatively analysed in chapter 10 were mainly aimed at addressing objective 
(1) above, and considered foundational to uncovering how and the extent managers acted or 
responded in ways depicting DMC. Interestingly and surprisingly too, insights about resource 
cognition in another context arguably omitted by previous studies (e.g. Danneels, 2011) 
began to emerge. Discussion in the section below addresses the emergent insights before 
focusing on the research about how DMC influence competitive survival in Nigeria.  
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11.3.1 Natural-Resources, Government-deposits and managerial cognition  
In particular, one surprising finding by this research was about how managers’ cognition 
about the country’s (i.e. Nigeria) natural resources (crude-oil income) and government 
financial-deposits in Nigerian banks jointly led to what this research has termed “natural 
resource-trap” as admitted across the samples explored by this research. Danneels (2011) 
introduced the concept of resource cognition defined as the identification of resources and 
their fungibility. Danneels (2011) after tracing events that led to the demise of Smith Corona,  
uncovered that ineffective cognition of the company’s two key resources (a) their brand and 
(b) customers’ understanding, impacted the way the managers attempted to exercise the 
dynamic capability to renew the organisation in terms of which opportunities they pursued, 
and which they did not. Similar to Danneels (2011), the findings by this study show that 
ineffective resource cognition negatively impacted how and the extent managers attempted to 
implement DCs in the Nigeria banking industry and further responds to the call for more 
studies on how managers “conceptualise resources and competences” (Danneels, 2011:26)  
Nigeria is blessed with abundant natural resources– crude oil especially (Nakpodia, 2016). 
Regrettably, the Nigerian economy over the years has been largely dependent on crude oil 
income with little effort to diversify its economy (Okotie, 2018). Evidence from this study 
suggests that the natural resources in the country, in particular, the crude oil unwittingly 
became what the researcher in this study considered as ‘natural resource trap’ at national, 
industry, organisational and individual managers’ levels. Natural resource trap can be defined 
as the degree in which the natural resources in a place could be limiting or contribute to 
blurring peoples’ proclivity for different and better resources and its associated opportunities 
(Author). Despite this resource trap, or put another way, source of inertia; Nigeria by 2014 
has moved to be Africa’s largest economy and the 26th largest economy in the world as 
widely reported in the media (e.g. The Telegraph 07 April 2014. See, www.telegraph.co.uk).  
Regrettably, the Nigerian economy slid into recession by 2016 (CBN communique no.109, 
MPC committee meeting 19-20 September 2016) due to problems in the oil and gas sector of 
the economy, particularly, an offshoot of the decline in crude oil prices which began in 2014 
(IMF country report, 2017). By 2015, the Nigerian government through the central bank 
(CBN) on their part also introduced the treasury single account policy – a policy directive 
that mandated the CBN to recall all government funds/deposits from commercial and other 
banks in Nigeria e.g. microfinance banks (Zubairu, 2015). These two critical events were 
unexpected by the industry players as confirmed by evidence obtained by this study but 
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interestingly allows this study to uncover important insights contributing in responding to 
Danneels (2011) and Eggers (2013) suggestions for further research about resource cognition, 
and the limits that some organisational context may place on dynamic managerial capabilities 
(Helfat & Peteraf, 2015) .   
This study shows that incorrect cognition about the country’s natural resources (crude-oil) 
income streams, and government financial-deposits, which traditionally served as de-facto 
capital base of Nigerian banks by their managers; jointly led to significant assets base erosion 
and liquidity problems for the banks.  These problems strongly threatened the survival of 
many banks in Nigerian as those sources unexpectedly became challenged following the two 
critical events from 2014 and 2015 as explained. More specifically, the ease with which 
banks were making huge profits through revenue from the oil and gas sector, and deposits 
from government (mostly from the crude oil revenue too) being controlled over the past 
years, influenced how managers in the industry tried to deploy DMC and asset orchestration 
– where they searched for opportunities and where not. For instance, the opportunities 
presented by Nigerian’s rising population, SMEs and other sectors of the economy with 
handsome potentials were utterly neglected by managers until those income sources became 
challenged.  
To make clear the point of departure from the earlier contribution by Danneels (2011), this 
study enhances the understanding of resource cognition by highlighting two other types of 
resources: natural resources-related assets/income (crude oil), and government-deposits, not 
captured in earlier theorisation. Unlike Danneels's (2011) findings in the case of Smith 
Corona with only negative experience, the present study offers evidence of both negative and 
positive experiences. Managers’ seem to acknowledge their mistake (or past failure) based on 
their experience from those two critical events (Cope, 2003; 2011), honed their cognition 
regarding those income sources and responded with “managerially directed asset 
orchestration” (2017:695) that evidently helped the firms to maintain competitive survival.  
Based on this new insight about how managers wrongly perceived the stated income streams 
as reliable income sources, and how the managers when freed from that mind-set, or inertia 
later responded with asset orchestration processes, in ways plausibly underpinned by 
attention diversity. This study not only contributes in addressing the question about “how 
environmental factors affect cognition and capabilities” (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000: 1159), but 
also how managers “conceptualise resources and competences” (Danneels, 2011:26) and 
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organisational contexts factors that may place limits on managers DMC (Helfat & Peteraf, 
2015). Moreover, the findings allow this study to directly contribute to the knowledge of 
“how an unexpected critical event or series of events can cause shifts in the belief and 
knowledge systems of executives” (Kor & Mesko, 2013:242) in organisations in the 
emerging economies especially. An integrative framework illustrating the research findings is 
presented in figure 11.2 below and then, followed by the discussion about the concept of 
attention diversity developed by this study.   
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Figure 15 Integrative Framework 
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The basic assumption of the above framework is that ineffective cognition of firms’ resource 
base had a significant moderating effect on the extent of DMC implementation by managers 
in the Nigerian banking industry. However, following the environmental challenges 
highlighted by this research, especially the economic downturn, the TSA policy, and the 
associated tensions. Managers called upon attention diversity to address the incorrect 
cognition of their resource base through congruent strategic responses that evidently reflected 
managerially directed asset orchestration (Teece, 2017) to ensure competitive survival. The 
framework also suggests that the collegiate system and buying-in contribute to managers’ 
‘attention diversity’ and DMC deployment. Further discussion about the concept of attention 
diversity developed by this study is next.   
11.4 Attention Diversity and DMC in the emerging economies   
This study has identified attention diversity as cognitive behaviour and driving force related 
to strategic responses reflecting asset orchestration processes observed from the samples 
investigated. Discussion in this section further reflects on earlier theorisation on DMC to 
make a case for a more integrative framework that illuminates a better understanding of the 
concept as presented by this research. Previous studies have identified that DMC comprises 
asset orchestration (Helfat et al, 2007; Sirmon & Hitt, 2009).  Helfat et al (2007:25) clarified 
that asset orchestration includes ‘search and selection in relation to opportunity identification, 
implementing new business model, making astute investment choices and accessing critical 
co-specialised assets’. Search and selection are akin to strategic decisions-making (Helfat et 
al, 2007).  From the above model, this research brings to fore the limiting or negative effect 
of ineffective resource cognition related (1) crude oil income and (2) government deposit.  
Previous studies have also established the basis of effective strategic decisions making or 
otherwise depends on managerial cognition (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Helfat & Peteraf, 
2015). This became the basis for the recent extension provided by Helfat & Peteraf's (2015) 
idea of managerial cognitive capabilities. Figure 15 above highlights how key elements of 
managerial cognitive capabilities including perception, attention, problem-solving capacity 
and communication forms the antecedents of DMC and asset orchestration  (Helfat & Peteraf, 
2015; Teece, 2017). In this study, the finding implies that DCs across all five cases largely 
includes innovation and capacity building (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Wang & Ahmed, 
2007). Initial steps for implementing innovation and capacity building as observed involve 
search and selection (decisions-making) (Helfat et al, 2007) driven by managers’ cognition 
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shift and flexibility (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Lauriero-Martinez & 
Brusoni, 2018) compared to their mindset prior to the 2014 and 2015 critical events, earlier 
discussed.  
As the integrative framework presented above show, ineffective cognition about natural 
resources in Nigeria, precisely crude oil and government deposit acted as constraint to DMC 
in the Nigeria banking industry until the unexpected drop in crude oil prices which began in 
late 2014, and unprecedented introduction of TSA policy in 2015 (Zubairu, 2015). Triggered 
by tensions generated by those critical events, findings show that attention diversity acted as 
a plausible driver of asset orchestration related to the two organisational level DC (innovation 
and capacity building) by management of banks in Nigeria. To that extent, findings by this 
research also lends credence to previous studies, which characterise DMC in practice as a 
managerial process mainly driven by managers’ cognition (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Eggers & 
Kaplan, 2009; 2013; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015;Martins & Bachrach, 2018; Ambrosini & 
Altintas, 2019).  
Moreover, previous studies have also found that attention patterns (myopic or farsighted) 
connects to how managers may respond to external environmental stimuli under conditions of 
uncertainty (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009). Laamanen & Wallin (2009) through the analysis 
software firms show that managers who paid the most attention to customers need developed 
capabilities to improve their offering. Tripsas & Gavetti (2000) discovered that attention to 
new technologies helped Polaroid to develop their capability on digital imaging. From a 
political policy perspective, Boydstun, Bevan & Thomas III (2014) posits that political 
attention to a given policy matters. This study is related to these previous contributions 
because it aligns with the understanding that managerial attention matters but distinct by 
highlighting the importance of attention distribution to both opportunities and threats in the 
business environment explored and better decision-making.  
In particular, this study shows that attention diversity is critical for competitive survival in the 
emerging economies. Building on Boydstun, et al (2014:174) idea, attention diversity can be 
described as the “the degree of spread (vs. concentration) of managers' attention on and 
across possible opportunities and/or threats in relation to strategic change, competitive 
survival and success over time”. One of the most profound insights from this study was about 
how the over-concentration of banks and their managers on income streams from the oil and 
gas sector and government deposits led to the neglect of other sectors despite the huge 
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potentials they hold. This, in turn, led to significant liquidity problems when two unexpected 
events (economic downturn, and the introduction of TSA in Nigeria) occurred. Fast-forward, 
this study notes that lessons were learned and across the five cases investigated, managers 
responded with attention diversity helping to initiate innovations and capacity building 
actions reflected in figure 15.  
One of the strongest evidence of attention diversity contribution uncovered by this study was 
regarding swiftly adapting/modifying firms’ business models (and implementing diversified 
banking) in all five cases investigated. Ebonyi claimed that they “cautiously came down the 
ladder” – referring to their recent implementation of the retail banking model while holding 
unto corporate banking models as their core interest. Similarly Delta, Abia, and Cross-River 
all declaring more focus on the retail model, while Bayelsa talked about fully or 100% 
focusing on the retail banking model thus divesting their interest in the corporate banking 
model. Whether more focused or fully focused on the retail-banking model, a stronger 
illumination of the importance of attention diversity was also explained on the basis that the 
retail banking model itself characteristically and in the context of this study requires the 
management to further distribute attention towards many other things essentially key to 
implementing retail. For instance, managers differently talked about investments in 
technology, new customers’ acquisition, measured approaches to cost containment, and 
human capital building to name a few.  
Furthermore, analysis shows that four out of the five cases explored alluded to stronger 
benefits and assurance of more sustainable business because they diversified their attention 
by modifying their business models to now having more significant attention to business 
segments earlier on ignored or given little attention. In the case of Bayelsa, their approach 
signifies a complete switch from the prior concentration of corporate and public sector related 
banking models to a concentration on the retail banking model. However, little evidence was 
found to suggest that they have fared better than others by more concentration on the retail 
banking model whilst completely unwind interest in corporate sector banking. The concept of 
attention diversity also allows this study to integrate further findings regarding two other 
cognitive processes that evidently underpinned better and effective decision-making related 
to resource base transformation in the organisations by managers. The next session expands 
on this.    
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11.5 DMC: Collegiate System and Buying-in 
    
Objective 3: How to find a balance between the existing routine and better decision making.  
1n addressing the above research objective, findings from this research highlighted a number 
of related themes as contained in table 10.4.1 and discussed in the preceding chapter. Based 
on the context in which managers discussed the concepts, it became clear that managers 
individually and as a team, all have parts to play and the organisational routines as well. In 
other words, the support of the managers and organisational system and culture were all 
required. After evaluating the themes and context in which managers used them, this study 
captured the enabling processes to include mainly communication in ways particularly 
involving collegiate system, and buying-in as processes enabling effective decisions making 
in Nigeria.  
 11.5.1 Collegiate system  
The collegiate system is a communication practice that depicts an enabling environment and 
structure, which allows synergy for mutual interaction, communication and decision making. 
Using a collegiate system, managers felt free to voice their considerations and propositions 
with an assurance of respect, constructive engagement and consensus where possible in 
relation to strategy and decision-making. Hodgkinson & Healey (2011:1510) suggest that an 
“emotionally secure psychological environment” is an important cognitive mechanism, which 
enables strategic change. So, through collegiate system decisions can be arrived at with more 
transparency, engagement, and openness. It is about interfacing with different stakeholders 
to, for example, discuss plans of action, listening and offering feedback to what a 
stakeholder’s perception about strategic issues of importance. These findings concur with 
Ocasio et al (2017) recent analysis of the role of communication in facilitating co-orientation 
and management attention on strategic initiatives and activities enabling strategic change in 
organisation. In other words, faced with series of critical scenarios or perhaps when one is 
constrained by organisational path (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015, this study show, and add to extant 
knowledge by suggesting that collegiate system can enable managers not only to make 
different strategic choices but also better managerial choices (Beck & Wiersema, 2013).  
11.5.2 Buying-in 
The findings of this study also show that buying-in underpins effective decision-making. 
Managers differently spoke about strategic decisions making related to recent investments in 
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innovative technology, implementing new business models, structure and processes change, 
new business solution offering, their development, and cultural shift. In this regard, the 
ability to convince or to buy-in relevant stakeholders that such initiatives are necessary and 
the right way to go was very important. In this study, participants in the study explained that 
the industry is a highly regulated one and therefore, strategic decisions must be taken not only 
by satisfying that the overall best business interest of the organisation and other key 
stakeholders are served but also that no regulatory infractions may be caused. Based on 
consistent use of this theme, and the way it was used, it became clear that the concept of 
buying-in involves (1) belief in an idea, (2) organise the idea clearly and convincingly, and 
then (3) getting others to believe in your idea regarding an important strategic proposition.    
Buying-in reflects a number of the views expressed by Ocasio et al (2017) and Helfat & 
Peteraf (2015) about the role of communication in enabling strategic change and asset 
orchestration. Helfat & Peteraf (2015:843) talked about the language can be used to 
communicate broad, and overarching goals is necessary in order to foster alignment among 
disparate parts of an organisation. The authors also add that the communication style of top 
managers in general, and the way they communicate vision …can inspire workers and 
encourage initiatives (Helfat & Peteraf 2015). This study argues that while self-belief and 
communication remains critical, you may not really have DMC in practice if it only exists in 
your mind-set, and in your perception, a good idea, or because you communicated a set of 
ideas, perhaps unconvincing. In other words, the self-belief and how it is communicated must 
compel strategic decision making by convincing others on a strategic matter related to 
innovation at the organisation’s level to suffice.  
Therefore, the extent to which a belief is translated to strategic decision for innovation is 
dependent on the extent to which the initiator buy-in or influences the belief of others on a 
strategic matter. The findings of this study strongly affirm this. This study demonstrates that 
managers through buy-in were able to influence better decisions related to strategic change. 
Taken together, through these findings, this study thus responds to the call by Ocasio et al 
(2017) about research to identify other communication practices enabling DMC. It also 
contributes to addressing the question by Becks & Wiersema (2013) about what may 
constitute drivers of better executive decisions as opposed to simply different decisions. 
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11.6. Implication for Managers  
This study offers several practical business implications for managers. Findings by this 
research are consistent with the perspectives of other strategy scholars highlighting that DMC 
including managerial cognition capability and effective leadership are fundamental in the 
asset orchestration that can ultimately lead to competitive survival or advantage. (e.g. Adner 
& Helfat 2003; Ambrosini & Altintas 2019 Danneels, 2011; Helfat et al, 2007; Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2015; Day & Schoemaker, 2016; Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Martins & Bachrach, 
2018; Huy & Zott, 2019; Rosenbloom, 2000; Schoemaker et al, 2018; Teece, 2007; 2012; 
2017).  
First, managers especially those in more complex settings like Nigeria should note that their 
cognition capabilities and attention diversity in relation to their organisation’s resource base 
and environment are critical to the DMC required for long-term competitive survival, and 
staying ahead of rivals (Fainshmidt et al, 2017; Teece, 2017). Managers thus must seek to 
develop their resource cognition capability and maintain their organisation’s long-term 
success through honest and prudent assessment of their resources base (Danneels, 2011). 
Secondly, managers should seek to enhance their DMC and attention model (Ocasio et al, 
2017) and decisions making capabilities (Beck & Wiersema, 2013) through attention 
diversity rather.  This will ensure that they and their organisations are not relying on the 
perceived benefits of naturally endowed resources and/or other institutions/sectoral 
entrenched norms that may unwittingly become sources of inertia exposable when things 
change in unexpected ways as revealed by this study. By valuing attention diversity, they are 
more likely to fully search, select and exploit other available or underexplored opportunities, 
problems solution and even those they could create.   
Thirdly, to exploit perceived opportunities or respond to change in the business environment, 
managers should engage communication processes involving collegiate system, and buying-
in as key mechanisms for necessary asset orchestration. Other communication practices have 
been previously, discussed as underpinning cognitive capability (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015) 
attention management (Ocasio et al, 2017) and decision-making (Kunc & Morecroft, 2010; 
Kor & Mesko, 2013). Additional communication mechanisms such as collegiate system, and 
buying-in as revealed by this study should be, spurred in order to facilitate the mental model 
for asset orchestration in ways that can enable competitive survival or performance 
improvement.   
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11.7 Limitations of the study and suggestions 
As with any empirical research endeavour, this research has many limitations some of which 
also provide avenues for future lines of research. One of the limitations of this study is 
regarding the research methodology employed and in particular, the data collection process. 
As Hoskisson et al (2000:257) earlier acknowledged, ‘research on strategies in emerging 
economies faces several difficulties, especially, data collection problems’. An investigation 
on the concept of DMC and asset orchestration characteristically places restraints due to how 
to access the calibre of informants and the sensitivity of information required. Access to the 
needed informants for this research was challenging beyond the expectation of the researcher. 
For instance, some potential informants who initially accepted to assist the researcher with 
interview opportunity could not respond to contacts put to them when the data collection 
commenced in earnest and they were needed for the interview. Some could not guarantee 
when exactly it would be possible to meet with them; their busy schedules mostly cited. This 
necessitated a change to the researcher’s initial plan to travel to Nigeria for data collection.  
Following Rowley (2012) suggestion, the researcher consequently relied on interviews 
conducted over the telephone; twenty-seven interviews altogether but twenty-four was used 
in the end. The remaining three unused interviews were mainly because the participants did 
not meet the senior/middle management position criteria. One of the senior executives who 
earlier agreed to an interview with the researcher, elected to speak with the researcher when 
he arrived in the UK for an official assignment on the date he gave but later sent a message to 
explain that he lost a relative and had to quickly return to Nigeria. While it would have been 
useful and preferable to have a face-to-face interview with the participants, it was also 
realised that the telephone interview option worked well. 
All but one of the participants are people the researcher never met before. The participants 
seemed more comfortable to speak on the phone since it tend to preserve their security 
perhaps, anonymity as assured already, and to speak at their best comfort places. Despite the 
stated constraints, the telephone interviews allowed the study to obtain rich and valuable data 
used to address the questions of this study. Some impactful contributions to DMC e.g. 
Danneels (2011) have also relied on telephone interviews. This suggests that the use of 
telephone as against face-to-face interview does not demean the quality of conversation and 
richness of the data as one may presume, especially if the right questions were asked (Yin, 
2009), and probed if necessary.  
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Nonetheless, the data collection process was not without pockets of biases. The researcher 
noted that during the interviews, some of the participants did not want to answer some 
questions about key strategic decisions perceived as being either too sensitive or demands 
revealing classified information. Such positions were respected. In some cases, some 
responses by the participants seemed somewhat inconsistent with reality. This is mainly from 
some senior managers/executives who did not want to expose/admit the mistakes of their 
bank. A typical example was one of the senior executives who claimed that there were 
proactive and that the TSA policy did not affect them much. On the contrary, a middle-level 
manager from the same organisation explained that their bank was adversely affected, by the 
policy. However, the CLS and data contained in the bank’s annual report confirmed the latter 
to be more realistic. This also shows that a combination of data sources as employed 
enhanced the research validity.  
Despite that, the semi-structured interview approach allowed for answers to questions to be 
probed further and in some situations to vary the sequence of questions or return to and 
reframe some questions differently in ways that helped to obtain richer information and 
details. As already mentioned, the researcher also obtained important information through the 
annual report, CLS, press releases and media reports. For some of those written materials, it 
would have been useful to probe further on what was written in order to get more answers or 
clarity. Nevertheless, it is believed that semi-structured interviews with the managers 
interviewed and other media interviews accessed by the researcher complements this and also 
helped to ensure that only verifiable facts have been relied on by this study.  
Another limitation is the scope of this study. DMC is context-dependent (Ambrosini & 
Altintas, 2019) and as such, findings by this study may not be fully generalizable beyond the 
Nigerian banking industry and some emerging economies context. However, it is considered 
that the Nigerian banking industry shares similar characteristics with many other highly 
regulated and rapidly evolving service industries in other countries especially, the emerging 
economies. Therefore, insights from this study can be applied to industries such as insurance 
in other emerging/developing economies. However, having restricted the research to samples 
from the Nigerian banking industry, it, therefore, allows the opportunity for future studies to 
complement this study by investigating other fast-changing sectors such as the IT, automotive 
industry and even public sector institutions.   
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Moreover, while the range data/focal period analysed by this study may reflect a longitudinal 
research, analysis over a longer period say ten years could have been more worthy. This is 
admittedly limiting for this study. However, it is also a strength of the study by concentrating 
on a critical period in the industry to determine how DMCs were exercised. Despite the 
contribution of this study, it remains important to emphasise that there remains a scarcity of 
research and literature on the idea of DMC from the emerging economy context. Certain 
aspects about the concept as discussed here can be further explained, or improved upon. For 
instance, future research could aim to further explore how and the extent to which DMC are 
developed and deployed in other emerging economies with less dependency on crude oil, and 
less-public sector driven economies. Additional insights could emerge from such contexts.  
In addition, given the impact of public-sector organisations in emerging economies, a context 
in which thus far known to have received less research attention (Pablo et al 2007; Piening, 
2013), future analysis could aim to explore the nature of DMC in public sector organisations 
from the emerging economies context. Furthermore, the concept of attention diversity 
introduced by this study requires more precise theorisation and operationalization. For 
example, in this study, inferences by this study have relied largely on how managers 
described their attention in terms fully focused or more-focused, redirection and distribution 
in comparison to what they were in the past. The researcher thus believes that a stronger 
measured approach can be developed. Future studies could prioritise this.  
Finally, this study by probing the cognitive frame associated with managers’ responses under 
the condition of extraordinary challenges in Nigeria has demonstrated that natural resources 
and the scale of public or private sector domination in a country’s economy have critical 
implications for DMC deployment and development. More research effort to explore the role 
of other different types of natural resources on capabilities at organisational and managerial 
levels would be a fruitful endeavour. Notwithstanding the limitations of this study as 
acknowledged, it is believed that this thesis provides useful insights and particularly brings to 
fore the knowledge of DMC from the context of Nigeria.  
11.8 Conclusion  
In conclusion, why/how do some organisations survive, and/or further maintain a competitive 
advantage in a complex business environment? This study began by highlighting that this 
age-long question in strategy research is central in the dynamic [managerial] capabilities 
research mission (Salvato & Vasollo, 2018; Helfat & Martin, 2015). Based on the promise of 
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the concept, and extant gaps in literature, this study responds to the observation in scholarship 
that interrelationships between DMC, DCs and competitive advantage, and critical challenges 
that may affect managers’ efficacy in those roles have not been fully explored. Up till date, 
the empirical evidence of DMC remains scant (Helfat & Martin, 2015; Correa et al, 2019) 
and, only “few studies have examined the relationship between DMC and firm performance 
under extremely unfavourable macro-environmental conditions” (Fainshmidt et al, 
2017:1089) from the emerging economies context (Maitland & Sammartino, 2015; Teece, 
2017).  
This study focused on investigating DMC deployment and development in the Nigerian 
banking industry and is notably one of the few research efforts that have explored the concept 
from emerging economies context, Nigeria in particular. It thus compensates for the paucity 
of empirical literature on DMC from the context of Nigeria. Based on a critical realism 
philosophy involving a qualitative case study of firms in the Nigerian banking industry, this 
study has identified environmental factors that acted as inhibitors to DMC on one hand, and 
on the other hand triggers of DMC deployment and development now helping to maintain 
competitive survival of firms in Nigeria. Specifically, this study has explained how 
managers’ incorrect cognition about crude oil income streams and government deposits, 
traditionally enjoyed in Nigerian banks constituted a moderating effect on managers’ 
commitment to DMCs deployment and development in the industry. The findings allow this 
study to contribute to the literature on resource cognition through new insights regarding 
external and organisational contexts that can place limits on cognition and DMC development 
and deployment (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). 
This study based on the tension triggered by the unexpected economic downturn from late 
2014, the unprecedented introduction of TSA policy in Nigeria in 2015, and competitive 
intensity partly exacerbated by those two events mentioned, in addition to shifts in 
technology and customers’ need today, albeit globally (Schoemaker et al, 2018) identified the 
importance of attention diversity. Attention diversity was central in how managers responded 
with assets orchestration that contributed to the survival and repositioning for the long-term 
success of many banks in Nigeria. It means that attention diversity is an important enabler of 
better decision-making (Becks & Wiersema, 2013) and DMC (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). 
Managers through attention diversity influenced better decisions-making and organisational 
DC (asset orchestration) mainly appearing in the form of innovation including shifts in 
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organisational culture, and capacity building in Nigerian banks. Relatedly, this study also 
identified that communication practices involving collegiate system and buying-in supported 
DMC through attention diversity and asset orchestration at firm levels. This led this study to 
introduce and makes a case for attention diversity as an important driver of DMC that can 
help managers and their organisation to address inertia whilst ensuring good resource 
cognition (Danneels, 2011), in terms of managements’ perception and attention distribution 
to opportunities and solutions in ways allowing better decision making related to resource 
base changes and improvements.  
Finally, this thesis acknowledges its limitations and underscores the need for future studies. 
Despite its limitations, this study has contributed to bringing to fore the knowledge of DMC 
from the context of Nigeria. The researcher hopes that future studies would advance the 
contributions provided by this research in order to further enrich our knowledge of the 
influence of cognition and DMC. In particular, through more research exploring the 
knowledge of DMC in the emerging economies, scholars could bring us to fuller theorisation 
of the DMC and DC concepts and lead us closer to addressing the age-long question of 
strategy – how firms can achieve and maintain a sustainable competitive advantage.  
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Appendix 2  
    
                            RESEARCH ORGANISATION INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
                                            Faculty of Business and Law 
University of Northumbria 
Completion of this form is required whenever research is being undertaken by Business and Law staff 
or students within any organisation. This applies to research that is carried out on the premises, or is 
about an organisation, or members of that organisation or its customers, as specifically targeted as 
subjects of research. 
The researcher must supply an explanation to inform the organisation of the purpose of the study, who 
is carrying out the study, and who will eventually have access to the results.  In particular issues of 
anonymity and avenues of dissemination and publications of the findings should be brought to the 
organisations’ attention. 
Researcher’s Name: Chinedu Ochie 
Student ID No (if applicable):12037034 
Researcher’s Statement: 
The Head Human Resources  
XXX Bank Plc Lagos, Nigeria, 
My name is Mr. Chinedu Ochie, a doctoral researcher at Newcastle Business School, Northumbria 
University, UK. This academic research project is focused on Dynamic Managerial Capabilities 
Deployment in Emerging Economies: a managerial perspective of the Nigerian Banking 
Industry. The purpose of the research is to contribute to the knowledge of dynamic capabilities 
deployment in practical business realities. I am writing to request your assistance by giving me an 
opportunity for an interview with you via telephone or Skype on a suitable date/venue/time.  
A purposive sampling technique has been used to select participants in the research and you are being 
approached formally. This means that your organisation has been purposefully identified for this 
study because of her significance as a key player in the industry and relevance to the research focus, 
and you in particular because of your position as senior level manager in Union Bank Plc and based 
on the consideration that your valuable knowledge and experiences would contribute to both dynamic 
capabilities theory and practice vis-à-vis this research project. Please note that the research interview 
will involve not more than one hour telephone/Skype conversations with you at a suitable time and 
place of your choice. For quick documentation, I intend to record the conversations electronically (if I 
am permitted). Your participation in the interview is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw 
your participation at any time/stage you choose without any regrettable consequences. 
Perhaps you may feel uncomfortable to share certain aspects of your experiences or opinion especially 
about sensitive information or some strategic practices of your organisation; I wish to let you know 
that your right to shield such information or any aspects which you may not want to share will be 
absolutely respected. Moreover, I can assure you that any information which could identify you or any 
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other manager and your place of work will be strictly protected in line with the Data Protection Act 
1998 in the UK and in compliance with the Northumbria University research ethics policy and 
guidelines. For example, while it is expected that the research will lead to academic publications in 
the form of a thesis, and journal articles, only codes and pseudonyms will be used in the discussion of 
interview data. In other words, information about your identity, address, and place of work will be 
anonymized.  Please see a copy of the confirmation of ethical approval for my research.  
The following resources and arrangement are especially in place for storage and to ensure the highest 
level of data protection: 
(a)  The telephone/Skype interview with you will be conducted from a private office located at the 
Newcastle Business School in Northumbria University and without the presence of any third party. 
(b) The interview record will be transcribed personally. No third party will be used. 
(c) The interview transcripts will be anonymised. Other paper documents including this consent form 
be kept confidential and separate from all other research materials like journal articles and textbooks. 
Please note that it may be unhelpful and almost impossible to anonymise voice files/records.  
 (d) In the research office, I have access to a steel locker/file cabinet and their keys with which I hope 
to store hard copy documents such that they are not accessible to any other person(s).  
 (e) My PC and network U-drive at the university where I store my electronic files are all protected 
with strong passwords. So as much as the university network security permits, my personal files are 
well secured. 
(f) My house in Newcastle to the best of my knowledge has no history of burglary and it is under a 
special security surveillance company apart from the Northumbria police. My home computer to the 
best of my knowledge is safe, used by me alone, and is password protected. 
(g) Data collected from you will remain confidential and will be destroyed within six months after the 
research is completed or immediately if you choose to withdraw your participation.  
There are no costs to you and your organisation in the research process only the time for participating 
in the interview. However, it is more likely that you and other executives in Union bank would find 
the outcome of the research insightful, timely, and can help to improve the business performance of 
the bank through the application of the insights derived. It is expected that research would provide 
unique contributions to knowledge in the strategic management field and fresh insights into the 
dynamic capabilities theory especially. It will also offer practical prescriptions to business executives 
about new ways of how to more astutely develop and deploy capabilities within their organisation to 
enhance their competitiveness and success in emerging economies and beyond. A copy of the research 
output can be emailed to you on your request. If you accept to participate and to assist me in my 
research, please complete the section below and email this consent form back to me as soon as 
possible. If you have further concerns about this research, please do not hesitate to contact me via 
email: chinedu.ochie@northumbria.ac.uk; phone: +447411984330 or my supervisor: Prof Gregory 
Ludwig via email: gregory.ludwig@northumbria.ac.uk. 
Yours Sincerely, 
Chinedu Ochie  
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Any organisation manager or representative who is empowered to give consent may do so here: 
Name: ________________________________________________________ 
Position/Title: __________________________________________________ 
Organisation Name: _____________________________________________ 
Location: ______________________________________________________ 
If the organisation is the Faculty of Business and Law please completed the following: 
Start/End Date of Research /  
Consultancy project: 
Start: 
End: 
Programme 
Year 
Sample to be used: seminar group, 
entire year etc.  
 
Has Programme Director/Leader, 
Module Tutor being consulted, 
informed. 
 
Anonymity must be offered to the organisation if it does not wish to be identified in the research 
report. Confidentiality is more complex and cannot extend to the markers of student work or the 
reviewers of staff work, but can apply to the published outcomes. If confidentiality is required, what 
form applies?  
 [   ] No confidentiality required 
 [   ] Masking of organisation name in research report 
 [   ] No publication of the research results without specific organisational consent 
[   ] Other by agreement as specified by addendum 
 
Signature: __________________________________ Date: ______________ 
This form can be signed via email if the accompanying email is attached with the signer’s personal 
email address included.  The form cannot be completed by phone, rather should be handled via post. 
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 Appendix 3 - Profile and background of cases  
                                          The case of Abia 
Abia is regarded as one of the ‘new generation’ Nigerian commercial banks. Established in 
the late 1980s, the organisation has since developed to become a multinational bank through 
a network of over 300 branches across Nigeria, Africa, and service outlets in the United 
Kingdom. Abia (for short) currently ranks among the three largest banks in Nigeria, listed 
among Africa’s largest twenty-five banks and among Top 1000 global banks (Annual report, 
2016). Abia lists on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.  During the 2004/2005 consolidation 
programme by the CBN, Abia acquired one of the banks identified as technically insolvent 
and successfully integrated (Source: Annual report, 2016). The organisation prides itself as 
being renowned in offering a comprehensive range of financial products and services in key 
business segments including commercial banking, corporate and investment banking, and 
business and personal banking, also known as retail. The key customer segments and client 
base of the organisation comprise manufacturing, oil & gas, telecommunication, beverages, 
construction, parastatals, high net-worth individuals and middle income professionals 
(Source: Annual report, 2016).  
 
                                               The Case of Bayelsa  
Bayelsa prides itself as Nigeria’s leading retail bank with strong offerings in corporate and 
business banking as well. Originally established in the early 1990s as a private limited 
liability company, the organisation in 2005 became a Public Limited Liability Company 
(PLC). Bayelsa is regarded as one of Nigeria’s new generation banks showing significant 
development and continuously achieving great fit both locally and internationally since its 
creation. Bayelsa lists on the Nigerian Stock Exchange and on Global Depository Receipts 
(GDRs) on the London Stock Exchange. Bayelsa ranks among the top ten banks in Nigeria by 
the CBN, Africa’s top twenty-five banks and among the only nine Nigeria’s commercial 
banks ranked among Top 1000 Global banks by The Financial Times magazine in 2017. 
Bayelsa also takes pride in being the first Nigerian bank to operate in the Francophone West 
Africa with branches in countries including Ivory Coast, Republic of Benin, Senegal and 
Togo. By 2013, the organisation extended its operation beyond Africa when it established a 
subsidiary in the UK. Bayelsa boasts of over 270 branches across major cities, towns, and 
states in Nigeria an evidence of strong presence both in the Nigerian space and beyond 
(Source: Annual report, 2016).  
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                                         The Case of Cross River 
Cross River Bank (CRB) hereafter, was originally established in the late 1970’s to operate as 
a stockbroking, issuing house and registrar firm in Nigeria. About five years later, following 
its success as a broker and issuing house, it metamorphosed and became a merchant bank and 
a deposit taker. CRB prides itself on being the first merchant bank in Nigeria to declare N1 
billion in terms of profitability at the time. CRB again transformed from a merchant bank to a 
commercial bank by 2004 and was listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange the same year 
(Annual report). CRB is also a public limited liability company. CRB was only ranked among 
Tier 2 Nigeria banks compared with her other rivals involved in this study that were all listed 
among Tier 1 capital banks. CRB through an initial public offer (IPO) was able to raise N16 
billion towards the N25 billion paid up capital requirement of the CBN during the 2005 
consolidation programme to make her one of the only 25 surviving banks in Nigeria at the 
time. Cross-River by 2007 further completed the acquisition of three undercapitalised to 
bring the bank to about 150 branches from 26 branches. Although CRB maintains a strong 
presence in Nigeria and it has only one international banking operation presence in the UK. 
(Source: company’s website/annual report).  
                                                 The Case of Delta Bank 
Delta bank was established in Nigeria in the 1990s, thus, regarded as one of the new 
generation banks. Delta has made significant inroads and impacts in the Nigeria banking 
space and beyond to become “one of Africa’s leading financial institutions” (CLS, 2016). 
Delta is a quoted company, and lists on the Nigeria Stock Exchange, and on the Global 
Depository Receipt on the London Stock Exchange. The bank emerged as one of the few 
survivors of the 2004/2005 consolidation of the CBN. In addition to its Nigeria operations, 
Delta bank also has banking operations in other countries including the UK, Tanzania, 
Ghana, Liberia, Kenya, Rwanda, Liberia, Uganda, Sierra Lone, Gambia, and Cote d’Ivore. 
Delta bank not only ranks among the top five commercial banks in Nigeria (cbn.ng.org) but 
also among Africa’s top most twenty-five banks and the top 1000 global banks (Financial 
Times). 
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                                           The Case of Ebonyi 
Ebonyi is one of the biggest banks in Nigeria. The bank was established in the 1990s as a 
commercial bank and commenced operation the same year. By mid 2000s, the bank became a 
public limited liability company (PLC) and was listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange the 
same year (Source, annual report, 2016). Ebonyi is listed on a non-capital raising Global 
Depository Receipts (GDRs) on the London Stock Exchange – one of the very few Nigeria 
banks to have achieved that. By 2015, Ebonyi was admitted into the Premium Board of the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (source: 2016 annual report). The bank ranks among the top three 
banks in Nigeria, Africa’s top twenty-five banks and named among Top 1000 global banks 
according to The Financial Times magazine in 2017.  Ebonyi boasts of over 500 branches 
across metropolitan centres, major towns and cities, all states and the federal capital territory, 
Abuja, Nigeria. Ebonyi prides in being the first Nigerian bank that was licensed for banking 
operations in the United Kingdom, and have since expanded her international presence and 
operations to other countries including Ghana, Sierra-Lone, Gambia, Dubai and country 
offices in South Africa and China (Source: Ebonyi press release statement and Website).  
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Appendix 4                                                    Interview Guide  
Participants Name 
Participants Position 
Participants Years of experience in the industry 
What does your role involve? 
Business Environment: 
1. How would you describe the structure of your management teams in terms of how you 
interact to achieve your goals? Who are those involved?  
2. What significant challenges have been facing regarding your banking business in Nigeria?  
Why?  
DMC and Strategic response/actions/changes  
3. How have you been responding to these challenges exactly? And why?  
4. Talking about (one recent/on-going innovation project or strategic initiative), describe the 
project/initiative, and the decision making process involved?  
5. How would you describe the senior/middle level management team contribution to the 
project/initiative? What were your (specific) roles in one project you were involved in?  
6. What other new business opportunities are you looking at? Why? How did it emerge? 
7. What resources do you consider most important? Why?  How do you ensure that you will 
continue to have those resources? 
How managers find balance between routine and DMC/decision making  
8. What internal sources of constraints have you had in your work in terms of your strategic 
decisions-making? Why? 
9. How do you manage such situations in order to make a better decision? Example? 
General question related to DMCs 
10. What other past experience did you have that became the basis of your decision for one 
strategic change? How did the experience, learning or understanding emerge?  
11. In summary, what do you consider as the key success factors in your organisation? Why?      
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                                                    Appendix 5 
Coding frame showing how banks responded in ways that reflecting asset orchestration 
                           Subcategory themes  
 
 
 Generic 
Category  
     Main category 
 
 Diversifying by focusing more on retail banking 
 Focusing more on value chain/MSME banking 
 Interest in sustainable business culture  
 Business Model 
modification  
 
 
 
 
 
Cultural 
Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asset 
Orchestration 
(AO)  
 Improvements on risk management 
 Changed lending practice 
 Focus on cost reduction  
 Using supportive technology   
 
Risk, and balance 
management   
 Creating new regions and divisions  
 Functional reorganising/restructuring  
 Implementing a flat structure  
 Promoting teamwork/collegiate system 
 
Governance 
structure and 
enabling culture  
 Introducing new products/business solutions 
 Quality customer service 
 Customer relationship improvement 
 Leveraging on digital banking    
 
Customer-centric  
banking culture 
 Rights issuing and equity investments seeking 
 Focusing on growing customer base/financial 
inclusion 
 Seeking new/alternative income lines  
 
Optimising 
financial capital 
base 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capacity 
Building 
  
 Investing in cutting-edge technologies  
 Upgrading core application 
 Creating a social media platform   
Technology 
infrastructure 
building  
 Hiring talents from non-banking background 
 Training/mentoring/motivating employees 
 Promoting continuous learning culture  
 Collaborating with Fintechs, Telcos, and agents 
 
Human Capacity 
building 
 Focusing on Africa/international expansion  
 Building an international brand and recognition  
 Untapped opportunities search  
 
Expansion and 
brand building  
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                          Appendix 6: The influence of Cognition and DMC  
 
 Subcategory themes Generic 
Category 
Main category 
 Nigeria’s huge population/ Africa/other 
countries  
 Abundance of unbanked MSMEs/people in 
Nigeria  
 Technology/digital banking as now/future of 
banking 
 
 
Opportunities 
recognition 
 
 
 
 
Perception  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Managerial 
Cognition to 
underpin 
DMC 
 Global attention shift from fossil fuel 
 Introduction of TSA 
 Shifting competition boundary 
 
Threats 
recognition  
 Government, and corporates as key income 
sources  
 Focusing on corporates (in risk asset creation)  
 Minimal interest in retail segment 
 
Attention  
Concentration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attention 
Diversity   
 
 
 Less concentration on oil income sources and 
government deposit 
 Focusing on neglected segments with good 
opportunities 
 Spreading attention across different sources for 
income, information, and ideas 
 Increasing global network/focus/inspiration   
 
 
Attention 
Diversity 
 Listening and being open-minded to diverse 
views/opinions 
 Engaging with employees at all levels 
 Looking for game changing ideas 
 
Collegiate 
system 
 
 
 
Communication 
practices  Self-belief  
 Organising ideas effectively  
 Convincing presentation to stakeholders    
 
Buying –in  
 Investment and commitments on capacity 
building   
 Investment on innovative business 
model/culture 
 Restructure/realigning operation                                                                                         
 Creating a diversified financial capital structure 
 
 
Innovation and 
Capacity 
building
( AO ) 
 
 
 
Problem-
solving 
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Appendix 7             Nigeria – Country profile and relevant facts 
 
                                Country Profile: Nigeria vs. UK 
 
 
Nigeria UK Comments/sources 
Region  
 
Africa Europe www.qqfs.com  
www.uneca.org/publications  
Capital  
 
Abuja London www.qqfs.com  
www.countryeconomy.com  
Classification 
of economy 
Emerging Developed  www.uneca.org/publications 
Population  190.8m as of 
July, 2017 
66.5m as at 
July 2018 
www.qqfs.com; WBG: 
www.data.worldbank.org  
www.countryeconomy.com/countries/nigeria
/  
Percentage of 
world 
population 
2.35% 
(2017) 
0.86% in 
(2017) 
www.qqfs.com; 
www.tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/populati
on  
 
Annual 
population 
growth  
   3.2% by 
2017 
0.6% in 
2017 
www.uneca.org/publications; NBS 
www.ons.gov.uk  
Average Life 
expectancy 
rate  
55/56 years 
(male/female
) as of 2016 
80/83 years 
(male/female
) as of 2016 
www.who.int/countries/nga/en/ 
www.who.int/countries/gbr/en/  
 
Illiteracy  
    0  
 
GDP 
$376.3 
(2017) 
$2.9 trillion www.data.worldbank.org  
www.countryeconomy.com/countries/nigeria  
GDP growth 
(annual %)  
-1.617% as 
of (2016) 
 www.data.worldbank.org  
GNI per capita 
in 2013 
$5360 $35,760 www.who.int/countries/nga/en/ 
www.who.int/countries/gbr/en/ 
Unemployme
nt rate 
24.3% in 
2014 
4% in 2017 www.tradingeconomics.com  
www.uneca.org/publications 
Currency Naira Pounds 
Sterling 
www.qqfs.com 
www.uneca.org/publications 
 
Economic 
Structure  
Agriculture 
23% of GDP 
Crude-oil 
11% to GDP 
but 93% of 
exports  
75% service 
  
www.uneca.org/publications 
National 
Language  
English; 
Hausa, Ibo, 
Yoruba 
English www.qqfs.com  
www.uneca.org/publications 
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Appendix 8: The Nigerian Banking Industry – History, developments, and key issues  
Banking and in particular commercial banking business in Nigeria predates 1900, however, 
there were no formal legislation governing operations until 1952 (Alford, 2010). British Bank 
of West Africa (BBWA) established in 1894 currently known as First Bank plc was the first 
banking institution that commenced banking operations in Nigeria, and Africa as well 
(www.firstbanknigeria.com). The BBWA was seconded by Barclays Bank in 1917 (also an 
expatriate bank) and thereafter, the emergence of what was the first indigenous bank, the 
National Bank of Nigeria 1933 (Alford, 2010). Other banks also followed suit and between 
1947 and 1952, Nigeria has had 25 banks, however, only 4 of them remained in business 
while the other 21 all failed (Alford, 2010). Alarmed by those failures, the Nigerian 
government began to regulate banking operations in the country following the passage of the 
1952 Act of parliament (Alford, 2010). The central bank Act of 1958 subsequently 
established the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) as an independent regulatory institution for 
banking business in Nigeria and the watchdog commenced full operations on 01 July 1959 
(www.cbn.gov.ng; Alford, 2010). Amendments have been made to the 1958 Act of 
parliament in 1991, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2007. The CBN Act of 2007 mandates the bank 
with the overall control, supervision, and administration of the monetary and financial sector 
policies in the Federal Republic of Nigeria (See details at www.cbn.gov.ng/aboutcbn/).    
At independence from Britain in 1960, and a republic soon after (i.e.1963), the 1960s and 
1970s saw the emergence of both expatriate and indigenous owned financial institutions 
(banks) in Nigeria. Another key development after the transition, however, was the 
promulgation of the Indigenous Enterprises Promotion Decrees of 1972 and 1977 that 
supported government ownership of significant interest in key institutions and sectors in the 
economy (Alford, 2010). Consequently, the government acquired 60% equity in expatriate 
banks including First Bank, United Bank for Africa and Union Bank and in fact dominated 
equity ownership of institutions in the industry except few until in the mid1980s (Ezeoha, 
2007; Alford, 2010). However, in 1986, as a prerequisite to borrow from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the then military government introduced the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) to reduce much of government regulation and tight control of the economy 
and thereby foster more economic liberalisation (Alford, 2010).   
As a result of SAP, and an easier requirement for banking license that followed, there was 
evidently a surge in the number of banks operating in Nigeria. Alford (2010) reckon that 
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between 1985 and 1992, the number of banks that operated in Nigeria rose from 40 to 120 
banks, to date, one of the highest numbers recorded in the industry history. At the time, the 
National Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) was also established to protect and insurance 
to depositors' funds. Since then, a number of more recent reforms and significant 
developments have also shaped the Nigerian banking industry. Discusses hereafter reflects on 
few relevant ones, three of which are core industry regulatory policies while the other is more 
generally reflects the politically induced policy of the FGN which is midwifed by and 
consistent with CBN agenda for robust and sustainable banking sector.  
Bank Reforms and Consolidation   
In the context of this study, Bank reforms generally refer to the Central Bank of Nigeria’s 
programme and effort at different times to reposition and facilitate sound banking system, 
and robustness of the nation’s economy. Speaking at the University of Warwick’s Economic 
Summit, in 2012, Lamido Sanusi, the former Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
explained “the concern to ensure a sound banking system by the Central Bank is underscored 
by the critical role of banks in national economic development. Banks, for instance, mobilizes 
savings for investment purposes, which further generates growth and employment. The real 
sector, which is the productive sector of the economy, relies heavily on the banking sector for 
credit. Government also raises funds through the banking system to finance its developmental 
programmes and strategic objectives. It is in view of these strategic roles of the banking 
system to national economic development that the issue of a sound banking system, through 
proactive reforms becomes imperative” (Sanusi, 2012:1).  
A significant step towards banking reforms in the Nigerian banking industry began in 2004 
through the then governor of the CBN Professor Charles Soludo’s consolidation programme. 
In particular, the consolidation programme represents a policy directive of the CBN which 
raised the minimum paid up capital (or capital requirement) from 2 billion naira to 25 billion 
naira (Sanusi, 2010). The thrust of the programme was based on the need for recapitalisation 
and strengthening of existing banks at the time to drive the growth of the real sectors of the 
country’s economy (Alford 2010; Sanusi, 2012). All 89 exiting banks at the time were urged 
to comply by the end of December 2005 (Alford, 2010). There are three key fallout of the 
consolidation policy which is necessary to the discussion here. First, it led to an important 
revelation, disclosure, and realisation of stakeholders about the extent of the vulnerable state 
of banks in Nigeria. The majority of those 89 banks were family-owned, having privately 
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held equity and exhibited questionable management practices (Alford, 2010; Ezeoha, 2007). 
According to Alford (2010:4), the “industry was fragmented into relatively small, weakly 
capitalised banks with most having paid in capital of US$10 million or less while the best 
capitalised banks at the time had US$240 million”. This was for the new CBN leadership a 
key concern, one that needed immediate steps to address, thus, raised the capital requirement. 
Secondly, in an attempt to meet the paid in capital requirement, the policy led to a number of 
mergers and acquisitions among banks. The impact of the policy and relative outcome of the 
mergers and acquisition was a sweeping reduction of the number of banks from 89 
commercial banks to 25 in 2005, later 24 (Sanusi, 2012) and currently 22 banks (cbn.gov.ng). 
Thirteen banks could not complete a negotiation for either merger or acquisition, and were 
unable to meet the December 2005 deadline and consequently had their operating license 
withdrawn (Ezeoha, 2007). Thirdly and on a positive note, was the key benefit of the policy 
which was the consolidation of banks to larger institutions. But notably, consolidation alone 
was not the ultimate solution to the problems of the industry as they were (Ezeoha, 2007) and 
not an end in itself (Sanusi, 2010). As such, Sanusi (2012) for instance reasoned that the 
unprecedented financial and economic crisis between 2007 and 2009 which led to global 
recession and the second round effect of the crisis on the Nigerian institutions and economy 
underscores the imperative of the CBN on behalf of the government of Nigeria to embark on 
banking reforms on a regular basis.    
Holistic Investigation of Nigerian Banks 
To support the consolidation effort and achievement of Soludo’s administration, in 2009, the 
CBN under the leadership of Mallam Lamido Sanusi established a panel to further conduct a 
holistic investigation of the 24 surviving banks out the 25 post consolidation in 2005 to 
determine their solvency (Sanusi, 2012). The outcome of the investigation revealed that while 
some banks in the industry are financially sound, however, not less than 8 out of the 24 banks 
were technically insolvent (Alford, 2010). In particular, it was determined that the average 
percentage of Non-Performing Loan (NPL) in those 8 banks averaged about 40.81% and with 
those banks holding over 30% of total customers deposit in the industry, it represented 
significant systemic risk (Alford, 2010) to the nation’s economy. Through proactive actions, 
those eight banks were quickly rescued by the CBN through capital and liquidity injection of 
620 billion naira (Sanusi, 2010), after sacking and replacement of their top management and 
consequent prosecution of those who were identified to have committed infractions (Sanusi, 
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2012). Of course with less confidence of stakeholder, the CBN thereafter in a press statement 
declared “we have come to the end of the first phase of the process of restoring the financial 
sector stability” (CBN press statement cited in Alford, 2010:7).  
More details as to what went wrong show that the relatively huge capital bases of banks after 
2004/2005 consolidation, coupled with pressure  to deliver substantial returns to shareholders 
fuelled reckless lending decisions, corruption and unethical practices at the board and 
executive management levels (Alford, 2010; Sanusi, 2010; Ezeoha, 2011) in many banks.  
Sanusi (2012) more succinctly captures the eight interrelated factors uncovered by that 
holistic investigation which he argued to have nearly collapsed the Nigerian financial system. 
In short, those findings prompted new reforms that focused on strict enforcement of corporate 
governance principles in banking, risk-focused and rule-based framework, greater 
transparency and expeditious process of rendition of reports/results (Sanusi, 2012). The 
succeeding sections will discuss a number of specific reforms that followed. 
 Corporate Governance and financial reporting 
Another aspect of the CBN’s key reforms recently was with respect to limiting the tenure of 
Banks CEOs to a maximum of ten years – a policy that the CBN enforced with retrospective 
effect. The policy also required that CEOs that have served their bank for more than ten years 
should resign at the latest by 31 July 2010 (Alford, 2010). Infractions traced to the leadership 
of those rescued banks made it necessary and a policy decision to protect the general public. 
The clear intent of the policy was to enhance corporate governance by preventing bank 
executives from what was considered as “sit-tight syndrome” and managing their banks as 
personal/private equity rather than publicly held institutions accountable to depositors, 
shareholders, the general public and government regulators (Alford, 2010). Despite mixed 
reaction which trailed the policy, this study also observed that Bank CEOs in the industry are 
now limited to a five year tenure in office, renewable only for another five years maximum.       
Replacing the universal banking model with mono licensing regime  
Until 2010, banks in Nigeria operated on what the CBN referred to as a universal banking 
model (UB) which allowed banks to diversify into non-bank financial businesses e.g. 
insurance (Sanusi, 2012). However, after the 2005 consolidation programme, the CBN 
observed that banks were awash with huge capital and that some operators were abusing the 
objectives of the model to the detriment of the core banking business (Sanusi, 2012). To 
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address that fallout, the CBN reviewed and replaced the UB by issuing banks with a mono 
license, which authorises banks to focus on core banking operations only. Under the mono 
license banking regime, banks, for example, can only operate either (a) commercial banking 
(b) merchant (investment) banking (c) specialised banking e.g. microfinance, mortgage or 
non-interest banking, and (d) developmental finance institutions e.g. Agric bank. In short, the 
clear intent of replacing the UB model with the new model (or mono licensing model) was to 
encourage banks to focus on their core banking only (Sanusi, 2010; 2012) – a directive this 
study also confirms is now fully complied with by all banks in Nigeria.  
Creation of AMCON 
The Assets Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) was established on July 19, 2010, 
following the promulgation of the enabling Act of the parliament (amcon.com.ng).  The 
creation of AMCON was in response to the CBN finding from its investigation in 2009, to 
serve as a special purpose vehicle for addressing concerns over the ratio of non-performing 
loans (NPLs) in the industry and its effects on the liquidity of many banks (Sanusi, 2012). 
The stated mission of AMCON is to “positively impact and improve the economy of Nigeria 
by 1) complementing the recapitalisation of the affected Nigerian banks, 2) providing the 
opportunity for banks to sell off non-performing loans, 3) freeing up valuable resources and 
enabling banks to focus on their key activities, and 4) to propel the lending ideology in banks 
again” (amcon.com.ng). Pursuant to this ‘mission’ AMCON is said to have acquired non-
performing risk assets worth about 1.7 trillion naira from the 8 insolvent banks; through that 
rescued the ailing banks, and averted what would have been another incident of bank failures 
in the country (Sanusi, 2012). Having also weaned the banks from the CBN support, 
consideration of the regulatory body entails that the banks are relatively strong enough to 
contribute to the real sector of the economy but until the recent crash in the price of crude oil.  
Introduction of Treasury Single Account (TSA) 
The central bank of Nigeria (CBN) introduced the Treasury Single Account (TSA) in 2015 as 
a cardinal policy of the Federal government and Buhari led Administration aim to ensure 
greater public sector revenue accountability, transparency and fight against corruption. The 
policy refers to the Federal government directives to all Ministries, Departments, and 
Agencies (MDAs) to move their accounts from banks to CBN (Central Bank of Nigeria 
Annual report, 2015; cbn.gov.ng, 2016). For bankers, the TSA policy had significant 
implications for them in terms of liquidity and operating capital as they had obligation to 
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comply with the directives before the set September 2015 deadline (Central Bank of Nigeria 
Annual report, 2015) and under an environment already challenged by other macroeconomic 
meltdown (IMF). As earlier stated, before then, Nigerian banks not only enjoyed and relied 
mostly on huge revenues from crude oil both from MNEs and IOCs but also had in their 
books the public sector institutions as their highest depositors. In fact, it is also evident that 
most banks in Nigeria operated public sector banking as a substantive directorate.   
A CBN circular dated 12th November 2015 nearly 2 months after the set deadline, cited by 
this study, is indicative of the difficult it was for banks to comply with the policy hence, a 
note of warning in the letter of severe penalties for any further delays and non-compliance. 
As of 2016 during the primary data collection by this research, comments by participants 
generally affirm that banks have fully complied with the policy. All banks examined by this 
research after the TSA policy came into force, through interviews, press releases and in their 
annual reports differently expressed sentiments on the adverse effects of the policy especially 
on the quality of and asset side of their balance sheet. However, there also claims to have 
largely navigated through the negative effects of these reforms to emerge stronger. 
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Appendix 9 – TSA Implementation Circular  
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Appendix 10: CBN Unified Accounting Year Circular  
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